SUNRPC: fix out-of-bounds write in xdr_inline_pages()
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 SUNRPC: fix out-of-bounds write in xdr_inline_pages()
xdr_inline_pages() re-carves an existing receive buffer into a head, a page list and a tail at a caller-supplied offset, computing the tail length as buflen - offset. It does not check that the offset lies within the buffer being carved, and iov_len is unsigned, so an offset past the end wraps the tail length instead of failing.
The offset reaches it from wire data. rpc_prepare_reply_pages() derives it from the authentication flavour's au_ralign, which is read on every encode, while the receive buffer's size is fixed once in call_allocate() from au_rslack. unx_validate() raises au_verfsize, au_rslack and au_ralign from the reply verifier's length, and runs before rpc_decode_header() reads the accept_stat, so a GARBAGE_ARGS reply poisons the alignment and only then selects call_encode(). call_allocate() short-circuits on the existing buffer, so rq_rcvsize is not recomputed and the retry carves a new offset against the old size. auth_unix keeps these fields in a file-scope static rpc_auth shared by every AUTH_SYS client.
For an NFSv3 READ the design slack is exactly one XDR word, so the underflow needs only au_ralign at encode to exceed au_rslack at allocation by two -- a five-byte verifier body. Observed with eight:rq_rcvsize is 132 with a 128-byte head and a 4-byte tail, the verifier raises au_ralign from 2 to 4, and the retry carves at (26 + 4 + 4) << 2 = 136 against an unchanged 132-byte buffer. The in-tree sunrpc:rpc_xdr_reply_pages tracepoint shows the transition on one task:
rpc_xdr_reply_pages: head=[..a18,128] tail=[..a98,4]
rpc_xdr_reply_pages: head=[..a18,136] tail=[..aa0,4294967292]
(one task, before and after the re-encode; addresses abbreviated)
xs_read_xdr_buf() then fills the tail against that length, and the TCP record length is not capped against rq_rcvsize, so the reply to the retried call writes peer-controlled bytes past the object:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_iter+0x7c8/0x1538 Write of size 1664 at addr ffff0000c7640aa0 by task kworker/u8:0/12 Workqueue: xprtiod xs_stream_data_receive_workfn _copy_to_iter+0x7c8/0x1538 __skb_datagram_iter+0x33c/0x560 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x3c/0x454 tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x110c/0x2308 xs_sock_recvmsg.constprop.0+0x34/0xe4 xs_read_stream_request.constprop.0+0x410/0x1140 xs_read_stream.constprop.0+0x680/0xe9c xs_stream_data_receive_workfn+0xcc/0x420 Allocated by task 12: rpc_malloc+0x174/0x2d0 call_allocate+0x25c/0x944 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7640880 which belongs to the cache rpc_buffers of size 2048 The buggy address is located 544 bytes inside of allocated 2048-byte region [ffff0000c7640880, ffff0000c7641080)
That is 160 bytes past the object, with both the length and every byte chosen by the peer. Under KASAN the interposed __asan_memcpy() returns without calling __memcpy once the range check fails, so the report establishes that the write is reachable and out of bounds; it does not establish that the copy executed. The enlarged head stays inside the same slab object and is not itself a violation.
Reproduced twice on an unmodified v7.2-rc7 arm64 KASAN kernel with CONFIG_NFS_V3=y and no other configuration change; the geometry above came from tracepoints that already ship in the kernel, not from added instrumentation. The trigger is an ordinary read(2) on an already mounted NFSv3 AUTH_SYS share over TCP and needs no client privilege; every byte the attacker supplies is a legal server reply. Under RPCSEC_GSS the verifier is authenticated and cannot be forged. UDP is bounded by the datagram length in xs_udp_data_read_skb() and is not affected. NFSv4 does not take the retry path, since RPC_TASK_NO_RETRANS_TIMEOUT suppresses the re-encode.
Commit 53bc19f17f21 ("SUNRPC: receive buffer size estimation values almost never change") placed the equivalent slack update behind RPCAUTH_AUTH_UPDATE_SLACK in gss_update_rslack(), but auth_unix was never converted and still assigns unconditionally. Gating it the same way narrows the window without closing it, because the first update can still land between the allocation and the re-encode of an in-flight request, and it would leave the other caller of xdr_inline_pages() unguarded.
