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rsync: Fix multiple CVEs

PATCH Superseded Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) 1 participant 14 messages Jul 17

v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover rsync: Fix multiple CVEs

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

Backport the upstream rsync security fixes for CVE-2026-29518, CVE-2026-43617, CVE-2026-43618, CVE-2026-43619, CVE-2026-43620, and CVE-2026-45232 to Wrynose.

Changes in v2:
- Updated the CVE-2026-43619 backport to restore the upstream commit description and explanatory comments for the openat2/Android fallback handling.
- Clarified the Wrynose-specific Backport Changes metadata.
- No functional changes were made to the other five CVE patches.

Ashishkumar Parmar (6):
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-29518
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43619
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43618
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43620
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43617
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-45232

Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/6 rsync: Fix CVE-2026-29518

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch backports the upstream rsync v3.4.3 security fix train for CVE-2026-29518. The direct CVE fixes are [3] and [4]:

- [3] enables secure_relative_open() for daemon modules running with "use chroot = no", closing the receiver-side basis-file TOCTOU.
- [4] routes the sender read path through secure_relative_open() from the trusted module root, closing the matching sender-side TOCTOU.

This patch also carries [1] and [2] from the same upstream v3.4.3 security/update train. These are supporting secure_relative_open() changes, not standalone direct CVE fixes: [1] uses Linux openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) to preserve the same confinement while allowing legitimate in-tree symlinks, fixing upstream issue #715; [2] adds the equivalent FreeBSD/macOS O_RESOLVE_BENEATH path. Debian's rsync 3.4.1+ds1-5+deb13u3 security update also carries these commits before the direct CVE-2026-29518 commits.

The upstream fixed release is referenced in [5], and the public CVE record is referenced in [6]. Individual backported commit links are also recorded in the embedded patch headers.

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/4fa7156ccdb2ad34b034d18fe2fd6cd79adef8a1
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/7f60ec001a0be63b770707ec8b829524c3809a43
[3] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/f1c24ab03bc85cb2638a569faa60216582fb6c5d
[4] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/859d44fa4f1420775e4ba050337ef32092f2894c
[5] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/releases/tag/v3.4.3
[6] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-29518

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p1.patch       | 392 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p2.patch       |  98 +++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p3.patch       | 328 +++++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p4.patch       |  71 ++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |   4 +
 5 files changed, 893 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p4.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p1.patch new file +392 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fcb7b777fe
@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+From e7b575413b962ac042079a55530577b20c7eee44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 08:39:22 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] syscall: use openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) on Linux for
+ secure_relative_open
+
+The CVE fix in commit c35e283 made secure_relative_open() walk every
+component of relpath with O_NOFOLLOW. That blocks every symlink in the
+path, which is stricter than the threat model required: legitimate
+directory symlinks within the destination tree (e.g. when using -K /
+--copy-dirlinks) are also rejected, breaking delta transfers with
+"failed verification -- update discarded".  See issue #715.
+
+On Linux 5.6+, openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH | RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS) gives
+us exactly what we want: the kernel rejects any resolution that would
+escape the starting directory (via "..", absolute paths, or symlinks
+pointing outside dirfd) while still following symlinks that resolve
+within it. /proc magic-links are blocked too.
+
+Use openat2 first; fall back to the existing per-component O_NOFOLLOW
+walk on ENOSYS (kernel < 5.6). The lexical "../" checks at the head
+of the function are kept as defense in depth. The Linux gate is
+plain #ifdef __linux__: the runtime ENOSYS fallback covers the only
+case that actually matters (header present + old kernel), and any
+Linux build environment without linux/openat2.h will fail with a
+clear "no such file" error rather than silently disabling the
+protection.
+
+Verified manually that openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) blocks all four
+escape patterns (absolute symlink, ../ symlink, lexical .., absolute
+path) while allowing direct and within-tree symlinks. The new
+testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test (taken from PR #864 by Samuel
+Henrique) exercises the issue #715 regression and passes; full
+make check passes 47/47.
+
+Test: testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test (8 scenarios)
+Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/715
+
+Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-29518
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/4fa7156ccdb2ad34b034d18fe2fd6cd79adef8a1]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 4fa7156ccdb2ad34b034d18fe2fd6cd79adef8a1)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ syscall.c                            |  62 ++++++-
+ testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test | 247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 304 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100755 testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test
+
+diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c
+index 34a9bba0..d66c9fdd 100644
+--- a/syscall.c
++++ b/syscall.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
+ #include <sys/syscall.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef __linux__
++#include <sys/syscall.h>
++#include <linux/openat2.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include "ifuncs.h"
+ 
+ extern int dry_run;
+@@ -715,12 +720,49 @@ int do_open_nofollow(const char *pathname, int flags)
+ /*
+   open a file relative to a base directory. The basedir can be NULL,
+   in which case the current working directory is used. The relpath
+-  must be a relative path, and the relpath must not contain any
+-  elements in the path which follow symlinks (ie. like O_NOFOLLOW, but
+-  applies to all path components, not just the last component)
+-
+-  The relpath must also not contain any ../ elements in the path
++  must be a relative path. The kernel must guarantee that resolution
++  cannot escape basedir (or the cwd, when basedir is NULL): no ".."
++  jumps above the start, no symlinks pointing outside, no absolute
++  paths, no /proc magic-link tricks.
++
++  Symlinks *within* basedir are followed normally — earlier rsync
++  versions rejected every symlink with O_NOFOLLOW on each component,
++  which broke legitimate directory symlinks on the receiver side
++  (https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/715). The escape
++  prevention is handled by the kernel via openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH)
++  on Linux 5.6+; older systems fall back to the per-component
++  O_NOFOLLOW walk below.
++
++  The relpath must also not contain any ../ elements in the path.
+ */
++
++#ifdef __linux__
++static int secure_relative_open_linux(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode)
++{
++	struct open_how how;
++	int dirfd, retfd;
++
++	memset(&how, 0, sizeof how);
++	how.flags = flags;
++	how.mode = mode;
++	how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH | RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS;
++
++	if (basedir == NULL) {
++		dirfd = AT_FDCWD;
++	} else {
++		dirfd = openat(AT_FDCWD, basedir, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
++		if (dirfd == -1)
++			return -1;
++	}
++
++	retfd = syscall(SYS_openat2, dirfd, relpath, &how, sizeof how);
++
++	if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD)
++		close(dirfd);
++	return retfd;
++}
++#endif
++
+ int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode)
+ {
+ 	if (!relpath || relpath[0] == '/') {
+@@ -734,6 +776,16 @@ int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mo
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef __linux__
++	{
++		int fd = secure_relative_open_linux(basedir, relpath, flags, mode);
++		/* ENOSYS = kernel < 5.6 doesn't have the syscall even though
++		 * glibc/kernel-headers do; fall through to the portable path. */
++		if (fd != -1 || errno != ENOSYS)
++			return fd;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ #if !defined(O_NOFOLLOW) || !defined(O_DIRECTORY) || !defined(AT_FDCWD)
+ 	// really old system, all we can do is live with the risks
+ 	if (!basedir) {
+diff --git a/testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test b/testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test
+new file mode 100755
+index 00000000..9065dd81
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test
+@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++# Test that updating a file through a directory symlink works when using
++# -K (--copy-dirlinks). This is a regression test for:
++#   https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/715
++#
++# The CVE fix in commit c35e283 introduced secure_relative_open() which
++# uses O_NOFOLLOW on all path components, breaking legitimate directory
++# symlinks on the receiver side. The fix splits the path into basedir
++# (dirname, symlinks followed) and basename (O_NOFOLLOW) so that
++# directory symlinks are traversed while the final file component is
++# still protected.
++#
++# The regression only manifests when delta matching is triggered (i.e.,
++# the sender finds matching blocks in the old file). Small files with
++# completely different content are transferred in full and don't trigger
++# the bug. We use a large file with a small modification to ensure
++# delta transfer is used.
++#
++# In addition to the original regression, this test covers edge cases
++# in the fix itself:
++#   - --backup with directory symlinks (finish_transfer pointer identity)
++#   - --partial-dir with protocol < 29 (fnamecmp != partialptr guard)
++#   - --inplace with directory symlinks (updating_basis_or_equiv check)
++#   - Files without a dirname (top-level files, no split needed)
++
++. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
++
++RSYNC_RSH="$scratchdir/src/support/lsh.sh"
++export RSYNC_RSH
++
++# $HOME is set to $scratchdir by rsync.fns
++# localhost: destination will cd to $HOME (i.e., $scratchdir)
++
++# Helper: create a large file suitable for delta transfers.
++# ~32KB is large enough for rsync's block matching to find matches.
++make_testfile() {
++    dd if=/dev/urandom of="$1" bs=1024 count=32 2>/dev/null \
++	|| test_fail "failed to create test file $1"
++}
++
++# Set up source tree
++srcbase="$tmpdir/src"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 1: Basic directory symlink update (the original issue #715)
++######################################################################
++
++mkdir -p "$HOME/real-dir"
++ln -s real-dir "$HOME/dir"
++
++mkdir -p "$srcbase/dir"
++make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++# First transfer (initial): should create the file through the symlink
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 1: initial transfer failed"
++
++if [ ! -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" ]; then
++    test_fail "test 1: initial transfer did not create file through symlink"
++fi
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 1: initial transfer content mismatch"
++
++# Small modification to trigger delta transfer
++echo "appended update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++# Second transfer (update): was failing with "failed verification"
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 1: update through directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 1: update transfer content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 2: Compression (-z) as in the original reproducer
++######################################################################
++
++echo "another line" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptzv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 2: compressed update through directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 2: compressed update content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 3: Nested directory symlinks (nested/sub/data.txt where
++#          "nested" is a symlink to "nested_real")
++######################################################################
++
++mkdir -p "$HOME/nested_real/sub"
++ln -s nested_real "$HOME/nested"
++
++mkdir -p "$srcbase/nested/sub"
++make_testfile "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" nested/sub/data.txt localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 3: initial nested transfer failed"
++
++echo "appended nested" >> "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" nested/sub/data.txt localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 3: update through nested directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt" "$HOME/nested_real/sub/data.txt" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 3: nested update content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 4: --backup with directory symlinks
++#
++# Exercises the finish_transfer() "fnamecmp == fname" pointer
++# comparison that determines whether to update fnamecmp to the
++# backup name. If broken, --backup would reference a renamed file
++# for xattr handling.
++######################################################################
++
++# Reset destination
++rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file~"
++
++make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 4: initial transfer for backup test failed"
++
++echo "backup update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --backup --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 4: update with --backup through directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 4: backup update content mismatch"
++
++if [ ! -f "$HOME/real-dir/file~" ]; then
++    test_fail "test 4: backup file was not created"
++fi
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 5: --inplace with directory symlinks
++#
++# Exercises the updating_basis_or_equiv check which uses
++# "fnamecmp == fname". With --inplace, rsync writes directly to
++# the destination file instead of a temp file.
++######################################################################
++
++rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file~"
++
++make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --inplace --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 5: initial inplace transfer failed"
++
++echo "inplace update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --inplace --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 5: inplace update through directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 5: inplace update content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 6: Top-level file (no dirname, no split needed)
++#
++# Ensures the dirname/basename split is not attempted for files
++# at the top level (file->dirname is NULL).
++######################################################################
++
++make_testfile "$srcbase/topfile"
++mkdir -p "$HOME"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -Rlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" topfile localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 6: initial top-level transfer failed"
++
++echo "toplevel update" >> "$srcbase/topfile"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/topfile"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -Rlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" topfile localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 6: top-level update failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/topfile" "$HOME/topfile" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 6: top-level update content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 7: --partial-dir with protocol < 29
++#
++# For protocol < 29, fnamecmp_type stays FNAMECMP_FNAME even when
++# fnamecmp is set to partialptr. The dirname/basename split must
++# NOT trigger in this case (guarded by "fnamecmp == fname").
++######################################################################
++
++rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file"
++make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 --partial-dir=.rsync-partial \
++    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 7: initial proto28 partial-dir transfer failed"
++
++echo "partial-dir update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 --partial-dir=.rsync-partial \
++    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 7: proto28 partial-dir update through dirlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 7: proto28 partial-dir update content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 8: Protocol < 29 basic directory symlink update
++#
++# Exercises the protocol < 29 code path and its fallback logic
++# (clearing basedir on retry).
++######################################################################
++
++rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file"
++make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 \
++    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 8: initial proto28 transfer failed"
++
++echo "proto28 update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 \
++    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 8: proto28 update through directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 8: proto28 update content mismatch"
++
++# The script would have aborted on error, so getting here means we've won.
++exit 0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p2.patch new file +98 -0

98 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p3.patch new file +328 -0

328 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p4.patch new file +71 -0

71 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb +4 -0
index 509be486b8..e2fe0128d5 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://determism.patch \
            file://0001-Add-missing-prototypes-to-function-declarations.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-10158.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-29518_p1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-29518_p2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-29518_p3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-29518_p4.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2924bcb3a1ed8b551fc101f740b9f0fe0a202b115027647cf69850d65fd88c52"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#2 lore raw

Re: [wrynose][PATCH v2 1/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-29518

Hi,

Please ignore this patch series. I will send corrected patches again.

Regards,
Ashish.

________________________________
From: Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Sent: 17 July 2026 10:50
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: Ashishkumar Parmar -X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Subject: [wrynose][PATCH v2 1/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-29518

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch backports the upstream rsync v3.4.3 security fix train for CVE-2026-29518. The direct CVE fixes are [3] and [4]:

- [3] enables secure_relative_open() for daemon modules running with "use chroot = no", closing the receiver-side basis-file TOCTOU.
- [4] routes the sender read path through secure_relative_open() from the trusted module root, closing the matching sender-side TOCTOU.

This patch also carries [1] and [2] from the same upstream v3.4.3 security/update train. These are supporting secure_relative_open() changes, not standalone direct CVE fixes: [1] uses Linux openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) to preserve the same confinement while allowing legitimate in-tree symlinks, fixing upstream issue #715; [2] adds the equivalent FreeBSD/macOS O_RESOLVE_BENEATH path. Debian's rsync 3.4.1+ds1-5+deb13u3 security update also carries these commits before the direct CVE-2026-29518 commits.

The upstream fixed release is referenced in [5], and the public CVE record is referenced in [6]. Individual backported commit links are also recorded in the embedded patch headers.

