keys: Fix key_user use-after-free during ownership changes
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 keys: Fix key_user use-after-free during ownership changes
keyctl_chown_key() replaces key->user while holding key->sem and drops the old key_user reference after releasing the semaphore. The /proc/keys iterators and find_keyring_by_name() instead dereference key->user while holding unrelated locks.
This allows the following interleaving:
CPU 0 (/proc/keys) CPU 1 (KEYCTL_CHOWN)
load old key->user
replace key->user
key_user_put(old)
kfree(old) read old->uid
Serialize the namespace-mapping reads and the pointer replacement with key_user_lock. This lock already protects final key_user removal, so the old object cannot be freed while its uid is being read. Keep reading the quota-owner UID rather than key->uid because those values can legitimately differ for thread keyrings.
--- security/keys/internal.h | 10 ++++++++++ security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 ++ security/keys/keyring.c | 2 +- security/keys/proc.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/keys/internal.h +10 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,16 @@ extern struct key_user root_key_user;extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup (kuid_t uid);extern void key_user_put (struct key_user *user); +static inline kuid_t key_user_uid (const struct key *key) +{ +kuid_t uid; + +spin_lock (&key_user_lock); + uid = key->user->uid; +spin_unlock (&key_user_lock); +return uid; +} +/* * Key quota limits. * - root has its own separate limits to everyone else
security/keys/keyctl.c +2 -0
@@ -1036,8 +1036,10 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)atomic_inc (&newowner->nikeys); } +spin_lock (&key_user_lock); zapowner = key->user; key->user = newowner; +spin_unlock (&key_user_lock); key->uid = uid; }
security/keys/keyring.c +1 -1
@@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring)* grants Search permission and that hasn't been revoked */ list_for_each_entry (keyring, &ns->keyring_name_list, name_link) { -if (!kuid_has_mapping (ns, keyring->user->uid)) +if (!kuid_has_mapping (ns,key_user_uid (keyring)))continue ;if (test_bit (KEY_FLAG_REVOKED , &keyring->flags))
security/keys/proc.c +2 -2
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n) n =rb_next (n);while (n) { struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node); -if (kuid_has_mapping (user_ns, key->user->uid)) +if (kuid_has_mapping (user_ns,key_user_uid (key)))break ; n =rb_next (n); }
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id)return NULL ;for (;;) { -if (kuid_has_mapping (user_ns, minkey->user->uid)) +if (kuid_has_mapping (user_ns,key_user_uid (minkey)))return minkey; n =rb_next (&minkey->serial_node);if (!n)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 102 lines · Chengfeng Ye
keyctl_chown_key()replaceskey->userwhile holdingkey->semand drops the oldkey_userreference after releasing the semaphore. The/proc/keysiterators andfind_keyring_by_name()instead dereferencekey->userwhile holding unrelated locks.This allows the following interleaving:
CPU 0 (
/proc/keys) CPU 1 (KEYCTL_CHOWN)
load oldkey->userreplace key->user key_user_put(old) kfree(old)read
old->uidSerialize the namespace-mapping reads and the pointer replacement with
key_user_lock. This lock already protects finalkey_userremoval, so the old object cannot be freed while its uid is being read. Keep reading the quota-owner UID rather thankey->uidbecause those values can legitimately differ for thread keyrings.Signed-off-by Chengfeng Ye <[email protected]>--- security/keys/internal.h | 10 ++++++++++ security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 ++ security/keys/keyring.c | 2 +- security/keys/proc.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)security/keys/internal.h +10
-0@@ -70,6 +70,16 @@ extern struct key_user root_key_user;extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup (kuid_t uid);extern void key_user_put (struct key_user *user); +static inline kuid_t key_user_uid (const struct key *key) +{ +kuid_t uid; + +spin_lock (&key_user_lock); + uid = key->user->uid; +spin_unlock (&key_user_lock); +return uid; +} +/* * Key quota limits. * - root has its own separate limits to everyone else security/keys/keyctl.c +2
-0@@ -1036,8 +1036,10 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)atomic_inc (&newowner->nikeys); } +spin_lock (&key_user_lock); zapowner = key->user; key->user = newowner; +spin_unlock (&key_user_lock); key->uid = uid; }security/keys/keyring.c +1
-1@@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring)* grants Search permission and that hasn't been revoked */ list_for_each_entry (keyring, &ns->keyring_name_list, name_link) { -if (!kuid_has_mapping (ns, keyring->user->uid)) +if (!kuid_has_mapping (ns,key_user_uid (keyring)))continue ;if (test_bit (KEY_FLAG_REVOKED , &keyring->flags))security/keys/proc.c +2
-2@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n) n =rb_next (n);while (n) { struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node); -if (kuid_has_mapping (user_ns, key->user->uid)) +if (kuid_has_mapping (user_ns,key_user_uid (key)))break ; n =rb_next (n); }@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id)return NULL ;for (;;) { -if (kuid_has_mapping (user_ns, minkey->user->uid)) +if (kuid_has_mapping (user_ns,key_user_uid (minkey)))return minkey; n =rb_next (&minkey->serial_node);if (!n)Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
I hope you don't mind that I sanity check a bit:
git grep "user->uid" security/keys
security/keys/internal.h: uid = key->user->uid; security/keys/key.c: if (uid_lt(uid, user->uid)) security/keys/key.c: else if (uid_gt(uid, user->uid)) security/keys/key.c: unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(key->user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? security/keys/proc.c: if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, user->uid)) security/keys/proc.c: unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? security/keys/proc.c: unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? security/keys/proc.c: from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), user->uid), security/keys/process_keys.c: uid_t uid = from_kuid(user_ns, cred->user->uid); security/keys/process_keys.c: uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, cred->user->uid, INVALID_GID, security/keys/process_keys.c: session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, cred->user->uid, INVALID_GID, security/keys/process_keys.c: cred->user->uid));
Have you audited these and reflected against your current patch?
BR, Jarkko
Quoted 17 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
I hope you don't mind that I sanity check a bit:
git grep "
user->uid"security/keyssecurity/keys/internal.h: uid = key->user->uid; security/keys/key.c: if (uid_lt(uid, user->uid)) security/keys/key.c: else if (uid_gt(uid, user->uid)) security/keys/key.c: unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(key->user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? security/keys/proc.c: if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, user->uid)) security/keys/proc.c: unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? security/keys/proc.c: unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? security/keys/proc.c: from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), user->uid), security/keys/process_keys.c: uid_t uid = from_kuid(user_ns, cred->user->uid); security/keys/process_keys.c: uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, cred->user->uid, INVALID_GID, security/keys/process_keys.c: session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, cred->user->uid, INVALID_GID, security/keys/process_keys.c: cred->user->uid));
Quoted 4 lines
Have you audited these and reflected against your current patch?
BR, Jarkko
Right, there are more sites that take and dereference key->user but not serialized to prevent the UAF. I am going to send a v2 to protect other sites affected by the data race.
Best regards,
Chengfeng