Clamp the offset to the length of the buffer being carved so the tail length cannot underflow.
---
Note: the defect is reproduced 2/2 on an unmodified v7.2-rc7 arm64 KASAN kernel; the patched kernel has not been built or booted. A reproducer exists and can be shared privately on request.
No Fixes: tag: the unbounded carve is original to xdr_inline_pages() (unchanged since the initial git import) and unx_validate() has written the shared rpc_auth's slack from the reply verifier since at least v2.6.32, so there is no commit that introduced this.
net/sunrpc/xdr.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/sunrpc/xdr.c +3 -0
@@ -409,6 +409,9 @@ xdr_inline_pages(struct xdr_buf *xdr, unsigned int offset,char *buf = (char *)head->iov_base;unsigned int buflen = head->iov_len; +if (offset > buflen) + offset = buflen; + head->iov_len = offset; xdr->pages = pages;
base-commit: a4ff2be345d0abc943da8dd8da98151843b750dc
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
Anna Schumaker
maintainerHi Paula,
Quoted 84 lines · Paula Moutafian
xdr_inline_pages()re-carves an existing receive buffer into a head, a page list and a tail at a caller-supplied offset, computing the tail length as buflen - offset. It does not check that the offset lies within the buffer being carved, andiov_lenis unsigned, so an offset past the end wraps the tail length instead of failing.The offset reaches it from wire data.
rpc_prepare_reply_pages()derives it from the authentication flavour'sau_ralign, which is read on every encode, while the receive buffer's size is fixed once incall_allocate()fromau_rslack.unx_validate()raisesau_verfsize,au_rslackandau_ralignfrom the reply verifier's length, and runs beforerpc_decode_header()reads theaccept_stat, so aGARBAGE_ARGSreply poisons the alignment and only then selectscall_encode().call_allocate()short-circuits on the existing buffer, sorq_rcvsizeis not recomputed and the retry carves a new offset against the old size.auth_unixkeeps these fields in a file-scope staticrpc_authshared by everyAUTH_SYSclient.For an NFSv3 READ the design slack is exactly one XDR word, so the underflow needs only
au_ralignat encode to exceedau_rslackat allocation by two -- a five-byte verifier body. Observed with eight:rq_rcvsizeis 132 with a 128-byte head and a 4-byte tail, the verifier raisesau_ralignfrom 2 to 4, and the retry carves at (26 + 4 + 4) << 2 = 136 against an unchanged 132-byte buffer. The in-tree sunrpc:rpc_xdr_reply_pages tracepoint shows the transition on one task:
rpc_xdr_reply_pages: head=[..a18,128] tail=[..a98,4]
rpc_xdr_reply_pages: head=[..a18,136] tail=[..aa0,4294967292](one task, before and after the re-encode; addresses abbreviated)
xs_read_xdr_buf()then fills the tail against that length, and the TCP record length is not capped againstrq_rcvsize, so the reply to the retried call writes peer-controlled bytes past the object:BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_iter+0x7c8/0x1538 Write of size 1664 at addr ffff0000c7640aa0 by task kworker/u8:0/12 Workqueue: xprtiod xs_stream_data_receive_workfn _copy_to_iter+0x7c8/0x1538 __skb_datagram_iter+0x33c/0x560 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x3c/0x454 tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x110c/0x2308 xs_sock_recvmsg.constprop.0+0x34/0xe4 xs_read_stream_request.constprop.0+0x410/0x1140 xs_read_stream.constprop.0+0x680/0xe9c xs_stream_data_receive_workfn+0xcc/0x420 Allocated by task 12: rpc_malloc+0x174/0x2d0 call_allocate+0x25c/0x944 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7640880 which belongs to the cache rpc_buffers of size 2048 The buggy address is located 544 bytes inside of allocated 2048-byte region [ffff0000c7640880, ffff0000c7641080)That is 160 bytes past the object, with both the length and every byte chosen by the peer. Under KASAN the interposed
__asan_memcpy()returns without calling__memcpyonce the range check fails, so the report establishes that the write is reachable and out of bounds; it does not establish that the copy executed. The enlarged head stays inside the same slab object and is not itself a violation.Reproduced twice on an unmodified v7.2-rc7 arm64 KASAN kernel with
CONFIG_NFS_V3=yand no other configuration change; the geometry above came from tracepoints that already ship in the kernel, not from added instrumentation. The trigger is an ordinary read(2) on an already mounted NFSv3AUTH_SYSshare over TCP and needs no client privilege; every byte the attacker supplies is a legal server reply. UnderRPCSEC_GSSthe verifier is authenticated and cannot be forged. UDP is bounded by the datagram length inxs_udp_data_read_skb()and is not affected. NFSv4 does not take the retry path, sinceRPC_TASK_NO_RETRANS_TIMEOUTsuppresses the re-encode.Commit
53bc19f17f21("SUNRPC: receive buffer size estimation values almost never change") placed the equivalent slack update behindRPCAUTH_AUTH_UPDATE_SLACKingss_update_rslack(), butauth_unixwas never converted and still assigns unconditionally. Gating it the same way narrows the window without closing it, because the first update can still land between the allocation and the re-encode of an in-flight request, and it would leave the other caller ofxdr_inline_pages()unguarded.Clamp the offset to the length of the buffer being carved so the tail length cannot underflow.
