bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs
The opts argument of the BPF conntrack kfuncs can point to a shared map value. __bpf_nf_ct_lookup() and __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry() read opts->netns_id separately when acquiring and releasing the network namespace reference.
The reference imbalance can occur as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
read opts->netns_id (-1)
skip get_net_ns_by_id()
write opts->netns_id (id)
read opts->netns_id (id)
put_net(net) /* no matching get */
The reverse transition leaks the reference. Repeating the unmatched put can destroy a live namespace and crash later users.
The kernel reported:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x52c/0x1700 Call Trace: __sys_bpf+0x1662/0x50c0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Read netns_id once with READ_ONCE() and use that value for validation and the matching get/put pair. Each invocation then consistently uses either the calling namespace or a referenced namespace.
---
Please queue this fix for stable kernels.
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +12 -8
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,struct nf_conntrack_tuple otuple, rtuple;struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;struct nf_conn *ct; +s32 netns_id;int err;if (!(opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len ==12 ))
@@ -134,7 +135,8 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } -if (unlikely (opts->netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS )) + netns_id =READ_ONCE (opts->netns_id); +if (unlikely (netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,
@@ -147,8 +149,8 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,if (err <0 )return ERR_PTR (err); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) { - net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, opts->netns_id); +if (netns_id >=0 ) { + net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, netns_id);if (unlikely (!net))return ERR_PTR (-ENONET ); }
@@ -171,7 +173,7 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,__nf_ct_set_timeout (ct, timeout *HZ ); out: -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) +if (netns_id >=0 )put_net (net);return ct;
@@ -186,6 +188,7 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net,struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;struct nf_conn *ct; +s32 netns_id;int err;if (!opts || !bpf_tuple)
@@ -201,7 +204,8 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net, }if (unlikely (opts->l4proto !=IPPROTO_TCP && opts->l4proto !=IPPROTO_UDP ))return ERR_PTR (-EPROTO ); -if (unlikely (opts->netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS )) + netns_id =READ_ONCE (opts->netns_id); +if (unlikely (netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,
@@ -209,8 +213,8 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net,if (err <0 )return ERR_PTR (err); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) { - net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, opts->netns_id); +if (netns_id >=0 ) { + net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, netns_id);if (unlikely (!net))return ERR_PTR (-ENONET ); }
@@ -225,7 +229,7 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net, } hash =nf_conntrack_find_get (net, &ct_zone, &tuple); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) +if (netns_id >=0 )put_net (net);if (!hash)return ERR_PTR (-ENOENT );
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] TOCTOU races on bpf_tuple and opts->l4proto allow creation of asymmetrical and corrupted conntrack entries. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs --- commit a848b567930cfe1aaae045cb53d2955c9b1029c6
Author: Chengfeng Ye <[email protected]>
bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs
This commit fixes a netns reference leak in the conntrack BPF kfuncs. It reads opts->netns_id once using READ_ONCE() to prevent a race condition where a shared BPF map value is modified concurrently.
Quoted 4 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,
Quoted 11 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +2
-1@@ -134,7 +135,8 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } -if (unlikely (opts->netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS )) + netns_id =READ_ONCE (opts->netns_id); +if (unlikely (netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,@@ -147,8 +149,8 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but since this patch addresses a TOCTOU race with opts->netns_id, could similar races occur with bpf_tuple and opts->l4proto?
In net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c:__bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(), bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse() is called twice sequentially:
err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,
IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL, &otuple);
if (err < 0)
return ERR_PTR(err);
err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,
IP_CT_DIR_REPLY, &rtuple);If a BPF program concurrently modifies the shared map value containing bpf_tuple or opts->l4proto between these two calls, could this create a conntrack entry with mismatched original and reply tuples?
Could this also result in mismatched L4 protocols, violating core conntrack invariants?
Additionally, later in the same function, we write directly back to the map memory:
if (opts->ct_zone_dir == 0)
opts->ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;Does this inappropriately modify BPF map memory or introduce another TOCTOU vulnerability if the value is accessed concurrently?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
[email protected]
AI reviewThis isn't a bug, but could the crash trace be clearer about its connection to the fix? The trace shows only BPF test-run frames with no netfilter or conntrack function names visible.
Quoted 11 lines
The kernel reported:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x52c/0x1700 Call Trace: __sys_bpf+0x1662/0x50c0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
This isn't a bug, but could the crash trace be clearer about its connection to the fix? The trace shows only BPF test-run frames with no netfilter or conntrack function names visible.
