vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-28422
PATCH v2 1/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-28422
From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28422
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-28422
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-28422.patch | 44 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-28422.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-28422.patch new file +44 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From fcf19885004325f5a52db6bd6893cb5b387799d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2026 20:29:20 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 01/17] patch 9.2.0078: [security]: stack-buffer-overflow in + build_stl_str_hl() + +Problem: A stack-buffer-overflow occurs when rendering a statusline + with a multi-byte fill character on a very wide terminal. + The size check in build_stl_str_hl() uses the cell width + rather than the byte length, allowing the subsequent fill + loop to write beyond the 4096-byte MAXPATHL buffer + (ehdgks0627, un3xploitable). +Solution: Update the size check to account for the byte length of + the fill character (using MB_CHAR2LEN). + +Github Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-gmqx-prf2-8mwf + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/4e5b9e31cb7484ad156fba995fdce3c9b075b5fd] +CVE: CVE-2026-28422 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/buffer.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/buffer.c b/src/buffer.c +index 0feafc590d..363dd0e04a 100644 +--- a/src/buffer.c ++++ b/src/buffer.c +@@ -5293,7 +5293,8 @@ build_stl_str_hl( + } + width = maxwidth; + } +- else if (width < maxwidth && outputlen + maxwidth - width + 1 < outlen) ++ else if (width < maxwidth && ++ outputlen + (maxwidth - width) * MB_CHAR2LEN(fillchar) + 1 < outlen) + { + // Find how many separators there are, which we will use when + // figuring out how many groups there are. +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-52858.patch \ file://CVE-2026-52859.patch \ file://CVE-2026-52860.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-28422.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 2/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-42307
From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42307
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-42307
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch | 121 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 122 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch new file +121 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +From 936634660e3836e1a495965b48a0dc913e9d0deb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 19:03:02 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 02/17] patch 9.2.0383: [security]: runtime(netrw): + shell-injection via sftp: and file: URLs + +Problem: runtime(netrw): shell-injection via sftp: and file: URLs + (Joshua Rogers) +Solution: Escape temporary file names, harden filename suffix regex, + drop unused g:netrw_tmpfile_escape variable + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/405e2fb6d54d5653523809e2853d99d1c000a5fc] +CVE: CVE-2026-42307 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/doc/pi_netrw.txt | 4 ---- + runtime/doc/tags | 1 - + runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim | 16 +++++++++------- + runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/doc/netrw.txt | 4 ---- + 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/doc/pi_netrw.txt b/runtime/doc/pi_netrw.txt +index a86cac36ba..2d98a8407b 100644 +--- a/runtime/doc/pi_netrw.txt ++++ b/runtime/doc/pi_netrw.txt +@@ -2854,10 +2854,6 @@ your browsing preferences. (see also: |netrw-settings|) + such as listing, file removal, etc. + default: ssh + +- *g:netrw_tmpfile_escape* =' &;' +- escape() is applied to all temporary files +- to escape these characters. +- + *g:netrw_timefmt* specify format string to vim's strftime(). + The default, "%c", is "the preferred date + and time representation for the current +diff --git a/runtime/doc/tags b/runtime/doc/tags +index 300dfd18a6..7ce3b63075 100644 +--- a/runtime/doc/tags ++++ b/runtime/doc/tags +@@ -7863,7 +7863,6 @@ g:netrw_ssh_browse_reject pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_ssh_browse_reject* + g:netrw_ssh_cmd pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_ssh_cmd* + g:netrw_sshport pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_sshport* + g:netrw_timefmt pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_timefmt* +-g:netrw_tmpfile_escape pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_tmpfile_escape* + g:netrw_uid pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_uid* + g:netrw_use_noswf pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_use_noswf* + g:netrw_use_nt_rcp pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_use_nt_rcp* +diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +index 1c98104d00..805474616d 100644 +--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim ++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +@@ -378,7 +378,6 @@ else + call s:NetrwInit("g:netrw_glob_escape",'*[]?`{~$\') + endif + call s:NetrwInit("g:netrw_menu_escape",'.&? \') +-call s:NetrwInit("g:netrw_tmpfile_escape",' &;') + call s:NetrwInit("s:netrw_map_escape","<|\n\r\\\<C-V>\"") + if has("gui_running") && (&enc == 'utf-8' || &enc == 'utf-16' || &enc == 'ucs-4') + let s:treedepthstring= "│ " +@@ -1799,14 +1798,14 @@ function netrw#NetRead(mode,...) + "......................................... + " NetRead: (sftp) NetRead Method #9 {{{3 + elseif b:netrw_method == 9 +- call netrw#os#Execute(s:netrw_silentxfer."!".g:netrw_sftp_cmd." ".netrw#os#Escape(g:netrw_machine.":".b:netrw_fname,1)." ".tmpfile) ++ call netrw#os#Execute(s:netrw_silentxfer."!".g:netrw_sftp_cmd." ".netrw#os#Escape(g:netrw_machine.":".b:netrw_fname,1)." ".netrw#os#Escape(tmpfile,1)) + let result = s:NetrwGetFile(readcmd, tmpfile, b:netrw_method) + let b:netrw_lastfile = choice + + "......................................... + " NetRead: (file) NetRead Method #10 {{{3 + elseif b:netrw_method == 10 && exists("g:netrw_file_cmd") +- call netrw#os#Execute(s:netrw_silentxfer."!".g:netrw_file_cmd." ".netrw#os#Escape(b:netrw_fname,1)." ".tmpfile) ++ call netrw#os#Execute(s:netrw_silentxfer."