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/4fa7156ccdb2ad34b034d18fe2fd6cd79adef8a1
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/7f60ec001a0be63b770707ec8b829524c3809a43
[3] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/f1c24ab03bc85cb2638a569faa60216582fb6c5d
[4] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/859d44fa4f1420775e4ba050337ef32092f2894c
[5] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/releases/tag/v3.4.3
[6] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-29518

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p1.patch       | 392 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p2.patch       |  98 +++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p3.patch       | 328 +++++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p4.patch       |  71 ++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |   4 +
 5 files changed, 893 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p4.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p1.patch new file +392 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fcb7b777fe
@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+From e7b575413b962ac042079a55530577b20c7eee44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 08:39:22 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] syscall: use openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) on Linux for
+ secure_relative_open
+
+The CVE fix in commit c35e283 made secure_relative_open() walk every
+component of relpath with O_NOFOLLOW. That blocks every symlink in the
+path, which is stricter than the threat model required: legitimate
+directory symlinks within the destination tree (e.g. when using -K /
+--copy-dirlinks) are also rejected, breaking delta transfers with
+"failed verification -- update discarded".  See issue #715.
+
+On Linux 5.6+, openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH | RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS) gives
+us exactly what we want: the kernel rejects any resolution that would
+escape the starting directory (via "..", absolute paths, or symlinks
+pointing outside dirfd) while still following symlinks that resolve
+within it. /proc magic-links are blocked too.
+
+Use openat2 first; fall back to the existing per-component O_NOFOLLOW
+walk on ENOSYS (kernel < 5.6). The lexical "../" checks at the head
+of the function are kept as defense in depth. The Linux gate is
+plain #ifdef __linux__: the runtime ENOSYS fallback covers the only
+case that actually matters (header present + old kernel), and any
+Linux build environment without linux/openat2.h will fail with a
+clear "no such file" error rather than silently disabling the
+protection.
+
+Verified manually that openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) blocks all four
+escape patterns (absolute symlink, ../ symlink, lexical .., absolute
+path) while allowing direct and within-tree symlinks. The new
+testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test (taken from PR #864 by Samuel
+Henrique) exercises the issue #715 regression and passes; full
+make check passes 47/47.
+
+Test: testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test (8 scenarios)
+Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/715
+
+Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-29518
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/4fa7156ccdb2ad34b034d18fe2fd6cd79adef8a1]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 4fa7156ccdb2ad34b034d18fe2fd6cd79adef8a1)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ syscall.c                            |  62 ++++++-
+ testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test | 247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 304 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100755 testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test
+
+diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c
+index 34a9bba0..d66c9fdd 100644
+--- a/syscall.c
++++ b/syscall.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@
+ #include <sys/syscall.h>
+ #endif
+
++#ifdef __linux__
++#include <sys/syscall.h>
++#include <linux/openat2.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include "ifuncs.h"
+
+ extern int dry_run;
+@@ -715,12 +720,49 @@ int do_open_nofollow(const char *pathname, int flags)
+ /*
+   open a file relative to a base directory. The basedir can be NULL,
+   in which case the current working directory is used. The relpath
+-  must be a relative path, and the relpath must not contain any
+-  elements in the path which follow symlinks (ie. like O_NOFOLLOW, but
+-  applies to all path components, not just the last component)
+-
+-  The relpath must also not contain any ../ elements in the path
++  must be a relative path. The kernel must guarantee that resolution
++  cannot escape basedir (or the cwd, when basedir is NULL): no ".."
++  jumps above the start, no symlinks pointing outside, no absolute
++  paths, no /proc magic-link tricks.
++
++  Symlinks *within* basedir are followed normally — earlier rsync
++  versions rejected every symlink with O_NOFOLLOW on each component,
++  which broke legitimate directory symlinks on the receiver side
++  (https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/715). The escape
++  prevention is handled by the kernel via openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH)
++  on Linux 5.6+; older systems fall back to the per-component
++  O_NOFOLLOW walk below.
++
++  The relpath must also not contain any ../ elements in the path.
+ */
++
++#ifdef __linux__
++static int secure_relative_open_linux(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode)
++{
++      struct open_how how;
++      int dirfd, retfd;
++
++      memset(&how, 0, sizeof how);
++      how.flags = flags;
++      how.mode = mode;
++      how.resolve = RESOLVE_BENEATH | RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS;
++
++      if (basedir == NULL) {
++              dirfd = AT_FDCWD;
++      } else {
++              dirfd = openat(AT_FDCWD, basedir, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
++              if (dirfd == -1)
++                      return -1;
++      }
++
++      retfd = syscall(SYS_openat2, dirfd, relpath, &how, sizeof how);
++
++      if (dirfd != AT_FDCWD)
++              close(dirfd);
++      return retfd;
++}
++#endif
++
+ int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mode_t mode)
+ {
+        if (!relpath || relpath[0] == '/') {
+@@ -734,6 +776,16 @@ int secure_relative_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags, mo
+                return -1;
+        }
+
++#ifdef __linux__
++      {
++              int fd = secure_relative_open_linux(basedir, relpath, flags, mode);
++              /* ENOSYS = kernel < 5.6 doesn't have the syscall even though
++               * glibc/kernel-headers do; fall through to the portable path. */
++              if (fd != -1 || errno != ENOSYS)
++                      return fd;
++      }
++#endif
++
+ #if !defined(O_NOFOLLOW) || !defined(O_DIRECTORY) || !defined(AT_FDCWD)
+        // really old system, all we can do is live with the risks
+        if (!basedir) {
+diff --git a/testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test b/testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test
+new file mode 100755
+index 00000000..9065dd81
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/testsuite/symlink-dirlink-basis.test
+@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++# Test that updating a file through a directory symlink works when using
++# -K (--copy-dirlinks). This is a regression test for:
++#   https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/715
++#
++# The CVE fix in commit c35e283 introduced secure_relative_open() which
++# uses O_NOFOLLOW on all path components, breaking legitimate directory
++# symlinks on the receiver side. The fix splits the path into basedir
++# (dirname, symlinks followed) and basename (O_NOFOLLOW) so that
++# directory symlinks are traversed while the final file component is
++# still protected.
++#
++# The regression only manifests when delta matching is triggered (i.e.,
++# the sender finds matching blocks in the old file). Small files with
++# completely different content are transferred in full and don't trigger
++# the bug. We use a large file with a small modification to ensure
++# delta transfer is used.
++#
++# In addition to the original regression, this test covers edge cases
++# in the fix itself:
++#   - --backup with directory symlinks (finish_transfer pointer identity)
++#   - --partial-dir with protocol < 29 (fnamecmp != partialptr guard)
++#   - --inplace with directory symlinks (updating_basis_or_equiv check)
++#   - Files without a dirname (top-level files, no split needed)
++
++. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
++
++RSYNC_RSH="$scratchdir/src/support/lsh.sh"
++export RSYNC_RSH
++
++# $HOME is set to $scratchdir by rsync.fns
++# localhost: destination will cd to $HOME (i.e., $scratchdir)
++
++# Helper: create a large file suitable for delta transfers.
++# ~32KB is large enough for rsync's block matching to find matches.
++make_testfile() {
++    dd if=/dev/urandom of="$1" bs=1024 count=32 2>/dev/null \
++      || test_fail "failed to create test file $1"
++}
++
++# Set up source tree
++srcbase="$tmpdir/src"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 1: Basic directory symlink update (the original issue #715)
++######################################################################
++
++mkdir -p "$HOME/real-dir"
++ln -s real-dir "$HOME/dir"
++
++mkdir -p "$srcbase/dir"
++make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++# First transfer (initial): should create the file through the symlink
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 1: initial transfer failed"
++
++if [ ! -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" ]; then
++    test_fail "test 1: initial transfer did not create file through symlink"
++fi
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 1: initial transfer content mismatch"
++
++# Small modification to trigger delta transfer
++echo "appended update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++# Second transfer (update): was failing with "failed verification"
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 1: update through directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 1: update transfer content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 2: Compression (-z) as in the original reproducer
++######################################################################
++
++echo "another line" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptzv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 2: compressed update through directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 2: compressed update content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 3: Nested directory symlinks (nested/sub/data.txt where
++#          "nested" is a symlink to "nested_real")
++######################################################################
++
++mkdir -p "$HOME/nested_real/sub"
++ln -s nested_real "$HOME/nested"
++
++mkdir -p "$srcbase/nested/sub"
++make_testfile "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" nested/sub/data.txt localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 3: initial nested transfer failed"
++
++echo "appended nested" >> "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" nested/sub/data.txt localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 3: update through nested directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/nested/sub/data.txt" "$HOME/nested_real/sub/data.txt" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 3: nested update content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 4: --backup with directory symlinks
++#
++# Exercises the finish_transfer() "fnamecmp == fname" pointer
++# comparison that determines whether to update fnamecmp to the
++# backup name. If broken, --backup would reference a renamed file
++# for xattr handling.
++######################################################################
++
++# Reset destination
++rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file~"
++
++make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 4: initial transfer for backup test failed"
++
++echo "backup update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --backup --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 4: update with --backup through directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 4: backup update content mismatch"
++
++if [ ! -f "$HOME/real-dir/file~" ]; then
++    test_fail "test 4: backup file was not created"
++fi
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 5: --inplace with directory symlinks
++#
++# Exercises the updating_basis_or_equiv check which uses
++# "fnamecmp == fname". With --inplace, rsync writes directly to
++# the destination file instead of a temp file.
++######################################################################
++
++rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file~"
++
++make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --inplace --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 5: initial inplace transfer failed"
++
++echo "inplace update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --inplace --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 5: inplace update through directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 5: inplace update content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 6: Top-level file (no dirname, no split needed)
++#
++# Ensures the dirname/basename split is not attempted for files
++# at the top level (file->dirname is NULL).
++######################################################################
++
++make_testfile "$srcbase/topfile"
++mkdir -p "$HOME"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -Rlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" topfile localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 6: initial top-level transfer failed"
++
++echo "toplevel update" >> "$srcbase/topfile"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/topfile"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -Rlptv --rsync-path="$RSYNC" topfile localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 6: top-level update failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/topfile" "$HOME/topfile" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 6: top-level update content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 7: --partial-dir with protocol < 29
++#
++# For protocol < 29, fnamecmp_type stays FNAMECMP_FNAME even when
++# fnamecmp is set to partialptr. The dirname/basename split must
++# NOT trigger in this case (guarded by "fnamecmp == fname").
++######################################################################
++
++rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file"
++make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 --partial-dir=.rsync-partial \
++    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 7: initial proto28 partial-dir transfer failed"
++
++echo "partial-dir update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 --partial-dir=.rsync-partial \
++    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 7: proto28 partial-dir update through dirlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 7: proto28 partial-dir update content mismatch"
++
++######################################################################
++# Test 8: Protocol < 29 basic directory symlink update
++#
++# Exercises the protocol < 29 code path and its fallback logic
++# (clearing basedir on retry).
++######################################################################
++
++rm -f "$HOME/real-dir/file"
++make_testfile "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 \
++    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 8: initial proto28 transfer failed"
++
++echo "proto28 update" >> "$srcbase/dir/file"
++sleep 1
++touch "$srcbase/dir/file"
++
++(cd "$srcbase" && $RSYNC -KRlptv --protocol=28 \
++    --rsync-path="$RSYNC" dir/file localhost:) \
++    || test_fail "test 8: proto28 update through directory symlink failed"
++
++diff "$srcbase/dir/file" "$HOME/real-dir/file" >/dev/null \
++    || test_fail "test 8: proto28 update content mismatch"
++
++# The script would have aborted on error, so getting here means we've won.
++exit 0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p2.patch new file +98 -0

98 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p3.patch new file +328 -0

328 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-29518_p4.patch new file +71 -0

71 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb +4 -0
index 509be486b8..e2fe0128d5 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://determism.patch \
            file://0001-Add-missing-prototypes-to-function-declarations.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-10158.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-29518_p1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-29518_p2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-29518_p3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-29518_p4.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2924bcb3a1ed8b551fc101f740b9f0fe0a202b115027647cf69850d65fd88c52"
 

--
2.35.6

#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/6 rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43619

In reply to Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch backports the upstream rsync v3.4.3 symlink-race fix chain for CVE-2026-43619. The upstream NEWS entry describes this CVE as symlink races on path-based system calls in "use chroot = no" daemon mode, generalizing CVE-2026-29518 beyond the receiver's open() path.

The backported commits form the following linear upstream chain:

- [1] closes the receiver-side do_chmod() path.
- [2] closes the daemon-no-chroot change_dir() escape.
- [3] adds the remaining symlink-race-safe do_*_at() wrappers and migrates the affected path-based syscall users.
- [4] closes adjacent bare-path copy/open surfaces. Upstream titles this commit "defence-in-depth", but it is in the same linear v3.4.3 symlink-race fix chain and Debian's rsync 3.4.1+ds1-5+deb13u3 security update carries it as part of the CVE-2026-43619 patch train.

The v3.4.3 security train also has portability and functional follow-ups that were released in v3.4.4, so this CVE-scoped backport includes them under CVE-2026-43619:

- [5] adds the mknodat()/mkfifoat() configure fallback used by the new do_mknod_at() path.
- [6] gates <linux/openat2.h> and openat2() use behind configure/runtime checks so systems without the header or usable syscall fall back safely.

The upstream fixed security release is referenced in [7], the v3.4.4 follow-up release is referenced in [8], and the public advisory is referenced in [9]. The Debian tracker entry is referenced in [10]. Individual backported commit links are also recorded in the embedded patch headers.

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/862fe4eeaf82178324c66e504bf2c6c2e4038f99
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/15d296425609a997f56eb8f9017ff73922f99b20
[3] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/30656c5e358b1c6033f4caf24f3e11b29d25c9f4
[4] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/3cc6a9e8cdcffb637ecdd41dae47833096dca317
[5] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/f3757a470ad3defdb2c4c6ad334e3839f3c7f1ae
[6] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/c14e2258b59a3f16a99c6e83a28660ba438a73e9
[7] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/releases/tag/v3.4.3
[8] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/releases/tag/v3.4.4
[9] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-4h9m-w5ff-j735
[10] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-43619

