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PATCH In review Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) 2 participants 11 messages Jul 20 – Jul 28

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PATCH 7/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-60002

In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4 backport for CVE-2026-60002. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e8bdfb151a356d0171fea4194dd205fbb252be23
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60002

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60002.patch      | 226 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |   1 +
 2 files changed, 227 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60002.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60002.patch new file +226 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e94e77261
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+From 767104acedd68c317b9d8fb603561e1a8be9e76a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 07:49:58 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: fix ownership and lifetime of several bits of
+ client
+
+state that need to persist for the life of the connection, especially the
+cached hostkey that was being incorrectly freed early on some paths, possibly
+allowing its use after free.
+
+Reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin from depthfirst.com
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-60002
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e8bdfb151a356d0171fea4194dd205fbb252be23]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Retained Scarthgap's valid_hostname() and valid_ruser() helpers when
+  relocating ssh_conn_info_free() from ssh.c to sshconnect.c.
+- Retained Scarthgap's ext-info-c proposal handling while applying the
+  upstream connection-state ownership and lifetime changes.
+- Retained the Scarthgap OpenBSD revision identifiers in ssh.c,
+  sshconnect.c, sshconnect.h, and sshconnect2.c.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: faaa6ad72e7d69d41fa8b197b606265b7d9bc73f
+(cherry picked from commit e8bdfb151a356d0171fea4194dd205fbb252be23)
+Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
+---
+ ssh.c         | 24 ++----------------------
+ sshconnect.c  | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ sshconnect.h  |  7 +++++--
+ sshconnect2.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
+ 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 9c49f98a8..aecdb79ea 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -606,26 +606,6 @@ set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-static void
+-ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+-{
+-	if (cinfo == NULL)
+-		return;
+-	free(cinfo->conn_hash_hex);
+-	free(cinfo->shorthost);
+-	free(cinfo->uidstr);
+-	free(cinfo->keyalias);
+-	free(cinfo->thishost);
+-	free(cinfo->host_arg);
+-	free(cinfo->portstr);
+-	free(cinfo->remhost);
+-	free(cinfo->remuser);
+-	free(cinfo->homedir);
+-	free(cinfo->locuser);
+-	free(cinfo->jmphost);
+-	free(cinfo);
+-}
+-
+ static int
+ valid_hostname(const char *s)
+ {
+@@ -1771,8 +1751,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ 
+ 	/* Log into the remote system.  Never returns if the login fails. */
+-	ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
+-	    options.port, pw, timeout_ms, cinfo);
++	ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, &hostaddr, options.port,
++	    pw, timeout_ms, cinfo);
+ 
+ 	/* We no longer need the private host keys.  Clear them now. */
+ 	if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index bd077c75c..7823b6782 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -83,6 +83,49 @@ extern char *__progname;
+ static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *);
+ static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *);
+ 
++void
++ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
++{
++	if (cinfo == NULL)
++		return;
++	free(cinfo->conn_hash_hex);
++	free(cinfo->shorthost);
++	free(cinfo->uidstr);
++	free(cinfo->keyalias);
++	free(cinfo->thishost);
++	free(cinfo->host_arg);
++	free(cinfo->portstr);
++	free(cinfo->remhost);
++	free(cinfo->remuser);
++	free(cinfo->homedir);
++	free(cinfo->locuser);
++	free(cinfo->jmphost);
++	freezero(cinfo, sizeof(*cinfo));
++}
++
++struct ssh_conn_info *
++ssh_conn_info_dup(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
++{
++	struct ssh_conn_info *ret;
++
++	if (cinfo == NULL)
++		return NULL;
++	ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
++	ret->conn_hash_hex = xstrdup(cinfo->conn_hash_hex);
++	ret->shorthost = xstrdup(cinfo->shorthost);
++	ret->uidstr = xstrdup(cinfo->uidstr);
++	ret->keyalias = xstrdup(cinfo->keyalias);
++	ret->thishost = xstrdup(cinfo->thishost);
++	ret->host_arg = xstrdup(cinfo->host_arg);
++	ret->portstr = xstrdup(cinfo->portstr);
++	ret->remhost = xstrdup(cinfo->remhost);
++	ret->remuser = xstrdup(cinfo->remuser);
++	ret->homedir = xstrdup(cinfo->homedir);
++	ret->locuser = xstrdup(cinfo->locuser);
++	ret->jmphost = xstrdup(cinfo->jmphost);
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /* Expand a proxy command */
+ static char *
+ expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user,
+@@ -1559,8 +1602,8 @@ out:
+  */
+ void
+ ssh_login(struct ssh *ssh, Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
+-    struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms,
+-    const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
++    struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw,
++    int timeout_ms, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ {
+ 	char *host;
+ 	char *server_user, *local_user;
+diff --git a/sshconnect.h b/sshconnect.h
+index 79d35cc19..da2a73f5a 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.h
++++ b/sshconnect.h
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int	 ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *,
+ void	 ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
+ 
+ void	 ssh_login(struct ssh *, Sensitive *, const char *,
+-    struct sockaddr *, u_short, struct passwd *, int,
++    struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, struct passwd *, int,
+     const struct ssh_conn_info *);
+ 
+ int	 verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *,
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ int	 verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *,
+ void	 get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
+     char **, char **);
+ 
+-void	 ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
++void	 ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short,
+     const struct ssh_conn_info *);
+ 
+ void	 ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *, const char *,
+@@ -94,3 +94,6 @@ void	 maybe_add_key_to_agent(const char *, struct sshkey *,
+ void	 load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *, const char *,
+     const char *, const struct ssh_conn_info *,
+     const struct sshkey *, const char *);
++
++void ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *);
++struct ssh_conn_info *ssh_conn_info_dup(const struct ssh_conn_info *);
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index a296c9b8c..9efb3da8a 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ extern Options options;
+  */
+ 
+ static char *xxx_host;
+-static struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
++static struct sockaddr_storage xxx_hostaddr;
+ static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info;
+ static int key_type_allowed(struct sshkey *, const char *);
+ 
+@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		fatal("Server host key %s not in HostKeyAlgorithms",
+ 		    sshkey_ssh_name(hostkey));
+ 	}
+-	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
++	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, (struct sockaddr *)&xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
+ 	    xxx_conn_info) != 0)
+ 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -222,16 +222,16 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+-    const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
++ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr,
++    u_short port, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
+ 	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
+ 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
+ 
+-	xxx_host = host;
+-	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+-	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
++	xxx_host = xstrdup(host);
++	xxx_hostaddr = *hostaddr;
++	xxx_conn_info = ssh_conn_info_dup(cinfo);
+ 
+ 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
+@@ -257,8 +257,10 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+ 	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
+ 
+-	if (use_known_hosts_order)
+-		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
++	if (use_known_hosts_order) {
++		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, (struct sockaddr *)hostaddr,
++		    port, cinfo);
++	}
+ 
+ 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, options.ciphers,
+ 	    options.macs, compression_alg_list(options.compression),
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index b15b909f60..a6bf37d8a6 100644
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-59996.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-59995.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-60001.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-60002.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
#0 lore raw