!".g:netrw_file_cmd." ".netrw#os#Escape(b:netrw_fname,1)." ".netrw#os#Escape(tmpfile,1)) + let result = s:NetrwGetFile(readcmd, tmpfile, b:netrw_method) + let b:netrw_lastfile = choice + +@@ -8927,14 +8926,17 @@ function s:GetTempfile(fname) + endif + + " use fname's suffix for the temporary file ++ " Restrict the suffix to word characters so shell metacharacters in a ++ " remote filename (e.g. sftp://host/foo.txt;id) cannot ride along into ++ " the tempfile name and out into a downstream shell command. + if a:fname != "" +- if a:fname =~ '\.[^./]\+$' ++ if a:fname =~ '\.\w\+$' + if a:fname =~ '\.tar\.gz$' || a:fname =~ '\.tar\.bz2$' || a:fname =~ '\.tar\.xz$' +- let suffix = ".tar".substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.[^./]\+\)$','\1','e') ++ let suffix = ".tar".substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.\w\+\)$','\1','e') + elseif a:fname =~ '.txz$' +- let suffix = ".txz".substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.[^./]\+\)$','\1','e') ++ let suffix = ".txz".substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.\w\+\)$','\1','e') + else +- let suffix = substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.[^./]\+\)$','\1','e') ++ let suffix = substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.\w\+\)$','\1','e') + endif + let tmpfile= substitute(tmpfile,'\.tmp$','','e') + let tmpfile .= suffix +diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/doc/netrw.txt b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/doc/netrw.txt +index 01a5bda597..144bab5fb3 100644 +--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/doc/netrw.txt ++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/doc/netrw.txt +@@ -2854,10 +2854,6 @@ your browsing preferences. (see also: |netrw-settings|) + such as listing, file removal, etc. + default: ssh + +- *g:netrw_tmpfile_escape* =' &;' +- escape() is applied to all temporary files +- to escape these characters. +- + *g:netrw_timefmt* specify format string to vim's strftime(). + The default, "%c", is "the preferred date + and time representation for the current +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-52859.patch \ file://CVE-2026-52860.patch \ file://CVE-2026-28422.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-42307.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCHv2 02/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-42307
Quoted 8 lines · Siddharth Doshi via lists.openembedded.org
From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42307
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-42307
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch | 121 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 122 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch
Hello,
As far as I can tell CVE-2026-42307 applies to wrynose but I can't find a fix for this CVE on wrynose.
Can you send fixes for CVEs from this series to wrynose when it is applicable?
In the meantime, I'll hold this series.
Regards,
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS
PATCH v2 3/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-43961
In reply to SiddharthFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/8af0f098c3a42a28661d0295364e
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-43961
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-43961.patch | 65 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-43961.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-43961.patch new file +65 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From f38c7cb2fcc9d5839386ea4722463ea921f0bbce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 16:43:15 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 03/17] patch 9.2.0480: [security]: runtime(netrw): code + injection via mf command + +Problem: [security]: runtime(netrw): code injection via mf command + (Christopher Lusk, Zdenek Dohnal) +Solution: Do not use string concatenation inside the filter() commands + (Zdenek Dohnal) + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-66hr-7p6x-x5j3 + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/8af0f098c3a42a28661d0295364e] +CVE: CVE-2026-43961 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim | 7 +++---- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +index 805474616d..e484de5c93 100644 +--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim ++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +@@ -5155,7 +5155,7 @@ function s:NetrwMarkFile(islocal,fname) + + else + " remove filename from buffer's markfilelist +- call filter(s:netrwmarkfilelist_{curbufnr},'v:val != a:fname') ++ call filter(s:netrwmarkfilelist_{curbufnr}, {_, v -> v !=# a:fname}) + if s:netrwmarkfilelist_{curbufnr} == [] + " local markfilelist is empty; remove it entirely + call s:NetrwUnmarkList(curbufnr,curdir) +@@ -5176,7 +5176,6 @@ function s:NetrwMarkFile(islocal,fname) + + else + " initialize new markfilelist +- + let s:netrwmarkfilelist_{curbufnr}= [] + call add(s:netrwmarkfilelist_{curbufnr},substitute(a:fname,'[|@]$','','')) + +@@ -5196,7 +5195,7 @@ function s:NetrwMarkFile(islocal,fname) + call add(s:netrwmarkfilelist,netrw#fs#ComposePath(b:netrw_curdir,a:fname)) + else + " remove new filename from global markfilelist +- call filter(s:netrwmarkfilelist,'v:val != "'.dname.'"') ++ call filter(s:netrwmarkfilelist, {_, v -> v !=# dname}) + if s:netrwmarkfilelist == [] + unlet s:netrwmarkfilelist + endif +@@ -7202,7 +7201,7 @@ function s:NetrwTreeDisplay(dir,depth) + " hide given patterns + let listhide= split(g:netrw_list_hide,',') + for pat in listhide +- call filter(w:netrw_treedict[dir],'v:val !~ "'.escape(pat,'\\').'"') ++ call filter(w:netrw_treedict[dir], {_, v -> v !~# pat}) + endfor + + elseif g:netrw_hide == 2 +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-52860.patch \ file://CVE-2026-28422.patch \ file://CVE-2026-42307.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-43961.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 4/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-47162
In reply to SiddharthFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47162
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-47162