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p1.patch       |  471 +++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p2.patch       |  205 ++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p3.patch       | 1783 +++++++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p4.patch       |  568 ++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p5.patch       |   69 +
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p6.patch       |  264 +++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |    6 +
 7 files changed, 3366 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p4.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p5.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p6.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p1.patch new file +471 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b1556e51fa
@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
+From e406eb555ea1fadb7c0dd8ddef3fde1b92771aa7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 21:53:14 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] syscall+receiver: secure receiver-side do_chmod against
+ symlink-race TOCTOU
+
+CVE-2026-29518's fix routed the receiver's open() through
+secure_relative_open(), but every other path-based syscall the
+receiver runs on sender-controllable paths is vulnerable to the
+same TOCTOU primitive. This commit closes the chmod variant.
+
+Add do_chmod_at() that opens the parent of fname under
+secure_relative_open() and uses fchmodat() against the resulting
+dirfd. Gate the secure path on am_daemon && !am_chrooted (the same
+gate use_secure_symlinks already uses for the receiver basis-file
+open), so non-daemon callers and chrooted daemons keep the original
+do_chmod() fast path.
+
+Migrate the receiver-side do_chmod() call sites in delete.c,
+generator.c, rsync.c, and xattrs.c.
+
+Adds testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test (with t_chmod_secure helper)
+as regression coverage.
+
+Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-43619
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/862fe4eeaf82178324c66e504bf2c6c2e4038f99]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Upstream also updates runtests.py and a newer Makefile.in test
+  helper list that includes simdtest. Wrynose 3.4.1 does not carry
+  runtests.py and its CHECK_PROGS list has no simdtest entry, so
+  those test-runner hunks were not applicable.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 862fe4eeaf82178324c66e504bf2c6c2e4038f99)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ Makefile.in                       |   9 ++-
+ delete.c                          |   4 +-
+ generator.c                       |   4 +-
+ rsync.c                           |   2 +-
+ syscall.c                         |  80 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ t_chmod_secure.c                  | 117 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ t_stub.c                          |   2 +
+ testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test |  68 +++++++++++++++++
+ xattrs.c                          |   6 +-
+ 9 files changed, 282 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 t_chmod_secure.c
+ create mode 100755 testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 2c5cf996..c30b8876 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -62,12 +62,13 @@ TLS_OBJ = tls.o syscall.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/perms
+ 
+ # Programs we must have to run the test cases
+ CHECK_PROGS = rsync$(EXEEXT) tls$(EXEEXT) getgroups$(EXEEXT) getfsdev$(EXEEXT) \
+-	testrun$(EXEEXT) trimslash$(EXEEXT) t_unsafe$(EXEEXT) wildtest$(EXEEXT)
++	testrun$(EXEEXT) trimslash$(EXEEXT) t_unsafe$(EXEEXT) t_chmod_secure$(EXEEXT) \
++	wildtest$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+ CHECK_SYMLINKS = testsuite/chown-fake.test testsuite/devices-fake.test testsuite/xattrs-hlink.test
+ 
+ # Objects for CHECK_PROGS to clean
+-CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o trimslash.o wildtest.o
++CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o t_chmod_secure.o trimslash.o wildtest.o
+ 
+ # note that the -I. is needed to handle config.h when using VPATH
+ .c.o:
+@@ -183,6 +184,10 @@ T_UNSAFE_OBJ = t_unsafe.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/sn
+ t_unsafe$(EXEEXT): $(T_UNSAFE_OBJ)
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_UNSAFE_OBJ) $(LIBS)
+ 
++T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ = t_chmod_secure.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/wildmatch.o lib/permstring.o
++t_chmod_secure$(EXEEXT): $(T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ)
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ) $(LIBS)
++
+ .PHONY: conf
+ conf: configure.sh config.h.in
+ 
+diff --git a/delete.c b/delete.c
+index 89c1f8d6..ded0ab2a 100644
+--- a/delete.c
++++ b/delete.c
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static enum delret delete_dir_contents(char *fname, uint16 flags)
+ 
+ 		strlcpy(p, fp->basename, remainder);
+ 		if (!(fp->mode & S_IWUSR) && !am_root && fp->flags & FLAG_OWNED_BY_US)
+-			do_chmod(fname, fp->mode | S_IWUSR);
++			do_chmod_at(fname, fp->mode | S_IWUSR);
+ 		/* Save stack by recursing to ourself directly. */
+ 		if (S_ISDIR(fp->mode)) {
+ 			if (delete_dir_contents(fname, flags | DEL_RECURSE) != DR_SUCCESS)
+@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ enum delret delete_item(char *fbuf, uint16 mode, uint16 flags)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (flags & DEL_NO_UID_WRITE)
+-		do_chmod(fbuf, mode | S_IWUSR);
++		do_chmod_at(fbuf, mode | S_IWUSR);
+ 
+ 	if (S_ISDIR(mode) && !(flags & DEL_DIR_IS_EMPTY)) {
+ 		/* This only happens on the first call to delete_item() since
+diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c
+index b56fa569..e5aff654 100644
+--- a/generator.c
++++ b/generator.c
+@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
+ #ifdef HAVE_CHMOD
+ 		if (!am_root && (file->mode & S_IRWXU) != S_IRWXU && dir_tweaking) {
+ 			mode_t mode = file->mode | S_IRWXU;
+-			if (do_chmod(fname, mode) < 0) {
++			if (do_chmod_at(fname, mode) < 0) {
+ 				rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
+ 					"failed to modify permissions on %s",
+ 					full_fname(fname));
+@@ -2111,7 +2111,7 @@ static void touch_up_dirs(struct file_list *flist, int ndx)
+ 			continue;
+ 		fname = f_name(file, NULL);
+ 		if (fix_dir_perms)
+-			do_chmod(fname, file->mode);
++			do_chmod_at(fname, file->mode);
+ 		if (need_retouch_dir_times) {
+ 			STRUCT_STAT st;
+ 			if (link_stat(fname, &st, 0) == 0 && mtime_differs(&st, file)) {
+diff --git a/rsync.c b/rsync.c
+index b130aba5..cc46a2f9 100644
+--- a/rsync.c
++++ b/rsync.c
+@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ int set_file_attrs(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, stat_x *sxp,
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_CHMOD
+ 	if (!BITS_EQUAL(sxp->st.st_mode, new_mode, CHMOD_BITS)) {
+-		int ret = am_root < 0 ? 0 : do_chmod(fname, new_mode);
++		int ret = am_root < 0 ? 0 : do_chmod_at(fname, new_mode);
+ 		if (ret < 0) {
+ 			rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
+ 				"failed to set permissions on %s",
+diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c
+index dcecda1a..06d5ed3f 100644
+--- a/syscall.c
++++ b/syscall.c
+@@ -281,6 +281,86 @@ int do_chmod(const char *path, mode_t mode)
+ 		return code;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++
++/*
++  Symlink-race-safe variant of do_chmod() for receiver-side use.
++
++  Threat model: on a daemon running with "use chroot = no" (the prerequisite
++  for CVE-2026-29518), a local attacker can race a symlink swap of one of
++  the parent directory components of a path the receiver is about to chmod.
++  Because chmod() resolves symlinks at every component, the swap redirects
++  the chmod outside the receiver's confinement.
++
++  Defence: open the *parent* directory of fname under secure_relative_open()
++  (which uses openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) on Linux 5.6+, openat() with
++  O_RESOLVE_BENEATH on FreeBSD 13+ and macOS 15+ (Sequoia), or a per-component
++  O_NOFOLLOW walk elsewhere) and do fchmodat() against that dirfd. A symlink
++  substituted into one of the parent components is then either followed
++  within the tree (legitimate dir-symlinks still work) or rejected by the
++  kernel (escape attempts fail).
++
++  Final-component handling matches do_chmod(): fchmodat() with flag 0
++  follows a symlink at the final component, which is the same behaviour as
++  chmod() and matches every current call site (the file being chmod'd is
++  one the receiver itself just created or transferred). For the rare case
++  where the caller wants to chmod a symlink-as-an-object (S_ISLNK in the
++  mode bits), we fall through to do_chmod() which has portability code for
++  that case.
++
++  Falls back to do_chmod() for absolute paths and for paths with no parent
++  component, where there is nothing to protect against.
++*/
++int do_chmod_at(const char *fname, mode_t mode)
++{
++#ifdef AT_FDCWD
++	extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
++	char dirpath[MAXPATHLEN];
++	const char *bname;
++	const char *slash;
++	int dfd, ret, e;
++	size_t dlen;
++
++	if (dry_run) return 0;
++	RETURN_ERROR_IF_RO_OR_LO;
++
++	/* Only the daemon-without-chroot case is exposed to the symlink-
++	 * race attack: a chroot already confines the receiver, and a
++	 * non-daemon rsync runs with the user's own authority so a
++	 * symlink they planted can only redirect to files they could
++	 * already access.  Everywhere else, fall through to plain
++	 * do_chmod() to avoid the dirfd-open overhead on every call. */
++	if (!am_daemon || am_chrooted)
++		return do_chmod(fname, mode);
++
++	if (!fname || !*fname || *fname == '/' || S_ISLNK(mode))
++		return do_chmod(fname, mode);
++
++	slash = strrchr(fname, '/');
++	if (!slash)
++		return do_chmod(fname, mode);
++
++	dlen = slash - fname;
++	if (dlen >= sizeof dirpath) {
++		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
++		return -1;
++	}
++	memcpy(dirpath, fname, dlen);
++	dirpath[dlen] = '\0';
++	bname = slash + 1;
++
++	dfd = secure_relative_open(NULL, dirpath, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
++	if (dfd < 0)
++		return -1;
++
++	ret = fchmodat(dfd, bname, mode, 0);
++	e = errno;
++	close(dfd);
++	errno = e;
++	return ret;
++#else
++	return do_chmod(fname, mode);
++#endif
++}
+ #endif
+ 
+ int do_rename(const char *old_path, const char *new_path)
+diff --git a/t_chmod_secure.c b/t_chmod_secure.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..114dfb2d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t_chmod_secure.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
++/*
++ * Test harness for do_chmod_at(). Confirms the symlink-TOCTOU
++ * primitive used by CVE-2026-29518 (and its incomplete-fix follow-up
++ * for chmod) is closed by do_chmod_at(): a parent directory component
++ * being a symlink that escapes the receiver's confinement must be
++ * rejected, while a parent symlink that resolves *within* the tree
++ * must still work (so legitimate dir-symlinks are not regressed).
++ *
++ * Not linked into rsync itself.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
++ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
++ */
++
++#include "rsync.h"
++
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++
++int dry_run = 0;
++int am_root = 0;
++int am_sender = 0;
++int read_only = 0;
++int list_only = 0;
++int copy_links = 0;
++int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
++extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
++
++short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
++
++static int errs = 0;
++
++static void check(const char *label, int actual_rc, int expect_ok,
++		  const char *path, mode_t expected_mode)
++{
++	struct stat st;
++	int got_ok = (actual_rc == 0);
++	if (got_ok != expect_ok) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "FAIL [%s]: rc=%d errno=%d (%s), expected %s\n",
++			label, actual_rc, errno, strerror(errno),
++			expect_ok ? "success" : "rejection");
++		errs++;
++		return;
++	}
++	if (path && stat(path, &st) < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "FAIL [%s]: stat(%s) failed: %s\n",
++			label, path, strerror(errno));
++		errs++;
++		return;
++	}
++	if (path && (st.st_mode & 07777) != expected_mode) {
++		fprintf(stderr,
++			"FAIL [%s]: %s mode is 0%o, expected 0%o\n",
++			label, path, st.st_mode & 07777, expected_mode);
++		errs++;
++		return;
++	}
++	fprintf(stderr, "OK   [%s]\n", label);
++}
++
++int main(int argc, char **argv)
++{
++	if (argc != 2) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <module-dir>\n", argv[0]);
++		return 2;
++	}
++	if (chdir(argv[1]) < 0) {
++		perror("chdir");
++		return 2;
++	}
++
++	/* Simulate the daemon-without-chroot deployment that do_chmod_at()
++	 * defends. With am_daemon=0 or am_chrooted=1 the wrapper falls
++	 * through to plain do_chmod() and the symlink-race test would be
++	 * meaningless. */
++	am_daemon = 1;
++	am_chrooted = 0;
++
++	/* Test layout (all inside the directory we just chdir'd to):
++	 *
++	 *     ./realdir/sentinel        -- regular target file
++	 *     ./inside_link -> realdir  -- legitimate dir-symlink within the tree
++	 *     ./escape_link -> ../trap  -- attacker swap, target outside tree
++	 *     ../trap/sentinel          -- the file the attacker wants to alter
++	 *
++	 * The shell wrapper that calls this helper has set both sentinel
++	 * files to mode 0600 so we have a clean baseline to compare.
++	 */
++
++	/* Scenario A: legitimate parent dir-symlink, chmod must succeed. */
++	int rc = do_chmod_at("inside_link/sentinel", 0640);
++	check("A: legit dir-symlink within tree",
++	      rc, 1, "realdir/sentinel", 0640);
++
++	/* Scenario B: parent symlink escapes the tree -- chmod must be
++	 * rejected and the outside file's mode must be unchanged. */
++	rc = do_chmod_at("escape_link/sentinel", 0666);
++	check("B: parent symlink escapes tree (the attack)",
++	      rc, 0, "../trap/sentinel", 0600);
++
++	/* Scenario C: plain relative path with no symlink components,
++	 * regression check that the safe wrapper doesn't break the
++	 * normal case. */
++	rc = do_chmod_at("realdir/sentinel", 0644);
++	check("C: plain relative path (regression check)",
++	      rc, 1, "realdir/sentinel", 0644);
++
++	/* Scenario D: top-level file, no parent directory component.
++	 * Falls back to do_chmod(); should succeed. */
++	rc = do_chmod_at("topfile", 0640);
++	check("D: top-level file, no parent component",
++	      rc, 1, "topfile", 0640);
++
++	if (errs)
++		fprintf(stderr, "%d failure(s)\n", errs);
++	return errs ? 1 : 0;
++}
+diff --git a/t_stub.c b/t_stub.c
+index eee92729..63bc144c 100644
+--- a/t_stub.c
++++ b/t_stub.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
+ 
+ int do_fsync = 0;
+ int inplace = 0;
++int am_daemon = 0;
++int am_chrooted = 0;
+ int modify_window = 0;
+ int preallocate_files = 0;
+ int protect_args = 0;
+diff --git a/testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test b/testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test
+new file mode 100755
+index 00000000..48bbfbb4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test
+@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
++
++# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
++# COPYING).
++
++# Regression test for the symlink-TOCTOU class of bug applied to
++# chmod() on the receiver side. The CVE-2026-29518 fix used
++# secure_relative_open() for the basis-file open, but every other
++# path-based syscall the receiver runs on sender-controllable paths
++# is vulnerable to the same primitive: a local attacker swaps a
++# symlink into one of the parent directory components between the
++# receiver's check and its act, and the syscall escapes the module.
++#
++# This test exercises the new do_chmod_at() wrapper via the
++# t_chmod_secure helper. The helper sets up two scenarios:
++#   - a parent dir-symlink that resolves WITHIN the module tree
++#     (legitimate -K-style use, must continue to work)
++#   - a parent dir-symlink that escapes the module tree (the
++#     attack, must be rejected)
++# plus two regression scenarios (plain relative path, top-level
++# file) that just confirm the safe wrapper doesn't break the
++# normal case.
++#
++# The kernel-enforced "stay below dirfd" path resolution is
++# only available on Linux 5.6+, FreeBSD 13+, and macOS 15+.
++# Skip on platforms that fall back to per-component O_NOFOLLOW
++# (Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, Cygwin); the per-component fallback
++# would also reject the attack but the legitimate dir-symlink
++# scenario would fail there.
++
++. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
++
++case "$(uname -s)" in
++    SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
++	test_skipped "do_chmod_at relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
++	;;
++esac
++
++mod="$scratchdir/module"
++trap_outside="$scratchdir/trap"
++rm -rf "$mod" "$trap_outside"
++mkdir -p "$mod/realdir" "$trap_outside"
++
++# Set up the four file-system objects the helper expects:
++echo bystander > "$mod/realdir/sentinel"
++chmod 0600 "$mod/realdir/sentinel"
++echo target > "$trap_outside/sentinel"
++chmod 0600 "$trap_outside/sentinel"
++ln -s realdir "$mod/inside_link"
++ln -s ../trap "$mod/escape_link"
++echo top > "$mod/topfile"
++chmod 0600 "$mod/topfile"
++
++"$TOOLDIR/t_chmod_secure" "$mod" || \
++    test_fail "t_chmod_secure reported failures (see stderr above)"
++
++# Sanity-check from the shell side too: the outside file's mode must
++# still be 0600 -- the helper checked this, but a second look from
++# the shell guards against a helper-internal stat() bug.
++mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$trap_outside/sentinel" 2>/dev/null \
++       || stat -f '%Lp' "$trap_outside/sentinel" 2>/dev/null)
++if [ "$mode" != "600" ]; then
++    test_fail "outside sentinel mode changed from 600 to $mode -- chmod escaped the module"
++fi
++
++exit 0
+diff --git a/xattrs.c b/xattrs.c
+index 26e50a6f..4462d63b 100644
+--- a/xattrs.c
++++ b/xattrs.c
+@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ int set_xattr(const char *fname, const struct file_struct *file, const char *fna
+ 	 && !S_ISLNK(sxp->st.st_mode)
+ #endif
+ 	 && access(fname, W_OK) < 0
+-	 && do_chmod(fname, (sxp->st.st_mode & CHMOD_BITS) | S_IWUSR) == 0)
++	 && do_chmod_at(fname, (sxp->st.st_mode & CHMOD_BITS) | S_IWUSR) == 0)
+ 		added_write_perm = 1;
+ 
+ 	ndx = F_XATTR(file);
+@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ int set_xattr(const char *fname, const struct file_struct *file, const char *fna
+ 	lst = &glst->xa_items;
+ 	int return_value = rsync_xal_set(fname, lst, fnamecmp, sxp);
+ 	if (added_write_perm) /* remove the temporary write permission */
+-		do_chmod(fname, sxp->st.st_mode);
++		do_chmod_at(fname, sxp->st.st_mode);
+ 	return return_value;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int set_stat_xattr(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, mode_t new_mode)
+ 	mode = (fst.st_mode & _S_IFMT) | (fmode & ACCESSPERMS)
+ 	     | (S_ISDIR(fst.st_mode) ? 0700 : 0600);
+ 	if (fst.st_mode != mode)
+-		do_chmod(fname, mode);
++		do_chmod_at(fname, mode);
+ 	if (!IS_DEVICE(fst.st_mode))
+ 		fst.st_rdev = 0; /* just in case */
+ 
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p2.patch new file +205 -0

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meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p6.patch new file +264 -0

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2.35.6

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#4 lore raw

Re: [wrynose][PATCH v2 2/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43619

Hi,

Please ignore this patch series. I will send corrected patches again.

Regards,
Ashish.

________________________________
From: Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Sent: 17 July 2026 10:50
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: Ashishkumar Parmar -X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Subject: [wrynose][PATCH v2 2/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43619

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch backports the upstream rsync v3.4.3 symlink-race fix chain for CVE-2026-43619. The upstream NEWS entry describes this CVE as symlink races on path-based system calls in "use chroot = no" daemon mode, generalizing CVE-2026-29518 beyond the receiver's open() path.

The backported commits form the following linear upstream chain:

- [1] closes the receiver-side do_chmod() path.
- [2] closes the daemon-no-chroot change_dir() escape.
- [3] adds the remaining symlink-race-safe do_*_at() wrappers and migrates the affected path-based syscall users.
- [4] closes adjacent bare-path copy/open surfaces. Upstream titles this commit "defence-in-depth", but it is in the same linear v3.4.3 symlink-race fix chain and Debian's rsync 3.4.1+ds1-5+deb13u3 security update carries it as part of the CVE-2026-43619 patch train.

The v3.4.3 security train also has portability and functional follow-ups that were released in v3.4.4, so this CVE-scoped backport includes them under CVE-2026-43619:

- [5] adds the mknodat()/mkfifoat() configure fallback used by the new do_mknod_at() path.
- [6] gates <linux/openat2.h> and openat2() use behind configure/runtime checks so systems without the header or usable syscall fall back safely.

The upstream fixed security release is referenced in [7], the v3.4.4 follow-up release is referenced in [8], and the public advisory is referenced in [9]. The Debian tracker entry is referenced in [10]. Individual backported commit links are also recorded in the embedded patch headers.