cover openssh: Security fixes

From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>

This series backports security fixes from OpenSSH 10.4 to the OpenSSH 9.6p1 recipe in Scarthgap. The relevant upstream fixes are carried as individual patches instead of upgrading the stable-branch recipe.

- CVE-2026-59995: Command-line SCP downloads could use a path controlled
by the server. Fixed by retaining the client-selected destination path
rather than allowing the server response to redirect the download.
Upstream: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1b39f39657d2e58f8ec57341581a39bbf0be645b

- CVE-2026-59996: A remote glob could return ".." during remote-to-remote
copies and escape the expected path handling. Fixed by rejecting the parent-directory result, matching the existing remote-to-local
protection.
Upstream: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/36480181fa22f98e180b4f9e10203480c0346c78

- CVE-2026-59997: The internal-sftp server silently dropped command-line
arguments after the ninth argument. Fixed by passing the complete
argument vector to internal-sftp.
Upstream: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e9916c44c1324ab9ab022719e4df08a390a83014

- CVE-2026-59998: Some environments require special consideration when
using GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck. Fixed by documenting the configuration
caveat in the upstream manual page.
Upstream: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432

- CVE-2026-59999: DisableForwarding=yes did not override
PermitTunnel=yes. Fixed by including tunnel permission in the
DisableForwarding policy enforcement.
Upstream: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8dfe7ed6e2fd988de08df508355a196b956b2753

