openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59999
PATCH 1/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59999
From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-59999. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8dfe7ed6e2fd988de08df508355a196b956b2753
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59999
--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59999.patch | 38 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59999.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59999.patch new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From a83dd105dc407d95c42140ea6f04a1e247aaf2f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 04:47:29 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: DisableForwarding=yes didn't override + PermitTunnel=yes + +Reported independently by Huzaifa Sidhpurwala of Redhat and Marko +Jevtic; ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5c13f0746cf079b21f8deba47407fad49ccbf4c + +CVE: CVE-2026-59999 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8dfe7ed6e2fd988de08df508355a196b956b2753] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunk in serverloop.c and + retained the Wrynose OpenSSH 10.3p1 revision because this stable + backport carries only the functional security change. + +(cherry picked from commit 8dfe7ed6e2fd988de08df508355a196b956b2753) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + serverloop.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c +index 8e63480ec..42c3ce9fe 100644 +--- a/serverloop.c ++++ b/serverloop.c +@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh) + ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Unsupported tunnel device mode."); + return NULL; + } +- if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) { ++ if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0 || options.disable_forwarding) { + ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has rejected tunnel device " + "forwarding"); + return NULL;
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta file://run-ptest \ file://sshd_check_keys \ file://0001-regress-banner.sh-log-input-and-output-files-on-erro.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59999.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 2/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59997
From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-59997. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e9916c44c1324ab9ab022719e4df08a390a83014
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59997
--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59997.patch | 60 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59997.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59997.patch new file +60 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From 91ce99061c78d0ae84dafc96409c8ea9746f70c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 08:53:07 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: pass >9 commandline arguments to the internal-sftp + server, + +previously they were silently dropped; reported by Steve Caffrey ok deraadt@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ee6cd5430a3ca027c3223af54b58ad3cc7ccd624 + +CVE: CVE-2026-59997 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e9916c44c1324ab9ab022719e4df08a390a83014] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunk in session.c and + retained the Wrynose OpenSSH 10.3p1 revision because this stable + backport carries only the functional security change. + +(cherry picked from commit e9916c44c1324ab9ab022719e4df08a390a83014) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + session.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/session.c b/session.c +index 93de35d7c..b1f125a3c 100644 +--- a/session.c ++++ b/session.c +@@ -1607,21 +1607,22 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) + exit(1); + } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) { + extern int optind, optreset; +- int i; +- char *p, *args; ++ int sftp_argc; ++ char **sftp_argv; + + setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME); +- args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server"); +- for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " "))) +- if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1) +- argv[i++] = p; +- argv[i] = NULL; ++ if (argv_split(command == NULL ? "sftp-server" : command, ++ &sftp_argc, &sftp_argv, 1) != 0) { ++ error("internal error: can't split internal-sftp " ++ "arguments"); ++ exit(1); ++ } + optind = optreset = 1; +- __progname = argv[0]; ++ __progname = sftp_argv[0]; + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); + #endif +- exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); ++ exit(sftp_server_main(sftp_argc, sftp_argv, s->pw)); + } + + fflush(NULL);
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta file://sshd_check_keys \ file://0001-regress-banner.sh-log-input-and-output-files-on-erro.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59999.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59997.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 3/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998
In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-59998. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59998
--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +36 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 94a089cd331eeea77ffd6fd715e61d281c3b97c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 06:55:12 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: mention a caveat regarding + GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck in + +some environments + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa7158d8f22cb34063c1c2d3cbcf30a9489847c2 + +CVE: CVE-2026-59998 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision and Mdocdate-only hunks in + sshd_config.5 and retained the Wrynose OpenSSH 10.3p1 values because + this stable backport carries only the security-relevant documentation. + +(cherry picked from commit 8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + sshd_config.5 | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 3f5e29812..22b9039d2 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -769,6 +769,7 @@ machine's default store. + This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. + The default is + .Cm yes . ++This option may not be effective in Windows Active Directory environments. + .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms + Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased + authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta file://0001-regress-banner.sh-log-input-and-output-files-on-erro.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59999.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59997.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59998.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 4/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59996