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/862fe4eeaf82178324c66e504bf2c6c2e4038f99
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/15d296425609a997f56eb8f9017ff73922f99b20
[3] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/30656c5e358b1c6033f4caf24f3e11b29d25c9f4
[4] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/3cc6a9e8cdcffb637ecdd41dae47833096dca317
[5] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/f3757a470ad3defdb2c4c6ad334e3839f3c7f1ae
[6] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/c14e2258b59a3f16a99c6e83a28660ba438a73e9
[7] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/releases/tag/v3.4.3
[8] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/releases/tag/v3.4.4
[9] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-4h9m-w5ff-j735
[10] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-43619

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p1.patch       |  471 +++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p2.patch       |  205 ++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p3.patch       | 1783 +++++++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p4.patch       |  568 ++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p5.patch       |   69 +
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p6.patch       |  264 +++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |    6 +
 7 files changed, 3366 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p4.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p5.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p6.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43619_p1.patch new file +471 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b1556e51fa
@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
+From e406eb555ea1fadb7c0dd8ddef3fde1b92771aa7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 21:53:14 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] syscall+receiver: secure receiver-side do_chmod against
+ symlink-race TOCTOU
+
+CVE-2026-29518's fix routed the receiver's open() through
+secure_relative_open(), but every other path-based syscall the
+receiver runs on sender-controllable paths is vulnerable to the
+same TOCTOU primitive. This commit closes the chmod variant.
+
+Add do_chmod_at() that opens the parent of fname under
+secure_relative_open() and uses fchmodat() against the resulting
+dirfd. Gate the secure path on am_daemon && !am_chrooted (the same
+gate use_secure_symlinks already uses for the receiver basis-file
+open), so non-daemon callers and chrooted daemons keep the original
+do_chmod() fast path.
+
+Migrate the receiver-side do_chmod() call sites in delete.c,
+generator.c, rsync.c, and xattrs.c.
+
+Adds testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test (with t_chmod_secure helper)
+as regression coverage.
+
+Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-43619
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/862fe4eeaf82178324c66e504bf2c6c2e4038f99]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Upstream also updates runtests.py and a newer Makefile.in test
+  helper list that includes simdtest. Wrynose 3.4.1 does not carry
+  runtests.py and its CHECK_PROGS list has no simdtest entry, so
+  those test-runner hunks were not applicable.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 862fe4eeaf82178324c66e504bf2c6c2e4038f99)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ Makefile.in                       |   9 ++-
+ delete.c                          |   4 +-
+ generator.c                       |   4 +-
+ rsync.c                           |   2 +-
+ syscall.c                         |  80 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ t_chmod_secure.c                  | 117 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ t_stub.c                          |   2 +
+ testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test |  68 +++++++++++++++++
+ xattrs.c                          |   6 +-
+ 9 files changed, 282 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 t_chmod_secure.c
+ create mode 100755 testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 2c5cf996..c30b8876 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -62,12 +62,13 @@ TLS_OBJ = tls.o syscall.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/perms
+
+ # Programs we must have to run the test cases
+ CHECK_PROGS = rsync$(EXEEXT) tls$(EXEEXT) getgroups$(EXEEXT) getfsdev$(EXEEXT) \
+-      testrun$(EXEEXT) trimslash$(EXEEXT) t_unsafe$(EXEEXT) wildtest$(EXEEXT)
++      testrun$(EXEEXT) trimslash$(EXEEXT) t_unsafe$(EXEEXT) t_chmod_secure$(EXEEXT) \
++      wildtest$(EXEEXT)
+
+ CHECK_SYMLINKS = testsuite/chown-fake.test testsuite/devices-fake.test testsuite/xattrs-hlink.test
+
+ # Objects for CHECK_PROGS to clean
+-CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o trimslash.o wildtest.o
++CHECK_OBJS=tls.o testrun.o getgroups.o getfsdev.o t_stub.o t_unsafe.o t_chmod_secure.o trimslash.o wildtest.o
+
+ # note that the -I. is needed to handle config.h when using VPATH
+ .c.o:
+@@ -183,6 +184,10 @@ T_UNSAFE_OBJ = t_unsafe.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/sn
+ t_unsafe$(EXEEXT): $(T_UNSAFE_OBJ)
+        $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_UNSAFE_OBJ) $(LIBS)
+
++T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ = t_chmod_secure.o syscall.o util1.o util2.o t_stub.o lib/compat.o lib/snprintf.o lib/wildmatch.o lib/permstring.o
++t_chmod_secure$(EXEEXT): $(T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ)
++      $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(T_CHMOD_SECURE_OBJ) $(LIBS)
++
+ .PHONY: conf
+ conf: configure.sh config.h.in
+
+diff --git a/delete.c b/delete.c
+index 89c1f8d6..ded0ab2a 100644
+--- a/delete.c
++++ b/delete.c
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static enum delret delete_dir_contents(char *fname, uint16 flags)
+
+                strlcpy(p, fp->basename, remainder);
+                if (!(fp->mode & S_IWUSR) && !am_root && fp->flags & FLAG_OWNED_BY_US)
+-                      do_chmod(fname, fp->mode | S_IWUSR);
++                      do_chmod_at(fname, fp->mode | S_IWUSR);
+                /* Save stack by recursing to ourself directly. */
+                if (S_ISDIR(fp->mode)) {
+                        if (delete_dir_contents(fname, flags | DEL_RECURSE) != DR_SUCCESS)
+@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ enum delret delete_item(char *fbuf, uint16 mode, uint16 flags)
+        }
+
+        if (flags & DEL_NO_UID_WRITE)
+-              do_chmod(fbuf, mode | S_IWUSR);
++              do_chmod_at(fbuf, mode | S_IWUSR);
+
+        if (S_ISDIR(mode) && !(flags & DEL_DIR_IS_EMPTY)) {
+                /* This only happens on the first call to delete_item() since
+diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c
+index b56fa569..e5aff654 100644
+--- a/generator.c
++++ b/generator.c
+@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
+ #ifdef HAVE_CHMOD
+                if (!am_root && (file->mode & S_IRWXU) != S_IRWXU && dir_tweaking) {
+                        mode_t mode = file->mode | S_IRWXU;
+-                      if (do_chmod(fname, mode) < 0) {
++                      if (do_chmod_at(fname, mode) < 0) {
+                                rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
+                                        "failed to modify permissions on %s",
+                                        full_fname(fname));
+@@ -2111,7 +2111,7 @@ static void touch_up_dirs(struct file_list *flist, int ndx)
+                        continue;
+                fname = f_name(file, NULL);
+                if (fix_dir_perms)
+-                      do_chmod(fname, file->mode);
++                      do_chmod_at(fname, file->mode);
+                if (need_retouch_dir_times) {
+                        STRUCT_STAT st;
+                        if (link_stat(fname, &st, 0) == 0 && mtime_differs(&st, file)) {
+diff --git a/rsync.c b/rsync.c
+index b130aba5..cc46a2f9 100644
+--- a/rsync.c
++++ b/rsync.c
+@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ int set_file_attrs(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, stat_x *sxp,
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_CHMOD
+        if (!BITS_EQUAL(sxp->st.st_mode, new_mode, CHMOD_BITS)) {
+-              int ret = am_root < 0 ? 0 : do_chmod(fname, new_mode);
++              int ret = am_root < 0 ? 0 : do_chmod_at(fname, new_mode);
+                if (ret < 0) {
+                        rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
+                                "failed to set permissions on %s",
+diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c
+index dcecda1a..06d5ed3f 100644
+--- a/syscall.c
++++ b/syscall.c
+@@ -281,6 +281,86 @@ int do_chmod(const char *path, mode_t mode)
+                return code;
+        return 0;
+ }
++
++/*
++  Symlink-race-safe variant of do_chmod() for receiver-side use.
++
++  Threat model: on a daemon running with "use chroot = no" (the prerequisite
++  for CVE-2026-29518), a local attacker can race a symlink swap of one of
++  the parent directory components of a path the receiver is about to chmod.
++  Because chmod() resolves symlinks at every component, the swap redirects
++  the chmod outside the receiver's confinement.
++
++  Defence: open the *parent* directory of fname under secure_relative_open()
++  (which uses openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH) on Linux 5.6+, openat() with
++  O_RESOLVE_BENEATH on FreeBSD 13+ and macOS 15+ (Sequoia), or a per-component
++  O_NOFOLLOW walk elsewhere) and do fchmodat() against that dirfd. A symlink
++  substituted into one of the parent components is then either followed
++  within the tree (legitimate dir-symlinks still work) or rejected by the
++  kernel (escape attempts fail).
++
++  Final-component handling matches do_chmod(): fchmodat() with flag 0
++  follows a symlink at the final component, which is the same behaviour as
++  chmod() and matches every current call site (the file being chmod'd is
++  one the receiver itself just created or transferred). For the rare case
++  where the caller wants to chmod a symlink-as-an-object (S_ISLNK in the
++  mode bits), we fall through to do_chmod() which has portability code for
++  that case.
++
++  Falls back to do_chmod() for absolute paths and for paths with no parent
++  component, where there is nothing to protect against.
++*/
++int do_chmod_at(const char *fname, mode_t mode)
++{
++#ifdef AT_FDCWD
++      extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
++      char dirpath[MAXPATHLEN];
++      const char *bname;
++      const char *slash;
++      int dfd, ret, e;
++      size_t dlen;
++
++      if (dry_run) return 0;
++      RETURN_ERROR_IF_RO_OR_LO;
++
++      /* Only the daemon-without-chroot case is exposed to the symlink-
++       * race attack: a chroot already confines the receiver, and a
++       * non-daemon rsync runs with the user's own authority so a
++       * symlink they planted can only redirect to files they could
++       * already access.  Everywhere else, fall through to plain
++       * do_chmod() to avoid the dirfd-open overhead on every call. */
++      if (!am_daemon || am_chrooted)
++              return do_chmod(fname, mode);
++
++      if (!fname || !*fname || *fname == '/' || S_ISLNK(mode))
++              return do_chmod(fname, mode);
++
++      slash = strrchr(fname, '/');
++      if (!slash)
++              return do_chmod(fname, mode);
++
++      dlen = slash - fname;
++      if (dlen >= sizeof dirpath) {
++              errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
++              return -1;
++      }
++      memcpy(dirpath, fname, dlen);
++      dirpath[dlen] = '\0';
++      bname = slash + 1;
++
++      dfd = secure_relative_open(NULL, dirpath, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY, 0);
++      if (dfd < 0)
++              return -1;
++
++      ret = fchmodat(dfd, bname, mode, 0);
++      e = errno;
++      close(dfd);
++      errno = e;
++      return ret;
++#else
++      return do_chmod(fname, mode);
++#endif
++}
+ #endif
+
+ int do_rename(const char *old_path, const char *new_path)
+diff --git a/t_chmod_secure.c b/t_chmod_secure.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..114dfb2d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/t_chmod_secure.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
++/*
++ * Test harness for do_chmod_at(). Confirms the symlink-TOCTOU
++ * primitive used by CVE-2026-29518 (and its incomplete-fix follow-up
++ * for chmod) is closed by do_chmod_at(): a parent directory component
++ * being a symlink that escapes the receiver's confinement must be
++ * rejected, while a parent symlink that resolves *within* the tree
++ * must still work (so legitimate dir-symlinks are not regressed).
++ *
++ * Not linked into rsync itself.
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
++ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
++ */
++
++#include "rsync.h"
++
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++
++int dry_run = 0;
++int am_root = 0;
++int am_sender = 0;
++int read_only = 0;
++int list_only = 0;
++int copy_links = 0;
++int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
++extern int am_daemon, am_chrooted;
++
++short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
++
++static int errs = 0;
++
++static void check(const char *label, int actual_rc, int expect_ok,
++                const char *path, mode_t expected_mode)
++{
++      struct stat st;
++      int got_ok = (actual_rc == 0);
++      if (got_ok != expect_ok) {
++              fprintf(stderr, "FAIL [%s]: rc=%d errno=%d (%s), expected %s\n",
++                      label, actual_rc, errno, strerror(errno),
++                      expect_ok ? "success" : "rejection");
++              errs++;
++              return;
++      }
++      if (path && stat(path, &st) < 0) {
++              fprintf(stderr, "FAIL [%s]: stat(%s) failed: %s\n",
++                      label, path, strerror(errno));
++              errs++;
++              return;
++      }
++      if (path && (st.st_mode & 07777) != expected_mode) {
++              fprintf(stderr,
++                      "FAIL [%s]: %s mode is 0%o, expected 0%o\n",
++                      label, path, st.st_mode & 07777, expected_mode);
++              errs++;
++              return;
++      }
++      fprintf(stderr, "OK   [%s]\n", label);
++}
++
++int main(int argc, char **argv)
++{
++      if (argc != 2) {
++              fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <module-dir>\n", argv[0]);
++              return 2;
++      }
++      if (chdir(argv[1]) < 0) {
++              perror("chdir");
++              return 2;
++      }
++
++      /* Simulate the daemon-without-chroot deployment that do_chmod_at()
++       * defends. With am_daemon=0 or am_chrooted=1 the wrapper falls
++       * through to plain do_chmod() and the symlink-race test would be
++       * meaningless. */
++      am_daemon = 1;
++      am_chrooted = 0;
++
++      /* Test layout (all inside the directory we just chdir'd to):
++       *
++       *     ./realdir/sentinel        -- regular target file
++       *     ./inside_link -> realdir  -- legitimate dir-symlink within the tree
++       *     ./escape_link -> ../trap  -- attacker swap, target outside tree
++       *     ../trap/sentinel          -- the file the attacker wants to alter
++       *
++       * The shell wrapper that calls this helper has set both sentinel
++       * files to mode 0600 so we have a clean baseline to compare.
++       */
++
++      /* Scenario A: legitimate parent dir-symlink, chmod must succeed. */
++      int rc = do_chmod_at("inside_link/sentinel", 0640);
++      check("A: legit dir-symlink within tree",
++            rc, 1, "realdir/sentinel", 0640);
++
++      /* Scenario B: parent symlink escapes the tree -- chmod must be
++       * rejected and the outside file's mode must be unchanged. */
++      rc = do_chmod_at("escape_link/sentinel", 0666);
++      check("B: parent symlink escapes tree (the attack)",
++            rc, 0, "../trap/sentinel", 0600);
++
++      /* Scenario C: plain relative path with no symlink components,
++       * regression check that the safe wrapper doesn't break the
++       * normal case. */
++      rc = do_chmod_at("realdir/sentinel", 0644);
++      check("C: plain relative path (regression check)",
++            rc, 1, "realdir/sentinel", 0644);
++
++      /* Scenario D: top-level file, no parent directory component.
++       * Falls back to do_chmod(); should succeed. */
++      rc = do_chmod_at("topfile", 0640);
++      check("D: top-level file, no parent component",
++            rc, 1, "topfile", 0640);
++
++      if (errs)
++              fprintf(stderr, "%d failure(s)\n", errs);
++      return errs ? 1 : 0;
++}
+diff --git a/t_stub.c b/t_stub.c
+index eee92729..63bc144c 100644
+--- a/t_stub.c
++++ b/t_stub.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
+
+ int do_fsync = 0;
+ int inplace = 0;
++int am_daemon = 0;
++int am_chrooted = 0;
+ int modify_window = 0;
+ int preallocate_files = 0;
+ int protect_args = 0;
+diff --git a/testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test b/testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test
+new file mode 100755
+index 00000000..48bbfbb4
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/testsuite/chmod-symlink-race.test
+@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
++
++# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
++# COPYING).
++
++# Regression test for the symlink-TOCTOU class of bug applied to
++# chmod() on the receiver side. The CVE-2026-29518 fix used
++# secure_relative_open() for the basis-file open, but every other
++# path-based syscall the receiver runs on sender-controllable paths
++# is vulnerable to the same primitive: a local attacker swaps a
++# symlink into one of the parent directory components between the
++# receiver's check and its act, and the syscall escapes the module.
++#
++# This test exercises the new do_chmod_at() wrapper via the
++# t_chmod_secure helper. The helper sets up two scenarios:
++#   - a parent dir-symlink that resolves WITHIN the module tree
++#     (legitimate -K-style use, must continue to work)
++#   - a parent dir-symlink that escapes the module tree (the
++#     attack, must be rejected)
++# plus two regression scenarios (plain relative path, top-level
++# file) that just confirm the safe wrapper doesn't break the
++# normal case.
++#
++# The kernel-enforced "stay below dirfd" path resolution is
++# only available on Linux 5.6+, FreeBSD 13+, and macOS 15+.
++# Skip on platforms that fall back to per-component O_NOFOLLOW
++# (Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, Cygwin); the per-component fallback
++# would also reject the attack but the legitimate dir-symlink
++# scenario would fail there.
++
++. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
++
++case "$(uname -s)" in
++    SunOS|OpenBSD|NetBSD|CYGWIN*)
++      test_skipped "do_chmod_at relies on RESOLVE_BENEATH-equivalent kernel support not available on $(uname -s)"
++      ;;
++esac
++
++mod="$scratchdir/module"
++trap_outside="$scratchdir/trap"
++rm -rf "$mod" "$trap_outside"
++mkdir -p "$mod/realdir" "$trap_outside"
++
++# Set up the four file-system objects the helper expects:
++echo bystander > "$mod/realdir/sentinel"
++chmod 0600 "$mod/realdir/sentinel"
++echo target > "$trap_outside/sentinel"
++chmod 0600 "$trap_outside/sentinel"
++ln -s realdir "$mod/inside_link"
++ln -s ../trap "$mod/escape_link"
++echo top > "$mod/topfile"
++chmod 0600 "$mod/topfile"
++
++"$TOOLDIR/t_chmod_secure" "$mod" || \
++    test_fail "t_chmod_secure reported failures (see stderr above)"
++
++# Sanity-check from the shell side too: the outside file's mode must
++# still be 0600 -- the helper checked this, but a second look from
++# the shell guards against a helper-internal stat() bug.
++mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$trap_outside/sentinel" 2>/dev/null \
++       || stat -f '%Lp' "$trap_outside/sentinel" 2>/dev/null)
++if [ "$mode" != "600" ]; then
++    test_fail "outside sentinel mode changed from 600 to $mode -- chmod escaped the module"
++fi
++
++exit 0
+diff --git a/xattrs.c b/xattrs.c
+index 26e50a6f..4462d63b 100644
+--- a/xattrs.c
++++ b/xattrs.c
+@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ int set_xattr(const char *fname, const struct file_struct *file, const char *fna
+         && !S_ISLNK(sxp->st.st_mode)
+ #endif
+         && access(fname, W_OK) < 0
+-       && do_chmod(fname, (sxp->st.st_mode & CHMOD_BITS) | S_IWUSR) == 0)
++       && do_chmod_at(fname, (sxp->st.st_mode & CHMOD_BITS) | S_IWUSR) == 0)
+                added_write_perm = 1;
+
+        ndx = F_XATTR(file);
+@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ int set_xattr(const char *fname, const struct file_struct *file, const char *fna
+        lst = &glst->xa_items;
+        int return_value = rsync_xal_set(fname, lst, fnamecmp, sxp);
+        if (added_write_perm) /* remove the temporary write permission */
+-              do_chmod(fname, sxp->st.st_mode);
++              do_chmod_at(fname, sxp->st.st_mode);
+        return return_value;
+ }
+
+@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int set_stat_xattr(const char *fname, struct file_struct *file, mode_t new_mode)
+        mode = (fst.st_mode & _S_IFMT) | (fmode & ACCESSPERMS)
+             | (S_ISDIR(fst.st_mode) ? 0700 : 0600);
+        if (fst.st_mode != mode)
+-              do_chmod(fname, mode);
++              do_chmod_at(fname, mode);
+        if (!IS_DEVICE(fst.st_mode))
+                fst.st_rdev = 0; /* just in case */
+
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#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/6 rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43618