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-47162.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47162.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47162.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From d254c3b584e19555f2aecc4886ae7c92c0acc199 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 18:53:48 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 04/17] patch 9.2.0495: [security]: runtime(netrw): code + injection via NetrwBookHistSave() + +Problem: [security]: runtime(netrw): code injection via + NetrwBookHistSave() +Solution: Properly quote the directory name using string() function + (Srinivas Piskala Ganesh Babu) + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-crm5-rh6j-2c7c + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/f08ab2f4d7d2947c8dd6c179ae08ee6146a2694b] +CVE: CVE-2026-47162 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +index e484de5c93..9014ca339b 100644 +--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim ++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +@@ -2921,7 +2921,7 @@ function s:NetrwBookHistSave() + while ( first || cnt != g:netrw_dirhistcnt ) + let lastline= lastline + 1 + if exists("g:netrw_dirhist_{cnt}") +- call setline(lastline,'let g:netrw_dirhist_'.cnt."='".g:netrw_dirhist_{cnt}."'") ++ call setline(lastline,'let g:netrw_dirhist_'.cnt.'='.string(g:netrw_dirhist_{cnt})) + endif + let first = 0 + let cnt = ( cnt - 1 ) % g:netrw_dirhistmax +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-28422.patch \ file://CVE-2026-42307.patch \ file://CVE-2026-43961.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-47162.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 5/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-47167
In reply to SiddharthFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47167
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-47167
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-47167.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47167.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47167.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From e117fcc6f1c1973602c8e2c6529fba9ee1ce59b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 19:39:24 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 05/17] patch 9.2.0496: [security]: Code Injection in cucumber + filetype plugin + +Problem: [security]: Code Injection in cucumber filetype plugin + (Christopher Lusk) +Solution: Use rubys Regexp.new() with the untrusted pattern + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-4473-94jm-w5x9 + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/a65a52d684bc58535ad28a4ae824d22e76399934] +CVE: CVE-2026-47167 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim b/runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim +index f4848d1c60..3361f1db4a 100644 +--- a/runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim ++++ b/runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim +@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ function! s:stepmatch(receiver,target) + catch + endtry + if has("ruby") && pattern !~ '\\\@<!#{' +- ruby VIM.command("return #{if (begin; Kernel.eval('/'+VIM.evaluate('pattern')+'/'); rescue SyntaxError; end) === VIM.evaluate('a:target') then 1 else 0 end}") ++ " Use Regexp.new, so the pattern stays untrusted data and cannot inject Ruby ++ ruby VIM.command("return #{if (begin; Regexp.new(VIM.evaluate('pattern')); rescue RegexpError; end) === VIM.evaluate('a:target') then 1 else 0 end}") + else + return 0 + endif +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-42307.patch \ file://CVE-2026-43961.patch \ file://CVE-2026-47162.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-47167.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 6/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55693
In reply to SiddharthFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55693
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-55693
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-55693.patch | 88 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55693.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55693.patch new file +88 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +From 315b35adb406138c962bcc653db95acc3c87c8ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 19:39:08 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 09/17] patch 9.2.0653: [security]: out-of-bounds write in + tree_count_words() + +Problem: [security]: a crafted spell file can drive tree_count_words() + past the end of its MAXWLEN-sized depth arrays; the descent + loop has no depth bound. +Solution: only descend while depth < MAXWLEN - 1, as the sibling trie + walkers already do; apply the same guard to sug_filltree(). + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-wgh4-64f7-q3jq + +Supported by AI. + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/a80874d9b84a01040e3d1aef2d4a59e1934dafb7] +CVE: CVE-2026-55693 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/spellfile.c | 4 ++-- + src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/spellfile.c b/src/spellfile.c +index 0b9536dc16..0010d9aa27 100644 +--- a/src/spellfile.c ++++ b/src/spellfile.c +@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ tree_count_words(char_u *byts, idx_T *idxs) + ++curi[depth]; + } + } +- else ++ else if (depth < MAXWLEN - 1) + { + // Normal char, go one level deeper to count the words. + ++depth; +@@ -5648,7 +5648,7 @@ sug_filltree(spellinfo_T *spin, slang_T *slang) + ++curi[depth]; + } + } +- else ++ else if (depth < MAXWLEN - 1) + { + // Normal char, go one level deeper. + tword[depth++] = c; +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +index b72974ed07..e5f8c5778f 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +@@ -1166,4 +1166,31 @@ func Test_mkspell_empty_dic() + endfunc + + ++func Test_spell_sug_tree_count_words_overflow() ++ " A crafted .spl/.sug pair with a BY_INDEX self-cycle in the fold word tree ++ " parses cleanly (shared refs aren't recursed, so read_tree_node()'s depth ++ " cap never trips), but drove tree_count_words() past its MAXWLEN-sized depth ++ " arrays -> stack out-of-bounds write. The walk only happens when ++ " spellsuggest() loads the matching .sug. Reaching the assert == no OOB. ++ call mkdir('Xrtp/spell', 'pR') ++ " VIMspell + v50, SN_SUGFILE(ts), SN_END, LWORDTREE{node:1,BY_INDEX->0,'A'}, ++ " empty KWORDTREE/PREFIXTREE ++ let spl = eval('0z56494D7370656C6C320B0000000008000000001234' ++ \ .. '5678FF000000020101000000410000000000000000') ++ " VIMsug + v1, matching ts, SUGWORDTREE word "a", empty SUGTABLE ++ let sug = 0z56494D737567010000000012345678000000040161010000000000 ++ call writefile(spl, 'Xrtp/spell/xx.utf-8.spl', 'b') ++ call writefile(sug, 'Xrtp/spell/xx.utf-8.sug', 'b') ++ ++ new ++ set runtimepath+=./Xrtp ++ set spelllang=xx ++ set spell ++ " Unpatched: OOB write here (ASan abort, or crash). Patched: returns a list. ++ call assert_equal(v:t_list, type(spellsuggest('helloo'))) ++ ++ set spell& spelllang& runtimepath& ++ bwipe! ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-43961.patch \ file://CVE-2026-47162.patch \ file://CVE-2026-47167.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-55693.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 7/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55892
