9b08a09f6d: BUG:kernel_NULL_pointer_dereference,address
kernel test robot
build botHello,
kernel test robot noticed "BUG:kernel_NULL_pointer_dereference,address" on:
commit: 9b08a09f6d073bebd38e7be08781b0a4758c924e ("hazptrtorture: Defer release of hazard pointers") https://github.com/paulmckrcu/linux non-rcu/next
[test failed on linux-next/master 6b8c8af514d739d0335f5579b585e02babe8a727]
in testcase: trinity
version: trinity-i386-abe9de86-1_20230429 with following parameters:
runtime: 300s group: group-00 nr_groups: 5 reproduction: run 254 cycles, the issue can be reproduced for 16 times.
config: i386-randconfig-015-20260807
compiler: clang-22
test machine: qemu-system-i386 -enable-kvm -cpu SandyBridge -smp 2 -m 4G
(please refer to attached dmesg/kmsg for entire log/backtrace)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/[email protected]
[ 419.412561][ T52] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000108 [ 419.456670][ T52] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 419.495649][ T52] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 419.534113][ T52] *pde = 00000000 [ 419.554661][ T52] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 419.579287][ T52] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: hazptr_torture_ Tainted: G W 7.2.0-rc3-00011-g9b08a09f6d07 #1 PREEMPTLAZY 809133f67ba61c2271624f9b1ff820a8a212cdad [ 419.666331][ T52] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 419.686632][ T52] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 419.731225][ T52] EIP: hazptr_synchronize_overflow_list+0x43/0xc0 [ 419.767103][ T52] Code: 30 8b 4e 34 90 90 90 89 4d e8 89 7d ec 8d 46 2c 89 45 f0 8b 45 f0 8b 00 89 45 f0 85 c0 74 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 8b 45 f0 <8b> 40 08 3b 45 e4 0f 95 c3 83 f8 01 0f 95 c7 89 f0 e8 67 bc fe 00 All code ======== 0: 30 8b 4e 34 90 90 xor %cl,-0x6f6fcbb2(%rbx) 6: 90 nop 7: 89 4d e8 mov %ecx,-0x18(%rbp) a: 89 7d ec mov %edi,-0x14(%rbp) d: 8d 46 2c lea 0x2c(%rsi),%eax 10: 89 45 f0 mov %eax,-0x10(%rbp) 13: 8b 45 f0 mov -0x10(%rbp),%eax 16: 8b 00 mov (%rax),%eax 18: 89 45 f0 mov %eax,-0x10(%rbp) 1b: 85 c0 test %eax,%eax 1d: 74 67 je 0x86 1f: 90 nop 20: 90 nop 21: 90 nop 22: 90 nop 23: 90 nop 24: 90 nop 25: 90 nop 26: 90 nop 27: 8b 45 f0 mov -0x10(%rbp),%eax 2a:* 8b 40 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%eax <-- trapping instruction 2d: 3b 45 e4 cmp -0x1c(%rbp),%eax 30: 0f 95 c3 setne %bl 33: 83 f8 01 cmp $0x1,%eax 36: 0f 95 c7 setne %bh 39: 89 f0 mov %esi,%eax 3b: e8 67 bc fe 00 call 0xfebca7
Code starting with the faulting instruction ===========================================
0: 8b 40 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%eax 3: 3b 45 e4 cmp -0x1c(%rbp),%eax 6: 0f 95 c3 setne %bl 9: 83 f8 01 cmp $0x1,%eax c: 0f 95 c7 setne %bh f: 89 f0 mov %esi,%eax 11: e8 67 bc fe 00 call 0xfebc7d [ 419.872228][ T52] EAX: 00000100 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000202 [ 419.904569][ T52] ESI: e4f7e13c EDI: 00000829 EBP: b3e9df20 ESP: b3e9df04 [ 419.941247][ T52] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010006 [ 419.980096][ T52] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000108 CR3: 05fb1000 CR4: 00000690 [ 420.005370][ T52] Call Trace: [ 420.022998][ T52] hazptr_synchronize+0x166/0x200 [ 420.050473][ T52] hazptr_torture_writer+0x153/0x400 [ 420.076986][ T52] ? __kthread_parkme+0x4b/0x100 [ 420.094745][ T52] kthread+0x107/0x140 [ 420.112829][ T52] ? hazptr_torture_reader+0x340/0x340 [ 420.140468][ T52] ? kthread_unuse_mm+0xc0/0xc0 [ 420.165878][ T52] ? kthread_unuse_mm+0xc0/0xc0 [ 420.185387][ T52] ret_from_fork+0x131/0x240 [ 420.207521][ T52] ? kthread_unuse_mm+0xc0/0xc0 [ 420.231501][ T52] ret_from_fork_asm+0x12/0x20 [ 420.256219][ T52] entry_INT80_32+0x125/0x125 [ 420.280981][ T52] Modules linked in: ipmi_devintf ppdev rapl i2c_piix4 tpm_tis tpm_tis_core i2c_smbus tpm i2c_core ata_generic i6300esb libata parport_pc rtc_cmos parport fuse [ 420.365047][ T52] CR2: 0000000000000108 [ 420.387629][ T52] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 420.416535][ T52] EIP: hazptr_synchronize_overflow_list+0x43/0xc0 [ 420.451442][ T52] Code: 30 8b 4e 34 90 90 90 89 4d e8 89 7d ec 8d 46 2c 89 45 f0 8b 45 f0 8b 00 89 45 f0 85 c0 74 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 8b 45 f0 <8b> 40 08 3b 45 e4 0f 95 c3 83 f8 01 0f 95 c7 89 f0 e8 67 bc fe 00 All code ======== 0: 30 8b 4e 34 90 90 xor %cl,-0x6f6fcbb2(%rbx) 6: 90 nop 7: 89 4d e8 mov %ecx,-0x18(%rbp) a: 89 7d ec mov %edi,-0x14(%rbp) d: 8d 46 2c lea 0x2c(%rsi),%eax 10: 89 45 f0 mov %eax,-0x10(%rbp) 13: 8b 45 f0 mov -0x10(%rbp),%eax 16: 8b 00 mov (%rax),%eax 18: 89 45 f0 mov %eax,-0x10(%rbp) 1b: 85 c0 test %eax,%eax 1d: 74 67 je 0x86 1f: 90 nop 20: 90 nop 21: 90 nop 22: 90 nop 23: 90 nop 24: 90 nop 25: 90 nop 26: 90 nop 27: 8b 45 f0 mov -0x10(%rbp),%eax 2a:* 8b 40 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%eax <-- trapping instruction 2d: 3b 45 e4 cmp -0x1c(%rbp),%eax 30: 0f 95 c3 setne %bl 33: 83 f8 01 cmp $0x1,%eax 36: 0f 95 c7 setne %bh 39: 89 f0 mov %esi,%eax 3b: e8 67 bc fe 00 call 0xfebca7
Code starting with the faulting instruction ===========================================
0: 8b 40 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%eax 3: 3b 45 e4 cmp -0x1c(%rbp),%eax 6: 0f 95 c3 setne %bl 9: 83 f8 01 cmp $0x1,%eax c: 0f 95 c7 setne %bh f: 89 f0 mov %esi,%eax 11: e8 67 bc fe 00 call 0xfebc7d
The kernel config and materials to reproduce are available at:
https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260813/[email protected]
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
Quoted 160 lines · kernel test robot
Hello,
kernel test robot noticed "BUG:kernel_NULL_pointer_dereference,address" on:
commit:
9b08a09f6d073bebd38e7be08781b0a4758c924e("hazptrtorture: Defer release of hazard pointers") https://github.com/paulmckrcu/linux non-rcu/next[test failed on linux-next/master
6b8c8af514d739d0335f5579b585e02babe8a727]in testcase: trinity
version: trinity-i386-abe9de86-1_20230429 with following parameters:runtime: 300s group: group-00 nr_groups: 5 reproduction: run 254 cycles, the issue can be reproduced for 16 times.config: i386-randconfig-015-20260807
compiler: clang-22
test machine: qemu-system-i386 -enable-kvm -cpu SandyBridge -smp 2 -m 4G(please refer to attached dmesg/kmsg for entire log/backtrace)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Closes:
https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/[email protected][ 419.412561][ T52] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000108 [ 419.456670][ T52] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 419.495649][ T52] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 419.534113][ T52] *pde = 00000000 [ 419.554661][ T52] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 419.579287][ T52] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: hazptr_torture_ Tainted: G W 7.2.0-rc3-00011-g9b08a09f6d07 #1 PREEMPTLAZY 809133f67ba61c2271624f9b1ff820a8a212cdad [ 419.666331][ T52] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 419.686632][ T52] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 419.731225][ T52] EIP: hazptr_synchronize_overflow_list+0x43/0xc0 [ 419.767103][ T52] Code: 30 8b 4e 34 90 90 90 89 4d e8 89 7d ec 8d 462c 89 45 f0 8b 45 f0 8b 00 89 45 f0 85 c0 74 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 8b 45 f0 <8b> 40 08 3b 45 e4 0f 95 c3 83 f8 01 0f 95 c7 89 f0 e8 67 bc fe 00 All code
