nvmet: passthru: fix OOB reads when parsing ns id descriptor list
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 nvmet: passthru: fix OOB reads when parsing ns id descriptor list
nvmet_passthru_override_id_descs() walks a namespace identification descriptor list populated from the underlying passthru controller's Identify response, which is device reported. The loop advanced pos by device controlled amounts (sizeof(*cur) + nidl) without checking that the next descriptor header actually fits inside the buffer, so a malicious device could push pos to within a few bytes of the buffer end and cause cur->nidl, cur->nidt or the reserved field to be read past the allocation.
Additionally, when a CSI descriptor lands exactly at the last valid header offset, cur + 1 points one byte past the end of the buffer. The unconditional memcpy(&csi, cur + 1, NVME_NIDT_CSI_LEN) could read that out-of-bounds byte and copy it back to the initiator via nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), leaking adjacent heap memory.
Bounds check both the descriptor header and the CSI value before dereferencing them.
--- drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c +8 -0
@@ -53,13 +53,21 @@ static u16 nvmet_passthru_override_id_descs(struct nvmet_req *req)for (pos =0 ; pos <NVME_IDENTIFY_DATA_SIZE ; pos += len) {struct nvme_ns_id_desc *cur = data + pos; +if (pos +sizeof (*cur) >NVME_IDENTIFY_DATA_SIZE ) +break ; +if (cur->nidl ==0 )break ; +if (cur->nidt ==NVME_NIDT_CSI ) { +if (pos +sizeof (*cur) +NVME_NIDT_CSI_LEN >NVME_IDENTIFY_DATA_SIZE ) +break ; +memcpy (&csi, cur +1 ,NVME_NIDT_CSI_LEN ); csi_seen = true;break ; } + len =sizeof (struct nvme_ns_id_desc ) + cur->nidl; }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Christoph Hellwig
maintainerQuoted 29 lines · Hari Mishal
nvmet_passthru_override_id_descs()walks a namespace identification descriptor list populated from the underlying passthru controller's Identify response, which is device reported. The loop advanced pos by device controlled amounts (sizeof(*cur)+ nidl) without checking that the next descriptor header actually fits inside the buffer, so a malicious device could push pos to within a few bytes of the buffer end and causecur->nidl,cur->nidtor the reserved field to be read past the allocation.Additionally, when a CSI descriptor lands exactly at the last valid header offset, cur + 1 points one byte past the end of the buffer. The unconditional
memcpy(&csi, cur + 1, NVME_NIDT_CSI_LEN)could read that out-of-bounds byte and copy it back to the initiator vianvmet_copy_to_sgl(), leaking adjacent heap memory.Bounds check both the descriptor header and the CSI value before dereferencing them.
Signed-off-by Hari Mishal <[email protected]>--- drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c +0
-0@@ -53,13 +53,21 @@ static u16 nvmet_passthru_override_id_descs(struct nvmet_req *req)for (pos =0 ; pos <NVME_IDENTIFY_DATA_SIZE ; pos += len) {
drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c static u16 nvmet_passthru_override_id_descs(struct nvmet_req *req) · line 63
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c +5
-0struct nvme_ns_id_desc *cur = data + pos; +if (pos +sizeof (*cur) >NVME_IDENTIFY_DATA_SIZE ) +break ; +if (cur->nidl ==0 )break ; +if (cur->nidt ==NVME_NIDT_CSI ) { +if (pos +sizeof (*cur) +NVME_NIDT_CSI_LEN >NVME_IDENTIFY_DATA_SIZE )
Overly long line here. Otherwise this looks sane.
Thanks, applied to nvme-7.3 with fix to overly long line.