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Add support to boot TI K3 HSM M4 core

PATCH Superseded Beleswar Padhi 2 participants 10 messages Jul 20

Subsystems (3)

v5 of 8 Superseded Latest is v8 →

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#0 lore raw

v5 cover Add support to boot TI K3 HSM M4 core

Some TI K3 SoCs like J721S2, J784S4, and J722S have a HSM (High Security Module) M4F core in the Wakeup Voltage Domain which could be used to run secure services like Authentication. Boot flow for HSM M4 core is different than the general purpose M4F cores, and is as below:

1. Request control of HSM M4F remote processor.
2. Assert Reset on the HSM M4F remote processor.
3. Request Secure Entity to Authenticate and Load HSM firmware into core's internal SRAM memory region. For GP device, load the firmware manually into core's SRAM region.
4. Deassert Reset on the HSM M4F remote processor.
5. Release control of HSM M4F remote processor.

This series adds support to boot HSM M4 core from R5 SPL stage. The HSM firmware is packed inside the tispl.bin fit image. The firmware is unpacked into a temporary DDR address which is then used to load HSM core. The configs to boot HSM M4 core are disabled by default.

Additional documentation on HSM M4 core usage:
https://software-dl.ti.com/jacinto7/esd/processor-sdk-linux-j784s4/latest/exports/docs/linux/Foundational_Components/U-Boot/UG-HSM.html

v5: Changelog:
[Simon]:
1. Add 'depends on SOC_K3_J721S2 || SOC_K3_J784S4 || SOC_K3_J722S' for KConfig options.
2. Use hyphens in DT property names and underscores in python code.
3. Add comments to explain DT property values and link to ti-sci documentation
4. Use lower-case hex for DT property values.
5. Use consistent whitespaces.
6. Add property documentation in function docstring.
7. Log missing properties for boot and load extension groups.
8. Update tests to check the load and boot sections contain the expected values from test DTS. Add negative tests to check it raises an error when some of the properties are missing.
9. Driver improvements: Size check before memcpy(), type-casting, and checking device type via get_device_type().
10. Invoke ti_secure_image_post_process() only once for HSM images.
[General]:
1. Explicitly mention the load address of the HSM image in the FIT. Don't rely on U-Boot to assign a fallback load address. Use a Kconfig option to specify the HSM load address.
2. Pick up R/B tags from Neha and Simon.
3. Squash various patches together as they are atomic.

Link to v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v4: Changelog:
Re-spinning after Device Tree Syncup happened from Linux to U-Boot. [Andrew]:
1. Reworded commit message on [PATCH v4 03/11].
[Simon]:
1. Add a binman test for the boot & load extensions in certificate in

     [PATCH v4 08/11].

General:
1. Drop J722S defconfig changes out of this series. Will be posted/discussed separately.

Link to v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v3: Changelog:
[Andrew]:
1. Added dedicated remoteproc driver for booting HSM core.
2. Added support for signing HSM firmware images in U-Boot. [Anshul]
General:
1. Add support for booting HSM on J722S SoC as well.

Link to v2:
http://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v2: Changelog:
[Andrew]:
1. Added support in SPL to load FIT images with no 'load' property.
2. Removed 'default = n' in CONFIG option.
3. Used __maybe_unused to decrease preprocessing.
4. Better error messages with error code.
[Udit]:
1. Added 'HSM' entries in enum at the last.
2. Added error condition in if-elseif-else ladder.
3. Hang System boot when HSM failed to boot properly.

Link to v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Testing done:
1. Tested HSM boot across GP, HS-FS, HS-SE device types for J721S2, J784S4 and J722S SoCs.

Logs after enabling HSM boot configs:
https://gist.github.com/3V3RYONE/ad33683652c8c49e4fedab49f0493e79

Beleswar Padhi (7):
arm: mach-k3: Explicitly identify TIFSSTUB images when discarding
buffers
arm: mach-k3: Add config options for packaging HSM firmware
arm: dts: k3-{j721s2/j722s/j784s4}-binman: Add template for packing
HSM firmware
binman: openssl: Add boot and load extensions to x509 cert
arm: dts: k3-{j721s2/j722s/j784s4}-r5.dtsi: Enable HSM core
remoteproc: k3-hsm: Introduce a remoteproc driver for K3 HSM core
arm: mach-k3: r5: common: Invoke boot of HSM M4 core

