RDMA/rxe: Fix integer overflow in mr_check_range() leading to OOB access
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v3 1/1 RDMA/rxe: Fix integer overflow in mr_check_range() leading to OOB access
From: Gang Yan <[email protected]>
mr_check_range() validates that [iova, iova+length) falls within the registered MR range using wraparound-prone arithmetic:
if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova ||
iova + length > mr->ibmr.iova + mr->ibmr.length)A remote peer can craft an RDMA-Write/Read RETH so that iova + length wraps to 0 (e.g. iova=0xfffffffffffffff8, length=8), bypassing the check. rxe_mr_iova_to_index() then computes a huge index (int idx, only guarded by WARN_ON) and rxe_mr_copy_xarray() dereferences mr->page_info[huge], causing an out-of-bounds read/write and a kernel oops that is triggerable by an unauthenticated remote peer.
Rewrite the check in overflow-safe form; the first two clauses guarantee that the subsequent subtractions do not underflow:
if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova ||
length > mr->ibmr.length ||
iova - mr->ibmr.iova > mr->ibmr.length - length)With the fix, mr_check_range() returns -EINVAL for the crafted iova and the responder reports REMOTE_ACCESS_ERROR instead of triggering the OOB.
---
Changelog:
v3:
- rebase on rdma/for-next
- CC to stable maillist
v2:
- Add Yanjun's reviewed-by tag as he suggested.
v1:
- The reproducer is attached in v1 thread.
--- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mr.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_mr.c +2 -1
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ int mr_check_range(struct rxe_mr *mr, u64 iova, size_t length)case IB_MR_TYPE_USER :case IB_MR_TYPE_MEM_REG :if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova || - iova + length > mr->ibmr.iova + mr->ibmr.length) { + length > mr->ibmr.length || + iova - mr->ibmr.iova > mr->ibmr.length - length) {rxe_dbg_mr (mr,"iova/length out of range\n" );return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 3 lines
With the fix,
mr_check_range()returns-EINVALfor the crafted iova and the responder reportsREMOTE_ACCESS_ERRORinstead of triggering the OOB.
Thank you for the patch. We independently identified the same issue and have reviewed, and tested this patch using our two-VM PoC for OOB read/write.
The patch correctly rejects the wrapped requests and prevents the out-of-bounds read/write and host crash.
Kind regards,
Shukai Ni and Jo Van Bulck
DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leon Romanovsky
AppliedQuoted 6 lines · Gang Yan
mr_check_range()validates that [iova, iova+length) falls within the registered MR range using wraparound-prone arithmetic:if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova || iova + length > mr->ibmr.iova + mr->ibmr.length)
Quoted 8 lines
A remote peer can craft an RDMA-Write/Read RETH so that iova + length wraps to 0 (e.g. iova=0xfffffffffffffff8, length=8), bypassing the check.
rxe_mr_iova_to_index()then computes a huge index (int idx, only guarded byWARN_ON) andrxe_mr_copy_xarray()dereferences mr->page_info[huge], causing an out-of-bounds read/write and a kernel oops that is triggerable by an unauthenticated remote peer.[...]
Applied, thanks!
[1/1] RDMA/rxe: Fix integer overflow in mr_check_range() leading to OOB access
https://git.kernel.org/rdma/rdma/c/d10e2a08799e85
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>