- CVE-2026-60000: Multiple RFC 4462 GSSAPI authentication issues caused
different behavior for valid and invalid accounts, incomplete
MaxAuthTries enforcement, and a moderate pre-authentication resource
denial of service. Fixed by aligning failure handling, applying attempt
limits consistently, and adding missing error logging.
Upstream: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/5d04ca6af739b82fd30d84d2783ca802ebfa1192

- CVE-2026-60001: GSSAPI and keyboard-interactive authentication paths
did not always enforce the minimum per-attempt delay. Fixed by applying
the delay consistently to the affected authentication failures.
Upstream: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d43ba60c91cb323ca921049b7d43b1908c318454

- CVE-2026-60002: Several pieces of client state had incorrect ownership
or lifetime, including a cached host key that could be freed too early
and subsequently used. Fixed by retaining connection-scoped state for
the full lifetime of the connection.
Upstream: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e8bdfb151a356d0171fea4194dd205fbb252be23

Each fix is kept in a separate commit for independent review and CVE tracking. The OpenSSH recipe applies the patches in series order.

Validation:
- Built openssh successfully after applying the full series.
- Built core-image-minimal successfully with ptest packages enabled.

Devansh Patel (8):
openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59999
openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59997
openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998
openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59996
openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59995
openssh: Fix CVE-2026-60001
openssh: Fix CVE-2026-60002
openssh: Fix CVE-2026-60000

 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59995.patch      |  42 ++++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59996.patch      |  37 +++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59997.patch      |  58 +++++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch      |  34 +++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59999.patch      |  36 +++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60000.patch      | 140 +++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60001.patch      | 130 ++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60002.patch      | 226 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |   8 +
 9 files changed, 711 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59995.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59996.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59997.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59999.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60000.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60001.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60002.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59997

From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4 backport for CVE-2026-59997. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e9916c44c1324ab9ab022719e4df08a390a83014
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59997

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59997.patch      | 58 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59997.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59997.patch new file +58 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aa171def01
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 3011cbb6bb73f3f3dc90fa1d48736803fa407509 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 08:53:07 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: pass >9 commandline arguments to the internal-sftp
+ server,
+
+previously they were silently dropped; reported by Steve Caffrey ok deraadt@
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-59997
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/e9916c44c1324ab9ab022719e4df08a390a83014]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Retained the Scarthgap session.c OpenBSD revision identifier because the
+  10.4 identifier does not describe the older source baseline.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ee6cd5430a3ca027c3223af54b58ad3cc7ccd624
+(cherry picked from commit e9916c44c1324ab9ab022719e4df08a390a83014)
+Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
+---
+ session.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index eb932b8bf..1a01ecf74 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -1650,21 +1650,22 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 		exit(1);
+ 	} else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {
+ 		extern int optind, optreset;
+-		int i;
+-		char *p, *args;
++		int sftp_argc;
++		char **sftp_argv;
+ 
+ 		setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
+-		args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
+-		for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
+-			if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
+-				argv[i++] = p;
+-		argv[i] = NULL;
++		if (argv_split(command == NULL ? "sftp-server" : command,
++		    &sftp_argc, &sftp_argv, 1) != 0) {
++			error("internal error: can't split internal-sftp "
++			    "arguments");
++			exit(1);
++		}
+ 		optind = optreset = 1;
+-		__progname = argv[0];
++		__progname = sftp_argv[0];
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+ #endif
+-		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
++		exit(sftp_server_main(sftp_argc, sftp_argv, s->pw));
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	fflush(NULL);
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index efb89d45d7..3c706b00ae 100644
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-35414-CVE-2026-35387.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-35388.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-59999.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-59997.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
#6 lore raw

PATCH 4/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59996

In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4 backport for CVE-2026-59996. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/36480181fa22f98e180b4f9e10203480c0346c78
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59996

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59996.patch      | 37 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59996.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59996.patch new file +37 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b13390b25b
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 762b3d438547893d62ce3e147dce6cef14697b09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2026 23:47:16 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: resist that return ".." via remote glob during
+
+remote/remote copies, similar to fixes for bz3871 for remote/local copies.
+From Swival scanner
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-59996
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/36480181fa22f98e180b4f9e10203480c0346c78]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Retained the Scarthgap scp.c OpenBSD revision identifier because the
+  10.4 identifier does not describe the older source baseline.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c0c20a1b746db55c08e53658bf21ea9405b300a5
+(cherry picked from commit 36480181fa22f98e180b4f9e10203480c0346c78)
+Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
+---
+ scp.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 2c21fa19a..00d87517d 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -2043,6 +2043,10 @@ throughlocal_sftp(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
++		/* Special handling for source of '..' */
++		if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
++			filename = "."; /* Download to dest, not dest/.. */
++
+ 		if (targetisdir)
+ 			abs_dst = sftp_path_append(target, filename);
+ 		else
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index 256d90e7bd..c2e172c8d6 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-59999.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-59997.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-59998.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-59996.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
#8 lore raw