========0: 30 8b 4e 34 90 90 xor %cl,-0x6f6fcbb2(%rbx) 6: 90 nop 7: 89 4d e8 mov %ecx,-0x18(%rbp) a: 89 7d ec mov %edi,-0x14(%rbp) d: 8d 46 2c lea 0x2c(%rsi),%eax 10: 89 45 f0 mov %eax,-0x10(%rbp) 13: 8b 45 f0 mov -0x10(%rbp),%eax 16: 8b 00 mov (%rax),%eax 18: 89 45 f0 mov %eax,-0x10(%rbp) 1b: 85 c0 test %eax,%eax 1d: 74 67 je 0x86 1f: 90 nop 20: 90 nop 21: 90 nop 22: 90 nop 23: 90 nop 24: 90 nop 25: 90 nop 26: 90 nop 27: 8b 45 f0 mov -0x10(%rbp),%eax 2a:* 8b 40 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%eax <-- trapping instruction 2d: 3b 45 e4 cmp -0x1c(%rbp),%eax 30: 0f 95 c3 setne %bl 33: 83 f8 01 cmp $0x1,%eax 36: 0f 95 c7 setne %bh 39: 89 f0 mov %esi,%eax 3b: e8 67 bc fe 00 call 0xfebca7Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================0: 8b 40 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%eax 3: 3b 45 e4 cmp -0x1c(%rbp),%eax 6: 0f 95 c3 setne %bl 9: 83 f8 01 cmp $0x1,%eax c: 0f 95 c7 setne %bh f: 89 f0 mov %esi,%eax 11: e8 67 bc fe 00 call 0xfebc7d [ 419.872228][ T52] EAX: 00000100 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000202 [ 419.904569][ T52] ESI: e4f7e13c EDI: 00000829 EBP: b3e9df20 ESP: b3e9df04 [ 419.941247][ T52] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010006 [ 419.980096][ T52] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000108 CR3: 05fb1000 CR4: 00000690 [ 420.005370][ T52] Call Trace: [ 420.022998][ T52] hazptr_synchronize+0x166/0x200 [ 420.050473][ T52] hazptr_torture_writer+0x153/0x400 [ 420.076986][ T52] ? __kthread_parkme+0x4b/0x100 [ 420.094745][ T52] kthread+0x107/0x140 [ 420.112829][ T52] ? hazptr_torture_reader+0x340/0x340 [ 420.140468][ T52] ? kthread_unuse_mm+0xc0/0xc0 [ 420.165878][ T52] ? kthread_unuse_mm+0xc0/0xc0 [ 420.185387][ T52] ret_from_fork+0x131/0x240 [ 420.207521][ T52] ? kthread_unuse_mm+0xc0/0xc0 [ 420.231501][ T52] ret_from_fork_asm+0x12/0x20 [ 420.256219][ T52] entry_INT80_32+0x125/0x125 [ 420.280981][ T52] Modules linked in: ipmi_devintf ppdev rapl i2c_piix4 tpm_tis tpm_tis_core i2c_smbus tpm i2c_core ata_generic i6300esb libata parport_pc rtc_cmos parport fuse [ 420.365047][ T52] CR2: 0000000000000108 [ 420.387629][ T52] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 420.416535][ T52] EIP: hazptr_synchronize_overflow_list+0x43/0xc0 [ 420.451442][ T52] Code: 30 8b 4e 34 90 90 90 89 4d e8 89 7d ec 8d 462c 89 45 f0 8b 45 f0 8b 00 89 45 f0 85 c0 74 67 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 8b 45 f0 <8b> 40 08 3b 45 e4 0f 95 c3 83 f8 01 0f 95 c7 89 f0 e8 67 bc fe 00 All code
========0: 30 8b 4e 34 90 90 xor %cl,-0x6f6fcbb2(%rbx) 6: 90 nop 7: 89 4d e8 mov %ecx,-0x18(%rbp) a: 89 7d ec mov %edi,-0x14(%rbp) d: 8d 46 2c lea 0x2c(%rsi),%eax 10: 89 45 f0 mov %eax,-0x10(%rbp) 13: 8b 45 f0 mov -0x10(%rbp),%eax 16: 8b 00 mov (%rax),%eax 18: 89 45 f0 mov %eax,-0x10(%rbp) 1b: 85 c0 test %eax,%eax 1d: 74 67 je 0x86 1f: 90 nop 20: 90 nop 21: 90 nop 22: 90 nop 23: 90 nop 24: 90 nop 25: 90 nop 26: 90 nop 27: 8b 45 f0 mov -0x10(%rbp),%eax 2a:* 8b 40 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%eax <-- trapping instruction 2d: 3b 45 e4 cmp -0x1c(%rbp),%eax 30: 0f 95 c3 setne %bl 33: 83 f8 01 cmp $0x1,%eax 36: 0f 95 c7 setne %bh 39: 89 f0 mov %esi,%eax 3b: e8 67 bc fe 00 call 0xfebca7Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================0: 8b 40 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%eax 3: 3b 45 e4 cmp -0x1c(%rbp),%eax 6: 0f 95 c3 setne %bl 9: 83 f8 01 cmp $0x1,%eax c: 0f 95 c7 setne %bh f: 89 f0 mov %esi,%eax 11: e8 67 bc fe 00 call 0xfebc7d
