prctl: fix PR_SET_MM_AUXV losing the forced AT_NULL terminator
PATCH 1/1 prctl: fix PR_SET_MM_AUXV losing the forced AT_NULL terminator
prctl_set_auxv() copies the user vector into a stack buffer, forces AT_NULL on the last two entries there, and then copies only len bytes into mm->saved_auxv. Which is fine until the vector is shorter than the buffer, because then the forced terminator sits past the end of the copy and never lands in saved_auxv at all.
The code even says
/* Make sure the last entry is always AT_NULL */
and it does, just not in the part that gets copied.
So mm->saved_auxv keeps the stale tail from exec. Reproducing it is
easy: from a process with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE (just run it as root), call prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_AUXV, ...) with a vector that has a couple of entries and no AT_NULL inside len (32 bytes on arm64), and then hexdump /proc/self/auxv, or gcore the process and look at the AUXV note with readelf -n. This is arm64, the new vector was just { AT_UID, 0x1111, AT_GID, 0x2222 }:
idx before (from exec) after the prctl
[0] AT_SYSINFO_EHDR 0x7ed1d6e000 AT_UID 0x1111 <- new
[1] AT_MINSIGSTKSZ 0x1270 AT_GID 0x2222 <- new
[2] AT_HWCAP 0x119fff AT_HWCAP 0x119fff <- stale
[3] AT_PAGESZ 0x1000 AT_PAGESZ 0x1000 <- stale
... 16 more entries ... <- stale
[20] AT_NULL 0x0 AT_NULL 0x021 entries before the prctl, still 21 after: the two new ones plus all 19 left over from exec.
Every consumer walks the vector until AT_NULL, so what they get now is a vector that never existed at exec, the head from the prctl glued onto the tail of the old binary. gdb and crash pull the AUXV note out of coredumps to find AT_PHDR, AT_ENTRY, AT_SYSINFO_EHDR and friends, and a mixed vector points them at the wrong layout. /proc/<pid>/auxv and PR_GET_AUXV hand the same mess out to live processes too. Nothing crashes, everything just quietly reads a frankenstein auxv.
And callers that terminate their own vector hide the whole thing, which is likely why nobody noticed since PR_SET_MM_AUXV landed in 2012. Nothing exciting security wise either, I mean it needs CAP_SYS_RESOURCE to begin with.
prctl_set_mm_map() right above already copies the whole buffer for exactly this reason, so just do the same here. user_auxv is zero initialized and only partially filled from userspace, so the rest is zeros and nothing leaks.
--- kernel/sys.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/sys.c +1 -1
@@ -2189,7 +2189,7 @@ static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (user_auxv) !=sizeof (mm->saved_auxv));task_lock (current); -memcpy (mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, len); +memcpy (mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv,sizeof (user_auxv));task_unlock (current);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
Quoted 9 lines · Bradley Morgan
prctl_set_auxv()copies the user vector into a stack buffer, forcesAT_NULLon the last two entries there, and then copies only len bytes intomm->saved_auxv. Which is fine until the vector is shorter than the buffer, because then the forced terminator sits past the end of the copy and never lands insaved_auxvat all.
kernel/sys.c static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, · line 2193
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/sys.c +1
-1@@ -2189,7 +2189,7 @@ static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (user_auxv) !=sizeof (mm->saved_auxv));task_lock (current); -memcpy (mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, len); +memcpy (mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv,sizeof (user_auxv));task_unlock (current);
You're supposed to use prctl(PR_SET_MM_AUXV) with correct "len", yes.
This is userspace visible, warning could be added for another 14 years and then line changed.
PR_ALEXEY
Quoted 20 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
kernel/sys.c static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm,
Quoted 9 lines · Bradley Morgan
prctl_set_auxv()copies the user vector into a stack buffer, forcesAT_NULLon the last two entries there, and then copies only len bytes intomm->saved_auxv. Which is fine until the vector is shorter than the buffer, because then the forced terminator sits past the end of the copy and never lands insaved_auxvat all.kernel/sys.c +0
-0@@ -2189,7 +2189,7 @@ static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,
kernel/sys.c static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, · line 2193
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/sys.c +1
-1BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (user_auxv) !=sizeof (mm->saved_auxv));task_lock (current); -memcpy (mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, len); +memcpy (mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv,sizeof (user_auxv));task_unlock (current);You're supposed to use
prctl(PR_SET_MM_AUXV)with correct "len", yes.
Quoted 3 lines
This is userspace visible, warning could be added for another 14 years and then line changed.
well, the callers can't regress, so theres simply no point of adding a warn. best to just fix it
Quoted 2 lines
PR_ALEXEY
Thanks!