In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-59996. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/36480181fa22f98e180b4f9e10203480c0346c78
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59996
--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59996.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59996.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59996.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From f479595f7498e8c83d3df9d3eddb6e555497ff5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2026 23:47:16 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: resist that return ".." via remote glob during + +remote/remote copies, similar to fixes for bz3871 for remote/local copies. +From Swival scanner + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c0c20a1b746db55c08e53658bf21ea9405b300a5 + +CVE: CVE-2026-59996 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/36480181fa22f98e180b4f9e10203480c0346c78] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunk in scp.c and retained + the Wrynose OpenSSH 10.3p1 revision because this stable backport carries + only the functional security change. + +(cherry picked from commit 36480181fa22f98e180b4f9e10203480c0346c78) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + scp.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c +index 1faa9a555..bd01ebffd 100644 +--- a/scp.c ++++ b/scp.c +@@ -2039,6 +2039,10 @@ throughlocal_sftp(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to, + goto out; + } + ++ /* Special handling for source of '..' */ ++ if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) ++ filename = "."; /* Download to dest, not dest/.. */ ++ + if (targetisdir) + abs_dst = sftp_path_append(target, filename); + else
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta file://CVE-2026-59999.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59997.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59998.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59996.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 5/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59995
In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-59995. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1b39f39657d2e58f8ec57341581a39bbf0be645b
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59995
--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59995.patch | 44 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59995.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59995.patch new file +44 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 02e4b3cfd0bef64381921cdb9d6a21b1f50fdb74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 01:47:21 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: avoid download to server-controlled path when + performing + +download on the commandline. From Swival scanner + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1b2c44305fdfe6d51eed9ecc727e59478bf311f + +CVE: CVE-2026-59995 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1b39f39657d2e58f8ec57341581a39bbf0be645b] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunk in sftp.c and retained + the Wrynose OpenSSH 10.3p1 revision because this stable backport carries + only the functional security change. + +(cherry picked from commit 1b39f39657d2e58f8ec57341581a39bbf0be645b) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + sftp.c | 9 ++------- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c +index eebb166e8..33c8364e3 100644 +--- a/sftp.c ++++ b/sftp.c +@@ -2287,13 +2287,8 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2) + return (-1); + } + } else { +- /* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */ +- snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s", +- global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir, +- file2 == NULL ? "" : " ", +- file2 == NULL ? "" : file2); +- err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, +- &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0); ++ err = process_get(conn, dir, file2, remote_path, 0, 0, ++ global_aflag, 0); + free(dir); + free(startdir); + free(remote_path);
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta file://CVE-2026-59997.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59998.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59996.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59995.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 6/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-60001
In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-60001. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d43ba60c91cb323ca921049b7d43b1908c318454
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60001
--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60001.patch | 130 ++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 131 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60001.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60001.patch new file +130 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +From 6bc7dd87d543c882994f95c8309846dfda9ab503 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 07:44:48 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Fix cases in GSSAPI and keyboard-interactive + +authentication where the minimum per-attempt delay was not being enforced. + +Reported by Orange Cyberdefense Vulnerability Team + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c40bd35cc2428fcaccad7a141703c28baa6da01e + +CVE: CVE-2026-60001 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d43ba60c91cb323ca921049b7d43b1908c318454] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunks in auth.h, + auth2-chall.c, auth2-gss.c, and auth2.c and retained the Wrynose + OpenSSH 10.3p1 revisions because this stable backport carries only the + functional security changes. + +(cherry picked from commit d43ba60c91cb323ca921049b7d43b1908c318454) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + auth.h | 1 + + auth2-chall.c | 4 ++++ + auth2-gss.c | 7 +++++++ + auth2.c | 10 ++++++++-- + 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h +index 634a84aa8..c2cfa5ed8 100644 +--- a/auth.h ++++ b/auth.h +@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ void auth_log(struct ssh *, int, int, const char *, const char *); + void auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *) __attribute__((noreturn)); + void userauth_finish(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *); + int auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *, const char *); ++void auth_failure_delay(Authctxt *, double); + + char *auth2_read_banner(void); + int auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int); +diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c +index f3889079b..4687ca8e2 100644 +--- a/auth2-chall.c ++++ b/auth2-chall.c +@@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, uint32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + u_int i, nresp; + const char *devicename = NULL; + char **response = NULL; ++ double tstart = monotime_double(); + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal_f("no authctxt"); +@@ -358,6 +359,9 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, uint32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + auth2_challenge_start(ssh); + } + } ++ ++ if (!authenticated) ++ auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart); + userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive", + devicename); + return 0; +diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c +index 053548527..f27ac9221 100644 +--- a/auth2-gss.c ++++ b/auth2-gss.c +@@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, uint32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + { + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + int r, authenticated; ++ double tstart = monotime_double(); + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); +@@ -268,6 +269,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, uint32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); + + authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); ++ if (!authenticated) ++ auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); +@@ -288,6 +291,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, uint32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; + u_char *p; + size_t len; ++ double tstart = monotime_double(); + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); +@@ -315,6 +319,9 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, uint32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + sshbuf_free(b); + free(mic.value); + ++ if (!authenticated) ++ auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart); ++ + authctxt->postponed = 0; + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); +diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c +index 3a1682746..7ba611c02 100644 +--- a/auth2.c ++++ b/auth2.c +@@ -265,6 +265,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, double seconds) + nanosleep(&ts, NULL); + } + ++void ++auth_failure_delay(Authctxt *authctxt, double tstart) ++{ ++ ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart, user_specific_delay(authctxt->user)); ++} ++ + static int + input_userauth_request(int type, uint32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + { +@@ -346,8 +352,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, uint32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + authenticated = m->userauth(ssh, method); + } + if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0) +- ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart, +- user_specific_delay(authctxt->user)); ++ auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart); ++ + userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL); + r = 0; + out:
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta file://CVE-2026-59998.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59996.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59995.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-60001.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 7/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-60002
In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-60002. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e8bdfb151a356d0171fea4194dd205fbb252be23
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60002
--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60002.patch | 225 ++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 226 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60002.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60002.patch new file +225 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +From b571549bc93e95f0d3d563094f825544228501de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 07:49:58 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: fix ownership and lifetime of several bits of + client + +state that need to persist for the life of the connection, especially the +cached hostkey that was being incorrectly freed early on some paths, possibly +allowing its use after free. + +Reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin from depthfirst.com + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: faaa6ad72e7d69d41fa8b197b606265b7d9bc73f + +CVE: CVE-2026-60002 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e8bdfb151a356d0171fea4194dd205fbb252be23] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunks in ssh.c, + sshconnect.c, sshconnect.h, and sshconnect2.c and retained the Wrynose + OpenSSH 10.3p1 revisions because this stable backport carries only the + functional security changes. + +(cherry picked from commit e8bdfb151a356d0171fea4194dd205fbb252be23) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + ssh.c | 24 ++---------------------- + sshconnect.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + sshconnect.h | 7 +++++-- + sshconnect2.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- + 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +index 531f28eb2..efb8930f4 100644 +--- a/ssh.c ++++ b/ssh.c +@@ -612,26 +612,6 @@ set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port) + } + } + +-static void +-ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) +-{ +- if (cinfo == NULL) +- return; +- free(cinfo->conn_hash_hex); +- free(cinfo->shorthost); +- free(cinfo->uidstr); +- free(cinfo->keyalias); +- free(cinfo->thishost); +- free(cinfo->host_arg); +- free(cinfo->portstr); +- free(cinfo->remhost); +- free(cinfo->remuser); +- free(cinfo->homedir); +- free(cinfo->locuser); +- free(cinfo->jmphost); +- free(cinfo); +-} +- + /* + * Main program for the ssh client. + */ +@@ -1799,8 +1779,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); + + /* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */ +- ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, +- options.port, pw, timeout_ms, cinfo); ++ ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, &hostaddr, options.port, ++ pw, timeout_ms, cinfo); + + /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */ + if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) { +diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c +index 4384277a6..3d338ff23 100644 +--- a/sshconnect.c ++++ b/sshconnect.c +@@ -70,6 +70,49 @@ extern char *__progname; + static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *); + static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *); + ++void ++ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) ++{ ++ if (cinfo == NULL) ++ return; ++ free(cinfo->conn_hash_hex); ++ free(cinfo->shorthost); ++ free(cinfo->uidstr); ++ free(cinfo->keyalias); ++ free(cinfo->thishost); ++ free(cinfo->host_arg); ++ free(cinfo->portstr); ++ free(cinfo->remhost); ++ free(cinfo->remuser); ++ free(cinfo->homedir); ++ free(cinfo->locuser); ++ free(cinfo->jmphost); ++ freezero(cinfo, sizeof(*cinfo)); ++} ++ ++struct ssh_conn_info * ++ssh_conn_info_dup(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) ++{ ++ struct ssh_conn_info *ret; ++ ++ if (cinfo == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ++ ret->conn_hash_hex = xstrdup(cinfo->conn_hash_hex); ++ ret->shorthost = xstrdup(cinfo->shorthost); ++ ret->uidstr = xstrdup(cinfo->uidstr); ++ ret->keyalias = xstrdup(cinfo->keyalias); ++ ret->thishost = xstrdup(cinfo->thishost); ++ ret->host_arg = xstrdup(cinfo->host_arg); ++ ret->portstr = xstrdup(cinfo->portstr); ++ ret->remhost = xstrdup(cinfo->remhost); ++ ret->remuser = xstrdup(cinfo->remuser); ++ ret->homedir = xstrdup(cinfo->homedir); ++ ret->locuser = xstrdup(cinfo->locuser); ++ ret->jmphost = xstrdup(cinfo->jmphost); ++ return ret; ++} ++ + /* Expand a proxy command */ + static char * + expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user, +@@ -1585,8 +1628,8 @@ warn_nonpq_kex(void) + */ + void + ssh_login(struct ssh *ssh, Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, +- struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms, +- const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) ++ struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, ++ int timeout_ms, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) + { + char *host; + char *server_user, *local_user; +diff --git a/sshconnect.h b/sshconnect.h +index 4c19490da..8da0e04b9 100644 +--- a/sshconnect.h ++++ b/sshconnect.h +@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *, + void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void); + + void ssh_login(struct ssh *, Sensitive *, const char *, +- struct sockaddr *, u_short, struct passwd *, int, ++ struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, struct passwd *, int, + const struct ssh_conn_info *); + + int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *, +@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *, + void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, + char **, char **); + +-void ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, ++void ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, + const struct ssh_conn_info *); + + void ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *, const char *, +@@ -101,3 +101,6 @@ void load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *, const char *, + const struct sshkey *, const char *); + + int hostkey_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *); ++ ++void ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *); ++struct ssh_conn_info *ssh_conn_info_dup(const struct ssh_conn_info *); +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index 478a9a52f..50ac6b89d 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ extern Options options; + */ + + static char *xxx_host; +-static struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; ++static struct sockaddr_storage xxx_hostaddr; + static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info; + static int key_type_allowed(struct sshkey *, const char *); + +@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) + fatal("Server host key %s not in HostKeyAlgorithms", + sshkey_ssh_name(hostkey)); + } +- if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey, ++ if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, (struct sockaddr *)&xxx_hostaddr, hostkey, + xxx_conn_info) != 0) + fatal("Host key verification failed."); + return 0; +@@ -216,16 +216,16 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + } + + void +-ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, +- const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) ++ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, ++ u_short port, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) + { + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]; + char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL; + int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0; + +- xxx_host = host; +- xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; +- xxx_conn_info = cinfo; ++ xxx_host = xstrdup(host); ++ xxx_hostaddr = *hostaddr; ++ xxx_conn_info = ssh_conn_info_dup(cinfo); + + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, +@@ -248,8 +248,10 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist"); + free(all_key); + +- if (use_known_hosts_order) +- hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo); ++ if (use_known_hosts_order) { ++ hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, (struct sockaddr *)hostaddr, ++ port, cinfo); ++ } + + kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, + options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta file://CVE-2026-59996.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59995.patch \ file://CVE-2026-60001.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-60002.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 8/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-60000
In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-60000. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/5d04ca6af739b82fd30d84d2783ca802ebfa1192
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60000