The chain is reconstructible - the extra put_net() frees the caller's netns, loopback_dev becomes NULL, and bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() then dereferences it - but a reader has to derive this themselves.
Would it help to add a sentence connecting the trace to the fix, or include a Reported-by: or Closes: tag for the original report?
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/30472145413
Emil Tsalapatis
reviewerQuoted 29 lines · Chengfeng Ye
The opts argument of the BPF conntrack kfuncs can point to a shared map value.
__bpf_nf_ct_lookup()and__bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry()readopts->netns_idseparately when acquiring and releasing the network namespace reference.The reference imbalance can occur as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
readopts->netns_id(-1)
skipget_net_ns_by_id()write opts->netns_id (id)read
opts->netns_id(id)
put_net(net)/* no matching get */The reverse transition leaks the reference. Repeating the unmatched put can destroy a live namespace and crash later users.
The kernel reported:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x52c/0x1700 Call Trace: __sys_bpf+0x1662/0x50c0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Quoted 7 lines
Read
netns_idonce withREAD_ONCE()and use that value for validation and the matching get/put pair. Each invocation then consistently uses either the calling namespace or a referenced namespace.Fixes aed8ee7feb44 ("net: netfilter: Deduplicate code in bpf_{xdp,skb}_ct_lookup")Fixes d7e79c97c00c ("net: netfilter: Add kfuncs to allocate and insert CT")Signed-off-by Chengfeng Ye <[email protected]>
Sashiko is right on this regarding all other fields of opts having the same issue. While they can't lead to a crash, let's still snapshot them at the beginning of the function so they don't change from under us. This is still far from ideal - we may read an inconsistent snapshot of the struct - but it's backed by BPF program-controlled memory so AFAICT this is the best we can do.
pw-bot: cr
Quoted 86 lines
---
Please queue this fix for stable kernels.net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +12
-8@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,struct nf_conntrack_tuple otuple, rtuple;struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;struct nf_conn *ct; +s32 netns_id;int err;if (!(opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len ==12 ))@@ -134,7 +135,8 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } -if (unlikely (opts->netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS )) + netns_id =READ_ONCE (opts->netns_id); +if (unlikely (netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,@@ -147,8 +149,8 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,if (err <0 )return ERR_PTR (err); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) { - net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, opts->netns_id); +if (netns_id >=0 ) { + net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, netns_id);if (unlikely (!net))return ERR_PTR (-ENONET ); }@@ -171,7 +173,7 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,__nf_ct_set_timeout (ct, timeout *HZ ); out: -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) +if (netns_id >=0 )put_net (net);return ct;@@ -186,6 +188,7 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net,struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;struct nf_conn *ct; +s32 netns_id;int err;if (!opts || !bpf_tuple)@@ -201,7 +204,8 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net, }if (unlikely (opts->l4proto !=IPPROTO_TCP && opts->l4proto !=IPPROTO_UDP ))return ERR_PTR (-EPROTO ); -if (unlikely (opts->netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS )) + netns_id =READ_ONCE (opts->netns_id); +if (unlikely (netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,@@ -209,8 +213,8 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net,if (err <0 )return ERR_PTR (err); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) { - net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, opts->netns_id); +if (netns_id >=0 ) { + net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, netns_id);if (unlikely (!net))return ERR_PTR (-ENONET ); }@@ -225,7 +229,7 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net, } hash =nf_conntrack_find_get (net, &ct_zone, &tuple); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) +if (netns_id >=0 )put_net (net);if (!hash)return ERR_PTR (-ENOENT );
PATCH v2 1/1 bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs
In reply to Chengfeng YeThe opts argument of the BPF conntrack kfuncs can point to a shared map value. __bpf_nf_ct_lookup() and __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry() read opts->netns_id separately when acquiring and releasing the network namespace reference.
The reference imbalance can occur as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
read opts->netns_id (-1)
skip get_net_ns_by_id()
write opts->netns_id (id)
read opts->netns_id (id)
put_net(net) /* no matching get */
The reverse transition leaks the reference. Repeating the unmatched put can destroy a live namespace and crash later users.
The kernel reported:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x52c/0x1700 Call Trace: __sys_bpf+0x1662/0x50c0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Snapshot every input field of opts with READ_ONCE() before validating or using it. The netns_id snapshot keeps the namespace get/put pair balanced, while the other snapshots keep the remaining options from changing partway through an invocation. The individual reads can still observe an inconsistent combination during a concurrent update, but each selected field value remains stable for that invocation.
---
Changes in v2:
- Snapshot l4proto, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir, and the reserved bytes in addition to netns_id, as requested in review.
