KVM: x86/xen: Fix data race on poll event channel
Subsystems (5)
PATCH 1/1 KVM: x86/xen: Fix data race on poll event channel
Use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() for runtime accesses to poll_evtchn. This marks the intentionally concurrent scalar accesses and prevents the compiler from splitting, merging, or inventing accesses.
kvm_xen_schedop_poll() publishes the single port, or -1 for multiple ports, before setting poll_mask and halting the vCPU. Event delivery can call kvm_xen_check_poller() on another CPU while the vCPU thread publishes that value or resets the field to zero after returning from kvm_vcpu_halt():
vCPU thread event delivery thread
----------- ---------------------
poll_evtchn = port
set_bit(poll_mask)
kvm_vcpu_halt()
poll_evtchn = READ
poll_evtchn = 0
clear_bit(poll_mask)
The plain read and writes therefore race. KCSAN reported:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in kvm_xen_hypercall / kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast
read to 0xffff888112f55af0 of 4 bytes by task 98:
kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast+0x204/0x7c0 kvm_xen_hvm_evtchn_send+0xab/0x100 kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0xb31/0xd90 kvm_vm_ioctl+0xf42/0x16c0
write to 0xffff888112f55af0 of 4 bytes by task 96:
kvm_xen_hypercall+0xd8d/0xf50 kvm_emulate_hypercall+0x157/0x1d0 vmx_handle_exit+0x40f/0xae0 vcpu_run+0x137f/0x27d0 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5a5/0x970
The field is an aligned int on x86. Access annotations preserve the existing matching, callback, and poll-mask control flow while making the single-copy access requirement explicit.
--- arch/x86/kvm/xen.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/xen.c +4 -4
@@ -1536,9 +1536,9 @@ static bool kvm_xen_schedop_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool longmode, }if (sched_poll.nr_ports ==1 ) - vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn = port; +WRITE_ONCE (vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn, port);else - vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn =-1 ; +WRITE_ONCE (vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn,-1 );set_bit (vcpu->vcpu_idx, vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.poll_mask);
@@ -1557,7 +1557,7 @@ static bool kvm_xen_schedop_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool longmode,kvm_set_mp_state (vcpu,KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE ); } - vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn =0 ; +WRITE_ONCE (vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn,0 ); *r =0 ; out:/* Really, this is only needed in case of timeout */
@@ -1773,7 +1773,7 @@ int kvm_xen_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static void kvm_xen_check_poller (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int port) { -int poll_evtchn = vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn; +int poll_evtchn =READ_ONCE (vcpu->arch.xen.poll_evtchn);if ((poll_evtchn == port || poll_evtchn ==-1 ) &&test_and_clear_bit (vcpu->vcpu_idx, vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.poll_mask)) {
base-commit: 388b607d107c07aaade04c7f22f344cab6bdccd3
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
David Woodhouse
maintainerQuoted 36 lines · Chengfeng Ye
Use
READ_ONCE()andWRITE_ONCE()for runtime accesses topoll_evtchn. This marks the intentionally concurrent scalar accesses and prevents the compiler from splitting, merging, or inventing accesses.
kvm_xen_schedop_poll()publishes the single port, or -1 for multiple ports, before settingpoll_maskand halting the vCPU. Event delivery can callkvm_xen_check_poller()on another CPU while the vCPU thread publishes that value or resets the field to zero after returning fromkvm_vcpu_halt():vCPU thread event delivery thread ----------- ---------------------
poll_evtchn= port
set_bit(poll_mask)
kvm_vcpu_halt()
poll_evtchn= READpoll_evtchn= 0
clear_bit(poll_mask)The plain read and writes therefore race. KCSAN reported:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in kvm_xen_hypercall / kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fastread to
0xffff888112f55af0of 4 bytes by task 98:kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast+0x204/0x7c0 kvm_xen_hvm_evtchn_send+0xab/0x100 kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0xb31/0xd90 kvm_vm_ioctl+0xf42/0x16c0write to
0xffff888112f55af0of 4 bytes by task 96:kvm_xen_hypercall+0xd8d/0xf50 kvm_emulate_hypercall+0x157/0x1d0 vmx_handle_exit+0x40f/0xae0 vcpu_run+0x137f/0x27d0 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5a5/0x970
Quoted 7 lines
The field is an aligned int on x86. Access annotations preserve the existing matching, callback, and poll-mask control flow while making the single-copy access requirement explicit.
Fixes 1a65105a5aba ("KVM: x86/xen: handle PV spinlocks slowpath")Signed-off-by Chengfeng Ye <[email protected]>
LGTM, thanks. I don't think we need Cc:stable for a KCSAN splat, and possibly not even the Fixes: tag. I'll roll it into my series at
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
now sitting at
https://git.infradead.org/?p=users/dwmw2/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/xen-v3