 MAINTAINERS                                   |   1 +
 arch/arm/dts/k3-binman.dtsi                   |  26 ++
 arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-binman.dtsi            |  12 +
 arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-r5.dtsi                |  10 +
 arch/arm/dts/k3-j722s-binman.dtsi             |  12 +
 arch/arm/dts/k3-j722s-r5.dtsi                 |  10 +
 arch/arm/dts/k3-j784s4-binman.dtsi            |  12 +
 arch/arm/dts/k3-j784s4-r5.dtsi                |   9 +
 arch/arm/mach-k3/Kconfig                      |  16 ++
 arch/arm/mach-k3/r5/common.c                  |  32 ++-
 drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig                    |  10 +
 drivers/remoteproc/Makefile                   |   1 +
 drivers/remoteproc/ti_k3_hsm_rproc.c          | 267 ++++++++++++++++++
 tools/binman/btool/openssl.py                 |  49 +++-
 tools/binman/etype/ti_secure.py               |  65 +++++
 tools/binman/etype/x509_cert.py               |   4 +-
 tools/binman/ftest.py                         |  45 +++
 .../test/vendor/ti_secure_boot_load_ext.dts   |  23 ++
 .../ti_secure_boot_load_ext_partial.dts       |  20 ++
 19 files changed, 614 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/ti_k3_hsm_rproc.c
 create mode 100644 tools/binman/test/vendor/ti_secure_boot_load_ext.dts
 create mode 100644 tools/binman/test/vendor/ti_secure_boot_load_ext_partial.dts
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/7 arm: mach-k3: Explicitly identify TIFSSTUB images when discarding buffers

The board_fit_image_post_process() function assumes that all TIFSSTUB images appear at the end of the image_os_match[] array by using the condition:

	i < IMAGE_AMT && i > IMAGE_ID_DM_FW

However, this assumption breaks when new image types are appended to the enum and the array, causing unintended image types to match this condition and having their buffer sizes incorrectly set to 0 with:

	*p_size = 0

To avoid this issue, replace the range-based check with an explicit match for TIFSSTUB image IDs.

---
v5: Changelog:
1. Add R/B tags.

Link to v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v4: Changelog:
1. Added the correct condition in commit message. [Andrew]

Link to v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v3: Changelog:
1. None

Link to v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v2: Changelog:
1. New patch. Fixes condition to allow new images to be added at the end of the enum.

 arch/arm/mach-k3/r5/common.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/mach-k3/r5/common.c +2 -1
index 484d96f9536..a0e1b791c82 100644
@@ -347,7 +347,8 @@ void board_fit_image_post_process(const void *fit, int node, void **p_image,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (i < IMAGE_AMT && i > IMAGE_ID_DM_FW) {
+	if (i == IMAGE_ID_TIFSSTUB_HS || i == IMAGE_ID_TIFSSTUB_FS ||
+	    i == IMAGE_ID_TIFSSTUB_GP) {
 		int device_type = get_device_type();
 
 		if ((device_type == K3_DEVICE_TYPE_HS_SE &&
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5 1/7] arm: mach-k3: Explicitly identify TIFSSTUB images when discarding buffers

On July 20, 2026 thus sayeth Beleswar Padhi:

Quoted 6 lines

The board_fit_image_post_process() function assumes that all TIFSSTUB images appear at the end of the image_os_match[] array by using the condition:

	i < IMAGE_AMT && i > IMAGE_ID_DM_FW
Quoted 9 lines

However, this assumption breaks when new image types are appended to the enum and the array, causing unintended image types to match this condition and having their buffer sizes incorrectly set to 0 with:

	*p_size = 0

To avoid this issue, replace the range-based check with an explicit match for TIFSSTUB image IDs.

Is this needed anymore? I think Aristo has already fixed this[0]

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/u-boot/[email protected]/

~Bryan

#3 lore raw

PATCH v5 2/7 arm: mach-k3: Add config options for packaging HSM firmware

In reply to Beleswar Padhi

Some K3 SoCs like J721S2, and J784S4 have a HSM (High Security Module) M4F core in the Wakeup Voltage Domain which could be used to run secure services like Authentication. Add a config option which indicates that the SoC has a HSM core and the firmware for the core is available.

Add another config option (K3_HSM_LOAD_ADDR) to specify the load address for the HSM firmware image. This address is used to build the FIT image header that places the HSM image in memory during boot.

---
v5: Changelog:
1. Add new config option to specify the load address of HSM firmware in memory.
2. Add R/B tags.

Link to v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v4: Changelog:
1. None

Link to v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v3: Changelog:
1. Updated description of config to match with functionality.

Link to v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v2: Changelog:
1. Removed 'default = n' line from CONFIG.

