Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks
Subsystems (2)
Harald Freudenberger
maintainerv3 cover Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks
Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA and EP11 (AP message type 6) messages. The verification code related to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially length fields at message replies.
Changelog:
v1 - initial patch
v2 - fixed typo in header check_for_overflow -> check_add_overflow. v3 - rephrased and smoothed subject and text of the patch. It is now
"s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks" and the text does not talk about malicious cards any more. Updated Reviewed-by tags
Harald Freudenberger (1):
s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Harald Freudenberger
maintainerPATCH v3 1/1 s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks
Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA and EP11 (AP message type 6) messages. The verification code related to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially length fields at message replies.
The 3 hunks of this patch deal with CCA, EP11 and (CCA) RNG replies and improve the checking for reply buffer size by using size_t instead of int and the check_add_overflow() function. For RNG replies an additional check makes sure the hard coded limit of the data buffer is not exceeded.
--- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +32 -7
@@ -691,6 +691,13 @@ static int convert_type86_rng(struct zcrypt_queue *zq,if (msg->cprbx.ccp_rtcode !=0 || msg->cprbx.ccp_rscode !=0 )return -EINVAL ; +/* +* Note that offset2 and count2 have already been checked in +* zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(). So only check for not exceeding +* the hard coded rng buffer size. +*/ +if (msg->fmt2.count2 >ZCRYPT_RNG_BUFFER_SIZE ) +return -EMSGSIZE ;memcpy (buffer, data + msg->fmt2.offset2, msg->fmt2.count2);return msg->fmt2.count2; }
@@ -853,7 +860,7 @@ static void zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(struct ap_queue *aq, };struct ap_response_type *resp_type = &msg->response;struct type86x_reply *t86r; -int len; +size_t len;/* Copy the reply message to the request message buffer. */ if (!reply)
@@ -874,10 +881,23 @@ static void zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(struct ap_queue *aq, msg->len = len;break ;case CEXXC_RESPONSE_TYPE_XCRB : -if (t86r->fmt2.count2) - len = t86r->fmt2.offset2 + t86r->fmt2.count2; -else - len = t86r->fmt2.offset1 + t86r->fmt2.count1; +if (t86r->fmt2.count2) { +if (check_add_overflow (t86r->fmt2.offset2, + t86r->fmt2.count2, + &len)) { +pr_debug ("len overflow => EMSGSIZE\n" ); + msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE ; + goto out; + } + }else { +if (check_add_overflow (t86r->fmt2.offset1, + t86r->fmt2.count1, + &len)) { +pr_debug ("len overflow => EMSGSIZE\n" ); + msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE ; + goto out; + } + }if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize || len != reply->len) {pr_debug ("len mismatch => EMSGSIZE\n" );
@@ -917,7 +937,7 @@ static void zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(struct ap_queue *aq, };struct ap_response_type *resp_type = &msg->response;struct type86_ep11_reply *t86r; -int len; +size_t len;/* Copy the reply message to the request message buffer. */ if (!reply)
@@ -927,7 +947,12 @@ static void zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(struct ap_queue *aq, t86r->cprbx.cprb_ver_id == 0x04) {switch (resp_type->type) {case CEXXC_RESPONSE_TYPE_EP11 : - len = t86r->fmt2.offset1 + t86r->fmt2.count1; +if (check_add_overflow (t86r->fmt2.offset1, + t86r->fmt2.count1, &len)) { +pr_debug ("len overflow => EMSGSIZE\n" ); + msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE ; + goto out; + }if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize || len != reply->len) {pr_debug ("len mismatch => EMSGSIZE\n" );
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH v3 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [Low] The check_add_overflow() error paths are mathematically unreachable because 32-bit operands cannot overflow a 64-bit size_t destination.
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Unvalidated offset1 and count1 fields in zcrypt_msgtype6_receive() lead to a kernel memory leak in convert_type86_xcrb() when count2 != 0. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v3 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks --- commit b96e9311c01803c5c1f3023f735aa7268d688c81
Author: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
s390/zcrypt: Improve zcrypt reply message verification checks
This commit adds and improves checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes in the handling of replies from crypto cards for CCA and EP11 messages. It changes length variables from int to size_t and adds overflow checks to inspect length fields more closely.
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c static void zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(struct ap_queue *aq, · line 887
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +4
-4@@ -874,10 +881,23 @@ static void zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(struct ap_queue *aq, msg->len = len;break ;case CEXXC_RESPONSE_TYPE_XCRB : -if (t86r->fmt2.count2) - len = t86r->fmt2.offset2 + t86r->fmt2.count2; -else - len = t86r->fmt2.offset1 + t86r->fmt2.count1; +if (t86r->fmt2.count2) { +if (check_add_overflow (t86r->fmt2.offset2, + t86r->fmt2.count2, + &len)) {
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this conditional validation leave offset1 and count1 unchecked when count2 is non-zero?
If the hardware or firmware returns a malformed XCRB reply with a non-zero count2, only offset2 and count2 are validated here against the buffer bounds.
However, convert_type86_xcrb() appears to unconditionally copy count1 bytes from offset1 to userspace without validating if they remain within the bounds of the reply message:
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c:convert_type86_xcrb() {
...
if (z_copy_to_user(userspace, xcrb->reply_control_blk_addr,
data + msg->fmt2.offset1, msg->fmt2.count1))
return -EFAULT;
...
}Can this lead to an out-of-bounds memory read and an information leak to userspace?
[Severity: Low]
Is this check_add_overflow() mathematically reachable?
Since len was changed to a size_t, which is strictly 64-bit on the s390x architecture, and the offset and count variables are 32-bit unsigned integers, their sum can never overflow the 64-bit destination.
Does this make the overflow check always evaluate to false and the error branch dead code?
Quoted 16 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +13
-0+pr_debug ("len overflow => EMSGSIZE\n" ); + msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE ; + goto out; + } + }else { +if (check_add_overflow (t86r->fmt2.offset1, + t86r->fmt2.count1, + &len)) { +pr_debug ("len overflow => EMSGSIZE\n" ); + msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE ; + goto out; + } + }if (len > reply->bufsize || len > msg->bufsize || len != reply->len) {pr_debug ("len mismatch => EMSGSIZE\n" );
[ ... ]
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c static void zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(struct ap_queue *aq, · line 951
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +2
-1@@ -927,7 +947,12 @@ static void zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(struct ap_queue *aq, t86r->cprbx.cprb_ver_id == 0x04) {switch (resp_type->type) {case CEXXC_RESPONSE_TYPE_EP11 : - len = t86r->fmt2.offset1 + t86r->fmt2.count1; +if (check_add_overflow (t86r->fmt2.offset1, + t86r->fmt2.count1, &len)) {
[Severity: Low]
Is this check_add_overflow() also mathematically unreachable for the same reasons mentioned above?
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_msgtype6.c +4
-0+pr_debug ("len overflow => EMSGSIZE\n" ); + msg->rc = -EMSGSIZE ; + goto out; + }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1