--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60000.patch | 140 ++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 141 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60000.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60000.patch new file +140 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +From 884e94fafb20259c78bf394611b9929a7683e2b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 07:53:30 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Fix multiple RFC 4462 (GSSAPIAuthentication) + compliance + +problems + +1) Remove an early failure return for GSSAPI authentication attempts +made for invalid accounts that yielded different behaviour for +valid vs invalid accounts. + +2) Fix a situation where some GSSAPI requestes were not correctly +subjected to MaxAuthTries. + +3) Fix a moderate pre-authentication resource DoS related to #2. + +Add missing logging for error cases. + +Report and fixes from Manfred Kaiser, milCERT AT + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ca0acdd64eea435d6f89534538a9eb404a5629d3 + +CVE: CVE-2026-60000 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/5d04ca6af739b82fd30d84d2783ca802ebfa1192] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunk in auth2-gss.c and + retained the Wrynose OpenSSH 10.3p1 revision because this stable + backport carries only the functional security change. + +(cherry picked from commit 5d04ca6af739b82fd30d84d2783ca802ebfa1192) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + auth2-gss.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c +index f27ac9221..54c96fe4b 100644 +--- a/auth2-gss.c ++++ b/auth2-gss.c +@@ -111,12 +111,6 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) + return (0); + } + +- if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { +- debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user"); +- free(doid); +- return (0); +- } +- + if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid))) { + if (ctxt != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); +@@ -178,8 +172,14 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, uint32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "send ERRTOK packet"); + } ++ logit("Failed gssapi-with-mic for %s%.100s " ++ "from %.200s port %d ssh2", ++ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", ++ authctxt->user, ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + authctxt->postponed = 0; + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); + userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); + } else { + if (send_tok.length != 0) { +@@ -191,14 +191,18 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, uint32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + fatal_fr(r, "send TOKEN packet"); + } + if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { +- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); +- if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) +- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, ++ SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); ++ /* note: keep ERRTOK handler as per RFC 4462 s3.4 */ ++ if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) { ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, ++ SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, + &input_gssapi_mic); +- else ++ } else { + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, + &input_gssapi_exchange_complete); ++ } + } + } + +@@ -210,10 +214,6 @@ static int + input_gssapi_errtok(int type, uint32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + { + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; +- Gssctxt *gssctxt; +- gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; +- gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; +- OM_uint32 maj_status; + int r; + u_char *p; + size_t len; +@@ -221,26 +221,21 @@ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, uint32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); + +- gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; +- if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || ++ /* Minimal error handling - just cancel auth and return FAILURE */ ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse packet"); +- recv_tok.value = p; +- recv_tok.length = len; +- +- /* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */ +- maj_status = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok, +- &send_tok, NULL); +- +- free(recv_tok.value); + +- /* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */ ++ logit("Failed gssapi-with-mic for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2", ++ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", ++ authctxt->user, ++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); ++ authctxt->postponed = 0; + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); +- +- /* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */ +- +- gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); ++ userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); + return 0; + } +
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta file://CVE-2026-59995.patch \ file://CVE-2026-60001.patch \ file://CVE-2026-60002.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-60000.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
Re: [OE-core][wrynose][PATCH 3/8] openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998
In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)Quoted 45 lines · Devansh Patel via lists.openembedded.org
From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-59998. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59998Signed-off-by Devansh Patel <[email protected]>--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patchmeta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +23
-0@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 94a089cd331eeea77ffd6fd715e61d281c3b97c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 06:55:12 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: mention a caveat regarding + GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck in + +some environments + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa7158d8f22cb34063c1c2d3cbcf30a9489847c2 + +CVE: CVE-2026-59998 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision and Mdocdate-only hunks in + sshd_config.5 and retained the Wrynose OpenSSH 10.3p1 values because + this stable backport carries only the security-relevant documentation. + +(cherry picked from commit 8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + sshd_config.5 | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch line 33
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +10
-0+ +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 3f5e29812..22b9039d2 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -769,6 +769,7 @@ machine's default store. + This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. + The default is + .Cm yes . ++This option may not be effective in Windows Active Directory environments.
This is a oneline manpage patch for "Windows Active Directory environments.".
I'm not expert in GSSAPI but can we even trigger this? If not, I think this should be handled with a CVE_STATUS.
I'll hold this patch in the meantime.
