ovpn: prevent UAF re-add to by_transp_addr on float-vs-delete race
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 ovpn: prevent UAF re-add to by_transp_addr on float-vs-delete race
ovpn_peer_endpoints_update() reacts to a data-channel "float" (a peer's packets arriving from a new source transport address) by first committing the new endpoint under peer->lock, then dropping peer->lock, and only afterwards re-acquiring peer->ovpn->lock and peer->lock to rehash the peer into peers->by_transp_addr:
spin_unlock_bh(&peer->lock);
ovpn_nl_peer_float_notify(peer, &ss);
if (peer->ovpn->mode == OVPN_MODE_MP) {
spin_lock_bh(&peer->ovpn->lock);
spin_lock_bh(&peer->lock);
bind = rcu_dereference_protected(peer->bind, ...);
if (unlikely(!bind)) {
... return;
}
...
hlist_nulls_del_init_rcu(&peer->hash_entry_transp_addr);
nhead = ovpn_get_hash_head(peer->ovpn->peers->by_transp_addr, ...);
hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(&peer->hash_entry_transp_addr, nhead);
...
}Between the spin_unlock_bh(&peer->lock) and the re-acquire of peer->ovpn->lock, this thread holds *no* lock on the peer at all. If an OVPN_CMD_PEER_DEL arrives in that window, ovpn_peer_remove() (which only requires peer->ovpn->lock) runs to completion: it unhashes the peer from every table, including by_transp_addr, and queues it on the release list. peer->bind is only cleared much later, when the peer is actually released, so the
"if (unlikely(!bind))" check performed after re-acquiring the locks does *not* observe that the peer has already been removed. ovpn_peer_endpoints_update() then proceeds to unconditionally re-add hash_entry_transp_addr, resurrecting the already-removed peer in the by_transp_addr hash table. Because ovpn_peer_remove() itself guards against a double remove with
"if (hlist_unhashed(&peer->hash_entry_id)) return;", nothing ever unhashes the peer a second time. Once the in-flight RX packet that triggered the float drops its reference and the refcount reaches zero, the peer is kfree()'d via RCU while still linked in by_transp_addr. The next matching lookup in ovpn_peer_get_by_transp_addr() walks that bucket and calls ovpn_peer_transp_match(), dereferencing the freed peer's ->bind *before* ovpn_peer_hold() is attempted -- a slab-use-after-free read on the RX softirq path, runtime-confirmed under KASAN (715 independent "slab-use-after-free in ovpn_peer_get_by_transp_addr" reports, kmalloc-1k / struct ovpn_peer, freed by the RCU callback, read from udp_queue_rcv_one_skb -> ovpn_udp_encap_recv -> ovpn_peer_get_by_transp_addr).
Fix it the same way ovpn_peer_remove() protects itself against a racing double-remove: after re-acquiring peer->ovpn->lock, check hlist_unhashed(&peer->hash_entry_id) before touching hash_entry_transp_addr. ovpn_peer_remove() only mutates the peer's hashtable membership while holding peer->ovpn->lock, and this check is performed while we hold that same lock, so the observation is
race-free: either the remove has already happened and hash_entry_id is unhashed (in which case we must not resurrect the peer and simply return), or it has not happened yet and cannot happen until we release peer->ovpn->lock (by which point the rehash under this lock has already completed). This mirrors the existing double-remove idiom in ovpn_peer_remove() (drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c) rather than introducing a new locking primitive.
This is a minimal, targeted fix for the float-vs-delete race; it does not attempt to shrink the lock-free window itself (peer->lock is still dropped around ovpn_nl_peer_float_notify()), only to stop the rehash path from acting on a peer it can no longer safely assume is still part of the peer tables.
Runtime-verified on a v6.19 KASAN-instrumented kernel: a reproducer that races authenticated-peer float traffic against a concurrent OVPN_CMD_PEER_DEL reliably trips a KASAN slab-use-after-free read in ovpn_peer_get_by_transp_addr() before this fix, and the same reproducer no longer triggers it once this fix is applied.
--- drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c +22 -0
@@ -307,6 +307,28 @@ void ovpn_peer_endpoints_update(struct ovpn_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb)return ; } +/* Guard against a peer that was concurrently removed (e.g. +* OVPN_CMD_PEER_DEL -> ovpn_peer_remove()) while we held neither +* peer->lock nor ovpn->lock, i.e. in the window opened by the +* spin_unlock_bh(&peer->lock) above. ovpn_peer_remove() only +* unhashes the peer and queues it for release: peer->bind is +* not cleared until the peer is actually released, so the +* !bind check we just did above does not catch this case. +* Blindly re-adding hash_entry_transp_addr below would +* resurrect an already-removed (and soon to be freed) peer in +* the by_transp_addr table, causing a use-after-free the next +* time that table is walked. Reuse the same +* hlist_unhashed(&peer->hash_entry_id) test ovpn_peer_remove() +* itself uses to detect a duplicate removal: ovpn->lock is +* held here too, so this observation is race-free with any +* in-flight or future removal. +*/ +if (unlikely (hlist_unhashed (&peer->hash_entry_id))) { +spin_unlock_bh (&peer->lock); +spin_unlock_bh (&peer->ovpn->lock); +return ; + } +/* This function may be invoked concurrently, therefore another * float may have happened in parallel: perform rehashing * using the peer->bind->remote directly as key
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
Antonio Quartulli
maintainerHi there,
On 09/07/2026 00:46, Ibrahim Hashimov wrote:
[...]
Quoted 4 lines
Fixes f0281c1d3732 ("ovpn: add support for updating local or remote UDP endpoint")Signed-off-by Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]>Assisted-by AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Sorry for the delay in getting back to you.
We already have a fix for this bug that is queued for being sent to net.
You can find it here:
https://github.com/OpenVPN/ovpn-net-next/commit/beb427921aafd186eb139349bf04c6d54a4927f5
I was caught by Sashiko's fire and therefore had hard time sending all the fixes in my queue, but I am getting there.
If you want, please check the patch at the link above.
Thanks a lot.
Best Regards,
Signature · 2 lines
Antonio Quartulli OpenVPN Inc.
Thanks for the pointer, and no worries about the delay. That commit is the same fix -- please drop mine, I'll drop it on my side. Thanks for handling it.
Ibrahim