In reply to SiddharthFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55892
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-55892
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-55892.patch | 81 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 82 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55892.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55892.patch new file +81 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From f0df4a48a426bd67c0c2f5ad536000a4368cd4c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 20:32:21 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 10/17] patch 9.2.0662: [security] Stack out-of-bounds write in + dump_prefixes() + +Problem: [security]: a crafted spell file with a self-referential + BY_INDEX node in the prefix tree can drive dump_prefixes() + past the end of its MAXWLEN-sized depth arrays on :spelldump + (cipher-creator) +Solution: only descend while depth < MAXWLEN - 1, as the sibling trie + walkers already do (Yasuhiro Matsumoto) + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-qm9w-fmpj-879h + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/8325b193bba5f01e7a7d8241fc8633d93dff996b] +CVE: CVE-2026-55892 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/spell.c | 2 +- + src/testdir/test_spell.vim | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/spell.c b/src/spell.c +index 2281986435..6ef3fa899b 100644 +--- a/src/spell.c ++++ b/src/spell.c +@@ -4328,7 +4328,7 @@ dump_prefixes( + } + } + } +- else ++ else if (depth < MAXWLEN - 1) + { + // Normal char, go one level deeper. + prefix[depth++] = c; +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_spell.vim b/src/testdir/test_spell.vim +index 170ea57926..2a3f0e3696 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_spell.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_spell.vim +@@ -1567,4 +1567,31 @@ let g:test_data_aff_sal = [ + \"SAL Z S", + \ ] + ++" A crafted .spl with a self-referential BY_INDEX node in the PREFIXTREE drove ++" dump_prefixes() past its MAXWLEN-sized depth arrays (stack out-of-bounds ++" write). The tree parses cleanly (shared refs aren't recursed); the walk ++" happens on :spelldump. Reaching the assert means no OOB. Same class as the ++" tree_count_words() fix (9.2.0653). ++func Test_spelldump_prefixtree_overflow() ++ CheckUnix ++ call mkdir('Xrtp/spell', 'pR') ++ " VIMspell + v50, SN_PREFCOND(prefixcnt=1), SN_END, ++ " LWORDTREE word "a" with affixID=1 (so dump_prefixes runs), ++ " empty KWORDTREE, PREFIXTREE child BY_INDEX -> nodeidx 0 (self-cycle), 'A' ++ let spl = eval('0z56494D7370656C6C32030000000003000100FF00000004' ++ \ .. '0161010220010000000000000002010100000041') ++ call writefile(spl, 'Xrtp/spell/xx.utf-8.spl', 'b') ++ ++ new ++ set runtimepath+=./Xrtp ++ set spelllang=xx ++ set spell ++ spelldump ++ call assert_true(line('$') > 1) ++ ++ set spell& spelllang& runtimepath& ++ bwipe! ++ bwipe! ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-47162.patch \ file://CVE-2026-47167.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55693.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-55892.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 8/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55895
In reply to SiddharthFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55895
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-55895
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch new file +53 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 0d286458d71ff7b4d759621dd9a567aa9354819a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 21:00:28 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 11/17] patch 9.2.0663: [security]: runtime(netrw): code + injection in local file deletion + +Problem: [security]: s:NetrwLocalRmFile() escapes only the backslash in + the file name before passing it to :execute, so a name + containing "|" injects arbitrary Ex commands when the file is + deleted (cipher-creator) +Solution: Use fnameescape() to correctly escape the file name + (Yasuhiro Matsumoto). + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-vhh8-v6wx-hjjh + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/55bc757a5d436e59d50fe43f7cda94b118f86cb2] +CVE: CVE-2026-55895 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +index 9014ca339b..af43f469d1 100644 +--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim ++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +@@ -3025,7 +3025,7 @@ function s:NetrwBrowse(islocal,dirname) + elseif !a:islocal && dirname !~ '[\/]$' && dirname !~ '^"' + " s:NetrwBrowse : remote regular file handler {{{3 + if bufname(dirname) != "" +- exe "NetrwKeepj b ".bufname(dirname) ++ exe "NetrwKeepj b ".fnameescape(bufname(dirname)) + else + " attempt transfer of remote regular file + +@@ -8737,7 +8737,7 @@ function s:NetrwLocalRmFile(path, fname, all) + call netrw#msg#Notify('ERROR', printf("unable to delete <%s>!", rmfile)) + else + " Remove file only if there are no pending changes +- execute printf('silent! bwipeout %s', rmfile) ++ execute printf('silent! bwipeout %s', fnameescape(rmfile)) + endif + + elseif dir && (all || empty(ok)) +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-47167.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55693.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55892.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-55895.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 9/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-57452
In reply to SiddharthFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57452
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-57452