- Rebase onto current bpf/master.
Please queue this fix for stable kernels.
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +52 -24
@@ -122,42 +122,56 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,struct nf_conntrack_tuple otuple, rtuple;struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;struct nf_conn *ct; +u16 ct_zone_id; +s32 netns_id; +u8 ct_zone_dir =0 ; +u8 reserved[3 ] = {}; +u8 l4proto;int err;if (!(opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len ==12 ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + + netns_id =READ_ONCE (opts->netns_id); + l4proto =READ_ONCE (opts->l4proto); + ct_zone_id =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_id);if (opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ ) { -if (opts->reserved[0 ] || opts->reserved[1 ] || opts->reserved[2 ]) + ct_zone_dir =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_dir); + reserved[0 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[0 ]); + reserved[1 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[1 ]); + reserved[2 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[2 ]); +if (reserved[0 ] || reserved[1 ] || reserved[2 ])return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); }else { -if (opts->ct_zone_id) +if (ct_zone_id)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } -if (unlikely (opts->netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS )) +if (unlikely (netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); - err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto, + err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL , &otuple);if (err <0 )return ERR_PTR (err); - err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto, + err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,IP_CT_DIR_REPLY , &rtuple);if (err <0 )return ERR_PTR (err); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) { - net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, opts->netns_id); +if (netns_id >=0 ) { + net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, netns_id);if (unlikely (!net))return ERR_PTR (-ENONET ); }if (opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ ) { -if (opts->ct_zone_dir ==0 ) - opts->ct_zone_dir =NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR ; -nf_ct_zone_init (&ct_zone, - opts->ct_zone_id, opts->ct_zone_dir,0 ); +if (ct_zone_dir ==0 ) { + ct_zone_dir =NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR ; + opts->ct_zone_dir = ct_zone_dir; + } +nf_ct_zone_init (&ct_zone, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir,0 ); }else { ct_zone = nf_ct_zone_dflt; }
@@ -171,7 +185,7 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,__nf_ct_set_timeout (ct, timeout *HZ ); out: -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) +if (netns_id >=0 )put_net (net);return ct;
@@ -186,46 +200,60 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net,struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;struct nf_conn *ct; +u16 ct_zone_id; +s32 netns_id; +u8 ct_zone_dir =0 ; +u8 reserved[3 ] = {}; +u8 l4proto;int err;if (!opts || !bpf_tuple)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL );if (!(opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len ==12 ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + + netns_id =READ_ONCE (opts->netns_id); + l4proto =READ_ONCE (opts->l4proto); + ct_zone_id =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_id);if (opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ ) { -if (opts->reserved[0 ] || opts->reserved[1 ] || opts->reserved[2 ]) + ct_zone_dir =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_dir); + reserved[0 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[0 ]); + reserved[1 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[1 ]); + reserved[2 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[2 ]); +if (reserved[0 ] || reserved[1 ] || reserved[2 ])return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); }else { -if (opts->ct_zone_id) +if (ct_zone_id)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } -if (unlikely (opts->l4proto !=IPPROTO_TCP && opts->l4proto !=IPPROTO_UDP )) +if (unlikely (l4proto !=IPPROTO_TCP && l4proto !=IPPROTO_UDP ))return ERR_PTR (-EPROTO ); -if (unlikely (opts->netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS )) +if (unlikely (netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); - err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto, + err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL , &tuple);if (err <0 )return ERR_PTR (err); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) { - net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, opts->netns_id); +if (netns_id >=0 ) { + net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, netns_id);if (unlikely (!net))return ERR_PTR (-ENONET ); }if (opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ ) { -if (opts->ct_zone_dir ==0 ) - opts->ct_zone_dir =NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR ; -nf_ct_zone_init (&ct_zone, - opts->ct_zone_id, opts->ct_zone_dir,0 ); +if (ct_zone_dir ==0 ) { + ct_zone_dir =NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR ; + opts->ct_zone_dir = ct_zone_dir; + } +nf_ct_zone_init (&ct_zone, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir,0 ); }else { ct_zone = nf_ct_zone_dflt; } hash =nf_conntrack_find_get (net, &ct_zone, &tuple); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) +if (netns_id >=0 )put_net (net);if (!hash)return ERR_PTR (-ENOENT );
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 8 lines · Emil Tsalapatis
Sashiko is right on this regarding all other fields of opts having the same issue. While they can't lead to a crash, let's still snapshot them at the beginning of the function so they don't change from under us. This is still far from ideal - we may read an inconsistent snapshot of the struct - but it's backed by BPF program-controlled memory so AFAICT this is the best we can do.
pw-bot: cr
No problem, v2 was just sent.