Quoted 12 lines
The kernel config and materials to reproduce are available at:
https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260813/[email protected]--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
Hi, could anybody test if this fixes it?
From 3e92b8153c31106d6a080e1c9bbe9bf1e86e1f63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bradley Morgan <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2026 18:00:08 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] hazptrtorture: Only detach acquired hazard pointers
hazptr_torture_acquire() detaches unconditionally, even when the readlock fails. A failed acquire leaves nothing to detach, but the detach still promotes the context to its backup slot and chains that slot into the running CPU's overflow list. The reader then retries on its own CPU, the fast path hands out a per-CPU slot and overwrites ctx->slot, and the chained backup node is orphaned, still linked, with nobody left to unchain it.
The next detach of the same context chains the same node a second time, into another CPU's list, and the node ends up reachable from both. The eventual release unchains it once, hlist_del() poisons node->next, and the first list is left pointing at the poisoned node. The writer's next hazptr_synchronize() walks that list, steps onto LIST_POISON1 (0x100 on i386, where POISON_POINTER_DELTA is 0), and reads slot.addr at offset 8 of the backup slot, address 0x108, which is the crash the robot hit.
cpuA (IPI acquire) cpuR (reader) cpuD (do_pending)
--------------------- --------------------- -------------------
readlock() returns
NULL
detach chains the
backup node into
cpuA list
hpp_htp is NULL,
continue
reacquire, ctx->slot
is now a cpuR
per-CPU slot
acquire succeeds,
defer, detach chains
the SAME node into
cpuR list
release, unchain
once, node->next
is POISON1
kfree(hppp)
synchronize walks cpuA
list, node->next is
0x100, reads 0x108,
OopsSkip the detach when the acquire failed. The slot holds NULL in that case, note_context_switch() and the synchronize scanners skip NULL slots, and the next acquire overwrites ctx->slot, so leaving the context attached is safe.
The robot's original report was against the defer path before detach existed, which 4bd7f458229a fixed. This is the same crash surviving through the IPI acquire path that 6357ec235c59 added.
--- kernel/rcu/hazptrtorture.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/rcu/hazptrtorture.c +4 -1
@@ -373,8 +373,11 @@ static void hazptr_torture_acquire(void *hppp_in)/* * Acquiring a hazard pointer from a remote CPU. * Detach hazptr from its task so it can be released by another task. +* A failed acquire has nothing to detach, and detaching one anyway +* orphans the chained backup slot on this CPU's overflow list. */ -hazptr_detach (&hppp->hpp_hc); +if (hppp->hpp_htp) +hazptr_detach (&hppp->hpp_hc);atomic_long_inc (per_cpu_ptr (&hazptr_torture_acquires_irq,raw_smp_processor_id ())); }
Signature · 5 lines
2.47.3 --- Thanks! https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Mathieu Desnoyers
reviewerOn 2026-09-07 16:42, Bradley Morgan wrote:
[...]
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line
Hi, could anybody test if this fixes it?
Although this fix to the hazptr torture test addresses the issue at the call site, I think we should make hazptr_detach more robust instead.