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-57452.patch | 76 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57452.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57452.patch new file +76 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +From c8777cec25dcfae89c42e9aff51af61f71c5745f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 18:41:16 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0671: [security]: possible out-of-bounds read with + sodium encrypted files + +Problem: [security]: possible out-of-bounds read with sodium encrypted + files (cipher-creator) +Solution: Verify that there is enough space before calling + crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_pull() + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-c4j9-wr9j-4486 + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/c8777cec25dcfae89c42e9aff51af61f71c5745f] +CVE: CVE-2026-57452 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/crypt.c | 3 ++- + src/testdir/test_crypt.vim | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/crypt.c b/src/crypt.c +index 55edd6c6de..a11d204e5e 100644 +--- a/src/crypt.c ++++ b/src/crypt.c +@@ -1257,7 +1257,8 @@ crypt_sodium_buffer_decode( + + if (sod_st->count == 0) + { +- if (crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_pull(&sod_st->state, ++ if (len < crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_HEADERBYTES || ++ crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_pull(&sod_st->state, + from, sod_st->key) != 0) + { + emsg(_(e_libsodium_decryption_failed_header_incomplete)); +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_crypt.vim b/src/testdir/test_crypt.vim +index 4a96c30702..151a4dea17 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_crypt.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_crypt.vim +@@ -459,4 +459,28 @@ func Test_crypt_set_key_disallow_append_subtract() + bwipe! + endfunc + ++func Test_crypt_sodium_short_body() ++ CheckFeature sodium ++ " A VimCrypt~04! file with a complete 36-byte header (12 magic + 16 salt + ++ " 8 seed) but a body shorter than one secretstream header (24 bytes) used to ++ " underflow the body length and crash with a wild out-of-bounds read in ++ " crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_pull(). It must now fail cleanly. ++ " Bytes: "VimCrypt~04!" + 16 salt + 8 seed + 8-byte body = 44 bytes. ++ call writefile(0z56696D43727970747E303421 ++ \ + 0zA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF ++ \ + 0zB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7 ++ \ + 0z0000000000000000, 'Xtest_sodium_short') ++ ++ let v:errmsg = '' ++ try ++ call feedkeys(":split Xtest_sodium_short\<CR>foobar\<CR>", "xt") ++ catch /^Vim\%((\S\+)\)\=:E1198:/ ++ " no-op ++ endtry ++ ++ bwipe! ++ call delete('Xtest_sodium_short') ++ set key= ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-55693.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55892.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55895.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-57452.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 10/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-57455
In reply to SiddharthFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57455
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-57455
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-57455.patch | 72 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57455.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57455.patch new file +72 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From 497d2fb19b2af9bccf139bb910e4f91b583e769d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 19:20:03 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 13/17] patch 9.2.0698: [security]: Out-of-bounds write with + soundfold() + +Problem: [security]: Out-of-bounds write with soundfold() + (cipher-creator) +Solution: Add an abort condition to the for loop to validate the buffer + size. + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-q8mh-6qm3-25g4 + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/497f931f85339d175d7f69588dd249e8ccfed41b] +CVE: CVE-2026-57455 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/spell.c | 2 +- + src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/spell.c b/src/spell.c +index 6ef3fa899b..a7909ef46e 100644 +--- a/src/spell.c ++++ b/src/spell.c +@@ -3273,7 +3273,7 @@ spell_soundfold_sofo(slang_T *slang, char_u *inword, char_u *res) + else + { + // The sl_sal_first[] table contains the translation. +- for (s = inword; (c = *s) != NUL; ++s) ++ for (s = inword; (c = *s) != NUL && ri < MAXWLEN - 1; ++s) + { + if (VIM_ISWHITE(c)) + c = ' '; +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +index e5f8c5778f..d04d024911 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +@@ -1193,4 +1193,25 @@ func Test_spell_sug_tree_count_words_overflow() + bwipe! + endfunc + ++" A word longer than MAXWLEN must not overflow the soundfold result buffer in ++" the single-byte SOFO branch of spell_soundfold_sofo(). ++func Test_soundfold_overflow() ++ let _enc=&enc ++ set enc=latin1 ++ call writefile(['SOFOFROM ab', 'SOFOTO xy'], 'Xtest.aff', 'D') ++ call writefile(['1', 'foo'], 'Xtest.dic', 'D') ++ mkspell! Xtest Xtest ++ defer delete('Xtest.latin1.spl') ++ defer delete('Xtest.latin1.sug') ++ setl spelllang=Xtest.latin1.spl spell ++ ++ " Before the fix the copy loop wrote one byte per input byte into a ++ " MAXWLEN (254) stack buffer with no upper bound, smashing the stack. ++ let sound = soundfold(repeat('ab', 300)) ++ call assert_true(strlen(sound) < 254, 'soundfold result exceeds MAXWLEN') ++ ++ set spell& spelllang& ++ let &enc = _enc ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-55892.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55895.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57452.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-57455.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 11/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59856
In reply to SiddharthFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59856
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-59856
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-59856.patch | 103 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 104 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59856.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59856.patch new file +103 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From 43afc581a37a35762dd0ef292f038b9dc5680a24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 20:07:01 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0736: potential command execution in PHP + omni-completion + +Problem: With PHP omni-completion, a crafted file can potentially + execute arbitrary commands when completing a class member. +Solution: Quote the class name before inserting it into the search() + pattern run via win_execute(). + +Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/43afc581a37a35762dd0ef292f038b9dc5680a24] +CVE: CVE-2026-59856 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim | 3 ++- + src/testdir/Make_all.mak | 2 ++ + src/testdir/test_plugin_phpcomplete.vim | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 src/testdir/test_plugin_phpcomplete.vim + +diff --git a/runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim b/runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim +index 5b4263ae45..93f7d8b450 100644 +--- a/runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim ++++ b/runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim +@@ -2082,7 +2082,8 @@ function! phpcomplete#GetClassContentsStructure(file_path, file_lines, class_nam + let result = [] + let popup_id = popup_create(a:file_lines, {'hidden': v:true}) + +- call win_execute(popup_id, 'call search(''\c\(class\|interface\|trait\)\_s\+'.a:class_name.'