Link to v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

 arch/arm/mach-k3/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mach-k3/Kconfig +16 -0
index a32ed3a9683..f7b42a4912b 100644
@@ -198,6 +198,22 @@ config K3_REMOTEPROC_PRU
 	imply REMOTEPROC_TI_PRU
 	default y if (SOC_K3_AM642 || SOC_K3_AM654)
 
+config K3_HSM_FW
+	bool "Package firmware for HSM core"
+	depends on (SOC_K3_J721S2 || SOC_K3_J784S4 || SOC_K3_J722S)
+	help
+	  Enabling this will indicate that the system has a HSM (High Security
+	  Module) M4 Core and the firmware for the core is available. When
+	  enabled, the firmware for HSM core will be packaged inside tispl.bin.
+
+config K3_HSM_LOAD_ADDR
+	hex "Load address of HSM image"
+	depends on K3_HSM_FW
+	default 0x82000000
+	help
+	  The load address for the HSM image. This value is used to build the
+	  FIT image header that places HSM image in memory.
+
 if CPU_V7R
 source "arch/arm/mach-k3/r5/Kconfig"
 endif
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH v5 3/7 arm: dts: k3-{j721s2/j722s/j784s4}-binman: Add template for packing HSM firmware

In reply to Beleswar Padhi

The HSM M4 core needs to be booted at R5 SPL stage so that it can be used for further Authentication and security services. Therefore, the firmware for the HSM core needs to be packed in tispl.bin fit image so that it can be used by R5 SPL to boot the HSM core. By default, point to the firmware for HS-SE device type. This needs to be changed to point to appropriate firmware when using a different device type.

Add a template for packing the HSM firmware in tispl.bin. The template also contains necessary fields which will be populated in the boot extension and load extension in the x509 certificate for HSM firmware. This is required as the HSM firmware needs to be signed before invoking TIFS to authenticate and load the blob to HSM core.

Note: The os = "hsm" property is matched against image_os_match[IMAGE_ID_HSM] in arch/arm/mach-k3/r5/common.c during post-processing. This string must be kept consistent between the device tree and code, as changing it will break the image identification logic.

---
v5: Changelog:
1. Squash [PATCH v4 05/11] and [PATCH v4 06/11] into [PATCH v5 3/7] for bisectability.
2. Use hyphens in DT property names.
3. Update commit message to call out os = "hsm" matching criteria.
4. Add comments explaining DT property values and add link to ti-sci documentation.
5. Use whitespaces consistently.
6. Add R/B tags.

Link to v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v4: Changelog:
1. Changed phandle from hsm to hsm_fw in 'content' field to match with node label.

Link to v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v3: Changelog:
1. Added ti-secure node for signing hsm firmware image in U-Boot.

Link to v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v2: Changelog:
1. Got rid of 'load' and 'entry' properties. Rely on U-Boot to set it.

Link to v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

 arch/arm/dts/k3-binman.dtsi        | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-binman.dtsi | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/arm/dts/k3-j722s-binman.dtsi  | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/arm/dts/k3-j784s4-binman.dtsi | 12 ++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
arch/arm/dts/k3-binman.dtsi +26 -0
index ad127663d03..af752619255 100644
@@ -297,6 +297,32 @@
 					};
 				};
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_K3_HSM_FW
+				hsm {
+					description = "HSM binary";
+					type = "standalone";
+					compression = "none";
+					os = "hsm";
+					load = <CONFIG_K3_HSM_LOAD_ADDR>;
+
+					ti-secure {
+						/*
+						 * HSM (Hardware Security Module) core boot configuration.
+						 * Refer to TIFS Boot Extension format specification:
+						 * https://software-dl.ti.com/tisci/esd/latest/2_tisci_msgs/security/sec_cert_format.html#sysfw-boot-ext
+						 */
+						content = <&hsm_fw>;
+						keyfile = "custMpk.pem";
+						proc-id = <0x80>;      /* HSM core processor ID */
+						flags-set = <0x04>;    /* Bit 2: Release processor from reset */
+						flags-clr = <0x00>;    /* No flags to clear */
+						reset-vector = <0x00>; /* HSM starts execution from address 0x0 */
+						dest-addr = <0x43c00000>; /* Load address: HSM SRAM base */
+						auth-type = <0xfd00>;  /* Upper byte 0xfd: HSM host ID, lower byte 0x00: Copy to dest-addr */
+					};
+				};
+#endif
+
 				dm {
 					description = "DM binary";
 					type = "firmware";
arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-binman.dtsi +12 -0
index f79b3e543ae..2b36b04965e 100644
@@ -268,6 +268,14 @@
 
