smb: client: bound dirent name against end of SMB response in cifs_filldir
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 smb: client: bound dirent name against end of SMB response in cifs_filldir
cifs_filldir() copies the entry name out of an SMB1 TRANS2_FIND_FIRST / FIND_NEXT response using a length (de.namelen) supplied by the server. The kmalloc'd SMB response buffer is bounded, but nothing checks that de.name + de.namelen still lies inside that buffer before the eventual filldir64() -> verify_dirent_name() -> memchr() reads namelen bytes.
A hostile SMB1 server that returns an oversized FileNameLength in a directory entry therefore causes memchr() to read past the end of the response slab buffer. Reachable from any user who can list a directory on a CIFS mount served by an attacker-controlled server (getdents64() on the mounted directory):
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memchr+0x71/0x80 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800e0640cc by task poc/115 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x80 print_report+0xce/0x620 kasan_report+0xec/0x120 memchr+0x71/0x80 filldir64+0x4c/0x6a0 cifs_filldir.constprop.0+0x9bb/0x1e00 cifs_readdir+0x2101/0x3380 iterate_dir+0x19c/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x126/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x107/0x5a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Pass the end-of-response pointer down to cifs_filldir() and reject entries whose name would extend past that boundary.
This bug was discovered by Artiphishell's vTriage pipeline, which generated a userspace reproducer (an emulated hostile SMB1 server plus a getdents64() client) that reliably triggers the KASAN report on an unpatched kernel. The fix below was drafted with the Claude coding assistant; a userspace reproducer is available on request.
--- fs/smb/client/readdir.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/client/readdir.c +7 -2
@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@static int cifs_filldir (char *find_entry,struct file *file,struct dir_context *ctx,char *scratch_buf,unsigned int max_len, -struct cached_fid *cfid) +char *end_of_smb,struct cached_fid *cfid) {struct cifsFileInfo *file_info = file->private_data;struct super_block *sb =file_inode (file)->i_sb;
@@ -973,6 +973,11 @@ de.namelen);return -EINVAL ; } + +if (de.name + de.namelen > end_of_smb) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"search entry name extends past end of SMB\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }/* skip . and .. since we added them first */ if (cifs_entry_is_dot (&de, file_info->srch_inf.unicode))
@@ -1194,7 +1194,7 @@*/ *tmp_buf =0 ; rc =cifs_filldir (current_entry, file, ctx, - tmp_buf, max_len, cfid); + tmp_buf, max_len, end_of_smb, cfid);if (rc) {if (rc >0 ) rc =0 ;
merged into cifs-2.6.git for-next pending additional review and testing
Quoted 77 lines · Jay Vadayath
cifs_filldir()copies the entry name out of an SMB1TRANS2_FIND_FIRST/FIND_NEXTresponse using a length (de.namelen) supplied by the server. The kmalloc'd SMB response buffer is bounded, but nothing checks that de.name + de.namelen still lies inside that buffer before the eventualfilldir64()->verify_dirent_name()->memchr()reads namelen bytes.A hostile SMB1 server that returns an oversized FileNameLength in a directory entry therefore causes
memchr()to read past the end of the response slab buffer. Reachable from any user who can list a directory on a CIFS mount served by an attacker-controlled server (getdents64()on the mounted directory):BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memchr+0x71/0x80 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800e0640cc by task poc/115 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x80 print_report+0xce/0x620 kasan_report+0xec/0x120 memchr+0x71/0x80 filldir64+0x4c/0x6a0 cifs_filldir.constprop.0+0x9bb/0x1e00 cifs_readdir+0x2101/0x3380 iterate_dir+0x19c/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x126/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x107/0x5a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7fPass the end-of-response pointer down to
cifs_filldir()and reject entries whose name would extend past that boundary.This bug was discovered by Artiphishell's vTriage pipeline, which generated a userspace reproducer (an emulated hostile SMB1 server plus a
getdents64()client) that reliably triggers the KASAN report on an unpatched kernel. The fix below was drafted with the Claude coding assistant; a userspace reproducer is available on request.Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7Signed-off-by Jay Vadayath <[email protected]>--- fs/smb/client/readdir.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/smb/client/readdir.c +7
-2@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@static int cifs_filldir (char *find_entry,struct file *file,struct dir_context *ctx,char *scratch_buf,unsigned int max_len, -struct cached_fid *cfid) +char *end_of_smb,struct cached_fid *cfid) {struct cifsFileInfo *file_info = file->private_data;struct super_block *sb =file_inode (file)->i_sb;@@ -973,6 +973,11 @@ de.namelen);return -EINVAL ; } + +if (de.name + de.namelen > end_of_smb) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"search entry name extends past end of SMB\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }/* skip . and .. since we added them first */ if (cifs_entry_is_dot (&de, file_info->srch_inf.unicode))@@ -1194,7 +1194,7 @@*/ *tmp_buf =0 ; rc =cifs_filldir (current_entry, file, ctx, - tmp_buf, max_len, cfid); + tmp_buf, max_len, end_of_smb, cfid);if (rc) {if (rc >0 ) rc =0 ;
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, Steve