PATCH 6/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-60001

In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4 backport for CVE-2026-60001. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d43ba60c91cb323ca921049b7d43b1908c318454
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60001

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60001.patch      | 130 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |   1 +
 2 files changed, 131 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60001.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60001.patch new file +130 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ff1d14c7c9
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+From ef41798b35a53757f8aa08ad14ee1463b0fe9b15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 07:44:48 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Fix cases in GSSAPI and keyboard-interactive
+
+authentication where the minimum per-attempt delay was not being enforced.
+
+Reported by Orange Cyberdefense Vulnerability Team
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-60001
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d43ba60c91cb323ca921049b7d43b1908c318454]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Kept Scarthgap's PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok()) interface and GSSAPI
+  display-name recording while adding the upstream failure-delay calls;
+  mm_ssh_gssapi_userok() belongs to the later split-sshd architecture.
+- Retained the Scarthgap OpenBSD revision identifiers in auth.h,
+  auth2-chall.c, auth2-gss.c, and auth2.c.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c40bd35cc2428fcaccad7a141703c28baa6da01e
+(cherry picked from commit d43ba60c91cb323ca921049b7d43b1908c318454)
+Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
+---
+ auth.h        |  1 +
+ auth2-chall.c |  4 ++++
+ auth2-gss.c   |  7 +++++++
+ auth2.c       | 10 ++++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 6d2d39762..9ad4898c5 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ void	auth_log(struct ssh *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
+ void	auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *) __attribute__((noreturn));
+ void	userauth_finish(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *);
+ int	auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *, const char *);
++void	auth_failure_delay(Authctxt *, double);
+ 
+ char	*auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int	 auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
+diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
+index 021df8291..20e70d222 100644
+--- a/auth2-chall.c
++++ b/auth2-chall.c
+@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	u_int i, nresp;
+ 	const char *devicename = NULL;
+ 	char **response = NULL;
++	double tstart = monotime_double();
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("no authctxt");
+@@ -354,6 +355,9 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			auth2_challenge_start(ssh);
+ 		}
+ 	}
++
++	if (!authenticated)
++		auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart);
+ 	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
+ 	    devicename);
+ 	return 0;
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index f72a38998..195578bcf 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ 	int r, authenticated;
+ 	const char *displayname;
++	double tstart = monotime_double();
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ 		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+@@ -268,6 +269,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+ 
+ 	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++	if (!authenticated)
++		auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart);
+ 
+ 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+ 	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+@@ -293,6 +296,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	const char *displayname;
+ 	u_char *p;
+ 	size_t len;
++	double tstart = monotime_double();
+ 
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ 		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+@@ -320,6 +324,9 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	free(mic.value);
+ 
++	if (!authenticated)
++		auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart);
++
+ 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+ 	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+ 		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index 271789a77..18077d625 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -265,6 +265,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, double seconds)
+ 	nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
+ }
+ 
++void
++auth_failure_delay(Authctxt *authctxt, double tstart)
++{
++	ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart, user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
++}
++
+ static int
+ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+@@ -348,8 +354,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		authenticated =	m->userauth(ssh, method);
+ 	}
+ 	if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
+-		ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
+-		    user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
++		auth_failure_delay(authctxt, tstart);
++
+ 	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);
+ 	r = 0;
+  out:
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index b4885ab151..b15b909f60 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-59998.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-59996.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-59995.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-60001.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
#10 lore raw

PATCH 8/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-60000

In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4 backport for CVE-2026-60000. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/5d04ca6af739b82fd30d84d2783ca802ebfa1192
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60000