 					};
 				};
+#ifdef CONFIG_K3_HSM_FW
+				hsm {
+					hsm_fw: blob-ext {
+						filename = "ti-hsm/hsm-demo-firmware-j721s2-hs.bin";
+					};
+				};
+#endif
+
 				dm {
 					ti-secure {
 						content = <&dm>;
@@ -300,7 +308,11 @@
 				conf-0 {
 					description = "k3-j721s2-common-proc-board";
 					firmware = "atf";
+#ifdef CONFIG_K3_HSM_FW
+					loadables = "hsm", "tee", "dm", "spl";
+#else
 					loadables = "tee", "dm", "spl";
+#endif
 					fdt = "fdt-0";
 				};
 			};
arch/arm/dts/k3-j722s-binman.dtsi +12 -0
index 278b7bfac7f..3834d081c30 100644
@@ -117,6 +117,14 @@
 
 		fit {
 			images {
+#ifdef CONFIG_K3_HSM_FW
+				hsm {
+					hsm_fw: blob-ext {
+						filename = "ti-hsm/hsm-demo-firmware-j722s-hs.bin";
+					};
+				};
+#endif
+
 				dm {
 					ti-secure {
 						content = <&dm>;
@@ -153,7 +161,11 @@
 				conf-0 {
 					description = "k3-j722s-evm";
 					firmware = "atf";
+#ifdef CONFIG_K3_HSM_FW
+					loadables = "hsm", "tee", "dm", "spl";
+#else
 					loadables = "tee", "dm", "spl";
+#endif
 					fdt = "fdt-0";
 				};
 			};
arch/arm/dts/k3-j784s4-binman.dtsi +12 -0
index 34b2cc1e681..ac12335a84c 100644
@@ -154,6 +154,14 @@
 
 		fit {
 			images {
+#ifdef CONFIG_K3_HSM_FW
+				hsm {
+					hsm_fw: blob-ext {
+						filename = "ti-hsm/hsm-demo-firmware-j784s4-hs.bin";
+					};
+				};
+#endif
+
 				dm {
 					ti-secure {
 						content = <&dm>;
@@ -188,7 +196,11 @@
 				conf-0 {
 					description = BOARD_DESCRIPTION;
 					firmware = "atf";
+#ifdef CONFIG_K3_HSM_FW
+					loadables = "hsm", "tee", "dm", "spl";
+#else
 					loadables = "tee", "dm", "spl";
+#endif
 					fdt = "fdt-0";
 				};
 			};
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH v5 4/7 binman: openssl: Add boot and load extensions to x509 cert

In reply to Beleswar Padhi

The boot and load extensions in the x509 certificate are required for requesting the secure entity (TIFS) to boot a core. These fields are defined in the binman node for each core that must be booted by TIFS and must be included when generating the signed certificate.

Add support to parse the boot and load extension properties from the binman node and populate them into the certificate. If any of the mandatory properties for an extension are missing, that respective extension section is NOT added to the certificate.

Add test coverage for the boot and load extension functionality in ti-secure certificates. The test reads the generated config file and verifies the sysfw_boot_seq and sysfw_image_load sections contain the expected values from the DTS. The negative test verifies that partially specified boot/load extension properties trigger an error.

---
v5: Changelog:
1. Log missing properties and raise exception rather than returning silently.
2. Squash [PATCH v4 07/11] and [PATCH v4 08/11] into [PATCH v5 4/7]
3. Document properties in function docstring.
4. Update tests to check the load and boot sections contain the expected values from test DTS. Add negative tests to check it raises an error when some of the properties are missing.
5. Add R/B tags.

Link to v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v4: Changelog:
1. None

Link to v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v3: Changelog:
1. New patch. Add support to sign HSM firmware here in U-Boot.

 tools/binman/btool/openssl.py                 | 49 ++++++++++++--
 tools/binman/etype/ti_secure.py               | 65 +++++++++++++++++++
 tools/binman/etype/x509_cert.py               |  4 +-
 tools/binman/ftest.py                         | 45 +++++++++++++
 .../test/vendor/ti_secure_boot_load_ext.dts   | 23 +++++++
 .../ti_secure_boot_load_ext_partial.dts       | 20 ++++++
 6 files changed, 201 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/binman/test/vendor/ti_secure_boot_load_ext.dts
 create mode 100644 tools/binman/test/vendor/ti_secure_boot_load_ext_partial.dts
tools/binman/btool/openssl.py +45 -4
index b26f087c447..39ea4a51356 100644
@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ imageSize              = INTEGER:{len(indata)}
         return self.run_cmd(*args)
 
     def x509_cert_sysfw(self, cert_fname, input_fname, key_fname, sw_rev,
-                  config_fname, req_dist_name_dict, firewall_cert_data):
+                  config_fname, req_dist_name_dict, firewall_cert_data,
+                  boot_ext_data, load_ext_data):
         """Create a certificate to be booted by system firmware
 