Quoted 6 lines
Assisted-by Bynario AISigned-off-by Paula Moutafian <[email protected]>---
Note: the defect is reproduced 2/2 on an unmodified v7.2-rc7 arm64 KASAN kernel; the patched kernel has not been built or booted. A reproducer exists and can be shared privately on request.
Question: Am I understanding you correctly that you have a reproducer, but haven't tested or even compiled the code to verify that it works?
Thanks,
Anna
Quoted 27 lines
No Fixes: tag: the unbounded carve is original to
xdr_inline_pages()(unchanged since the initial git import) andunx_validate()has written the shared rpc_auth's slack from the reply verifier since at least v2.6.32, so there is no commit that introduced this.net/sunrpc/xdr.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)net/sunrpc/xdr.c +3
-0@@ -409,6 +409,9 @@ xdr_inline_pages(struct xdr_buf *xdr, unsigned int offset,char *buf = (char *)head->iov_base;unsigned int buflen = head->iov_len; +if (offset > buflen) + offset = buflen; + head->iov_len = offset; xdr->pages = pages;base-commit:
a4ff2be345d0abc943da8dd8da98151843b750dcSignature · 1 line
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): CANegxYFKBfCKjEEn73n1-C1Ev9MY9RE-zQ4LW2C-BCoRpjAqhw@mail.gmail.com
Hello Anna,
The note was a mistake, I confirm that it compiles fine and the patch works. :)
Kind regards,
Paula
Quoted 137 lines · Paula Moutafian
Hello Anna,
The note was a mistake, I confirm that it compiles fine and the patch works. :)
Kind regards,
PaulaQuoted 128 lines · Anna Schumaker
Hi Paula,
Quoted 84 lines · Paula Moutafian
xdr_inline_pages()re-carves an existing receive buffer into a head, a page list and a tail at a caller-supplied offset, computing the tail length as buflen - offset. It does not check that the offset lies within the buffer being carved, andiov_lenis unsigned, so an offset past the end wraps the tail length instead of failing.The offset reaches it from wire data.