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60000.patch      | 140 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |   1 +
 2 files changed, 141 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60000.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-60000.patch new file +140 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c25786ced
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+From 055316632809a2e2e58eac2020699b52187d1b11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 07:53:30 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Fix multiple RFC 4462 (GSSAPIAuthentication)
+ compliance
+
+problems
+
+1) Remove an early failure return for GSSAPI authentication attempts
+made for invalid accounts that yielded different behaviour for
+valid vs invalid accounts.
+
+2) Fix a situation where some GSSAPI requestes were not correctly
+subjected to MaxAuthTries.
+
+3) Fix a moderate pre-authentication resource DoS related to #2.
+
+Add missing logging for error cases.
+
+Report and fixes from Manfred Kaiser, milCERT AT
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-60000
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/5d04ca6af739b82fd30d84d2783ca802ebfa1192]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Kept Scarthgap's PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx()) interface and its
+  authentication-context guard while applying the upstream RFC 4462 state,
+  failure, logging, and MaxAuthTries changes.
+- Retained the Scarthgap auth2-gss.c OpenBSD revision identifier.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ca0acdd64eea435d6f89534538a9eb404a5629d3
+(cherry picked from commit 5d04ca6af739b82fd30d84d2783ca802ebfa1192)
+Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
+---
+ auth2-gss.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 195578bcf..6846eae5b 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -110,12 +110,6 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+ 		return (0);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+-		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
+-		free(doid);
+-		return (0);
+-	}
+-
+ 	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
+ 		if (ctxt != NULL)
+ 			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+@@ -177,8 +171,14 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "send ERRTOK packet");
+ 		}
++		logit("Failed gssapi-with-mic for %s%.100s "
++		    "from %.200s port %d ssh2",
++		    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
++		    authctxt->user,
++		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ 		authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+ 		userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ 	} else {
+ 		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+@@ -190,14 +190,18 @@ input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "send TOKEN packet");
+ 		}
+ 		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+-			ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+-			if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
+-				ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
++			ssh_dispatch_set(ssh,
++			    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
++			/* note: keep ERRTOK handler as per RFC 4462 s3.4 */
++			if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) {
++				ssh_dispatch_set(ssh,
++				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
+ 				    &input_gssapi_mic);
+-			else
++			} else {
+ 				ssh_dispatch_set(ssh,
+ 				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
+ 				    &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -209,10 +213,6 @@ static int
+ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+-	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+-	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+-	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+-	OM_uint32 maj_status;
+ 	int r;
+ 	u_char *p;
+ 	size_t len;
+@@ -220,26 +220,21 @@ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ 		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+ 
+-	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+-	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
++	/* Minimal error handling - just cancel auth and return FAILURE */
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+-	recv_tok.value = p;
+-	recv_tok.length = len;
+-
+-	/* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
+-	maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+-	    &send_tok, NULL));
+-
+-	free(recv_tok.value);
+ 
+-	/* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */
++	logit("Failed gssapi-with-mic for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2",
++	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
++	    authctxt->user,
++	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
++	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+-
+-	/* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
+-
+-	gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index a6bf37d8a6..95c546489f 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-59995.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-60001.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-60002.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-60000.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59999

In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4 backport for CVE-2026-59999. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8dfe7ed6e2fd988de08df508355a196b956b2753
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59999

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59999.patch      | 36 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59999.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59999.patch new file +36 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..89b7aa9c7f
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 1c719fa7d0fb0aa335f0e8d5db5d5e5d01c894e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 04:47:29 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: DisableForwarding=yes didn't override
+ PermitTunnel=yes
+
+Reported independently by Huzaifa Sidhpurwala of Redhat and Marko
+Jevtic; ok markus@
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-59999
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8dfe7ed6e2fd988de08df508355a196b956b2753]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Retained the Scarthgap serverloop.c OpenBSD revision identifier because
+  the 10.4 identifier does not describe the older source baseline.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5c13f0746cf079b21f8deba47407fad49ccbf4c
+(cherry picked from commit 8dfe7ed6e2fd988de08df508355a196b956b2753)
+Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
+---
+ serverloop.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index f3683c2e4..c1fe99d12 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	}
+-	if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) {
++	if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0 || options.disable_forwarding) {
+ 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has rejected tunnel device "
+ 		    "forwarding");
+ 		return NULL;
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index 4193bc8a5b..efb89d45d7 100644
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-35385.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-35414-CVE-2026-35387.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-35388.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-59999.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998

In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4 backport for CVE-2026-59998. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59998