         Args:
@@ -101,12 +102,52 @@ imageSize              = INTEGER:{len(indata)}
                 extended certificate
               - certificate (str): Extended firewall certificate with
                 the information for the firewall configurations.
+            boot_ext_data (dict):
+              - proc_id (int): The processor ID of core being booted
+              - flags_set (int): The config flags to set for core being booted
+              - flags_clr (int): The config flags to clear for core being booted
+              - reset_vector (int): The location of reset vector for core being
+                booted
+            load_ext_data (dict):
+              - dest_addr (int): The address to which image has to be copied
+              - auth_type (int): Contains the host ID for core being booted and
+                how the image is to be copied
 
         Returns:
             str: Tool output
         """
         indata = tools.read_file(input_fname)
         hashval = hashlib.sha512(indata).hexdigest()
+
+        if boot_ext_data is not None:
+            boot_ext = f'''
+[ sysfw_boot_seq ]
+bootCore = INTEGER:{boot_ext_data['proc_id']}
+bootCoreOpts_set = INTEGER:{boot_ext_data['flags_set']}
+bootCoreOpts_clr = INTEGER:{boot_ext_data['flags_clr']}
+resetVec = FORMAT:HEX,OCT:{boot_ext_data['reset_vector']:08x}
+# Reserved for future use
+flagsValid = FORMAT:HEX,OCT:00000000
+rsvd1 = INTEGER:0x00
+rsvd2 = INTEGER:0x00
+rsvd3 = INTEGER:0x00
+'''
+        else:
+            boot_ext = ""
+
+        if load_ext_data is not None:
+            load_ext = f'''
+[ sysfw_image_load ]
+destAddr = FORMAT:HEX,OCT:{load_ext_data['dest_addr']:08x}
+authInPlace = INTEGER:{load_ext_data['auth_type']}
+'''
+        else:
+            load_ext = f'''
+[ sysfw_image_load ]
+destAddr = FORMAT:HEX,OCT:00000000
+authInPlace = INTEGER:{hex(firewall_cert_data['auth_in_place'])}
+'''
+
         with open(config_fname, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as outf:
             print(f'''[ req ]
 distinguished_name     = req_distinguished_name
@@ -138,9 +179,9 @@ shaType                = OID:2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3
 shaValue               = FORMAT:HEX,OCT:{hashval}
 imageSize              = INTEGER:{len(indata)}
 
-[ sysfw_image_load ]
-destAddr = FORMAT:HEX,OCT:00000000
-authInPlace = INTEGER:{hex(firewall_cert_data['auth_in_place'])}
+{boot_ext}
+
+{load_ext}
 
 [ firewall ]
 numFirewallRegions = INTEGER:{firewall_cert_data['num_firewalls']}
tools/binman/etype/ti_secure.py +65 -0

83 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/binman/etype/x509_cert.py +3 -1
index b6e8b0b4fb0..b6028f6be84 100644
@@ -102,7 +102,9 @@ class Entry_x509_cert(Entry_collection):
                 config_fname=config_fname,
                 sw_rev=self.sw_rev,
                 req_dist_name_dict=self.req_dist_name,
-                firewall_cert_data=self.firewall_cert_data)
+                firewall_cert_data=self.firewall_cert_data,
+                boot_ext_data=self.boot_ext,
+                load_ext_data=self.load_ext)
         elif type == 'rom':
             stdout = self.openssl.x509_cert_rom(
                 cert_fname=output_fname,
tools/binman/ftest.py +45 -0

51 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/binman/test/vendor/ti_secure_boot_load_ext.dts new file +23 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..226415f39ea
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+
+/dts-v1/;
+
+/ {
+	#address-cells = <1>;
+	#size-cells = <1>;
+
+	binman {
+		ti-secure {
+			content = <&unsecure_binary>;
+			proc-id = <0x20>;
+			flags-set = <0x00000001>;
+			flags-clr = <0x00000002>;
+			reset-vector = <0x70000000>;
+			dest-addr = <0x80000000>;
+			auth-type = <0x02>;
+		};
+		unsecure_binary: blob-ext {
+			filename = "ti_unsecure.bin";
+		};
+	};
+};
tools/binman/test/vendor/ti_secure_boot_load_ext_partial.dts new file +20 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e90d27cb087
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+
+/dts-v1/;
+
+/ {
+	#address-cells = <1>;
+	#size-cells = <1>;
+
+	binman {
+		ti-secure {
+			content = <&unsecure_binary>;
+			proc-id = <0x20>;
+			flags-set = <0x00000001>;
+			// Missing: flags-clr, reset-vector, dest-addr, auth-type
+		};
+		unsecure_binary: blob-ext {
+			filename = "ti_unsecure.bin";
+		};
+	};
+};
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH v5 5/7 arm: dts: k3-{j721s2/j722s/j784s4}-r5.dtsi: Enable HSM core