rpc_prepare_reply_pages()derives it from the authentication flavour'sau_ralign, which is read on every encode, while the receive buffer's size is fixed once incall_allocate()fromau_rslack.unx_validate()raisesau_verfsize,au_rslackandau_ralignfrom the reply verifier's length, and runs beforerpc_decode_header()reads theaccept_stat, so aGARBAGE_ARGSreply poisons the alignment and only then selectscall_encode().call_allocate()short-circuits on the existing buffer, sorq_rcvsizeis not recomputed and the retry carves a new offset against the old size.auth_unixkeeps these fields in a file-scope staticrpc_authshared by everyAUTH_SYSclient.For an NFSv3 READ the design slack is exactly one XDR word, so the underflow needs only
au_ralignat encode to exceedau_rslackat allocation by two -- a five-byte verifier body. Observed with eight:rq_rcvsizeis 132 with a 128-byte head and a 4-byte tail, the verifier raisesau_ralignfrom 2 to 4, and the retry carves at (26 + 4 + 4) << 2 = 136 against an unchanged 132-byte buffer. The in-tree sunrpc:rpc_xdr_reply_pages tracepoint shows the transition on one task:
rpc_xdr_reply_pages: head=[..a18,128] tail=[..a98,4]
rpc_xdr_reply_pages: head=[..a18,136] tail=[..aa0,4294967292](one task, before and after the re-encode; addresses abbreviated)
xs_read_xdr_buf()then fills the tail against that length, and the TCP record length is not capped againstrq_rcvsize, so the reply to the retried call writes peer-controlled bytes past the object:BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_iter+0x7c8/0x1538 Write of size 1664 at addr ffff0000c7640aa0 by task kworker/u8:0/12 Workqueue: xprtiod xs_stream_data_receive_workfn _copy_to_iter+0x7c8/0x1538 __skb_datagram_iter+0x33c/0x560 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x3c/0x454 tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x110c/0x2308 xs_sock_recvmsg.constprop.0+0x34/0xe4 xs_read_stream_request.constprop.0+0x410/0x1140 xs_read_stream.constprop.0+0x680/0xe9c xs_stream_data_receive_workfn+0xcc/0x420 Allocated by task 12: rpc_malloc+0x174/0x2d0 call_allocate+0x25c/0x944 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7640880 which belongs to the cache rpc_buffers of size 2048 The buggy address is located 544 bytes inside of allocated 2048-byte region [ffff0000c7640880, ffff0000c7641080)That is 160 bytes past the object, with both the length and every byte chosen by the peer. Under KASAN the interposed
__asan_memcpy()returns without calling__memcpyonce the range check fails, so the report establishes that the write is reachable and out of bounds; it does not establish that the copy executed. The enlarged head stays inside the same slab object and is not itself a violation.Reproduced twice on an unmodified v7.2-rc7 arm64 KASAN kernel with
CONFIG_NFS_V3=yand no other configuration change; the geometry above came from tracepoints that already ship in the kernel, not from added instrumentation. The trigger is an ordinary read(2) on an already mounted NFSv3AUTH_SYSshare over TCP and needs no client privilege; every byte the attacker supplies is a legal server reply. UnderRPCSEC_GSSthe verifier is authenticated and cannot be forged. UDP is bounded by the datagram length inxs_udp_data_read_skb()and is not affected. NFSv4 does not take the retry path, sinceRPC_TASK_NO_RETRANS_TIMEOUTsuppresses the re-encode.Commit
53bc19f17f21("SUNRPC: receive buffer size estimation values almost never change") placed the equivalent slack update behindRPCAUTH_AUTH_UPDATE_SLACKingss_update_rslack(), butauth_unixwas never converted and still assigns unconditionally. Gating it the same way narrows the window without closing it, because the first update can still land between the allocation and the re-encode of an in-flight request, and it would leave the other caller ofxdr_inline_pages()unguarded.Clamp the offset to the length of the buffer being carved so the tail length cannot underflow.
Quoted 6 lines
Assisted-by Bynario AISigned-off-by Paula Moutafian <[email protected]>---
Note: the defect is reproduced 2/2 on an unmodified v7.2-rc7 arm64 KASAN kernel; the patched kernel has not been built or booted. A reproducer exists and can be shared privately on request.Question: Am I understanding you correctly that you have a reproducer, but haven't tested or even compiled the code to verify that it works?
Thanks,
AnnaQuoted 27 lines
No Fixes: tag: the unbounded carve is original to
xdr_inline_pages()(unchanged since the initial git import) andunx_validate()has written the shared rpc_auth's slack from the reply verifier since at least v2.6.32, so there is no commit that introduced this.net/sunrpc/xdr.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)net/sunrpc/xdr.c +3
-0@@ -409,6 +409,9 @@ xdr_inline_pages(struct xdr_buf *xdr, unsigned int offset,char *buf = (char *)head->iov_base;unsigned int buflen = head->iov_len; +if (offset > buflen) + offset = buflen; + head->iov_len = offset; xdr->pages = pages;base-commit:
a4ff2be345d0abc943da8dd8da98151843b750dc--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)