\(\>\|$\)'')') ++ call win_execute(popup_id, 'call search(' ++ \ . string('\c\(class\|interface\|trait\)\_s\+' . a:class_name . '\(\>\|$\)') . ')') + call win_execute(popup_id, "let cfline = line('.')") + call win_execute(popup_id, "call search('{')") + call win_execute(popup_id, "let endline = line('.')") +diff --git a/src/testdir/Make_all.mak b/src/testdir/Make_all.mak +index 0d4aeb0432..7d57b2e727 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/Make_all.mak ++++ b/src/testdir/Make_all.mak +@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ NEW_TESTS = \ + test_plugin_man \ + test_plugin_matchparen \ + test_plugin_python3complete \ ++ test_plugin_phpcomplete \ + test_plugin_tar \ + test_plugin_termdebug \ + test_plugin_tohtml \ +@@ -522,6 +523,7 @@ NEW_TESTS_RES = \ + test_plugin_man.res \ + test_plugin_matchparen.res \ + test_plugin_python3complete.res \ ++ test_plugin_phpcomplete.res \ + test_plugin_tar.res \ + test_plugin_termdebug.res \ + test_plugin_tohtml.res \ + +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_plugin_phpcomplete.vim b/src/testdir/test_plugin_phpcomplete.vim +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..7f66be47b7 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/testdir/test_plugin_phpcomplete.vim +@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ ++" Tests for the PHP omni-completion plugin (runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim). ++ ++" A buffer class name is interpolated into a search() pattern run via ++" win_execute(). Without escaping, "'" closes the string and "|" starts a new ++" Ex command, so the name runs as an Ex command during completion. ++func Test_phpcomplete_no_exec_via_class_name() ++ unlet! g:phpcomplete_injected ++ let lines = ['<?php', 'class x {}', ''] ++ let payload = "x')|let g:phpcomplete_injected = 1|call search('" ++ ++ try ++ call phpcomplete#GetClassContentsStructure('x.php', lines, payload) ++ catch ++ endtry ++ ++ call assert_false(exists('g:phpcomplete_injected'), ++ \ 'class name was executed as an Ex command during completion') ++ ++ unlet! g:phpcomplete_injected ++endfunc ++ ++func Test_phpcomplete_class_lookup_still_works() ++ let lines = ['<?php', 'class Foo {', ' public $bar;', '}', ''] ++ let result = phpcomplete#GetClassContentsStructure('Foo.php', lines, 'Foo') ++ ++ call assert_equal(type([]), type(result), ++ \ 'GetClassContentsStructure did not return a list') ++ call assert_true(len(result) > 0, 'no class structure returned') ++ call assert_match('class Foo', result[0].content, ++ \ 'class body missing from returned content') ++ call assert_match('bar', result[0].content, ++ \ 'class member missing from returned content') ++endfunc ++ ++" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-55895.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57452.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57455.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59856.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 12/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59857
In reply to SiddharthFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59857
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-59857
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-59857.patch | 110 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59857.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59857.patch new file +110 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +From 48287480f53acfb5e6f9172e571ed2f0508dfab2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 13:00:36 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH 16/17] patch 9.2.0725: [security]: Stack out-of-bounds write + in spell_soundfold_sal() + +Problem: [security]: A crafted spell file with non-collapsing SAL rules + can make soundfold() write one byte past the end of the + MAXWLEN result buffer. This is the same class of + out-of-bounds write as GHSA-q8mh-6qm3-25g4 (fixed in 9.2.0698 + for the SOFO branch), found while auditing the surrounding + code. +Solution: Bound the single-byte SAL result writes and the terminating + NUL to MAXWLEN - 1, matching the SOFO branch. + +The single-byte branch of spell_soundfold_sal() guarded its writes with +"reslen < MAXWLEN", allowing reslen to reach MAXWLEN (254). The trailing +"res[reslen] = NUL" then wrote at index 254 of the 254-byte stack buffer +res[MAXWLEN], an off-by-one out-of-bounds write. Input is case-folded to +about 253 characters, so a 253-character argument together with a SAL map +that does not collapse (collapse_result false) reaches the boundary. + +Related to previous issue +[GHSA-q8mh-6qm3-25g4](https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-q8mh-6qm3-25g4) +(9.2.0698) + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-m3hf-xcm3-xhm2 + +Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/d22ff1c955ff87e8273210eae125aab0e85b6c30] +CVE: CVE-2026-59857 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/spell.c | 6 +++--- + src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/spell.c b/src/spell.c +index a7909ef46e..05d6f0159d 100644 +--- a/src/spell.c ++++ b/src/spell.c +@@ -3516,7 +3516,7 @@ spell_soundfold_sal(slang_T *slang, char_u *inword, char_u *res) + // no '<' rule used + i += k - 1; + z = 0; +- while (*s != NUL && s[1] != NUL && reslen < MAXWLEN) ++ while (*s != NUL && s[1] != NUL && reslen < MAXWLEN - 1) + { + if (reslen == 0 || res[reslen - 1] != *s) + res[reslen++] = *s; +@@ -3526,7 +3526,7 @@ spell_soundfold_sal(slang_T *slang, char_u *inword, char_u *res) + c = *s; + if (strstr((char *)pf, "^^") != NULL) + { +- if (c != NUL) ++ if (c != NUL && reslen < MAXWLEN - 1) + res[reslen++] = c; + STRMOVE(word, word + i + 1); + i = 0; +@@ -3545,7 +3545,7 @@ spell_soundfold_sal(slang_T *slang, char_u *inword, char_u *res) + + if (z0 == 0) + { +- if (k && !p0 && reslen < MAXWLEN && c != NUL ++ if (k && !p0 && reslen < MAXWLEN - 1 && c != NUL + && (!slang->sl_collapse || reslen == 0 + || res[reslen - 1] != c)) + // condense only double letters +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +index d04d024911..c8c7ac2642 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +@@ -383,6 +383,30 @@ func Test_spellfile_format_error() + let &rtp = save_rtp + endfunc + ++" An over-length soundfold() argument must not overflow the MAXWLEN result ++" buffer in the single-byte branch of spell_soundfold_sal(). ++func Test_spellfile_soundfold_sal_overflow() ++ let save_enc = &encoding ++ set encoding=latin1 ++ " A SAL map that appends without collapsing, so the result is not shorter ++ " than the input. ++ call writefile(['SET ISO8859-1', 'SAL collapse_result false', ++ \ 'SAL a aaaa', 'SAL b bbbb'], 'Xsal.aff') ++ call writefile(['2', 'hello', 'world'], 'Xsal.dic') ++ mkspell! Xsal Xsal ++ set spl=Xsal.latin1.spl spell ++ ++ " 253 input characters hit the buffer boundary; the result must not exceed ++ " MAXWLEN - 1. ++ call assert_true(strlen(soundfold(repeat('a', 253))) <= 253) ++ ++ set nospell spl& spelllang& ++ call delete('Xsal.aff') ++ call delete('Xsal.dic') ++ call delete('Xsal.latin1.spl') ++ let &encoding = save_enc ++endfunc ++ + " Test for format errors in suggest file + func Test_sugfile_format_error() + let save_rtp = &rtp +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-57452.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57455.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59856.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59857.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 13/13 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59858
In reply to SiddharthFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59858
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-59858
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch | 134 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch new file +134 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +From 6b611b0d15603c52ebdad17172b0232b4f65704e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 15:41:24 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0735: [security]: arbitrary Ex command execution + during C omni-completion + +Problem: [security]: With C omni-completion, a crafted tags file can execute + arbitrary Ex commands when completing a struct/union member + (cipher-creator) +Solution: Escape the type field before inserting it into the :vimgrep + pattern so it cannot close the pattern and start a new command + (Hirohito Higashi). + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-mf92-v4xw-j45x + +Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>" +Signed-off-by: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/6b611b0d15603c52ebdad17172b0232b4f65704e] +CVE: CVE-2026-59858 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim | 2 +- + src/testdir/Make_all.mak | 2 + + src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim + +diff --git a/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim b/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim +index cb4bb2c167..248d6f2e60 100644 +--- a/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim ++++ b/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim +@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ def StructMembers( # {{{1 + return [] + endif + execute 'silent! keepjumps noautocmd ' +- .. n .. 'vimgrep ' .. '/\t' .. typename .. '\(\t\|$\)/j ' ++ .. n .. 'vimgrep ' .. '/\t' .. escape(typename, '/\') .. '\(\t\|$\)/j ' + .. fnames + + qflist = getqflist() +diff --git a/src/testdir/Make_all.mak b/src/testdir/Make_all.mak +index 7d57b2e727..681e9b3b2a 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/Make_all.mak ++++ b/src/testdir/Make_all.mak +@@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ NEW_TESTS = \ + test_partial \ + test_paste \ + test_perl \ ++ test_plugin_ccomplete \ + test_plugin_comment \ + test_plugin_glvs \ + test_plugin_helptoc \ +@@ -516,6 +517,7 @@ NEW_TESTS_RES = \ + test_partial.res \ + test_paste.res \ + test_perl.res \ ++ test_plugin_ccomplete.res \ + test_plugin_comment.res \ + test_plugin_glvs.res \ + test_plugin_helptoc.res \ +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim b/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..a635bd50bd +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim +@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ ++" Tests for the C omni-completion plugin (runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim). ++ ++func s:WriteTags(lines) ++ " Mark unsorted so lookup is a linear scan regardless of entry order. ++ let tagsfile = tempname() ++ call writefile(["!_TAG_FILE_SORTED\t0\t/0/"] + a:lines, tagsfile) ++ return tagsfile ++endfunc ++ ++" A crafted typeref field is interpolated into the :vimgrep pattern in ++" StructMembers(). Without escaping, "/" closes the pattern and "|" starts a ++" new Ex command, so the field runs as an Ex command during completion. ++func Test_ccomplete_no_exec_via_typeref() ++ unlet! g:ccomplete_injected ++ let tagsfile = s:WriteTags([ ++ \ "myvar\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tv\ttyperef:x/|let g:ccomplete_injected = 1|\"", ++ \ ]) ++ ++ let save_tags = &tags ++ let &tags = tagsfile ++ ++ new ++ call ccomplete#Complete(1, '') ++ call ccomplete#Complete(0, 'myvar.x') ++ ++ call assert_false(exists('g:ccomplete_injected'), ++ \ 'typeref field was executed as an Ex command during omni-completion') ++ ++ bwipe! ++ let &tags = save_tags ++ unlet! g:ccomplete_injected ++endfunc ++ ++" A legitimate typeref must still drive struct-member completion: escaping the ++" field value must not break the normal path. ++func Test_ccomplete_typeref_completion_still_works() ++ let tagsfile = s:WriteTags([ ++ \ "myvar\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tv\ttyperef:struct:mystruct", ++ \ "alpha\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tm\tstruct:mystruct", ++ \ "beta\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tm\tstruct:mystruct", ++ \ ]) ++ ++ let save_tags = &tags ++ let &tags = tagsfile ++ ++ new ++ call ccomplete#Complete(1, '') ++ let items = ccomplete#Complete(0, 'myvar.') ++ ++ call assert_equal(type([]), type(items), ++ \ 'ccomplete#Complete did not return a list') ++ let names = map(copy(items), 'v:val.word') ++ call assert_true(index(names, 'alpha') >= 0, ++ \ 'struct member "alpha" missing from completion: ' . string(names)) ++ call assert_true(index(names, 'beta') >= 0, ++ \ 'struct member "beta" missing from completion: ' . string(names)) ++ ++ bwipe! ++ let &tags = save_tags ++endfunc ++ ++" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-57455.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59856.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59857.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59858.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCHv2 13/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59858
Hi Team,
Any update on this?