Regards,
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS
Re: [OE-core][wrynose][PATCH 3/8] openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998
Hi Yoann,
Thanks for pointing this out. You are correct.
The Wrynose OpenSSH recipe does not enable the kerberos PACKAGECONFIG by default, so it is configured with --without-kerberos5. Consequently, GSSAPI authentication and GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck are not available in the default OE-Core build, and this scenario cannot be triggered.
Also, the referenced upstream commit only documents the existing Windows Active Directory behavior; it does not change or remediate that behavior. Therefore, carrying it as a CVE fix would be misleading.
We will withdraw this patch and replace it with a configuration-aware CVE_STATUS: not-applicable-config when the kerberos PACKAGECONFIG is disabled, while leaving the CVE unpatched when Kerberos/GSSAPI support is explicitly enabled.
Regards,
Devansh
________________________________
From: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2026 20:00
To: Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core][wrynose][PATCH 3/8] openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998
Quoted 45 lines · Devansh Patel via lists.openembedded.org
From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-59998. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59998Signed-off-by Devansh Patel <[email protected]>--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patchmeta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +23
-0@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 94a089cd331eeea77ffd6fd715e61d281c3b97c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 06:55:12 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: mention a caveat regarding + GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck in + +some environments + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa7158d8f22cb34063c1c2d3cbcf30a9489847c2 + +CVE: CVE-2026-59998 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision and Mdocdate-only hunks in + sshd_config.5 and retained the Wrynose OpenSSH 10.3p1 values because + this stable backport carries only the security-relevant documentation. + +(cherry picked from commit 8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + sshd_config.5 | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch line 33
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +10
-0+ +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 3f5e29812..22b9039d2 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -769,6 +769,7 @@ machine's default store. + This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. + The default is + .Cm yes . ++This option may not be effective in Windows Active Directory environments.
This is a oneline manpage patch for "Windows Active Directory environments.".
I'm not expert in GSSAPI but can we even trigger this? If not, I think this should be handled with a CVE_STATUS.
I'll hold this patch in the meantime.
Regards,
--
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS
Re: [OE-core][wrynose][PATCH 3/8] openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998
Quoted 15 lines · On Wed Jul 22, 2026 at 12:02 PM CEST, Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS…
Hi Yoann,
Thanks for pointing this out. You are correct.
The Wrynose OpenSSH recipe does not enable the kerberos PACKAGECONFIG by default, so it is configured with --without-kerberos5. Consequently, GSSAPI authentication and GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck are not available in the default OE-Core build, and this scenario cannot be triggered.
Also, the referenced upstream commit only documents the existing Windows Active Directory behavior; it does not change or remediate that behavior. Therefore, carrying it as a CVE fix would be misleading.
Quoted 4 lines
We will withdraw this patch and replace it with a configuration-aware
CVE_STATUS: not-applicable-config when the kerberos PACKAGECONFIG is disabled, while leaving the CVE unpatched when Kerberos/GSSAPI support is explicitly enabled.
Sounds good. I'll send the rest of the series for review. Please send this v2 as a single patch.
Thanks!
Quoted 81 lines
Regards,
Devansh
________________________________
From: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2026 20:00
To: Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core][wrynose][PATCH 3/8] openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998Quoted 45 lines · Devansh Patel via lists.openembedded.org
From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-59998. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59998Signed-off-by Devansh Patel <[email protected]>--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patchmeta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +23
-0@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 94a089cd331eeea77ffd6fd715e61d281c3b97c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 06:55:12 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: mention a caveat regarding + GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck in + +some environments + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa7158d8f22cb34063c1c2d3cbcf30a9489847c2 + +CVE: CVE-2026-59998 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision and Mdocdate-only hunks in + sshd_config.5 and retained the Wrynose OpenSSH 10.3p1 values because + this stable backport carries only the security-relevant documentation. + +(cherry picked from commit 8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + sshd_config.5 | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch line 33
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +10
-0+ +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 3f5e29812..22b9039d2 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -769,6 +769,7 @@ machine's default store. + This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. + The default is + .Cm yes . ++This option may not be effective in Windows Active Directory environments.This is a oneline manpage patch for "Windows Active Directory environments.".