In reply to Beleswar Padhi

The HSM M4F node is disabled by default in the device tree. Enable the node here as we have to load and boot the core in R5 SPL stage. Assign the alias of 'remoteproc2' to the hsm node. This assigns the sequence number '2' to HSM core which can be used during rproc_load() and rproc_start() calls.

---
v5: Changelog:
1. Add a comment calling out the usage of alias indexes in code.
2. Add R/B tags.

Link to v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v4: Changelog:
1. Changed node labels from 'hsm_m4fss' to 'hsm' to match with device tree definition.

Link to v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v3: Changelog:
1. New patch. Enable HSM nodes from DT.

 arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-r5.dtsi | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/arm/dts/k3-j722s-r5.dtsi  | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/arm/dts/k3-j784s4-r5.dtsi |  9 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-r5.dtsi +10 -0
index 7d4a6dc5301..abe64f2364e 100644
@@ -8,9 +8,15 @@
 		tick-timer = &mcu_timer0;
 	};
 
+	/*
+	 * The remoteproc sequence numbers defined here are used as literal indices
+	 * in arch/arm/mach-k3/r5/common.c (e.g., rproc_load(1, ...), rproc_load(2, ...)).
+	 * Adding, removing, or reordering these aliases will break the code.
+	 */
 	aliases {
 		remoteproc0 = &sysctrler;
 		remoteproc1 = &a72_0;
+		remoteproc2 = &hsm;
 	};
 
 	a72_0: a72@0 {
@@ -102,3 +108,7 @@
 	ranges = <0x0 0x47000000 0x0 0x47000000 0x0 0x00068400>,
 			 <0x0 0x50000000 0x0 0x50000000 0x0 0x08000000>;
 };
+
+&hsm {
+	status = "okay";
+};
arch/arm/dts/k3-j722s-r5.dtsi +10 -0
index 06a63fb83ba..9ddb951e078 100644
@@ -4,9 +4,15 @@
  */
 
 / {
+	/*
+	 * The remoteproc sequence numbers defined here are used as literal indices
+	 * in arch/arm/mach-k3/r5/common.c (e.g., rproc_load(1, ...), rproc_load(2, ...)).
+	 * Adding, removing, or reordering these aliases will break the code.
+	 */
 	aliases {
 		remoteproc0 = &sysctrler;
 		remoteproc1 = &a53_0;
+		remoteproc2 = &hsm;
 		serial0 = &wkup_uart0;
 		serial2 = &main_uart0;
 	};
@@ -82,3 +88,7 @@
 	reg = <0x00 0x0fc40000 0x00 0x100>,
 	      <0x00 0x60000000 0x00 0x08000000>;
 };
+
+&hsm {
+	status = "okay";
+};
arch/arm/dts/k3-j784s4-r5.dtsi +9 -0
index 78444dc4e14..afbb8faca44 100644
@@ -8,9 +8,15 @@
 		tick-timer = &mcu_timer0;
 	};
 
+	/*
+	 * The remoteproc sequence numbers defined here are used as literal indices
+	 * in arch/arm/mach-k3/r5/common.c (e.g., rproc_load(1, ...), rproc_load(2, ...)).
+	 * Adding, removing, or reordering these aliases will break the code.
+	 */
 	aliases {
 		remoteproc0 = &sysctrler;
 		remoteproc1 = &a72_0;
+		remoteproc2 = &hsm;
 	};
 
 	a72_0: a72@0 {
@@ -113,3 +119,6 @@
 	vdd-supply-2 = <&tps62873a>;
 };
 
+&hsm {
+	status = "okay";
+};
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#7 lore raw

PATCH v5 6/7 remoteproc: k3-hsm: Introduce a remoteproc driver for K3 HSM core

In reply to Beleswar Padhi

Some K3 SoCs like J721S2, J784S4, J722S, AM62X and AM62PX have a HSM (High Security Module) M4F core in the Wakeup Voltage Domain which could be used to run secure services like Authentication. Boot flow for HSM M4 core is different than the general purpose M4F cores, and is as below:

1. Request control of HSM M4F remote processor.
2. Assert Reset on the HSM M4F remote processor.
3. For HS devices, Request Secure Entity to Authenticate and Load HSM firmware into core's internal SRAM memory region. For GP devices, load the unsigned firmware manually.
4. Deassert Reset on the HSM M4F remote processor.
5. Release control of HSM M4F remote processor.

