btrfs: allow idmapped DEFRAG ioctls
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v2 1/1 btrfs: allow idmapped DEFRAG ioctls
From: Tao Cui <[email protected]>
btrfs_ioctl_defrag() checks MAY_WRITE against nop_mnt_idmap, so on an idmapped mount the owner comparison uses the caller's fsuid against the raw on-disk uid and the ioctl fails with -EPERM even for the file's owner. Pass the mount idmap down so defrag works on idmapped mounts.
The check, added in 616d374efa23 ("btrfs: allow defrag on a file opened read-only that has rw permissions"), is not a privilege gate. It only tests whether the file could have been opened for writing, and a user who owns the file on the idmapped mount can already open it O_RDWR, write() to it or fallocate() it. Defragmenting a regular file only rearranges the caller's own extents; there is nothing it can rewrite that the caller could not rewrite anyway. Whole-subvolume defrag on a directory keeps its capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) requirement, and the !capable() guard around this check is left as is.
FIDEDUPERANGE already works this way for unprivileged callers:may_dedupe_file() in fs/remap_range.c compares the inode owner through file_mnt_idmap(file) and falls back to inode_permission() with the same idmap, and dedupe can rewrite one file's extents from another file's contents, which is a stronger operation than defrag.
On regular mounts file_mnt_idmap() is nop_mnt_idmap and nothing changes.
---
v2: rewrite the commit message to explain why defrag is safe for idmapped users (Seth Forshee); the code is unchanged.
--- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_defrag(struct file *file, void __user *argp)* running and allows defrag on files open in read-only mode. */ if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && -inode_permission (&nop_mnt_idmap, inode,MAY_WRITE )) { +inode_permission (file_mnt_idmap (file), inode,MAY_WRITE )) { ret = -EPERM ; goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 23 lines · Tao Cui
From: Tao Cui <[email protected]>
btrfs_ioctl_defrag()checksMAY_WRITEagainstnop_mnt_idmap, so on an idmapped mount the owner comparison uses the caller's fsuid against the raw on-disk uid and the ioctl fails with-EPERMeven for the file's owner. Pass the mount idmap down so defrag works on idmapped mounts.The check, added in
616d374efa23("btrfs: allow defrag on a file opened read-only that has rw permissions"), is not a privilege gate. It only tests whether the file could have been opened for writing, and a user who owns the file on the idmapped mount can already open itO_RDWR,write()to it orfallocate()it. Defragmenting a regular file only rearranges the caller's own extents; there is nothing it can rewrite that the caller could not rewrite anyway. Whole-subvolume defrag on a directory keeps itscapable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)requirement, and the !capable() guard around this check is left as is.FIDEDUPERANGE already works this way for unprivileged callers:
may_dedupe_file()infs/remap_range.ccompares the inode owner throughfile_mnt_idmap(file)and falls back toinode_permission()with the same idmap, and dedupe can rewrite one file's extents from another file's contents, which is a stronger operation than defrag.
Quoted 4 lines
On regular mounts
file_mnt_idmap()isnop_mnt_idmapand nothing changes.Signed-off-by Tao Cui <[email protected]>
Thanks for the updated commit message!
Quoted 23 lines · Tao Cui
From: Tao Cui <[email protected]>
btrfs_ioctl_defrag()checksMAY_WRITEagainstnop_mnt_idmap, so on an idmapped mount the owner comparison uses the caller's fsuid against the raw on-disk uid and the ioctl fails with-EPERMeven for the file's owner. Pass the mount idmap down so defrag works on idmapped mounts.The check, added in
616d374efa23("btrfs: allow defrag on a file opened read-only that has rw permissions"), is not a privilege gate. It only tests whether the file could have been opened for writing, and a user who owns the file on the idmapped mount can already open itO_RDWR,write()to it orfallocate()it. Defragmenting a regular file only rearranges the caller's own extents; there is nothing it can rewrite that the caller could not rewrite anyway. Whole-subvolume defrag on a directory keeps itscapable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)requirement, and the !capable() guard around this check is left as is.FIDEDUPERANGE already works this way for unprivileged callers:
may_dedupe_file()infs/remap_range.ccompares the inode owner throughfile_mnt_idmap(file)and falls back toinode_permission()with the same idmap, and dedupe can rewrite one file's extents from another file's contents, which is a stronger operation than defrag.
Quoted 4 lines
On regular mounts
file_mnt_idmap()isnop_mnt_idmapand nothing changes.Signed-off-by Tao Cui <[email protected]>
Quoted 20 lines
---
v2: rewrite the commit message to explain why defrag is safe for idmapped users (Seth Forshee); the code is unchanged.--- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +1
-1@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_defrag(struct file *file, void __user *argp)* running and allows defrag on files open in read-only mode. */ if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && -inode_permission (&nop_mnt_idmap, inode,MAY_WRITE )) { +inode_permission (file_mnt_idmap (file), inode,MAY_WRITE )) { ret = -EPERM ; goto out; }
Quoted 23 lines · Tao Cui
From: Tao Cui <[email protected]>
btrfs_ioctl_defrag()checksMAY_WRITEagainstnop_mnt_idmap, so on an idmapped mount the owner comparison uses the caller's fsuid against the raw on-disk uid and the ioctl fails with-EPERMeven for the file's owner. Pass the mount idmap down so defrag works on idmapped mounts.The check, added in
616d374efa23("btrfs: allow defrag on a file opened read-only that has rw permissions"), is not a privilege gate. It only tests whether the file could have been opened for writing, and a user who owns the file on the idmapped mount can already open itO_RDWR,write()to it orfallocate()it. Defragmenting a regular file only rearranges the caller's own extents; there is nothing it can rewrite that the caller could not rewrite anyway. Whole-subvolume defrag on a directory keeps itscapable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)requirement, and the !capable() guard around this check is left as is.FIDEDUPERANGE already works this way for unprivileged callers:
may_dedupe_file()infs/remap_range.ccompares the inode owner throughfile_mnt_idmap(file)and falls back toinode_permission()with the same idmap, and dedupe can rewrite one file's extents from another file's contents, which is a stronger operation than defrag.
Quoted 5 lines
On regular mounts
file_mnt_idmap()isnop_mnt_idmapand nothing changes.Signed-off-by Tao Cui <[email protected]>---