In reply to Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream v3.4.3 backport for CVE-2026-43618. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/c44c90e9460c666c965446a8c0957f0b9fa4c66a
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-g37v-g3gj-pmwq

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43618.patch          | 248 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 249 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43618.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43618.patch new file +248 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4e5cf2dc6d
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+From a93cfc86b6daa2dfd754bcbe261cf01afef056f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 11:10:59 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] token: harden compressed-token decoding against integer
+ overflow
+
+The receiver's three compressed-token decoders --
+recv_deflated_token (zlib), recv_zstd_token, and
+recv_compressed_token (lz4) -- accumulated rx_token (a 32-bit
+signed counter) without overflow checking. A malicious sender
+could craft a compressed-token stream that walked rx_token past
+INT32_MAX, with careful manipulation leaking process memory
+contents to the wire (environment variables, passwords, heap
+pointers, library pointers -- significantly weakening ASLR
+and facilitating further exploitation).
+
+Cap rx_token at MAX_TOKEN_INDEX = 0x7ffffffe. Fold the
+bookkeeping into recv_compressed_token_num() and
+recv_compressed_token_run() shared by all three decoders. Reject
+negative or out-of-range token values explicitly. Also cap the
+simple_recv_token literal-block length at the source: any
+wire-supplied length > CHUNK_SIZE is ill-formed (the matching
+simple_send_token never writes a chunk larger than CHUNK_SIZE),
+so reject before looping on attacker-controlled bytes.
+
+Reach: an authenticated daemon connection with compression
+enabled (the default for protocols >= 30 when both peers
+advertise it). Disabling compression on the daemon
+("refuse options = compress" in rsyncd.conf) is the available
+workaround.
+
+Reporter: Omar Elsayed (seks99x).
+
+Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-43618
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/c44c90e9460c666c965446a8c0957f0b9fa4c66a]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Resolved token.c context differences against Wrynose's 3.4.1
+  source, whose three decoder bodies do not all match upstream's
+  surrounding negative-token validation blocks.
+- The Wrynose hunk replaces the older per-decoder token bookkeeping
+  with the upstream recv_compressed_token_num() and
+  recv_compressed_token_run() helper calls at the matching zlib,
+  zstd, and lz4 decoder sites.
+
+(cherry picked from commit c44c90e9460c666c965446a8c0957f0b9fa4c66a)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ receiver.c |  11 +++++-
+ token.c    | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
+index 8cf8366b..a487ad5a 100644
+--- a/receiver.c
++++ b/receiver.c
+@@ -318,7 +318,12 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	while ((i = recv_token(f_in, &data)) != 0) {
++	while (1) {
++		data = NULL;
++		i = recv_token(f_in, &data);
++		if (i == 0)
++			break;
++
+ 		if (INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 1))
+ 			show_progress(offset, total_size);
+ 
+@@ -326,6 +331,10 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
+ 			maybe_send_keepalive(time(NULL), MSK_ALLOW_FLUSH | MSK_ACTIVE_RECEIVER);
+ 
+ 		if (i > 0) {
++			if (!data) {
++				rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid literal token with no data [%s]\n", who_am_i());
++				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++			}
+ 			if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 3)) {
+ 				rprintf(FINFO,"data recv %d at %s\n",
+ 					i, big_num(offset));
+diff --git a/token.c b/token.c
+index c108b3af..02dabd8d 100644
+--- a/token.c
++++ b/token.c
+@@ -291,6 +291,14 @@ static int32 simple_recv_token(int f, char **data)
+ 		int32 i = read_int(f);
+ 		if (i <= 0)
+ 			return i;
++		/* simple_send_token caps each literal chunk at CHUNK_SIZE;
++		 * reject anything larger so a hostile peer cannot drive the
++		 * read_buf below past our static CHUNK_SIZE buffer. */
++		if (i > CHUNK_SIZE) {
++			rprintf(FERROR, "invalid uncompressed token length %ld [%s]\n",
++				(long)i, who_am_i());
++			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++		}
+ 		residue = i;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -493,9 +501,52 @@ static char *cbuf;
+ static char *dbuf;
+ 
+ /* for decoding runs of tokens */
++#define MAX_TOKEN_INDEX ((int32)0x7ffffffe)
++
+ static int32 rx_token;
+ static int32 rx_run;
+ 
++static NORETURN void invalid_compressed_token(void)
++{
++	rprintf(FERROR, "invalid token number in compressed stream\n");
++	exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++}
++
++static int32 recv_compressed_token_num(int f, int32 flag)
++{
++	if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
++		int32 incr = flag & 0x3f;
++		if (rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX - incr)
++			invalid_compressed_token();
++		rx_token += incr;
++		flag >>= 6;
++	} else {
++		rx_token = read_int(f);
++		if (rx_token < 0 || rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX)
++			invalid_compressed_token();
++	}
++
++	if (flag & 1) {
++		rx_run = read_byte(f);
++		rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
++		if (rx_run <= 0 || rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX - rx_run)
++			invalid_compressed_token();
++		recv_state = r_running;
++	}
++
++	return -1 - rx_token;
++}
++
++static int32 recv_compressed_token_run(void)
++{
++	if (rx_run <= 0 || rx_token >= MAX_TOKEN_INDEX)
++		invalid_compressed_token();
++	++rx_token;
++	if (--rx_run == 0)
++		recv_state = r_idle;
++	return -1 - rx_token;
++}
++
+ /* Receive a deflated token and inflate it */
+ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
+ {
+@@ -586,17 +637,7 @@ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
+ 			}
+ 
+ 			/* here we have a token of some kind */
+-			if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
+-				rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
+-				flag >>= 6;
+-			} else
+-				rx_token = read_int(f);
+-			if (flag & 1) {
+-				rx_run = read_byte(f);
+-				rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
+-				recv_state = r_running;
+-			}
+-			return -1 - rx_token;
++			return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
+ 
+ 		case r_inflating:
+ 			rx_strm.next_out = (Bytef *)dbuf;
+@@ -616,10 +657,7 @@ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		case r_running:
+-			++rx_token;
+-			if (--rx_run == 0)
+-				recv_state = r_idle;
+-			return -1 - rx_token;
++			return recv_compressed_token_run();
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ }
+@@ -828,17 +866,7 @@ static int32 recv_zstd_token(int f, char **data)
+ 				return 0;
+ 			}
+ 			/* here we have a token of some kind */
+-			if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
+-				rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
+-				flag >>= 6;
+-			} else
+-				rx_token = read_int(f);
+-			if (flag & 1) {
+-				rx_run = read_byte(f);
+-				rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
+-				recv_state = r_running;
+-			}
+-			return -1 - rx_token;
++			return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
+ 
+ 		case r_inflated: /* zstd doesn't get into this state */
+ 			break;
+@@ -869,10 +897,7 @@ static int32 recv_zstd_token(int f, char **data)
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		case r_running:
+-			++rx_token;
+-			if (--rx_run == 0)
+-				recv_state = r_idle;
+-			return -1 - rx_token;
++			return recv_compressed_token_run();
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ }
+@@ -992,17 +1017,7 @@ static int32 recv_compressed_token(int f, char **data)
+ 			}
+ 
+ 			/* here we have a token of some kind */
+-			if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
+-				rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
+-				flag >>= 6;
+-			} else
+-				rx_token = read_int(f);
+-			if (flag & 1) {
+-				rx_run = read_byte(f);
+-				rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
+-				recv_state = r_running;
+-			}
+-			return -1 - rx_token;
++			return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
+ 
+ 		case r_inflating:
+ 			avail_out = LZ4_decompress_safe(next_in, dbuf, avail_in, size);
+@@ -1018,10 +1033,7 @@ static int32 recv_compressed_token(int f, char **data)
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		case r_running:
+-			++rx_token;
+-			if (--rx_run == 0)
+-				recv_state = r_idle;
+-			return -1 - rx_token;
++			return recv_compressed_token_run();
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ }
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb +1 -0
index 47e195ef24..f84f269692 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p4.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p5.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p6.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-43618.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2924bcb3a1ed8b551fc101f740b9f0fe0a202b115027647cf69850d65fd88c52"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#6 lore raw

Re: [wrynose][PATCH v2 3/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43618

Hi,

Please ignore this patch series. I will send corrected patches again.

Regards,
Ashish.

________________________________
From: Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Sent: 17 July 2026 10:50
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: Ashishkumar Parmar -X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Subject: [wrynose][PATCH v2 3/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43618

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream v3.4.3 backport for CVE-2026-43618. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/c44c90e9460c666c965446a8c0957f0b9fa4c66a
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-g37v-g3gj-pmwq

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43618.patch          | 248 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 249 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43618.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43618.patch new file +248 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4e5cf2dc6d
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+From a93cfc86b6daa2dfd754bcbe261cf01afef056f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 11:10:59 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] token: harden compressed-token decoding against integer
+ overflow
+
+The receiver's three compressed-token decoders --
+recv_deflated_token (zlib), recv_zstd_token, and
+recv_compressed_token (lz4) -- accumulated rx_token (a 32-bit
+signed counter) without overflow checking. A malicious sender
+could craft a compressed-token stream that walked rx_token past
+INT32_MAX, with careful manipulation leaking process memory
+contents to the wire (environment variables, passwords, heap
+pointers, library pointers -- significantly weakening ASLR
+and facilitating further exploitation).
+
+Cap rx_token at MAX_TOKEN_INDEX = 0x7ffffffe. Fold the
+bookkeeping into recv_compressed_token_num() and
+recv_compressed_token_run() shared by all three decoders. Reject
+negative or out-of-range token values explicitly. Also cap the
+simple_recv_token literal-block length at the source: any
+wire-supplied length > CHUNK_SIZE is ill-formed (the matching
+simple_send_token never writes a chunk larger than CHUNK_SIZE),
+so reject before looping on attacker-controlled bytes.
+
+Reach: an authenticated daemon connection with compression
+enabled (the default for protocols >= 30 when both peers
+advertise it). Disabling compression on the daemon
+("refuse options = compress" in rsyncd.conf) is the available
+workaround.
+
+Reporter: Omar Elsayed (seks99x).
+
+Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-43618
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/c44c90e9460c666c965446a8c0957f0b9fa4c66a]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Resolved token.c context differences against Wrynose's 3.4.1
+  source, whose three decoder bodies do not all match upstream's
+  surrounding negative-token validation blocks.
+- The Wrynose hunk replaces the older per-decoder token bookkeeping
+  with the upstream recv_compressed_token_num() and
+  recv_compressed_token_run() helper calls at the matching zlib,
+  zstd, and lz4 decoder sites.
+
+(cherry picked from commit c44c90e9460c666c965446a8c0957f0b9fa4c66a)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ receiver.c |  11 +++++-
+ token.c    | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
+index 8cf8366b..a487ad5a 100644
+--- a/receiver.c
++++ b/receiver.c
+@@ -318,7 +318,12 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
+                }
+        }
+
+-      while ((i = recv_token(f_in, &data)) != 0) {
++      while (1) {
++              data = NULL;
++              i = recv_token(f_in, &data);
++              if (i == 0)
++                      break;
++
+                if (INFO_GTE(PROGRESS, 1))
+                        show_progress(offset, total_size);
+
+@@ -326,6 +331,10 @@ static int receive_data(int f_in, char *fname_r, int fd_r, OFF_T size_r,
+                        maybe_send_keepalive(time(NULL), MSK_ALLOW_FLUSH | MSK_ACTIVE_RECEIVER);
+
+                if (i > 0) {
++                      if (!data) {
++                              rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid literal token with no data [%s]\n", who_am_i());
++                              exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++                      }
+                        if (DEBUG_GTE(DELTASUM, 3)) {
+                                rprintf(FINFO,"data recv %d at %s\n",
+                                        i, big_num(offset));
+diff --git a/token.c b/token.c
+index c108b3af..02dabd8d 100644
+--- a/token.c
++++ b/token.c
+@@ -291,6 +291,14 @@ static int32 simple_recv_token(int f, char **data)
+                int32 i = read_int(f);
+                if (i <= 0)
+                        return i;
++              /* simple_send_token caps each literal chunk at CHUNK_SIZE;
++               * reject anything larger so a hostile peer cannot drive the
++               * read_buf below past our static CHUNK_SIZE buffer. */
++              if (i > CHUNK_SIZE) {
++                      rprintf(FERROR, "invalid uncompressed token length %ld [%s]\n",
++                              (long)i, who_am_i());
++                      exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++              }
+                residue = i;
+        }
+
+@@ -493,9 +501,52 @@ static char *cbuf;
+ static char *dbuf;
+
+ /* for decoding runs of tokens */
++#define MAX_TOKEN_INDEX ((int32)0x7ffffffe)
++
+ static int32 rx_token;
+ static int32 rx_run;
+
++static NORETURN void invalid_compressed_token(void)
++{
++      rprintf(FERROR, "invalid token number in compressed stream\n");
++      exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++}
++
++static int32 recv_compressed_token_num(int f, int32 flag)
++{
++      if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
++              int32 incr = flag & 0x3f;
++              if (rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX - incr)
++                      invalid_compressed_token();
++              rx_token += incr;
++              flag >>= 6;
++      } else {
++              rx_token = read_int(f);
++              if (rx_token < 0 || rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX)
++                      invalid_compressed_token();
++      }
++
++      if (flag & 1) {
++              rx_run = read_byte(f);
++              rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
++              if (rx_run <= 0 || rx_token > MAX_TOKEN_INDEX - rx_run)
++                      invalid_compressed_token();
++              recv_state = r_running;
++      }
++
++      return -1 - rx_token;
++}
++
++static int32 recv_compressed_token_run(void)
++{
++      if (rx_run <= 0 || rx_token >= MAX_TOKEN_INDEX)
++              invalid_compressed_token();
++      ++rx_token;
++      if (--rx_run == 0)
++              recv_state = r_idle;
++      return -1 - rx_token;
++}
++
+ /* Receive a deflated token and inflate it */
+ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
+ {
+@@ -586,17 +637,7 @@ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
+                        }
+
+                        /* here we have a token of some kind */
+-                      if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
+-                              rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
+-                              flag >>= 6;
+-                      } else
+-                              rx_token = read_int(f);
+-                      if (flag & 1) {
+-                              rx_run = read_byte(f);
+-                              rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
+-                              recv_state = r_running;
+-                      }
+-                      return -1 - rx_token;
++                      return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
+
+                case r_inflating:
+                        rx_strm.next_out = (Bytef *)dbuf;
+@@ -616,10 +657,7 @@ static int32 recv_deflated_token(int f, char **data)
+                        break;
+
+                case r_running:
+-                      ++rx_token;
+-                      if (--rx_run == 0)
+-                              recv_state = r_idle;
+-                      return -1 - rx_token;
++                      return recv_compressed_token_run();
+                }
+        }
+ }
+@@ -828,17 +866,7 @@ static int32 recv_zstd_token(int f, char **data)
+                                return 0;
+                        }
+                        /* here we have a token of some kind */
+-                      if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
+-                              rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
+-                              flag >>= 6;
+-                      } else
+-                              rx_token = read_int(f);
+-                      if (flag & 1) {
+-                              rx_run = read_byte(f);
+-                              rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
+-                              recv_state = r_running;
+-                      }
+-                      return -1 - rx_token;
++                      return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
+
+                case r_inflated: /* zstd doesn't get into this state */
+                        break;
+@@ -869,10 +897,7 @@ static int32 recv_zstd_token(int f, char **data)
+                        break;
+
+                case r_running:
+-                      ++rx_token;
+-                      if (--rx_run == 0)
+-                              recv_state = r_idle;
+-                      return -1 - rx_token;
++                      return recv_compressed_token_run();
+                }
+        }
+ }
+@@ -992,17 +1017,7 @@ static int32 recv_compressed_token(int f, char **data)
+                        }
+
+                        /* here we have a token of some kind */
+-                      if (flag & TOKEN_REL) {
+-                              rx_token += flag & 0x3f;
+-                              flag >>= 6;
+-                      } else
+-                              rx_token = read_int(f);
+-                      if (flag & 1) {
+-                              rx_run = read_byte(f);
+-                              rx_run += read_byte(f) << 8;
+-                              recv_state = r_running;
+-                      }
+-                      return -1 - rx_token;
++                      return recv_compressed_token_num(f, flag);
+
+                case r_inflating:
+                        avail_out = LZ4_decompress_safe(next_in, dbuf, avail_in, size);
+@@ -1018,10 +1033,7 @@ static int32 recv_compressed_token(int f, char **data)
+                        break;
+
+                case r_running:
+-                      ++rx_token;
+-                      if (--rx_run == 0)
+-                              recv_state = r_idle;
+-                      return -1 - rx_token;
++                      return recv_compressed_token_run();
+                }
+        }
+ }
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb +1 -0
index 47e195ef24..f84f269692 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p4.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p5.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p6.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-43618.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2924bcb3a1ed8b551fc101f740b9f0fe0a202b115027647cf69850d65fd88c52"
 