I'm not expert in GSSAPI but can we even trigger this? If not, I think this should be handled with a
CVE_STATUS.I'll hold this patch in the meantime.
Regards,
--
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS
PATCH v2 1/1 openssh: set status for CVE-2026-59998
In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
Analysis:
- CVE-2026-59998 concerns an undocumented limitation of GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck in Windows Active Directory environments [1].
- Upstream OpenSSH 10.4 only documents the existing behavior and provides no code remediation [2].
- The recipe disables Kerberos/GSSAPI by default. Mark the CVE not-applicable-config when PACKAGECONFIG lacks kerberos, and unpatched when kerberos is enabled.
Reference:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59998
[2] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432
---
Changes in v2:
- Drop the documentation-only backport for CVE-2026-59998.
- Add a configuration-aware CVE_STATUS that reports unpatched when Kerberos support is enabled and not-applicable-config otherwise.
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 and when running in a Kerberos environment" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2008-3844] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to some distributed RHEL binaries." CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-51767] = "upstream-wontfix: It was demonstrated on modified sshd and does not exist in upstream openssh https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3656#c1." CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-3497] = "not-applicable-platform: Only affects GSSAPI Key Exchange patches used by some Linux distributions and does not exist in upstream openssh." +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-59998] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is disabled in the default OpenSSH configuration', d)}" PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
Re: [OE-core][wrynose][PATCH 3/8] openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998
In reply to Yoann CongalHi Yoann,
As requested, I have submitted the v2 change to OE-Core as a single patch.
Mailing-list archive:
https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/241801
Patchwork link:
https://patchwork.yoctoproject.org/project/oe-core/patch/[email protected]/
Thanks,
Devansh
________________________________
From: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2026 17:03
To: Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core][wrynose][PATCH 3/8] openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998
Quoted 15 lines · On Wed Jul 22, 2026 at 12:02 PM CEST, Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS…
Hi Yoann,
Thanks for pointing this out. You are correct.
The Wrynose OpenSSH recipe does not enable the kerberos PACKAGECONFIG by default, so it is configured with --without-kerberos5. Consequently, GSSAPI authentication and GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck are not available in the default OE-Core build, and this scenario cannot be triggered.
Also, the referenced upstream commit only documents the existing Windows Active Directory behavior; it does not change or remediate that behavior. Therefore, carrying it as a CVE fix would be misleading.
Quoted 4 lines
We will withdraw this patch and replace it with a configuration-aware
CVE_STATUS: not-applicable-config when the kerberos PACKAGECONFIG is disabled, while leaving the CVE unpatched when Kerberos/GSSAPI support is explicitly enabled.
Sounds good. I'll send the rest of the series for review. Please send this v2 as a single patch.
Thanks!
Quoted 75 lines
Regards,
Devansh
________________________________
From: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2026 20:00
To: Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core][wrynose][PATCH 3/8] openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998Quoted 45 lines · Devansh Patel via lists.openembedded.org
From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4p1 backport for CVE-2026-59998. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59998Signed-off-by Devansh Patel <[email protected]>--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patchmeta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +23
-0@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 94a089cd331eeea77ffd6fd715e61d281c3b97c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 06:55:12 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: mention a caveat regarding + GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck in + +some environments + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa7158d8f22cb34063c1c2d3cbcf30a9489847c2 + +CVE: CVE-2026-59998 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision and Mdocdate-only hunks in + sshd_config.5 and retained the Wrynose OpenSSH 10.3p1 values because + this stable backport carries only the security-relevant documentation. + +(cherry picked from commit 8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + sshd_config.5 | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch line 33
Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +10
-0+ +diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 +index 3f5e29812..22b9039d2 100644 +--- a/sshd_config.5 ++++ b/sshd_config.5 +@@ -769,6 +769,7 @@ machine's default store. + This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. + The default is + .Cm yes . ++This option may not be effective in Windows Active Directory environments.This is a oneline manpage patch for "Windows Active Directory environments.".
I'm not expert in GSSAPI but can we even trigger this? If not, I think this should be handled with a
CVE_STATUS.
Quoted 6 lines
I'll hold this patch in the meantime.
Regards,
--
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS
--
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS