hwmon: sht3x: Fix unaligned accesses
Guenter Roeck
maintainerPATCH 1/1 hwmon: sht3x: Fix unaligned accesses
Sashiko reports:
In sht3x_update_client(), the 16-bit temperature and humidity values are extracted from a stack-allocated byte array using be16_to_cpup(). The pointers passed to this function are calculated as buf and buf + 3. Since the difference between the two pointers is an odd number of bytes, at least one of them is guaranteed to be at an unaligned offset.
This will trigger an alignment fault on strict-alignment architectures such as ARMv5 or SPARC, resulting in a kernel panic.
Fix the problem by using get_unaligned_be16() instead of be16_to_cpup(), and put_unaligned_be16() instead of cpu_to_be16().
--- drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c +5 -4
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/jiffies.h> +#include <linux/unaligned.h> /* commands (high repeatability mode) */ static const unsigned char sht3x_cmd_measure_single_hpm[] = {0x24 ,0x00 };
@@ -276,9 +277,9 @@ static struct sht3x_data *sht3x_update_client(struct device *dev)if (ret) goto out; - val =be16_to_cpup ((__be16 *)buf); + val =get_unaligned_be16 (buf); data->temperature =sht3x_extract_temperature (val); - val =be16_to_cpup ((__be16 *)(buf +3 )); + val =get_unaligned_be16 (buf +3 ); data->humidity =sht3x_extract_humidity (val); data->last_update = jiffies; }
@@ -336,7 +337,7 @@ static int limits_update(struct sht3x_data *data)if (ret)return ret; - raw =be16_to_cpup ((__be16 *)buffer); + raw =get_unaligned_be16 (buffer); temperature =sht3x_extract_temperature ((raw &0x01ff ) <<7 ); humidity =sht3x_extract_humidity (raw &0xfe00 ); data->temperature_limits[index] = temperature;
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ static size_t limit_write(struct device *dev, raw = ((u32)(temperature +45000 ) *24543 ) >> (16 +7 ); raw |= ((humidity *42950 ) >>16 ) &0xfe00 ; - *((__be16 *)position) =cpu_to_be16 (raw); +put_unaligned_be16 (raw, position); position +=SHT3X_WORD_LEN ; *position = crc8(sht3x_crc8_table, position - SHT3X_WORD_LEN,
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 5 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 5 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] 32-bit unsigned integer overflow in limit_write() when calculating raw limits for maximum valid inputs.
- [High] Missing hwmon_lock(), lockless state mutation, and missing sensor command update in repeatability_store().
- [High] I2C protocol violation: driver requests 6 bytes when reading 3-byte limit registers.
- [Medium] Sensor read operations ignore hardware-provided CRC bytes, risking silent data corruption.
- [Medium] Concurrent device probes trigger an unsynchronized data race on the global sht3x_crc8_table. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] hwmon: sht3x: Fix unaligned accesses --- commit 3b16c04f4d9f2de96142ecc5295ce7b48737c0c2
Author: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
hwmon: sht3x: Fix unaligned accesses
In sht3x_update_client(), extracting 16-bit values from an unaligned byte array using be16_to_cpup() triggers alignment faults on architectures like ARMv5 or SPARC. This patch fixes the problem by replacing the unaligned pointers with get_unaligned_be16() and put_unaligned_be16().
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c static struct sht3x_data *sht3x_update_client(struct device *dev) · line 282
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c +2
-2@@ -276,9 +277,9 @@ static struct sht3x_data *sht3x_update_client(struct device *dev)if (ret) goto out; - val =be16_to_cpup ((__be16 *)buf); + val =get_unaligned_be16 (buf); data->temperature =sht3x_extract_temperature (val); - val =be16_to_cpup ((__be16 *)(buf +3 )); + val =get_unaligned_be16 (buf +3 );
[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this ignore the hardware-provided CRC bytes?
The SHT3x sensor returns 6 bytes per measurement (Temperature, CRC, Humidity, CRC). Using offsets 0 and 3 completely skips the interleaved CRC bytes at indices 2 and 5 without validation, risking silent data corruption from I2C bus interference during sht3x_update_client().
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c +0
-0data->humidity =sht3x_extract_humidity (val); data->last_update = jiffies; }
[ ... ]
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c static int limits_update(struct sht3x_data *data) · line 341
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c +1
-1@@ -336,7 +337,7 @@ static int limits_update(struct sht3x_data *data)if (ret)return ret; - raw =be16_to_cpup ((__be16 *)buffer); + raw =get_unaligned_be16 (buffer); temperature =sht3x_extract_temperature ((raw &0x01ff ) <<7 );
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this read 6 bytes for a hardware command that only returns 3?
In limits_update(), the driver calls sht3x_read_from_command() with SHT3X_RESPONSE_LENGTH (6 bytes). However, the limit read command (e.g. 0xE11F) only returns a single 16-bit word and an 8-bit CRC (3 bytes total).
Requesting 6 bytes forces the I2C master to clock 3 extra bytes after the sensor stops transmitting, which can cause I2C protocol errors or NAK timeouts and abort the driver probe on strict I2C controllers.
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c +0
-0humidity =sht3x_extract_humidity (raw &0xfe00 ); data->temperature_limits[index] = temperature;data->humidity_limits[index] = humidity;
[ ... ]
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c static size_t limit_write(struct device *dev, · line 392
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c +0
-0@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ static size_t limit_write(struct device *dev, raw = ((u32)(temperature +45000 ) *24543 ) >> (16 +7 ); raw |= ((humidity *42950 ) >>16 ) &0xfe00 ;
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does this calculation overflow for maximum valid inputs?
When userspace writes the valid maximum temperature (130000) or humidity (100000) to limit_write(), the 32-bit integer arithmetic ((u32)(temperature + 45000) * 24543) equals 4,295,025,000, and (humidity * 42950) equals 4,295,000,000.
Both exceed U32_MAX, silently wrapping around before the bitwise shifts. This results in configuring the sensor to extreme minimums instead of maximums, breaking thermal management logic.
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c static size_t limit_write(struct device *dev, · line 395
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c +1
-1- *((__be16 *)position) =cpu_to_be16 (raw); +put_unaligned_be16 (raw, position); position +=SHT3X_WORD_LEN ; *position = crc8(sht3x_crc8_table,
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this driver fail to use hwmon_lock() for sysfs attributes?
The hwmon subsystem guidelines require hwmon_lock() for attributes registered outside the info structure, but heater_enable_store() uses a private lock:
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c:heater_enable_store() {
...
mutex_lock(&data->i2c_lock);
if (status)
ret = i2c_master_send(client, (char *)&sht3x_cmd_heater_on,
...
}Additionally, repeatability_store() fails to take any lock, mutating data->repeatability locklessly:
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c:repeatability_store() {
...
if (val > 2)
return -EINVAL;
data->repeatability = val;
return count;
}It also fails to call sht3x_select_command() after updating the value. For single-shot measurements, sht3x_update_client() relies on data->command, which becomes stale, meaning the repeatability change takes no effect until another attribute is modified.
[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this unconditional population of a global array cause a data race?
The global sht3x_crc8_table is populated on every probe invocation without DO_ONCE or lock protection:
drivers/hwmon/sht3x.c:sht3x_probe() {
...
data->client = client;
data->chip_id = (uintptr_t)i2c_get_match_data(client);
crc8_populate_msb(sht3x_crc8_table, SHT3X_CRC8_POLYNOMIAL);
sht3x_select_command(data);
...
}Concurrent driver probes will write to this shared global array simultaneously, which could lead to data races.
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1