How about the following:
When hazptr_acquire loads a NULL pointer, it sets:
- slot_item->slot.addr = NULL,
- slot_item->ctx.ctx = ctx
- ctx->slot = slot
And it returns NULL.
Then if we mistakenly call hazptr_detach on this ctx, it will act on the ctx as if needed to be promoted to backup slot, even though it has a NULL addr.
If we look at what hazptr_note_context_switch() does before promoting to backup slot, it checks for a NULL slot->addr, which is exactly what is missing from hazptr_detach.
Something like this patch (compile-tested only) ?
include/linux/hazptr.h +3 -1
@@ -160,10 +160,12 @@ void hazptr_detach(struct hazptr_ctx *ctx)struct hazptr_slot *slot;guard (preempt)(); + slot = ctx->slot; +if (!slot->addr) +return ;#ifdef CONFIG_HAZPTR_DEBUG ctx->detach_task = ctx->detach_cpu = true;#endif - slot = ctx->slot;if (unlikely (hazptr_slot_is_backup (ctx, slot)))return ;hazptr_promote_to_backup_slot (ctx, slot);
With this in place we would not need to explicitly check the hazptr_acquire return value before calling "detach". You will note that "hazptr_release" has a early return check for NULL addr as well, so it makes sense that detach does an early return (no-op) similarly.
Thanks,
Mathieu
Quoted 83 lines
From
3e92b8153c31106d6a080e1c9bbe9bf1e86e1f63Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bradley Morgan <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2026 18:00:08 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] hazptrtorture: Only detach acquired hazard pointers
hazptr_torture_acquire()detaches unconditionally, even when the readlock fails. A failed acquire leaves nothing to detach, but the detach still promotes the context to its backup slot and chains that slot into the running CPU's overflow list. The reader then retries on its own CPU, the fast path hands out a per-CPU slot and overwritesctx->slot, and the chained backup node is orphaned, still linked, with nobody left to unchain it.The next detach of the same context chains the same node a second time, into another CPU's list, and the node ends up reachable from both. The eventual release unchains it once,
hlist_del()poisonsnode->next, and the first list is left pointing at the poisoned node. The writer's nexthazptr_synchronize()walks that list, steps ontoLIST_POISON1(0x100on i386, wherePOISON_POINTER_DELTAis 0), and reads slot.addr at offset 8 of the backup slot, address0x108, which is the crash the robot hit.cpuA (IPI acquire) cpuR (reader) cpuD (do_pending) --------------------- --------------------- ------------------- readlock() returns NULL detach chains the backup node into cpuA list hpp_htp is NULL, continue reacquire, ctx->slot is now a cpuR per-CPU slot acquire succeeds, defer, detach chains the SAME node into cpuR list release, unchain once, node->next is POISON1 kfree(hppp) synchronize walks cpuA list, node->next is 0x100, reads 0x108, OopsSkip the detach when the acquire failed. The slot holds NULL in that case,
note_context_switch()and the synchronize scanners skip NULL slots, and the next acquire overwritesctx->slot, so leaving the context attached is safe.The robot's original report was against the defer path before detach existed, which
4bd7f458229afixed. This is the same crash surviving through the IPI acquire path that6357ec235c59added.Fixes 6357ec235c59 ("hazptrtorture: Fix hazptr ownership issue")Reported-by kernel test robot <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Bradley Morgan <[email protected]>--- kernel/rcu/hazptrtorture.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)kernel/rcu/hazptrtorture.c +4
-1@@ -373,8 +373,11 @@ static void hazptr_torture_acquire(void *hppp_in)/* * Acquiring a hazard pointer from a remote CPU. * Detach hazptr from its task so it can be released by another task. +* A failed acquire has nothing to detach, and detaching one anyway +* orphans the chained backup slot on this CPU's overflow list. */ -hazptr_detach (&hppp->hpp_hc); +if (hppp->hpp_htp) +hazptr_detach (&hppp->hpp_hc);atomic_long_inc (per_cpu_ptr (&hazptr_torture_acquires_irq,raw_smp_processor_id ())); }
Signature · 3 lines
Mathieu Desnoyers EfficiOS Inc. https://www.efficios.com
Bradley Morgan
Reviewed-byQuoted 131 lines · Mathieu Desnoyers
On 2026-09-07 16:42, Bradley Morgan wrote:
[...]Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line
Hi, could anybody test if this fixes it?