--
2.35.6

#7 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/6 rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43620

In reply to Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream v3.4.3 backport for CVE-2026-43620. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/0cf200ecbb8baaf58070d825c4fbd892b4a63b69
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-28pw-r563-rxvm

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43620.patch          | 122 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 123 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43620.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43620.patch new file +122 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2852b74b8d
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+From 271771f089f5f7acff5cce1ca3242849b0f6a6a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 16:48:16 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] receiver: add parent_ndx<0 guard, mirroring 797e17f
+
+Commit 797e17f ("fixed an invalid access to files array") added a
+parent_ndx < 0 guard to send_files() in sender.c, but the visually-
+identical block in recv_files() in receiver.c was not updated. A
+malicious rsync:// server can therefore drive any connecting client
+into the same out-of-bounds dir_flist->files[-1] read followed by a
+file_struct dereference in f_name() one line later.
+
+Reach: protocol-30+ default (inc_recurse) makes flist.c:2745 set
+parent_ndx = -1 on the first received flist when the sender omits a
+leading "." entry; rsync.c flist_for_ndx() does not reject ndx == 0
+in that state because the range check evaluates 0 < 0 = false; and
+read_ndx_and_attrs() only validates ndx with the ITEM_TRANSFER bit
+set, so iflags=ITEM_IS_NEW (or any other non-transfer iflag word)
+bypasses the check.
+
+Apply the same guard receiver-side. Confirmed: the same PoC (a
+minimal Python rsyncd that handshakes with CF_INC_RECURSE, sends a
+no-leading-"." flist, and emits ndx=0 with ITEM_IS_NEW) crashes
+unpatched 3.4.2 with SEGV_MAPERR si_addr=0x4101a-class in the
+receiver child; with this guard it exits cleanly with code 2
+(RERR_PROTOCOL).
+
+The attack surface delta over the sender variant is large:
+the original was malicious-client -> daemon, this is
+malicious-server -> any rsync client doing a normal rsync://
+or remote-shell pull.
+
+Reported by Pratham Gupta (alchemy1729).
+
+Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-43620
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/0cf200ecbb8baaf58070d825c4fbd892b4a63b69]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0cf200ecbb8baaf58070d825c4fbd892b4a63b69)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ generator.c | 4 ++++
+ io.c        | 3 +++
+ receiver.c  | 7 ++++++-
+ sender.c    | 2 ++
+ 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c
+index 311e9b78..89f99db4 100644
+--- a/generator.c
++++ b/generator.c
+@@ -2146,6 +2146,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
+ 			if (send_failed)
+ 				ndx = get_hlink_num();
+ 			flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.1");
++			if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
++				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ 			file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
+ 			assert(file->flags & FLAG_HLINKED);
+ 			if (send_failed)
+@@ -2174,6 +2176,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
+ 
+ 			flist = cur_flist;
+ 			cur_flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.2");
++			if (ndx < cur_flist->ndx_start)
++				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ 
+ 			file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
+ 			if (solo_file)
+diff --git a/io.c b/io.c
+index bb60eeca..c654a7ba 100644
+--- a/io.c
++++ b/io.c
+@@ -1090,6 +1090,9 @@ static void got_flist_entry_status(enum festatus status, int ndx)
+ {
+ 	struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "got_flist_entry_status");
+ 
++	if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
++		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++
+ 	if (remove_source_files) {
+ 		active_filecnt--;
+ 		active_bytecnt -= F_LENGTH(flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start]);
+diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
+index a487ad5a..3fa68d71 100644
+--- a/receiver.c
++++ b/receiver.c
+@@ -467,7 +467,10 @@ static void handle_delayed_updates(char *local_name)
+ static void no_batched_update(int ndx, BOOL is_redo)
+ {
+ 	struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "no_batched_update");
+-	struct file_struct *file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
++	struct file_struct *file;
++	if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
++		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++	file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
+ 
+ 	rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "(No batched update for%s \"%s\")\n",
+ 		is_redo ? " resend of" : "", f_name(file, NULL));
+@@ -604,6 +607,8 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
+ 
+ 		if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
+ 			file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
++		else if (cur_flist->parent_ndx < 0)
++			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ 		else
+ 			file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
+ 		fname = local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, fbuf);
+diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
+index 99f431fe..033f87e5 100644
+--- a/sender.c
++++ b/sender.c
+@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ void successful_send(int ndx)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "successful_send");
++	if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
++		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ 	file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
+ 	if (!change_pathname(file, NULL, 0))
+ 		return;
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb +1 -0
index f84f269692..2145d4ce7e 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p5.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p6.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43618.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-43620.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2924bcb3a1ed8b551fc101f740b9f0fe0a202b115027647cf69850d65fd88c52"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#8 lore raw

Re: [wrynose][PATCH v2 4/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43620

Hi,

Please ignore this patch series. I will send corrected patches again.

Regards,
Ashish.

________________________________
From: Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Sent: 17 July 2026 10:50
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: Ashishkumar Parmar -X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Subject: [wrynose][PATCH v2 4/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43620

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream v3.4.3 backport for CVE-2026-43620. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/0cf200ecbb8baaf58070d825c4fbd892b4a63b69
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-28pw-r563-rxvm

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43620.patch          | 122 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 123 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43620.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43620.patch new file +122 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2852b74b8d
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+From 271771f089f5f7acff5cce1ca3242849b0f6a6a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 16:48:16 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] receiver: add parent_ndx<0 guard, mirroring 797e17f
+
+Commit 797e17f ("fixed an invalid access to files array") added a
+parent_ndx < 0 guard to send_files() in sender.c, but the visually-
+identical block in recv_files() in receiver.c was not updated. A
+malicious rsync:// server can therefore drive any connecting client
+into the same out-of-bounds dir_flist->files[-1] read followed by a
+file_struct dereference in f_name() one line later.
+
+Reach: protocol-30+ default (inc_recurse) makes flist.c:2745 set
+parent_ndx = -1 on the first received flist when the sender omits a
+leading "." entry; rsync.c flist_for_ndx() does not reject ndx == 0
+in that state because the range check evaluates 0 < 0 = false; and
+read_ndx_and_attrs() only validates ndx with the ITEM_TRANSFER bit
+set, so iflags=ITEM_IS_NEW (or any other non-transfer iflag word)
+bypasses the check.
+
+Apply the same guard receiver-side. Confirmed: the same PoC (a
+minimal Python rsyncd that handshakes with CF_INC_RECURSE, sends a
+no-leading-"." flist, and emits ndx=0 with ITEM_IS_NEW) crashes
+unpatched 3.4.2 with SEGV_MAPERR si_addr=0x4101a-class in the
+receiver child; with this guard it exits cleanly with code 2
+(RERR_PROTOCOL).
+
+The attack surface delta over the sender variant is large:
+the original was malicious-client -> daemon, this is
+malicious-server -> any rsync client doing a normal rsync://
+or remote-shell pull.
+
+Reported by Pratham Gupta (alchemy1729).
+
+Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-43620
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/0cf200ecbb8baaf58070d825c4fbd892b4a63b69]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0cf200ecbb8baaf58070d825c4fbd892b4a63b69)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ generator.c | 4 ++++
+ io.c        | 3 +++
+ receiver.c  | 7 ++++++-
+ sender.c    | 2 ++
+ 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c
+index 311e9b78..89f99db4 100644
+--- a/generator.c
++++ b/generator.c
+@@ -2146,6 +2146,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
+                        if (send_failed)
+                                ndx = get_hlink_num();
+                        flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.1");
++                      if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
++                              exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+                        file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
+                        assert(file->flags & FLAG_HLINKED);
+                        if (send_failed)
+@@ -2174,6 +2176,8 @@ void check_for_finished_files(int itemizing, enum logcode code, int check_redo)
+
+                        flist = cur_flist;
+                        cur_flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "check_for_finished_files.2");
++                      if (ndx < cur_flist->ndx_start)
++                              exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+
+                        file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
+                        if (solo_file)
+diff --git a/io.c b/io.c
+index bb60eeca..c654a7ba 100644
+--- a/io.c
++++ b/io.c
+@@ -1090,6 +1090,9 @@ static void got_flist_entry_status(enum festatus status, int ndx)
+ {
+        struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "got_flist_entry_status");
+
++      if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
++              exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++
+        if (remove_source_files) {
+                active_filecnt--;
+                active_bytecnt -= F_LENGTH(flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start]);
+diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
+index a487ad5a..3fa68d71 100644
+--- a/receiver.c
++++ b/receiver.c
+@@ -467,7 +467,10 @@ static void handle_delayed_updates(char *local_name)
+ static void no_batched_update(int ndx, BOOL is_redo)
+ {
+        struct file_list *flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "no_batched_update");
+-      struct file_struct *file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
++      struct file_struct *file;
++      if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
++              exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++      file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
+
+        rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "(No batched update for%s \"%s\")\n",
+                is_redo ? " resend of" : "", f_name(file, NULL));
+@@ -604,6 +607,8 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
+
+                if (ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start >= 0)
+                        file = cur_flist->files[ndx - cur_flist->ndx_start];
++              else if (cur_flist->parent_ndx < 0)
++                      exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+                else
+                        file = dir_flist->files[cur_flist->parent_ndx];
+                fname = local_name ? local_name : f_name(file, fbuf);
+diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
+index 99f431fe..033f87e5 100644
+--- a/sender.c
++++ b/sender.c
+@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ void successful_send(int ndx)
+                return;
+
+        flist = flist_for_ndx(ndx, "successful_send");
++      if (ndx < flist->ndx_start)
++              exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+        file = flist->files[ndx - flist->ndx_start];
+        if (!change_pathname(file, NULL, 0))
+                return;
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb +1 -0
index f84f269692..2145d4ce7e 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p5.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p6.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43618.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-43620.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2924bcb3a1ed8b551fc101f740b9f0fe0a202b115027647cf69850d65fd88c52"
 

--
2.35.6

#9 lore raw

PATCH v2 5/6 rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43617

In reply to Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream v3.4.3 backport for CVE-2026-43617. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/c38f20c5ffabacd0c0c483786ab224a36e14bf43
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-rjfm-3w2m-jf4f

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43617.patch          | 201 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 202 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43617.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43617.patch new file +201 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5b3190224e
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+From d811094dc63486a8b6acf23963daccc23e9dbf43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2025 13:50:35 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] clientserver: fix hostname ACL bypass when using daemon
+ chroot
+
+On an rsync daemon configured with "daemon chroot", the reverse-DNS
+lookup of the connecting client was performed *after* the chroot
+had been entered. If the chroot did not contain the files glibc
+needs for resolution (/etc/resolv.conf, /etc/nsswitch.conf,
+/etc/hosts, NSS service modules), the lookup failed and
+client_name() returned "UNKNOWN". Hostname-based deny rules
+("hosts deny = *.evil.example") therefore could not match, and
+an attacker controlling their PTR record could connect from a
+hostname the administrator had intended to deny. IP-based ACLs
+were unaffected.
+
+Do the reverse DNS lookup before chroot/setuid; client_name()
+caches its result, so the post-chroot call uses the cached value
+and hostname-based ACLs work even when DNS is unavailable
+post-chroot.
+
+Adds testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test as end-to-end regression
+coverage. The test sets up an empty chroot directory, configures
+"hosts deny = <localhost-resolved-name>" with daemon chroot, and
+asserts the connection is refused with @ERROR access denied.
+Uses unshare --user --map-root-user for non-root CAP_SYS_CHROOT;
+skips cleanly on non-Linux or when user namespaces aren't
+available.
+
+Reporter: Joshua Rogers (MegaManSec).
+
+Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-43617
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/c38f20c5ffabacd0c0c483786ab224a36e14bf43]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted upstream .github/workflows/macos-build.yml because the
+  Yocto recipe does not carry upstream CI workflow files. That
+  upstream hunk only adds daemon-chroot-acl to the macOS
+  RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED list and has no rsync source/runtime effect.
+
+(cherry picked from commit c38f20c5ffabacd0c0c483786ab224a36e14bf43)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ clientserver.c                   |  22 ++++++
+ testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 133 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test
+
+diff --git a/clientserver.c b/clientserver.c
+index b6eba098..3333aa96 100644
+--- a/clientserver.c
++++ b/clientserver.c
+@@ -1310,6 +1310,28 @@ int start_daemon(int f_in, int f_out)
+ 	if (lp_proxy_protocol() && !read_proxy_protocol_header(f_in))
+ 		return -1;
+ 
++	/* Do reverse DNS lookup before chroot/setuid. The result is cached,
++	 * so the later client_name() call will use this cached value. This
++	 * ensures hostname-based ACLs work even when DNS is unavailable
++	 * after chroot.
++	 *
++	 * "reverse lookup" can be set globally OR per-module, so we also
++	 * scan each module: a deployment with "reverse lookup = no" in the
++	 * global section but "reverse lookup = yes" in a specific module
++	 * still triggers a post-chroot lookup at access-check time
++	 * (rsync_module() in this file), which would also fail in the
++	 * chroot and turn hostname-based deny rules into silent bypasses. */
++	{
++		int need_reverse = lp_reverse_lookup(-1);
++		int j, num_modules = lp_num_modules();
++		for (j = 0; !need_reverse && j < num_modules; j++) {
++			if (lp_reverse_lookup(j))
++				need_reverse = 1;
++		}
++		if (need_reverse)
++			(void)client_name(client_addr(f_in));
++	}
++
+ 	p = lp_daemon_chroot();
+ 	if (*p) {
+ 		log_init(0); /* Make use we've initialized syslog before chrooting. */
+diff --git a/testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test b/testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..9d1c1b63
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test
+@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
++
++# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
++# COPYING).
++
++# Regression test for GHSA-rjfm-3w2m-jf4f: a hostname-based "hosts deny"
++# rule must still match when the daemon performs a 'daemon chroot' and
++# the chroot does not contain the NSS files glibc needs for reverse DNS.
++#
++# Pre-fix, reverse DNS happened *after* the daemon chroot. With an empty
++# chroot the NSS lookup failed, client_name() returned "UNKNOWN", and a
++# deny rule referring to the connecting hostname silently failed to
++# match.
++#
++# Two scenarios are exercised so we can distinguish the case the fix
++# definitely covers from the per-module path that may still be
++# vulnerable:
++#   A. global  "reverse lookup = yes"           (covered by b6abdb4c)
++#   B. only module "reverse lookup = yes"       (gap to verify)
++
++. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
++
++case `uname -s` in
++Linux*) ;;
++*) test_skipped "test is Linux-specific (uses chroot+unshare)" ;;
++esac
++
++# We need CAP_SYS_CHROOT. Re-exec under a user namespace if not root.
++if ! chroot / /bin/true 2>/dev/null; then
++    if [ -z "$RSYNC_UNSHARED" ] && unshare --user --map-root-user true 2>/dev/null; then
++	echo "Re-running under unshare --user --map-root-user..."
++	RSYNC_UNSHARED=1 exec unshare --user --map-root-user "$SHELL_PATH" $RUNSHFLAGS "$0"
++    fi
++    test_skipped "need CAP_SYS_CHROOT (root or unshare --user --map-root-user)"
++fi
++
++# We need 127.0.0.1 to reverse-resolve to a real hostname while NSS is
++# still working (i.e. before the daemon's chroot). The daemon will
++# look that name up itself as part of its hostname-based ACL check;
++# we then deny that name and assert the connection is rejected.
++client_hostname=`getent hosts 127.0.0.1 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==1 {print $2}'`
++if [ -z "$client_hostname" ] || [ "$client_hostname" = "127.0.0.1" ]; then
++    test_skipped "no reverse DNS for 127.0.0.1"
++fi
++
++chrootdir="$scratchdir/chroot"
++rm -rf "$chrootdir"
++mkdir -p "$chrootdir/modroot"
++echo "from chroot" > "$chrootdir/modroot/file1"
++
++conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
++logfile="$scratchdir/rsyncd.log"
++
++write_conf() {
++    cat >"$conf" <<EOF
++use chroot = no
++log file = $logfile
++daemon chroot = $chrootdir
++reverse lookup = $1
++hosts deny = $client_hostname
++max verbosity = 4
++
++[chrootmod]
++    path = /modroot
++    read only = yes
++    reverse lookup = $2
++EOF
++}
++
++# Run a transfer and return 0 if the daemon refused with @ERROR access
++# denied (the expected outcome when the deny rule matches).
++run_check() {
++    label="$1"
++
++    rm -f "$logfile"
++    rm -rf "$todir"
++    mkdir -p "$todir"
++
++    out="$scratchdir/run.out"
++
++    RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
++	$RSYNC -av localhost::chrootmod/ "$todir/" >"$out" 2>&1
++    rc=$?
++
++    echo "----- $label (rsync exit $rc):"
++    cat "$out"
++    echo "----- daemon log:"
++    [ -f "$logfile" ] && cat "$logfile"
++    echo "-----"
++
++    grep -q '@ERROR.*access denied' "$out"
++}
++
++# Scenario A: global reverse lookup. Covered by b6abdb4c.
++write_conf yes yes
++if ! run_check "Scenario A (global reverse lookup = yes)"; then
++    test_fail "Scenario A: hostname deny rule was bypassed"
++fi
++
++# Scenario B: only the per-module reverse-lookup setting is enabled.
++# The b6abdb4c fix only pre-warms client_name()'s cache when the
++# global setting is on, so the post-chroot lookup in this path may
++# still produce "UNKNOWN" and bypass the deny rule.
++write_conf no yes
++if ! run_check "Scenario B (per-module reverse lookup only)"; then
++    test_fail "Scenario B: hostname deny rule was bypassed (per-module reverse lookup with daemon chroot still has the bypass)"
++fi
++
++exit 0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb +1 -0
index 2145d4ce7e..d0d57defe8 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p6.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43618.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43620.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-43617.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2924bcb3a1ed8b551fc101f740b9f0fe0a202b115027647cf69850d65fd88c52"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#10 lore raw

Re: [wrynose][PATCH v2 5/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43617

Hi,

Please ignore this patch series. I will send corrected patches again.

Regards,
Ashish.

________________________________
From: Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Sent: 17 July 2026 10:50
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: Ashishkumar Parmar -X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Subject: [wrynose][PATCH v2 5/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43617

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream v3.4.3 backport for CVE-2026-43617. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/c38f20c5ffabacd0c0c483786ab224a36e14bf43
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-rjfm-3w2m-jf4f

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-43617.patch          | 201 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 202 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43617.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-43617.patch new file +201 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5b3190224e
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+From d811094dc63486a8b6acf23963daccc23e9dbf43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2025 13:50:35 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] clientserver: fix hostname ACL bypass when using daemon
+ chroot
+
+On an rsync daemon configured with "daemon chroot", the reverse-DNS
+lookup of the connecting client was performed *after* the chroot
+had been entered. If the chroot did not contain the files glibc
+needs for resolution (/etc/resolv.conf, /etc/nsswitch.conf,
+/etc/hosts, NSS service modules), the lookup failed and
+client_name() returned "UNKNOWN". Hostname-based deny rules
+("hosts deny = *.evil.example") therefore could not match, and
+an attacker controlling their PTR record could connect from a
+hostname the administrator had intended to deny. IP-based ACLs
+were unaffected.
+
+Do the reverse DNS lookup before chroot/setuid; client_name()
+caches its result, so the post-chroot call uses the cached value
+and hostname-based ACLs work even when DNS is unavailable
+post-chroot.
+
+Adds testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test as end-to-end regression
+coverage. The test sets up an empty chroot directory, configures
+"hosts deny = <localhost-resolved-name>" with daemon chroot, and
+asserts the connection is refused with @ERROR access denied.
+Uses unshare --user --map-root-user for non-root CAP_SYS_CHROOT;
+skips cleanly on non-Linux or when user namespaces aren't
+available.
+
+Reporter: Joshua Rogers (MegaManSec).
+
+Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-43617
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/c38f20c5ffabacd0c0c483786ab224a36e14bf43]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted upstream .github/workflows/macos-build.yml because the
+  Yocto recipe does not carry upstream CI workflow files. That
+  upstream hunk only adds daemon-chroot-acl to the macOS
+  RSYNC_EXPECT_SKIPPED list and has no rsync source/runtime effect.
+
+(cherry picked from commit c38f20c5ffabacd0c0c483786ab224a36e14bf43)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ clientserver.c                   |  22 ++++++
+ testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 133 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test
+
+diff --git a/clientserver.c b/clientserver.c
+index b6eba098..3333aa96 100644
+--- a/clientserver.c
++++ b/clientserver.c
+@@ -1310,6 +1310,28 @@ int start_daemon(int f_in, int f_out)
+        if (lp_proxy_protocol() && !read_proxy_protocol_header(f_in))
+                return -1;
+
++      /* Do reverse DNS lookup before chroot/setuid. The result is cached,
++       * so the later client_name() call will use this cached value. This
++       * ensures hostname-based ACLs work even when DNS is unavailable
++       * after chroot.
++       *
++       * "reverse lookup" can be set globally OR per-module, so we also
++       * scan each module: a deployment with "reverse lookup = no" in the
++       * global section but "reverse lookup = yes" in a specific module
++       * still triggers a post-chroot lookup at access-check time
++       * (rsync_module() in this file), which would also fail in the
++       * chroot and turn hostname-based deny rules into silent bypasses. */
++      {
++              int need_reverse = lp_reverse_lookup(-1);
++              int j, num_modules = lp_num_modules();
++              for (j = 0; !need_reverse && j < num_modules; j++) {
++                      if (lp_reverse_lookup(j))
++                              need_reverse = 1;
++              }
++              if (need_reverse)
++                      (void)client_name(client_addr(f_in));
++      }
++
+        p = lp_daemon_chroot();
+        if (*p) {
+                log_init(0); /* Make use we've initialized syslog before chrooting. */
+diff --git a/testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test b/testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..9d1c1b63
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/testsuite/daemon-chroot-acl.test
+@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
++
++# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
++# COPYING).
++
++# Regression test for GHSA-rjfm-3w2m-jf4f: a hostname-based "hosts deny"
++# rule must still match when the daemon performs a 'daemon chroot' and
++# the chroot does not contain the NSS files glibc needs for reverse DNS.
++#
++# Pre-fix, reverse DNS happened *after* the daemon chroot. With an empty
++# chroot the NSS lookup failed, client_name() returned "UNKNOWN", and a
++# deny rule referring to the connecting hostname silently failed to
++# match.
++#
++# Two scenarios are exercised so we can distinguish the case the fix
++# definitely covers from the per-module path that may still be
++# vulnerable:
++#   A. global  "reverse lookup = yes"           (covered by b6abdb4c)
++#   B. only module "reverse lookup = yes"       (gap to verify)
++
++. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
++
++case `uname -s` in
++Linux*) ;;
++*) test_skipped "test is Linux-specific (uses chroot+unshare)" ;;
++esac
++
++# We need CAP_SYS_CHROOT. Re-exec under a user namespace if not root.
++if ! chroot / /bin/true 2>/dev/null; then
++    if [ -z "$RSYNC_UNSHARED" ] && unshare --user --map-root-user true 2>/dev/null; then
++      echo "Re-running under unshare --user --map-root-user..."
++      RSYNC_UNSHARED=1 exec unshare --user --map-root-user "$SHELL_PATH" $RUNSHFLAGS "$0"
++    fi
++    test_skipped "need CAP_SYS_CHROOT (root or unshare --user --map-root-user)"
++fi
++
++# We need 127.0.0.1 to reverse-resolve to a real hostname while NSS is
++# still working (i.e. before the daemon's chroot). The daemon will
++# look that name up itself as part of its hostname-based ACL check;
++# we then deny that name and assert the connection is rejected.
++client_hostname=`getent hosts 127.0.0.1 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==1 {print $2}'`
++if [ -z "$client_hostname" ] || [ "$client_hostname" = "127.0.0.1" ]; then
++    test_skipped "no reverse DNS for 127.0.0.1"
++fi
++
++chrootdir="$scratchdir/chroot"
++rm -rf "$chrootdir"
++mkdir -p "$chrootdir/modroot"
++echo "from chroot" > "$chrootdir/modroot/file1"
++
++conf="$scratchdir/test-rsyncd.conf"
++logfile="$scratchdir/rsyncd.log"
++
++write_conf() {
++    cat >"$conf" <<EOF
++use chroot = no
++log file = $logfile
++daemon chroot = $chrootdir
++reverse lookup = $1
++hosts deny = $client_hostname
++max verbosity = 4
++
++[chrootmod]
++    path = /modroot
++    read only = yes
++    reverse lookup = $2
++EOF
++}
++
++# Run a transfer and return 0 if the daemon refused with @ERROR access
++# denied (the expected outcome when the deny rule matches).
++run_check() {
++    label="$1"
++
++    rm -f "$logfile"
++    rm -rf "$todir"
++    mkdir -p "$todir"
++
++    out="$scratchdir/run.out"
++
++    RSYNC_CONNECT_PROG="$RSYNC --config=$conf --daemon" \
++      $RSYNC -av localhost::chrootmod/ "$todir/" >"$out" 2>&1
++    rc=$?
++
++    echo "----- $label (rsync exit $rc):"
++    cat "$out"
++    echo "----- daemon log:"
++    [ -f "$logfile" ] && cat "$logfile"
++    echo "-----"
++
++    grep -q '@ERROR.*access denied' "$out"
++}
++
++# Scenario A: global reverse lookup. Covered by b6abdb4c.
++write_conf yes yes
++if ! run_check "Scenario A (global reverse lookup = yes)"; then
++    test_fail "Scenario A: hostname deny rule was bypassed"
++fi
++
++# Scenario B: only the per-module reverse-lookup setting is enabled.
++# The b6abdb4c fix only pre-warms client_name()'s cache when the
++# global setting is on, so the post-chroot lookup in this path may
++# still produce "UNKNOWN" and bypass the deny rule.
++write_conf no yes
++if ! run_check "Scenario B (per-module reverse lookup only)"; then
++    test_fail "Scenario B: hostname deny rule was bypassed (per-module reverse lookup with daemon chroot still has the bypass)"
++fi
++
++exit 0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb +1 -0
index 2145d4ce7e..d0d57defe8 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2026-43619_p6.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43618.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43620.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-43617.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2924bcb3a1ed8b551fc101f740b9f0fe0a202b115027647cf69850d65fd88c52"
 

--
2.35.6

#11 lore raw

PATCH v2 6/6 rsync: Fix CVE-2026-45232

In reply to Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream v3.4.3 backport for CVE-2026-45232. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/a5fc5ebe7a8ef1aa72f6e344599f97fd4427ecba
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-8f85-j2cv-59m8