Add a new remoteproc driver to support this boot flow for HSM M4F core.

---
v5: Changelog:
1. Use get_device_type() to detect device type (GP, HS-FS, HS-SE).
2. Avoid typecasting at certain places.
3. Check buffer size before doing memcpy() for overruns.
4. Add R/B tag.

Link to v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v4: Changelog:
1. None

Link to v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v3: Changelog:
1. New patch. Add a dedicated remoteproc driver to boot HSM core.

 MAINTAINERS                          |   1 +
 drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig           |  10 +
 drivers/remoteproc/Makefile          |   1 +
 drivers/remoteproc/ti_k3_hsm_rproc.c | 267 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 279 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/ti_k3_hsm_rproc.c
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
index 45e9076de67..9528a9cce26 100644
@@ -823,6 +823,7 @@ F:	drivers/phy/ti-pipe3-phy.c
 F:	drivers/ram/k3*
 F:	drivers/ram/k3*/
 F:	drivers/remoteproc/ipu_rproc.c
+F:	drivers/remoteproc/ti_k3_hsm_rproc.c
 F:	drivers/remoteproc/k3_system_controller.c
 F:	drivers/remoteproc/pruc_rpoc.c
 F:	drivers/remoteproc/ti*
drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig +10 -0
index 7f9e35283f9..f1e586584f3 100644
@@ -108,6 +108,16 @@ config REMOTEPROC_TI_K3_M4F
 	  on various TI K3 family of SoCs through the remote processor
 	  framework.
 
+config REMOTEPROC_TI_K3_HSM_M4F
+	bool "TI K3 HSM M4F remoteproc support"
+	select REMOTEPROC
+	depends on ARCH_K3
+	depends on TI_SCI_PROTOCOL
+	help
+	  Say y here to support TI's HSM M4F remote processor subsystems
+	  on various TI K3 family of SoCs through the remote processor
+	  framework.
+
 config REMOTEPROC_TI_K3_R5F
 	bool "TI K3 R5F remoteproc support"
 	select REMOTEPROC
drivers/remoteproc/Makefile +1 -0
index 250915d0de4..5f2127fcb05 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_STM32_COPRO) += stm32_copro.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TI_K3_ARM64) += ti_k3_arm64_rproc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TI_K3_DSP) += ti_k3_dsp_rproc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TI_K3_M4F) += ti_k3_m4_rproc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TI_K3_HSM_M4F) += ti_k3_hsm_rproc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TI_K3_R5F) += ti_k3_r5f_rproc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TI_POWER) += ti_power_proc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TI_PRU) += pru_rproc.o
drivers/remoteproc/ti_k3_hsm_rproc.c new file +267 -0

267 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#8 lore raw

PATCH v5 7/7 arm: mach-k3: r5: common: Invoke boot of HSM M4 core

In reply to Beleswar Padhi

The tispl.bin fit image is packed with the HSM firmware image. Add support to load and boot the HSM M4F core during R5 SPL stage using the remoteprocessor framework.

Add IMAGE_ID_HSM enum and "hsm" OS type to detect HSM firmware in the FIT image. Track the load address for all FIT images. Load HSM firmware to remoteproc device 2 and start the core using the remoteprocessor framework when CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TI_K3_HSM_M4F is enabled.

Skip HSM firmware from R5 secure image authentication as TIFS will authenticate it during the remoteproc load operation.

---
v5: Changelog:
1. Optimize if-else ladder for logging.
2. Call ti_secure_image_post_process() only once for HSM image (during rproc load).
3. Add R/B tag.

Link to v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v4: Changelog:
1. None

Link to v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v3: Changelog:
1. Use remoteproc framework to boot HSM core.

Link to v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

v2: Changelog:
1. Hang system boot if HSM firmware failed to boot.
2. __maybe_unused to decrease preprocessor usage.
3. Better error messages with return code.
4. Added Error case in if-elseif-else ladder.

Note:
#define PROC_ID_HSM_M4F seems to have extra tab in the diff/patch. But when patch gets applied in file, all of them have consistent tabs.

Link to v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]

 arch/arm/mach-k3/r5/common.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm/mach-k3/r5/common.c +25 -4
index a0e1b791c82..fe4d22fe25f 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ enum {
 	IMAGE_ID_TIFSSTUB_HS,
 	IMAGE_ID_TIFSSTUB_FS,
 	IMAGE_ID_TIFSSTUB_GP,
+	IMAGE_ID_HSM,
 	IMAGE_AMT,
 };
 
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ static const char *image_os_match[IMAGE_AMT] = {
 	"tifsstub-hs",
 	"tifsstub-fs",
 	"tifsstub-gp",
+	"hsm",
 };
 #endif
 
@@ -158,6 +160,23 @@ void __noreturn jump_to_image(struct spl_image_info *spl_image)
 				     &loadaddr);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * It is assumed that remoteproc device 2 is the corresponding
+	 * Cortex-M4F HSM core. Make sure DT reflects the same.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TI_K3_HSM_M4F)) {
+		ret = rproc_load(2, fit_image_info[IMAGE_ID_HSM].load,
+				 fit_image_info[IMAGE_ID_HSM].image_len);
+		if (ret)
+			panic("Error while loading HSM firmware, ret = %d\n", ret);
+
+		ret = rproc_start(2);
+		if (ret)
+			panic("Error while starting HSM core\n");
+
+		printf("Successfully loaded and started HSM core\n");
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * It is assumed that remoteproc device 1 is the corresponding
 	 * Cortex-A core which runs ATF. Make sure DT reflects the same.
@@ -330,17 +349,19 @@ void board_fit_image_post_process(const void *fit, int node, void **p_image,
 	int len;
 	int i;
 	const char *os;
-	u32 addr;
+	u32 addr, load_addr;
 
 	os = fdt_getprop(fit, node, "os", &len);
 	addr = fdt_getprop_u32_default_node(fit, node, 0, "entry", -1);
+	load_addr = fdt_getprop_u32_default_node(fit, node, 0, "load", 0);
 
-	debug("%s: processing image: addr=%x, size=%d, os=%s\n", __func__,
-	      addr, *p_size, os);
+	debug("%s: processing image: addr=%x, load=%x, size=%d, os=%s\n", __func__,
+	      addr, load_addr, *p_size, os);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < IMAGE_AMT; i++) {
 		if (!strcmp(os, image_os_match[i])) {
 			fit_image_info[i].image_start = addr;
+			fit_image_info[i].load = load_addr;
 			fit_image_info[i].image_len = *p_size;
 			debug("%s: matched image for ID %d\n", __func__, i);
 			break;
@@ -369,7 +390,7 @@ void board_fit_image_post_process(const void *fit, int node, void **p_image,
 	 * Only DM and the DTBs are being authenticated here,
 	 * rest will be authenticated when A72 cluster is up
 	 */
-	if ((i != IMAGE_ID_ATF) && (i != IMAGE_ID_OPTEE)) {
+	if ((i != IMAGE_ID_ATF) && (i != IMAGE_ID_OPTEE) && (i != IMAGE_ID_HSM)) {
 		ti_secure_image_check_binary(p_image, p_size);
 		ti_secure_image_post_process(p_image, p_size);
 	} else {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#9 lore raw
In reply to Beleswar Padhi

On July 20, 2026 thus sayeth Beleswar Padhi:

Quoted 13 lines

Some TI K3 SoCs like J721S2, J784S4, and J722S have a HSM (High Security Module) M4F core in the Wakeup Voltage Domain which could be used to run secure services like Authentication. Boot flow for HSM M4 core is different than the general purpose M4F cores, and is as below:

1. Request control of HSM M4F remote processor.
2. Assert Reset on the HSM M4F remote processor.
3. Request Secure Entity to Authenticate and Load HSM firmware into core's internal SRAM memory region. For GP device, load the firmware manually into core's SRAM region.
4. Deassert Reset on the HSM M4F remote processor.
5. Release control of HSM M4F remote processor.

Quoted 7 lines

This series adds support to boot HSM M4 core from R5 SPL stage. The HSM firmware is packed inside the tispl.bin fit image. The firmware is unpacked into a temporary DDR address which is then used to load HSM core. The configs to boot HSM M4 core are disabled by default.

Additional documentation on HSM M4 core usage:
https://software-dl.ti.com/jacinto7/esd/processor-sdk-linux-j784s4/latest/exports/docs/linux/Foundational_Components/U-Boot/UG-HSM.html

This information should be included in the docs here to avoid issues when the evil vendor tree gets out of sync tree every year.

~Bryan