FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: fix integer overflow in set_file_allocation_info()" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
[email protected]
maintainerThe patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 1c0ae3df692ea2a4ce992f786346154e75a3f0d5
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026072024-headphone-posh-4ed4@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 1c0ae3df692ea2a4ce992f786346154e75a3f0d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 17:05:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: fix integer overflow in set_file_allocation_info()
set_file_allocation_info() converts the client-supplied FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION::AllocationSize into a 512-byte block count with:
alloc_blks = (le64_to_cpu(file_alloc_info->AllocationSize) + 511) >> 9;
AllocationSize is a fully client-controlled __le64 field; the only validation performed by the caller (smb2_set_info_file(), case FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION) is that the fixed buffer is at least sizeof(struct smb2_file_alloc_info) == 8 bytes. The value itself is never range-checked before this arithmetic.
When AllocationSize is close to U64_MAX (e.g. 0xffffffffffffffff), "AllocationSize + 511" wraps around mod 2^64 to a small number (0xffffffffffffffff + 511 = 510), so alloc_blks becomes 0. Since any existing regular file has stat.blocks > 0, the function then takes the "shrink" branch and calls:
ksmbd_vfs_truncate(work, fp, alloc_blks * 512); /* == 0 */
silently truncating the file to size 0, even though the client asked to grow the allocation to (what looks like) the maximum possible size. The trailing "if (size < alloc_blks * 512) i_size_write(inode, size);" restore is guarded by a comparison that is never true once alloc_blks == 0, so the truncation is not undone. This lets an authenticated SMB client that already holds an open handle with FILE_WRITE_DATA on a file silently truncate that same file to size 0 via a single crafted SET_INFO(FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION) request advertising a near-U64_MAX AllocationSize, even though the request asks to grow the file's allocation rather than shrink it. This is a functional/data-loss bug, not a privilege-boundary
violation: the same client could already truncate the file via FILE_END_OF_FILE_INFORMATION or a plain write.
Fix it by validating AllocationSize against MAX_LFS_FILESIZE, the same upper bound the VFS itself uses to reject unrepresentable file sizes, before doing the "+511" rounding, and rejecting oversized values with -EINVAL. Bounding AllocationSize to MAX_LFS_FILESIZE - 511 guarantees the "+511" addition cannot wrap, and that the subsequent "alloc_blks * 512" values passed to vfs_fallocate() and ksmbd_vfs_truncate() stay within a representable loff_t as well.
No legitimate SMB client asks for an allocation size anywhere near 2^64 bytes, so this only rejects a value that was previously silently misinterpreted as zero.
Runtime-verified on a v6.19 KASAN test stand: sending SET_INFO (FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION) with AllocationSize = 0xffffffffffffffff against ksmbd now returns -EINVAL and leaves the target file's size unchanged, where the unpatched kernel truncated it from 4096 to 0 bytes.
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +14 -1
@@ -6781,6 +6781,7 @@ static int set_file_allocation_info(struct ksmbd_work *work,*/ loff_t alloc_blks; +u64 alloc_size;struct inode *inode;struct kstat stat;int rc;
@@ -6796,7 +6797,19 @@ static int set_file_allocation_info(struct ksmbd_work *work,if (rc)return rc; - alloc_blks = (le64_to_cpu (file_alloc_info->AllocationSize) +511 ) >>9 ; +/* +* AllocationSize is fully client-controlled (the caller only +* validates the fixed 8-byte buffer length). Reject values that +* would overflow the "round up to 512-byte blocks" conversion +* below instead of silently wrapping it to a tiny block count, +* which would truncate the file to a size the client never +* asked for. +*/ + alloc_size =le64_to_cpu (file_alloc_info->AllocationSize); +if (alloc_size >MAX_LFS_FILESIZE -511 ) +return -EINVAL ; + + alloc_blks = (alloc_size +511 ) >>9 ; inode =file_inode (fp->filp);if (alloc_blks > stat.blocks) {
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/1 ksmbd: fix integer overflow in set_file_allocation_info()
From: Ibrahim Hashimov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1c0ae3df692ea2a4ce992f786346154e75a3f0d5 ]
set_file_allocation_info() converts the client-supplied FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION::AllocationSize into a 512-byte block count with:
alloc_blks = (le64_to_cpu(file_alloc_info->AllocationSize) + 511) >> 9;
AllocationSize is a fully client-controlled __le64 field; the only validation performed by the caller (smb2_set_info_file(), case FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION) is that the fixed buffer is at least sizeof(struct smb2_file_alloc_info) == 8 bytes. The value itself is never range-checked before this arithmetic.
When AllocationSize is close to U64_MAX (e.g. 0xffffffffffffffff), "AllocationSize + 511" wraps around mod 2^64 to a small number (0xffffffffffffffff + 511 = 510), so alloc_blks becomes 0. Since any existing regular file has stat.blocks > 0, the function then takes the "shrink" branch and calls:
ksmbd_vfs_truncate(work, fp, alloc_blks * 512); /* == 0 */
silently truncating the file to size 0, even though the client asked to grow the allocation to (what looks like) the maximum possible size. The trailing "if (size < alloc_blks * 512) i_size_write(inode, size);" restore is guarded by a comparison that is never true once alloc_blks == 0, so the truncation is not undone. This lets an authenticated SMB client that already holds an open handle with FILE_WRITE_DATA on a file silently truncate that same file to size 0 via a single crafted SET_INFO(FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION) request advertising a near-U64_MAX AllocationSize, even though the request asks to grow the file's allocation rather than shrink it. This is a functional/data-loss bug, not a privilege-boundary
violation: the same client could already truncate the file via FILE_END_OF_FILE_INFORMATION or a plain write.
Fix it by validating AllocationSize against MAX_LFS_FILESIZE, the same upper bound the VFS itself uses to reject unrepresentable file sizes, before doing the "+511" rounding, and rejecting oversized values with -EINVAL. Bounding AllocationSize to MAX_LFS_FILESIZE - 511 guarantees the "+511" addition cannot wrap, and that the subsequent "alloc_blks * 512" values passed to vfs_fallocate() and ksmbd_vfs_truncate() stay within a representable loff_t as well.
No legitimate SMB client asks for an allocation size anywhere near 2^64 bytes, so this only rejects a value that was previously silently misinterpreted as zero.
Runtime-verified on a v6.19 KASAN test stand: sending SET_INFO (FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION) with AllocationSize = 0xffffffffffffffff against ksmbd now returns -EINVAL and leaves the target file's size unchanged, where the unpatched kernel truncated it from 4096 to 0 bytes.
--- fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +14 -1
@@ -5814,6 +5814,7 @@ static int set_file_allocation_info(struct ksmbd_work *work,*/ loff_t alloc_blks; +u64 alloc_size;struct inode *inode;struct kstat stat;int rc;
@@ -5826,7 +5827,19 @@ static int set_file_allocation_info(struct ksmbd_work *work,if (rc)return rc; - alloc_blks = (le64_to_cpu (file_alloc_info->AllocationSize) +511 ) >>9 ; +/* +* AllocationSize is fully client-controlled (the caller only +* validates the fixed 8-byte buffer length). Reject values that +* would overflow the "round up to 512-byte blocks" conversion +* below instead of silently wrapping it to a tiny block count, +* which would truncate the file to a size the client never +* asked for. +*/ + alloc_size =le64_to_cpu (file_alloc_info->AllocationSize); +if (alloc_size >MAX_LFS_FILESIZE -511 ) +return -EINVAL ; + + alloc_blks = (alloc_size +511 ) >>9 ; inode =file_inode (fp->filp);if (alloc_blks > stat.blocks) {
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