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch      | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a9a13aa70e
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From f1fd8585548735bcba25faa13073aafb5f8686ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 06:55:12 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: mention a caveat regarding
+ GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck in
+
+some environments
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-59998
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Retained the Scarthgap sshd_config.5 OpenBSD revision identifier and
+  Mdocdate because the 10.4 values do not describe the older manual page.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa7158d8f22cb34063c1c2d3cbcf30a9489847c2
+(cherry picked from commit 8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432)
+Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
+---
+ sshd_config.5 | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 7e1a56cd0..e1c8dcaa2 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ machine's default store.
+ This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++This option may not be effective in Windows Active Directory environments.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index 3c706b00ae..256d90e7bd 100644
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-35388.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-59999.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-59997.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-59998.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
#7 lore raw

PATCH 5/8 openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59995

In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4 backport for CVE-2026-59995. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1b39f39657d2e58f8ec57341581a39bbf0be645b
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59995

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59995.patch      | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59995.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59995.patch new file +42 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9b6fee198f
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From b340eaa274a7e7dffea03bcb62169249bbddab37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 01:47:21 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: avoid download to server-controlled path when
+ performing
+
+download on the commandline. From Swival scanner
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-59995
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1b39f39657d2e58f8ec57341581a39bbf0be645b]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Retained the Scarthgap sftp.c OpenBSD revision identifier because the
+  10.4 identifier does not describe the older source baseline.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1b2c44305fdfe6d51eed9ecc727e59478bf311f
+(cherry picked from commit 1b39f39657d2e58f8ec57341581a39bbf0be645b)
+Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
+---
+ sftp.c | 9 ++-------
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+index c609b4153..487e53976 100644
+--- a/sftp.c
++++ b/sftp.c
+@@ -2268,13 +2268,8 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
+ 				return (-1);
+ 			}
+ 		} else {
+-			/* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */
+-			snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s",
+-			    global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir,
+-			    file2 == NULL ? "" : " ",
+-			    file2 == NULL ? "" : file2);
+-			err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
+-			    &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0);
++			err = process_get(conn, dir, file2, remote_path, 0, 0,
++			    global_aflag, 0);
+ 			free(dir);
+ 			free(startdir);
+ 			free(remote_path);
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index c2e172c8d6..b4885ab151 100644
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-59997.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-59998.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-59996.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-59995.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
#4 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH 3/8] openssh: Fix CVE-2026-59998

In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)
Quoted 33 lines · Devansh Patel via lists.openembedded.org

From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream OpenSSH 10.4 backport for CVE-2026-59998. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59998

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch      | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb                  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +11 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a9a13aa70e
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From f1fd8585548735bcba25faa13073aafb5f8686ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 06:55:12 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: mention a caveat regarding
+ GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck in
+
+some environments
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-59998
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432]
+

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch line 21

Quoted 10 lines
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-59998.patch new file +10 -0
+Backport Changes:
+- Retained the Scarthgap sshd_config.5 OpenBSD revision identifier and
+  Mdocdate because the 10.4 values do not describe the older manual page.
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa7158d8f22cb34063c1c2d3cbcf30a9489847c2
+(cherry picked from commit 8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432)
+Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
+---
+ sshd_config.5 | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

Same as: https://patchwork.yoctoproject.org/project/oe-core/patch/[email protected]/#40497

Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS
#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 openssh: set status for CVE-2026-59998

In reply to Devansh Patel -X (devanshp - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>

Analysis:
- CVE-2026-59998 concerns an undocumented limitation of GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck in Windows Active Directory environments [1].
- Upstream OpenSSH 10.4 only documents the existing behavior and provides no code remediation [2].
- The recipe disables Kerberos/GSSAPI by default. Mark the CVE not-applicable-config when PACKAGECONFIG lacks kerberos, and unpatched when kerberos is enabled.

Reference:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59998
[2] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432

---
Changes in v2:
- Drop the documentation-only backport for CVE-2026-59998.
- Add a configuration-aware CVE_STATUS that reports unpatched when Kerberos support is enabled and not-applicable-config otherwise.

 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
index ba8aaad9bb..b48e262c72 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 and when running in a Kerberos environment"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2008-3844] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to some distributed RHEL binaries."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-51767] = "upstream-wontfix: It was demonstrated on modified sshd and does not exist in upstream openssh https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3656#c1."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-3497] = "not-applicable-platform: Only affects GSSAPI Key Exchange patches used by some Linux distributions and does not exist in upstream openssh."
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-59998] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is disabled in the default OpenSSH configuration', d)}"
 
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6