[email protected]
AI reviewThis isn't a bug, but would it be worth reordering these declarations longest-to-shortest to match the netdev reverse-xmas-tree convention before this goes out again? The block goes from 'struct…
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple, · line 129
Quoted 13 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +5
-0@@ -122,42 +122,56 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,struct nf_conntrack_tuple otuple, rtuple;struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;struct nf_conn *ct; +u16 ct_zone_id; +s32 netns_id; +u8 ct_zone_dir =0 ; +u8 reserved[3 ] = {}; +u8 l4proto;
This isn't a bug, but would it be worth reordering these declarations longest-to-shortest to match the netdev reverse-xmas-tree convention before this goes out again? The block goes from 'struct nf_conn *ct;' (21 chars) down to 's32 netns_id;' (15), then back up to 'u8 reserved[3] = {};' (22). The same ordering appears in __bpf_nf_ct_lookup() further down.
Quoted 5 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +1
-0int err;if (!(opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len ==12 ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple, · line 143
Quoted 10 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +8
-1+ netns_id =READ_ONCE (opts->netns_id); + l4proto =READ_ONCE (opts->l4proto); + ct_zone_id =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_id);if (opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ ) { -if (opts->reserved[0 ] || opts->reserved[1 ] || opts->reserved[2 ]) + ct_zone_dir =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_dir); + reserved[0 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[0 ]); + reserved[1 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[1 ]); + reserved[2 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[2 ]); +if (reserved[0 ] || reserved[1 ] || reserved[2 ])
This isn't a bug, but since reserved[] is only used by the check on the next line, could the three READ_ONCE() calls be inlined into the condition instead of going through a local array? The same block appears in __bpf_nf_ct_lookup() at the corresponding location.
Quoted 6 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +1
-1return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); }else { -if (opts->ct_zone_id) +if (ct_zone_id)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); }
[ ... ]
Quoted 17 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +7
-0@@ -186,46 +200,60 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net,struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;struct nf_conn *ct; +u16 ct_zone_id; +s32 netns_id; +u8 ct_zone_dir =0 ; +u8 reserved[3 ] = {}; +u8 l4proto;int err;if (!opts || !bpf_tuple)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL );if (!(opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len ==12 ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + + netns_id =READ_ONCE (opts->netns_id);
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net, · line 224
Quoted 10 lines
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +7
-1+ l4proto =READ_ONCE (opts->l4proto); + ct_zone_id =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_id);if (opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ ) { -if (opts->reserved[0 ] || opts->reserved[1 ] || opts->reserved[2 ]) + ct_zone_dir =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_dir); + reserved[0 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[0 ]); + reserved[1 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[1 ]); + reserved[2 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[2 ]); +if (reserved[0 ] || reserved[1 ] || reserved[2 ])return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL );
[ ... ]
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/30527661826
Emil Tsalapatis
reviewerQuoted 36 lines · Chengfeng Ye
The opts argument of the BPF conntrack kfuncs can point to a shared map value.
__bpf_nf_ct_lookup()and__bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry()readopts->netns_idseparately when acquiring and releasing the network namespace reference.The reference imbalance can occur as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
readopts->netns_id(-1)
skipget_net_ns_by_id()write opts->netns_id (id)read
opts->netns_id(id)
put_net(net)/* no matching get */The reverse transition leaks the reference. Repeating the unmatched put can destroy a live namespace and crash later users.
The kernel reported:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x52c/0x1700 Call Trace: __sys_bpf+0x1662/0x50c0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exceptionSnapshot every input field of opts with
READ_ONCE()before validating or using it. Thenetns_idsnapshot keeps the namespace get/put pair balanced, while the other snapshots keep the remaining options from changing partway through an invocation. The individual reads can still observe an inconsistent combination during a concurrent update, but each selected field value remains stable for that invocation.
Quoted 3 lines
Fixes aed8ee7feb44 ("net: netfilter: Deduplicate code in bpf_{xdp,skb}_ct_lookup")Fixes d7e79c97c00c ("net: netfilter: Add kfuncs to allocate and insert CT")Signed-off-by Chengfeng Ye <[email protected]>
Looking a lot better, one nit: We don't really need to read reserve[] into a separate variable. We use it only once, so reading it into the stack isn't giving us anything, in contrast to all other fields.
The bot's ordering nit is also a nice-to-have.
pw-bot: cr
Quoted 165 lines
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Changes in v2:
- Snapshot l4proto,ct_zone_id,ct_zone_dir, and the reserved bytes in addition tonetns_id, as requested in review.