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-45232.patch          | 240 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 241 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-45232.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-45232.patch new file +240 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..544793bd1d
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+From de47c801a8083f1913e149c6ee6d0e864b728995 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 20:35:35 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] socket: reject over-long proxy response line
+
+fixes a one byte stack overflow when using RSYNC_PROXY with a
+malicious proxy.
+
+Reach: only when RSYNC_PROXY is set and a malicious or MITM'd
+proxy returns the pathological response.  The byte written is
+always '\0' and the attacker doesn't choose the offset, so impact
+is corruption of one adjacent stack byte and possible later
+misbehaviour or crash -- no information disclosure beyond the
+existing rprintf of buffer contents.
+
+Reported by Aisle Research via Michal Ruprich
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-45232
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/a5fc5ebe7a8ef1aa72f6e344599f97fd4427ecba]
+
+(cherry picked from commit a5fc5ebe7a8ef1aa72f6e344599f97fd4427ecba)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ socket.c                                    |  30 +++--
+ testsuite/proxy-response-line-too-long.test | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100755 testsuite/proxy-response-line-too-long.test
+
+diff --git a/socket.c b/socket.c
+index c2075adf..6a8f6f4a 100644
+--- a/socket.c
++++ b/socket.c
+@@ -47,21 +47,23 @@ static struct sigaction sigact;
+ 
+ static int sock_exec(const char *prog);
+ 
++#define PROXY_BUF_SIZE 1024
++
+ /* Establish a proxy connection on an open socket to a web proxy by using the
+  * CONNECT method.  If proxy_user and proxy_pass are not NULL, they are used to
+  * authenticate to the proxy using the "Basic" proxy-authorization protocol. */
+ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_user, char *proxy_pass)
+ {
+-	char *cp, buffer[1024];
+-	char *authhdr, authbuf[1024];
++	char *cp, buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE + 1];
++	char *authhdr, authbuf[PROXY_BUF_SIZE + 1];
+ 	int len;
+ 
+ 	if (proxy_user && proxy_pass) {
+-		stringjoin(buffer, sizeof buffer,
++		stringjoin(buffer, PROXY_BUF_SIZE,
+ 			 proxy_user, ":", proxy_pass, NULL);
+ 		len = strlen(buffer);
+ 
+-		if ((len*8 + 5) / 6 >= (int)sizeof authbuf - 3) {
++		if ((len*8 + 5) / 6 >= PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 3) {
+ 			rprintf(FERROR,
+ 				"authentication information is too long\n");
+ 			return -1;
+@@ -74,14 +76,14 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
+ 		authhdr = "";
+ 	}
+ 
+-	len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof buffer, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0%s%s\r\n\r\n", host, port, authhdr, authbuf);
+-	assert(len > 0 && len < (int)sizeof buffer);
++	len = snprintf(buffer, PROXY_BUF_SIZE, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0%s%s\r\n\r\n", host, port, authhdr, authbuf);
++	assert(len > 0 && len < PROXY_BUF_SIZE);
+ 	if (write(fd, buffer, len) != len) {
+ 		rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to write to proxy");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[sizeof buffer - 1]; cp++) {
++	for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 1]; cp++) {
+ 		if (read(fd, cp, 1) != 1) {
+ 			rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to read from proxy");
+ 			return -1;
+@@ -90,11 +92,13 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
+ 			break;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (*cp != '\n')
+-		cp++;
+-	*cp-- = '\0';
+-	if (*cp == '\r')
+-		*cp = '\0';
++	if (cp == &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 1]) {
++		rprintf(FERROR, "proxy response line too long\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++	*cp = '\0';
++	if (cp > buffer && cp[-1] == '\r')
++		cp[-1] = '\0';
+ 	if (strncmp(buffer, "HTTP/", 5) != 0) {
+ 		rprintf(FERROR, "bad response from proxy -- %s\n",
+ 			buffer);
+@@ -110,7 +114,7 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
+ 	}
+ 	/* throw away the rest of the HTTP header */
+ 	while (1) {
+-		for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[sizeof buffer - 1]; cp++) {
++		for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE]; cp++) {
+ 			if (read(fd, cp, 1) != 1) {
+ 				rsyserr(FERROR, errno,
+ 					"failed to read from proxy");
+diff --git a/testsuite/proxy-response-line-too-long.test b/testsuite/proxy-response-line-too-long.test
+new file mode 100755
+index 00000000..7f55c43b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/testsuite/proxy-response-line-too-long.test
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
++
++# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
++# COPYING).
++
++# Regression test for the off-by-one stack OOB write in
++# establish_proxy_connection() in socket.c when a malicious or
++# man-in-the-middle HTTP proxy returns a first response line of
++# 1023+ bytes without a '\n' terminator.
++#
++# Pre-fix: the read loop walked buffer[0..sizeof-2] one byte at a
++# time, then post-loop logic did "if (*cp != '\n') cp++; *cp-- =
++# '\0';".  If no newline arrived before the loop filled the buffer,
++# cp was left at &buffer[sizeof-1] (never written by the loop),
++# *cp held stale stack bytes, and cp++ pushed cp one past the array.
++# The null-termination then wrote one byte out of bounds on the
++# stack.  AddressSanitizer reports stack-buffer-overflow at the
++# null-termination site.
++#
++# Post-fix: the bound-exhaustion case is detected by position and
++# rejected with an "proxy response line too long" message, so no
++# OOB write occurs and rsync exits with a non-signal status.
++
++. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
++
++command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || test_skipped "python3 not available"
++
++workdir="$scratchdir/workdir"
++mkdir -p "$workdir"
++cd "$workdir"
++
++port_file="$workdir/port"
++proxy_log="$workdir/proxy.log"
++
++# A minimal TCP listener: binds to an ephemeral port on 127.0.0.1,
++# writes the chosen port to $port_file *before* accept() so the test
++# can synchronise without a sleep, accepts one connection, reads
++# until end-of-headers or 64 KiB, sends exactly 1023 bytes of 'X'
++# with no '\n', then closes.
++python3 - "$port_file" >"$proxy_log" 2>&1 <<'PYEOF' &
++import socket, sys, os
++port_file = sys.argv[1]
++s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
++s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
++s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
++port = s.getsockname()[1]
++tmp = port_file + ".tmp"
++with open(tmp, "w") as fp:
++    fp.write("%d\n" % port)
++os.rename(tmp, port_file)   # atomic visibility to the shell side
++s.listen(1)
++conn, _ = s.accept()
++conn.settimeout(5)
++try:
++    data = b""
++    while b"\r\n\r\n" not in data and len(data) < 65536:
++        chunk = conn.recv(8192)
++        if not chunk:
++            break
++        data += chunk
++except socket.timeout:
++    pass
++conn.sendall(b"X" * 1023)    # exactly the buffer-1 trigger size
++try:
++    conn.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
++except OSError:
++    pass
++conn.close()
++s.close()
++PYEOF
++proxy_pid=$!
++
++# Wait up to ~10s for the listener to publish its port.
++i=0
++while [ ! -s "$port_file" ] && [ $i -lt 10 ]; do
++    sleep 1
++    i=$((i + 1))
++done
++
++if [ ! -s "$port_file" ]; then
++    kill "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null
++    cat "$proxy_log" >&2 2>/dev/null
++    test_fail "proxy listener never published a port"
++fi
++
++port=`cat "$port_file"`
++case "$port" in
++    *[!0-9]*|"") kill "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null; test_fail "bogus port from listener: '$port'" ;;
++esac
++
++# Run rsync through the malicious proxy.  Any rsync:// URL works:
++# the proxy intercepts the CONNECT and never forwards anywhere.
++rsync_err="$workdir/rsync.err"
++
++# rsync MUST exit non-zero here (the proxy is misbehaving).
++# Use `|| status=$?` so we capture the real exit code under `sh -e`;
++# `if ! cmd; then status=$?` would only ever see 0 because the `!`
++# is the last command before `$?`.
++status=0
++RSYNC_PROXY="127.0.0.1:$port" \
++    $RSYNC rsync://example.invalid:873/whatever/ "$workdir/out/" \
++    >/dev/null 2>"$rsync_err" || status=$?
++
++# Reap the listener.
++wait "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
++
++# 1. rsync must not have crashed (SIGSEGV/SIGABRT report >= 128).
++if [ "$status" -ge 128 ]; then
++    cat "$rsync_err" >&2
++    test_fail "rsync killed by signal (status=$status) -- possible stack OOB regression"
++fi
++
++# 2. rsync must have actually exited non-zero (i.e. saw the bad proxy).
++if [ "$status" -eq 0 ]; then
++    cat "$rsync_err" >&2
++    test_fail "rsync returned success despite malformed proxy response"
++fi
++
++# 3. The new error message must appear.
++if ! grep -q "proxy response line too long" "$rsync_err"; then
++    cat "$rsync_err" >&2
++    test_fail "expected 'proxy response line too long' in rsync stderr"
++fi
++
++echo "OK: over-long proxy response line rejected cleanly without crashing"
++exit 0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb +1 -0
index d0d57defe8..2744b3a80f 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2026-43618.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43620.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43617.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-45232.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2924bcb3a1ed8b551fc101f740b9f0fe0a202b115027647cf69850d65fd88c52"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#12 lore raw

Re: [wrynose][PATCH v2 6/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-45232

Hi,

Please ignore this patch series. I will send corrected patches again.

Regards,
Ashish.

________________________________
From: Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Sent: 17 July 2026 10:50
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: Ashishkumar Parmar -X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Subject: [wrynose][PATCH v2 6/6] rsync: Fix CVE-2026-45232

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream v3.4.3 backport for CVE-2026-45232. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/a5fc5ebe7a8ef1aa72f6e344599f97fd4427ecba
[2] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/security/advisories/GHSA-8f85-j2cv-59m8

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-45232.patch          | 240 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 241 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-45232.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-45232.patch new file +240 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..544793bd1d
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+From de47c801a8083f1913e149c6ee6d0e864b728995 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 20:35:35 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] socket: reject over-long proxy response line
+
+fixes a one byte stack overflow when using RSYNC_PROXY with a
+malicious proxy.
+
+Reach: only when RSYNC_PROXY is set and a malicious or MITM'd
+proxy returns the pathological response.  The byte written is
+always '\0' and the attacker doesn't choose the offset, so impact
+is corruption of one adjacent stack byte and possible later
+misbehaviour or crash -- no information disclosure beyond the
+existing rprintf of buffer contents.
+
+Reported by Aisle Research via Michal Ruprich
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-45232
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/a5fc5ebe7a8ef1aa72f6e344599f97fd4427ecba]
+
+(cherry picked from commit a5fc5ebe7a8ef1aa72f6e344599f97fd4427ecba)
+Signed-off-by: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>
+---
+ socket.c                                    |  30 +++--
+ testsuite/proxy-response-line-too-long.test | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100755 testsuite/proxy-response-line-too-long.test
+
+diff --git a/socket.c b/socket.c
+index c2075adf..6a8f6f4a 100644
+--- a/socket.c
++++ b/socket.c
+@@ -47,21 +47,23 @@ static struct sigaction sigact;
+
+ static int sock_exec(const char *prog);
+
++#define PROXY_BUF_SIZE 1024
++
+ /* Establish a proxy connection on an open socket to a web proxy by using the
+  * CONNECT method.  If proxy_user and proxy_pass are not NULL, they are used to
+  * authenticate to the proxy using the "Basic" proxy-authorization protocol. */
+ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_user, char *proxy_pass)
+ {
+-      char *cp, buffer[1024];
+-      char *authhdr, authbuf[1024];
++      char *cp, buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE + 1];
++      char *authhdr, authbuf[PROXY_BUF_SIZE + 1];
+        int len;
+
+        if (proxy_user && proxy_pass) {
+-              stringjoin(buffer, sizeof buffer,
++              stringjoin(buffer, PROXY_BUF_SIZE,
+                         proxy_user, ":", proxy_pass, NULL);
+                len = strlen(buffer);
+
+-              if ((len*8 + 5) / 6 >= (int)sizeof authbuf - 3) {
++              if ((len*8 + 5) / 6 >= PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 3) {
+                        rprintf(FERROR,
+                                "authentication information is too long\n");
+                        return -1;
+@@ -74,14 +76,14 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
+                authhdr = "";
+        }
+
+-      len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof buffer, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0%s%s\r\n\r\n", host, port, authhdr, authbuf);
+-      assert(len > 0 && len < (int)sizeof buffer);
++      len = snprintf(buffer, PROXY_BUF_SIZE, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0%s%s\r\n\r\n", host, port, authhdr, authbuf);
++      assert(len > 0 && len < PROXY_BUF_SIZE);
+        if (write(fd, buffer, len) != len) {
+                rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to write to proxy");
+                return -1;
+        }
+
+-      for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[sizeof buffer - 1]; cp++) {
++      for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 1]; cp++) {
+                if (read(fd, cp, 1) != 1) {
+                        rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to read from proxy");
+                        return -1;
+@@ -90,11 +92,13 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
+                        break;
+        }
+
+-      if (*cp != '\n')
+-              cp++;
+-      *cp-- = '\0';
+-      if (*cp == '\r')
+-              *cp = '\0';
++      if (cp == &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE - 1]) {
++              rprintf(FERROR, "proxy response line too long\n");
++              return -1;
++      }
++      *cp = '\0';
++      if (cp > buffer && cp[-1] == '\r')
++              cp[-1] = '\0';
+        if (strncmp(buffer, "HTTP/", 5) != 0) {
+                rprintf(FERROR, "bad response from proxy -- %s\n",
+                        buffer);
+@@ -110,7 +114,7 @@ static int establish_proxy_connection(int fd, char *host, int port, char *proxy_
+        }
+        /* throw away the rest of the HTTP header */
+        while (1) {
+-              for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[sizeof buffer - 1]; cp++) {
++              for (cp = buffer; cp < &buffer[PROXY_BUF_SIZE]; cp++) {
+                        if (read(fd, cp, 1) != 1) {
+                                rsyserr(FERROR, errno,
+                                        "failed to read from proxy");
+diff --git a/testsuite/proxy-response-line-too-long.test b/testsuite/proxy-response-line-too-long.test
+new file mode 100755
+index 00000000..7f55c43b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/testsuite/proxy-response-line-too-long.test
+@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++# Copyright (C) 2026 by Andrew Tridgell
++
++# This program is distributable under the terms of the GNU GPL (see
++# COPYING).
++
++# Regression test for the off-by-one stack OOB write in
++# establish_proxy_connection() in socket.c when a malicious or
++# man-in-the-middle HTTP proxy returns a first response line of
++# 1023+ bytes without a '\n' terminator.
++#
++# Pre-fix: the read loop walked buffer[0..sizeof-2] one byte at a
++# time, then post-loop logic did "if (*cp != '\n') cp++; *cp-- =
++# '\0';".  If no newline arrived before the loop filled the buffer,
++# cp was left at &buffer[sizeof-1] (never written by the loop),
++# *cp held stale stack bytes, and cp++ pushed cp one past the array.
++# The null-termination then wrote one byte out of bounds on the
++# stack.  AddressSanitizer reports stack-buffer-overflow at the
++# null-termination site.
++#
++# Post-fix: the bound-exhaustion case is detected by position and
++# rejected with an "proxy response line too long" message, so no
++# OOB write occurs and rsync exits with a non-signal status.
++
++. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
++
++command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || test_skipped "python3 not available"
++
++workdir="$scratchdir/workdir"
++mkdir -p "$workdir"
++cd "$workdir"
++
++port_file="$workdir/port"
++proxy_log="$workdir/proxy.log"
++
++# A minimal TCP listener: binds to an ephemeral port on 127.0.0.1,
++# writes the chosen port to $port_file *before* accept() so the test
++# can synchronise without a sleep, accepts one connection, reads
++# until end-of-headers or 64 KiB, sends exactly 1023 bytes of 'X'
++# with no '\n', then closes.
++python3 - "$port_file" >"$proxy_log" 2>&1 <<'PYEOF' &
++import socket, sys, os
++port_file = sys.argv[1]
++s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
++s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
++s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
++port = s.getsockname()[1]
++tmp = port_file + ".tmp"
++with open(tmp, "w") as fp:
++    fp.write("%d\n" % port)
++os.rename(tmp, port_file)   # atomic visibility to the shell side
++s.listen(1)
++conn, _ = s.accept()
++conn.settimeout(5)
++try:
++    data = b""
++    while b"\r\n\r\n" not in data and len(data) < 65536:
++        chunk = conn.recv(8192)
++        if not chunk:
++            break
++        data += chunk
++except socket.timeout:
++    pass
++conn.sendall(b"X" * 1023)    # exactly the buffer-1 trigger size
++try:
++    conn.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
++except OSError:
++    pass
++conn.close()
++s.close()
++PYEOF
++proxy_pid=$!
++
++# Wait up to ~10s for the listener to publish its port.
++i=0
++while [ ! -s "$port_file" ] && [ $i -lt 10 ]; do
++    sleep 1
++    i=$((i + 1))
++done
++
++if [ ! -s "$port_file" ]; then
++    kill "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null
++    cat "$proxy_log" >&2 2>/dev/null
++    test_fail "proxy listener never published a port"
++fi
++
++port=`cat "$port_file"`
++case "$port" in
++    *[!0-9]*|"") kill "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null; test_fail "bogus port from listener: '$port'" ;;
++esac
++
++# Run rsync through the malicious proxy.  Any rsync:// URL works:
++# the proxy intercepts the CONNECT and never forwards anywhere.
++rsync_err="$workdir/rsync.err"
++
++# rsync MUST exit non-zero here (the proxy is misbehaving).
++# Use `|| status=$?` so we capture the real exit code under `sh -e`;
++# `if ! cmd; then status=$?` would only ever see 0 because the `!`
++# is the last command before `$?`.
++status=0
++RSYNC_PROXY="127.0.0.1:$port" \
++    $RSYNC rsync://example.invalid:873/whatever/ "$workdir/out/" \
++    >/dev/null 2>"$rsync_err" || status=$?
++
++# Reap the listener.
++wait "$proxy_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
++
++# 1. rsync must not have crashed (SIGSEGV/SIGABRT report >= 128).
++if [ "$status" -ge 128 ]; then
++    cat "$rsync_err" >&2
++    test_fail "rsync killed by signal (status=$status) -- possible stack OOB regression"
++fi
++
++# 2. rsync must have actually exited non-zero (i.e. saw the bad proxy).
++if [ "$status" -eq 0 ]; then
++    cat "$rsync_err" >&2
++    test_fail "rsync returned success despite malformed proxy response"
++fi
++
++# 3. The new error message must appear.
++if ! grep -q "proxy response line too long" "$rsync_err"; then
++    cat "$rsync_err" >&2
++    test_fail "expected 'proxy response line too long' in rsync stderr"
++fi
++
++echo "OK: over-long proxy response line rejected cleanly without crashing"
++exit 0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.4.1.bb +1 -0
index d0d57defe8..2744b3a80f 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2026-43618.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43620.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-43617.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-45232.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2924bcb3a1ed8b551fc101f740b9f0fe0a202b115027647cf69850d65fd88c52"
 

--
2.35.6

#13 lore raw
In reply to Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

Hi,

Please ignore this patch series. I will send corrected patches again.

Regards,
Ashish.
________________________________
From: Ashishkumar Parmar X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Sent: 17 July 2026 10:50
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: Ashishkumar Parmar -X (asparmar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Subject: [wrynose][PATCH v2 0/6] rsync: Fix multiple CVEs

From: Ashishkumar Parmar <[email protected]>

Backport the upstream rsync security fixes for CVE-2026-29518, CVE-2026-43617, CVE-2026-43618, CVE-2026-43619, CVE-2026-43620, and CVE-2026-45232 to Wrynose.

Changes in v2:
- Updated the CVE-2026-43619 backport to restore the upstream commit description and explanatory comments for the openat2/Android fallback handling.
- Clarified the Wrynose-specific Backport Changes metadata.
- No functional changes were made to the other five CVE patches.

Ashishkumar Parmar (6):
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-29518
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43619
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43618
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43620
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-43617
rsync: Fix CVE-2026-45232

--
2.35.6