docs: threat-model: fix /dev/kmsg reference
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 docs: threat-model: fix /dev/kmsg reference
Fix a '/dev/kmsg' reference which got replaced with '/proc/kmsg' (which is not accessible to regular users).
Fixes a03ef333fbd6 ("Documentation: security-bugs: explain what is and is not a security bug")
Signed-off-by Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
--- Documentation/process/threat-model.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/process/threat-model.rst +1 -1
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ possibilities of user namespaces are not covered in this document. The kernel also offers a lot of troubleshooting and debugging facilities, which can constitute attack vectors when placed in wrong hands. While some of them are designed to be accessible to regular local users with a low risk (e.g. -kernel logs via ``/proc/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to +kernel logs via ``/dev/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to represent a risk in most places and the decision to expose them is under the administrator's responsibility (perf events, traces), and others are not designed to be accessed by non-privileged users (e.g. debugfs). Access to these
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Hi Johan,
Quoted 2 lines · Johan Hovold
Fix a '
/dev/kmsg' reference which got replaced with '/proc/kmsg' (which is not accessible to regular users).
Actually it wasn't "replaced", it's because I didn't know about /dev/kmsg, for having been used to /proc/kmsg for decades long before its /dev cousin was born :-)
Quoted 2 lines
Fixes a03ef333fbd6 ("Documentation: security-bugs: explain what is and is not a security bug")Signed-off-by Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Acked-by Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Thanks,
Willy
Quoted 19 lines
--- Documentation/process/threat-model.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)Documentation/process/threat-model.rst +1
-1@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ possibilities of user namespaces are not covered in this document. The kernel also offers a lot of troubleshooting and debugging facilities, which can constitute attack vectors when placed in wrong hands. While some of them are designed to be accessible to regular local users with a low risk (e.g. -kernel logs via ``/proc/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to +kernel logs via ``/dev/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to represent a risk in most places and the decision to expose them is under the administrator's responsibility (perf events, traces), and others are not designed to be accessed by non-privileged users (e.g. debugfs). Access to theseSignature · 1 line
2.54.0
Quoted 14 lines · Johan Hovold
Fix a '
/dev/kmsg' reference which got replaced with '/proc/kmsg' (which is not accessible to regular users).Fixes a03ef333fbd6 ("Documentation: security-bugs: explain what is and is not a security bug")Signed-off-by Johan Hovold <[email protected]>--- Documentation/process/threat-model.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)Documentation/process/threat-model.rst +0
-0
Documentation/process/threat-model.rst possibilities of user namespaces are not covered in this document. · line 88
Quoted 6 lines
Documentation/process/threat-model.rst +1
-1@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ possibilities of user namespaces are not covered in this document. The kernel also offers a lot of troubleshooting and debugging facilities, which can constitute attack vectors when placed in wrong hands. While some of them are designed to be accessible to regular local users with a low risk (e.g. -kernel logs via ``/proc/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to +kernel logs via ``/dev/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to represent a risk in most places and the decision to expose them is under the
Applied, thanks.
jon