- Rebase onto current bpf/master.Please queue this fix for stable kernels.
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c +52
-24@@ -122,42 +122,56 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,struct nf_conntrack_tuple otuple, rtuple;struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;struct nf_conn *ct; +u16 ct_zone_id; +s32 netns_id; +u8 ct_zone_dir =0 ; +u8 reserved[3 ] = {}; +u8 l4proto;int err;if (!(opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len ==12 ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + + netns_id =READ_ONCE (opts->netns_id); + l4proto =READ_ONCE (opts->l4proto); + ct_zone_id =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_id);if (opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ ) { -if (opts->reserved[0 ] || opts->reserved[1 ] || opts->reserved[2 ]) + ct_zone_dir =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_dir); + reserved[0 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[0 ]); + reserved[1 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[1 ]); + reserved[2 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[2 ]); +if (reserved[0 ] || reserved[1 ] || reserved[2 ])return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); }else { -if (opts->ct_zone_id) +if (ct_zone_id)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } -if (unlikely (opts->netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS )) +if (unlikely (netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); - err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto, + err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL , &otuple);if (err <0 )return ERR_PTR (err); - err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto, + err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,IP_CT_DIR_REPLY , &rtuple);if (err <0 )return ERR_PTR (err); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) { - net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, opts->netns_id); +if (netns_id >=0 ) { + net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, netns_id);if (unlikely (!net))return ERR_PTR (-ENONET ); }if (opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ ) { -if (opts->ct_zone_dir ==0 ) - opts->ct_zone_dir =NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR ; -nf_ct_zone_init (&ct_zone, - opts->ct_zone_id, opts->ct_zone_dir,0 ); +if (ct_zone_dir ==0 ) { + ct_zone_dir =NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR ; + opts->ct_zone_dir = ct_zone_dir; + } +nf_ct_zone_init (&ct_zone, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir,0 ); }else { ct_zone = nf_ct_zone_dflt; }@@ -171,7 +185,7 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,__nf_ct_set_timeout (ct, timeout *HZ ); out: -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) +if (netns_id >=0 )put_net (net);return ct;@@ -186,46 +200,60 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net,struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;struct nf_conn *ct; +u16 ct_zone_id; +s32 netns_id; +u8 ct_zone_dir =0 ; +u8 reserved[3 ] = {}; +u8 l4proto;int err;if (!opts || !bpf_tuple)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL );if (!(opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len ==12 ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + + netns_id =READ_ONCE (opts->netns_id); + l4proto =READ_ONCE (opts->l4proto); + ct_zone_id =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_id);if (opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ ) { -if (opts->reserved[0 ] || opts->reserved[1 ] || opts->reserved[2 ]) + ct_zone_dir =READ_ONCE (opts->ct_zone_dir); + reserved[0 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[0 ]); + reserved[1 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[1 ]); + reserved[2 ] =READ_ONCE (opts->reserved[2 ]); +if (reserved[0 ] || reserved[1 ] || reserved[2 ])return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); }else { -if (opts->ct_zone_id) +if (ct_zone_id)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } -if (unlikely (opts->l4proto !=IPPROTO_TCP && opts->l4proto !=IPPROTO_UDP )) +if (unlikely (l4proto !=IPPROTO_TCP && l4proto !=IPPROTO_UDP ))return ERR_PTR (-EPROTO ); -if (unlikely (opts->netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS )) +if (unlikely (netns_id <BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); - err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto, + err =bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse (bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL , &tuple);if (err <0 )return ERR_PTR (err); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) { - net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, opts->netns_id); +if (netns_id >=0 ) { + net =get_net_ns_by_id (net, netns_id);if (unlikely (!net))return ERR_PTR (-ENONET ); }if (opts_len ==NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ ) { -if (opts->ct_zone_dir ==0 ) - opts->ct_zone_dir =NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR ; -nf_ct_zone_init (&ct_zone, - opts->ct_zone_id, opts->ct_zone_dir,0 ); +if (ct_zone_dir ==0 ) { + ct_zone_dir =NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR ; + opts->ct_zone_dir = ct_zone_dir; + } +nf_ct_zone_init (&ct_zone, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir,0 ); }else { ct_zone = nf_ct_zone_dflt; } hash =nf_conntrack_find_get (net, &ct_zone, &tuple); -if (opts->netns_id >=0 ) +if (netns_id >=0 )put_net (net);if (!hash)return ERR_PTR (-ENOENT );