Although this fix to the hazptr torture test addresses the issue at the call site, I think we should make
hazptr_detachmore robust instead.How about the following:
When
hazptr_acquireloads a NULL pointer, it sets:-
slot_item->slot.addr= NULL,
-slot_item->ctx.ctx= ctx
-ctx->slot= slotAnd it returns NULL.
Then if we mistakenly call
hazptr_detachon this ctx, it will act on the ctx as if needed to be promoted to backup slot, even though it has a NULL addr.If we look at what
hazptr_note_context_switch()does before promoting to backup slot, it checks for a NULLslot->addr, which is exactly what is missing fromhazptr_detach.Something like this patch (compile-tested only) ?
include/linux/hazptr.h +3
-1@@ -160,10 +160,12 @@ void hazptr_detach(struct hazptr_ctx *ctx)struct hazptr_slot *slot;guard (preempt)(); + slot = ctx->slot; +if (!slot->addr) +return ;#ifdef CONFIG_HAZPTR_DEBUG ctx->detach_task = ctx->detach_cpu = true;#endif - slot = ctx->slot;if (unlikely (hazptr_slot_is_backup (ctx, slot)))return ;hazptr_promote_to_backup_slot (ctx, slot);With this in place we would not need to explicitly check the
hazptr_acquirereturn value before calling "detach". You will note that "hazptr_release" has a early return check for NULL addr as well, so it makes sense that detach does an early return (no-op) similarly.Thanks,
Mathieu
Quoted 54 lines
From
3e92b8153c31106d6a080e1c9bbe9bf1e86e1f63Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bradley Morgan <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2026 18:00:08 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] hazptrtorture: Only detach acquired hazard pointers
hazptr_torture_acquire()detaches unconditionally, even when the readlock fails. A failed acquire leaves nothing to detach, but the detach still promotes the context to its backup slot and chains that slot into the running CPU's overflow list. The reader then retries on its own CPU, the fast path hands out a per-CPU slot and overwritesctx->slot, and the chained backup node is orphaned, still linked, with nobody left to unchain it.The next detach of the same context chains the same node a second time, into another CPU's list, and the node ends up reachable from both. The eventual release unchains it once,
hlist_del()poisonsnode->next, and the first list is left pointing at the poisoned node. The writer's nexthazptr_synchronize()walks that list, steps ontoLIST_POISON1(0x100on i386, wherePOISON_POINTER_DELTAis 0), and reads slot.addr at offset 8 of the backup slot, address0x108, which is the crash the robot hit.cpuA (IPI acquire) cpuR (reader) cpuD (do_pending) --------------------- --------------------- ------------------- readlock() returns NULL detach chains the backup node into cpuA list hpp_htp is NULL, continue reacquire, ctx->slot is now a cpuR per-CPU slot acquire succeeds, defer, detach chains the SAME node into cpuR list release, unchain once, node->next is POISON1 kfree(hppp) synchronize walks cpuA list, node->next is 0x100, reads 0x108, OopsSkip the detach when the acquire failed. The slot holds NULL in that case,
note_context_switch()and the synchronize scanners skip NULL slots, and the next acquire overwritesctx->slot, so leaving the context attached is safe.Quoted 7 lines
The robot's original report was against the defer path before detach existed, which
4bd7f458229afixed. This is the same crash surviving through the IPI acquire path that6357ec235c59added.Fixes 6357ec235c59 ("hazptrtorture: Fix hazptr ownership issue")Reported-by kernel test robot <[email protected]>Closes:
https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/[email protected]
Quoted 14 lines
Signed-off-by Bradley Morgan <[email protected]>--- kernel/rcu/hazptrtorture.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)kernel/rcu/hazptrtorture.c +1
-0@@ -373,8 +373,11 @@ static void hazptr_torture_acquire(void *hppp_in)/* * Acquiring a hazard pointer from a remote CPU. * Detach hazptr from its task so it can be released by another task. +* A failed acquire has nothing to detach, and detaching one anyway
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/rcu/hazptrtorture.c static void hazptr_torture_acquire(void *hppp_in) · line 383
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/rcu/hazptrtorture.c +3
-1+* orphans the chained backup slot on this CPU's overflow list. */ -hazptr_detach (&hppp->hpp_hc); +if (hppp->hpp_htp) +hazptr_detach (&hppp->hpp_hc);atomic_long_inc (per_cpu_ptr (&hazptr_torture_acquires_irq,raw_smp_processor_id ())); }
LGTM, thanks
If you submit as patch: