vhost/vdpa: reject VRING_NUM larger than device max
Subsystems (5)
PATCH v2 1/1 vhost/vdpa: reject VRING_NUM larger than device max
vhost_vring_set_num() only requires a non-zero power-of-two that fits in 16 bits. vhost-vdpa then hands that value to the backend through set_vq_num() without comparing it to get_vq_num_max().
A local process with access to /dev/vhost-vdpa-* can therefore set a queue size larger than the device advertises. On the vdpa_sim backend, the worker then walks descriptors beyond the mapped descriptor ring. KASAN reports a 16-byte out-of-bounds read, corresponding to one vring_desc, in the vringh IOTLB path:
BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in _copy_from_iter Read of size 16 copy_from_iotlb copydesc_iotlb vringh_getdesc_iotlb vdpasim_net_work
Check the requested size against get_vq_num_max() in vhost_vdpa_vring_ioctl() before calling vhost_vring_ioctl(), and return -EINVAL when the request is too large.
---
v2:
- Add the missing Signed-off-by tag.
drivers/vhost/vdpa.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/vhost/vdpa.c +7 -0
@@ -716,6 +716,13 @@ static long vhost_vdpa_vring_ioctl(struct vhost_vdpa *v, unsigned int cmd,vhost_vdpa_unsetup_vq_irq (v, idx); }break ; +case VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM : +/* Reject sizes above the max reported by the device. */ +if (copy_from_user (&s, argp,sizeof (s))) +return -EFAULT ; +if (s.num > ops->get_vq_num_max (vdpa)) +return -EINVAL ; +break ; } r =vhost_vring_ioctl (&v->vdev, cmd, argp);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] The newly added validation for VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM suffers from a double-fetch Time-of-Check to…
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] The newly added validation for VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM suffers from a double-fetch Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability, which completely bypasses the intended security fix. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v2] vhost/vdpa: reject VRING_NUM larger than device max --- commit 321003a29055f06433bde7512f4893c5f9acf2a6
Author: Jia Jia <[email protected]>
vhost/vdpa: reject VRING_NUM larger than device max
This commit adds a bounds check on the requested virtual queue size in vhost_vdpa_vring_ioctl() to prevent an out-of-bounds read in the backend. It returns -EINVAL if the requested size is larger than the device's maximum reported value.
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/vhost/vdpa.c +0
-0
drivers/vhost/vdpa.c static long vhost_vdpa_vring_ioctl(struct vhost_vdpa *v, unsigned int cmd, · line 732
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/vhost/vdpa.c +7
-0@@ -723,6 +723,13 @@ static long vhost_vdpa_vring_ioctl(struct vhost_vdpa *v, unsigned int cmd,vhost_vdpa_unsetup_vq_irq (v, idx); }break ; +case VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM : +/* Reject sizes above the max reported by the device. */ +if (copy_from_user (&s, argp,sizeof (s))) +return -EFAULT ; +if (s.num > ops->get_vq_num_max (vdpa)) +return -EINVAL ; +break ;
[Severity: High]
Does this introduce a double-fetch time-of-check to time-of-use vulnerability?
The size is checked here using copy_from_user(), but the same user space pointer (argp) is fetched a second time later in the call chain.
After this check, vhost_vdpa_vring_ioctl() calls vhost_vring_ioctl() which passes the same pointer down:
vhost_vring_ioctl() {
...
if (ioctl == VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM ||
ioctl == VHOST_SET_VRING_ADDR) {
return vhost_vring_set_num_addr(d, vq, ioctl, argp);
}
...
}This calls into vhost_vring_set_num() and performs a second fetch from argp:
vhost_vring_set_num() {
if (copy_from_user(&s, argp, sizeof s))
return -EFAULT;
if (!s.num || s.num > 0xffff || (s.num & (s.num - 1)))
return -EINVAL;
vq->num = s.num;
}If a malicious user space thread modifies the memory at argp between the first and second fetches, it can bypass the get_vq_num_max() check.
The inflated vq->num is then pushed to the backend via ops->set_vq_num(), which appears to trigger the exact out-of-bounds read this patch aims to fix.
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1