ovl: check access to copy_file_range source with src mounter creds
Subsystems (2)
Amir Goldstein
maintainerPATCH 1/1 ovl: check access to copy_file_range source with src mounter creds
Commit 5dae222a5ff0c ("vfs: allow copy_file_range to copy across devices") allowed filesystems that implement the copy_file_range() f_op to decide if they want to access cross-sb copy from/to the same fs type.
The same commit added checks to verify same sb copy for filesystems that implement ->copy_file_range() and do not support cross-sb copy at the time, namely, to ceph, fuse and nfs.
The two remaining fs which implement ->copy_file_range(), cifs and overlayfs started to support cross-sb copy from this time.
While overlayfs does support cross-sb copy when the two underlying files are on the same base fs, the copy operation on the two real files from two different overalyfs filesystems is performed with the mounter creds of the destination overlayfs and the read permission access hook for the source file was called with the wrong creds.
This could cause either deny of access to copy which would otherwise be allowed (e.g. with splice) or allow read access to file which would otherwise be denied.
Fix the latter case by explicitly verifying read access to source file with the source overlayfs mounter creds.
The former case remains a quirk of cross-sb overlayfs copy, but userspace could fall back to regular copy so no harm done.
---
Christian,
I am no longer surprised finding more things that are wrong with copy_file_range().
I have a feeling this is not the last time either.
Thanks,
Amir.
fs/overlayfs/file.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/overlayfs/file.c +15 -1
@@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, struct file *file_out, loff_t pos_out, loff_t len, unsigned int flags, enum ovl_copyop op) { + struct inode *inode_in = file_inode(file_in);struct inode *inode_out =file_inode (file_out);struct file *realfile_in, *realfile_out;loff_t ret;
@@ -551,7 +552,20 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,if (IS_ERR (realfile_in)) goto out_unlock; - with_ovl_creds(file_inode(file_out)->i_sb) { +/* +* For cross-sb copy, vfs_copy_file_range() will verify read access with +* the mounter creds of the dest fs mounter, so we need to explicitly +* verify read access with the source mounter creds. +*/ +if (unlikely (inode_in->i_sb != inode_out->i_sb)) { + with_ovl_creds(inode_in->i_sb) { + ret =rw_verify_area (READ , realfile_in, &pos_in, len); +if (unlikely (ret)) + goto out_unlock; + } + } + + with_ovl_creds(inode_out->i_sb) {switch (op) {case OVL_COPY : ret = vfs_copy_file_range(realfile_in, pos_in,
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Quoted 1 line · Amir Goldstein
ovl: check access to
copy_file_rangesource with src mounter creds
Applied to the vfs.fixes branch of the vfs/vfs.git tree. Patches in the vfs.fixes branch should appear in linux-next soon.
Please report any outstanding bugs that were missed during review in a new review to the original patch series allowing us to drop it.
It's encouraged to provide Acked-bys and Reviewed-bys even though the patch has now been applied. If possible patch trailers will be updated.
Note that commit hashes shown below are subject to change due to rebase, trailer updates or similar. If in doubt, please check the listed branch.
tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs.git branch: vfs.fixes
[1/1] ovl: check access to copy_file_range source with src mounter creds
https://git.kernel.org/vfs/vfs/c/bf681e326de0