Thanks & Regards,
Vijay
Quoted 199 lines · Siddharth Doshi via lists.openembedded.org
From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59858
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-59858Signed-off-by Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch | 134 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patchmeta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch new file +4
-0@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +From 6b611b0d15603c52ebdad17172b0232b4f65704e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 15:41:24 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0735: [security]: arbitrary Ex commandexecution
+ during C omni-completionmeta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch new file +2
-0+ +Problem: [security]: With C omni-completion, a crafted tags file canexecute
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch new file +14
-0+ arbitrary Ex commands when completing a struct/union member + (cipher-creator) +Solution: Escape the type field before inserting it into the :vimgrep + pattern so it cannot close the pattern and start a new command + (Hirohito Higashi). + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-mf92-v4xw-j45x + +Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>" +Signed-off-by: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/6b611b0d15603c52ebdad17172b0232b4f65704e
]meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch new file +10
-0+CVE: CVE-2026-59858 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim | 2 +- + src/testdir/Make_all.mak | 2 + + src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim + +diff --git a/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vimb/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch new file +9
-0+index cb4bb2c167..248d6f2e60 100644 +--- a/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim ++++ b/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim +@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ def StructMembers( # {{{1 + return [] + endif + execute 'silent! keepjumps noautocmd ' +- .. n .. 'vimgrep ' .. '/\t' .. typename .. '\(\t\|$\)/j ' ++ .. n .. 'vimgrep ' .. '/\t' .. escape(typename, '/\') ..'\(\t\|$\)/j '
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch new file +24
-0+ .. fnames + + qflist = getqflist() +diff --git a/src/testdir/Make_all.mak b/src/testdir/Make_all.mak +index 7d57b2e727..681e9b3b2a 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/Make_all.mak ++++ b/src/testdir/Make_all.mak +@@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ NEW_TESTS = \ + test_partial \ + test_paste \ + test_perl \ ++ test_plugin_ccomplete \ + test_plugin_comment \ + test_plugin_glvs \ + test_plugin_helptoc \ +@@ -516,6 +517,7 @@ NEW_TESTS_RES = \ + test_partial.res \ + test_paste.res \ + test_perl.res \ ++ test_plugin_ccomplete.res \ + test_plugin_comment.res \ + test_plugin_glvs.res \ + test_plugin_helptoc.res \ +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vimb/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch new file +6
-0+new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..a635bd50bd +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim +@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ ++" Tests for the C omni-completion plugin(runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim).
++
++func s:WriteTags(lines)++ " Mark unsorted so lookup is a linear scan regardless of entry order. ++ let tagsfile = tempname() ++ call writefile(["!_TAG_FILE_SORTED\t0\t/0/"] + a:lines, tagsfile) ++ return tagsfile++endfunc
++
++" A crafted typeref field is interpolated into the :vimgrep pattern in ++"StructMembers(). Without escaping, "/" closes the pattern and "|" starts a
++" new Ex command, so the field runs as an Ex command during completion. ++funcTest_ccomplete_no_exec_via_typeref()
++ unlet! g:ccomplete_injected
++ let tagsfile = s:WriteTags([
++ \ "myvar\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tv\ttyperef:x/|let
g:ccomplete_injected = 1|\"",
++ \ ])
++
++ letsave_tags= &tags
++ let &tags = tagsfile
++++ new ++ call ccomplete#Complete(1, '') ++ call ccomplete#Complete(0, 'myvar.x')++
++ call assert_false(exists('g:ccomplete_injected'),
++ \ 'typeref field was executed as an Ex command during
omni-completion')
++++ bwipe! ++ let &tags = save_tags ++ unlet! g:ccomplete_injected++endfunc
++
++" A legitimate typeref must still drive struct-member completion:
escaping the
++" field value must not break the normal path.
++funcTest_ccomplete_typeref_completion_still_works()++ let tagsfile = s:WriteTags([++ \ "myvar\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tv\ttyperef:struct:mystruct", ++ \ "alpha\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tm\tstruct:mystruct", ++ \ "beta\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tm\tstruct:mystruct", ++ \ ])++
++ letsave_tags= &tags
++ let &tags = tagsfile
++++ new ++ call ccomplete#Complete(1, '') ++ let items = ccomplete#Complete(0, 'myvar.')++
++ call assert_equal(type([]), type(items),
++ \ 'ccomplete#Complete did not return a list')
++ let names =map(copy(items), 'v:val.word')
++ call assert_true(index(names, 'alpha') >= 0,
++ \ 'struct member "alpha" missing from completion: ' .
string(names))
++ call assert_true(index(names, 'beta') >= 0,
++ \ 'struct member "beta" missing from completion: ' .
string(names))
++
++ bwipe!
++ let &tags =save_tags
++endfunc
++
++" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
+--
+2.44.4meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch new file +1
-0+meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1
-0@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git:// github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-57455.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59856.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59857.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59858.patch \ "PV .= ".1683"
--
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Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCHv2 13/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59858
Quoted 3 lines · Vijay Anusuri
Hi Team,
Any update on this?
For this series, 6-13/13 are in "awaiting Upstream" state[0], that mean that I will check if their equivalent merged on master&wrynose (I plan to do this next week)
You can check this yourself and send the missing patches if you find any (please be mindful of exiting patches on -nut branch and on list)
Regards,
[0]: https://patchwork.yoctoproject.org/project/oe-core/list/?series=49053&state=%2A&archive=both
Quoted 21 lines
Thanks & Regards,
VijayQuoted 14 lines · Siddharth Doshi via lists.openembedded.org
From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59858
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-59858Signed-off-by Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch | 134 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS
Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCHv2 13/13] vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59858
Hi Yoann,
Thanks for the information.
I checked the patches, and patches 6–13 are already present in the wrynose-nut branch.
Thanks & Regards,
Vijay
Quoted 45 lines · Yoann Congal
Quoted 3 lines · Vijay Anusuri
Hi Team,
Any update on this?
For this series, 6-13/13 are in "awaiting Upstream" state[0], that mean that
I will check if their equivalent merged on master&wrynose (I plan to do this next week)You can check this yourself and send the missing patches if you find any (please be mindful of exiting patches on -nut branch and on list)
Regards,
[0]:
https://patchwork.yoctoproject.org/project/oe-core/list/?series=49053&state=%2A&archive=bothQuoted 5 lines
Thanks & Regards,
VijayOn Thu, Jul 23, 2026 at 2:56 PM Siddharth Doshi via
lists.openembedded.org
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines · <[email protected]> wrote:
From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59858
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-59858Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch | 134 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch--
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS