bpf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 bpf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show
Iterating a sk_storage map is two stages:bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_find_next()
returns a selem, then __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show() uses that selem. __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show() re-reads selem->local_storage via rcu_dereference() with no NULL check. A concurrent close() can run bpf_selem_unlink_nofail() in between and set that field to NULL, causing a NULL dereference of sk_storage->owner.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000011 net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c:809 __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show() bpf_seq_read+0x366/0x1120 vfs_read+0x174/0xa50 ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0
Return if the re-read yields NULL.
--- net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +2 -0
@@ -806,6 +806,8 @@ static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, ctx.map = info->map;if (selem) { sk_storage =rcu_dereference (selem->local_storage); +if (!sk_storage) +return 0 ; ctx.sk = sk_storage->owner; ctx.value =SDATA (selem)->data; }
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Socket local storage elements are removed from the RCU-protected BPF map inside the socket's destruction path (__sk_destruct), violating RCU-001 rules and causing a use-after-free of the socket because the socket can be freed while a BPF iterator is still using it.
- [High] bpf_selem_unlink_nofail() concurrently sets SDATA(selem)->smap and selem->local_storage to NULL, causing guaranteed NULL pointer dereferences in concurrent bpf_selem_unlink() and bpf_selem_unlink_map() paths.
--
commit cabffb2f3787054c5c6ba2a413eaf5dc639ba23d
Author: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <[email protected]>
bpf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show
This commit addresses a NULL pointer dereference in __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show() during concurrent socket closure. It adds a NULL check after re-reading selem->local_storage to prevent dereferencing a cleared pointer.
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, · line 811
Quoted 11 lines
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +2
-0@@ -806,6 +806,8 @@ static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, ctx.map = info->map;if (selem) { sk_storage =rcu_dereference (selem->local_storage); +if (!sk_storage) +return 0 ; ctx.sk = sk_storage->owner;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this patch fully address the underlying TOCTOU race?
If a socket without SOCK_RCU_FREE (e.g., AF_UNIX) is closed, __sk_destruct() in net/core/sock.c calls bpf_sk_storage_free(), which unlinks the storage from the BPF map.
Couldn't a concurrent BPF iterator in __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show() operating under rcu_read_lock() find the storage element before it is unlinked, and read ctx.sk = sk_storage->owner? The socket is then synchronously freed by __sk_destruct() without waiting for an RCU grace period, leaving the iterator to pass a dangling pointer to the BPF program via bpf_iter_run_prog(prog, &ctx).
This appears to violate the remove-before-reclaim ordering (RCU-001) since the socket is removed from the RCU-protected BPF map inside the socket's destruction path.
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but might this only fix a downstream symptom in the iterator path while leaving other concurrent map operations vulnerable?
When a socket goes away, bpf_selem_unlink_nofail() in kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c sets SDATA(selem)->smap to NULL without holding local_storage->lock.
If a concurrent map deletion calls bpf_selem_unlink(), it acquires local_storage->lock first, sees selem->snode is still hashed, and calls bpf_selem_unlink_map(). Could bpf_selem_unlink_map() then unconditionally dereference the now-NULL SDATA(selem)->smap, crashing inside select_bucket()?
kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c:bpf_selem_unlink_map() {
...
smap = rcu_dereference_check(SDATA(selem)->smap,
bpf_rcu_lock_held());
b = select_bucket(smap, local_storage);
...
}Similarly, it looks like bpf_selem_unlink() could use a potentially NULL local_storage for lock acquisition:
kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c:bpf_selem_unlink() {
...
local_storage = rcu_dereference_check(selem->local_storage,
bpf_rcu_lock_held());
err = raw_res_spin_lock_irqsave(&local_storage->lock, flags);
...
}Quoted 3 lines
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +0
-0ctx.value =SDATA (selem)->data; }ret =
bpf_iter_run_prog(prog, &ctx);
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
[email protected]
AI reviewShould this return SEQ_SKIP instead of 0?
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, · line 810
Quoted 10 lines
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +2
-0@@ -806,6 +806,8 @@ static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, ctx.map = info->map;if (selem) { sk_storage =rcu_dereference (selem->local_storage); +if (!sk_storage) +return 0 ;
^
Should this return SEQ_SKIP instead of 0?
Returning 0 tells bpf_seq_read() that the object was shown, but it was actually skipped. In kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c bpf_seq_read():
err = seq->op->show(seq, p);
if (err > 0) {
/* object is skipped, decrease seq_num, so next
* valid object can reuse the same seq_num.
*/
bpf_iter_dec_seq_num(seq);
seq->count = offs;
} else if (err < 0 || seq_has_overflowed(seq)) {With return 0, bpf_iter_dec_seq_num() is not called, so the skipped element consumes a seq_num that no BPF program invocation ever observes.
If the skipped element is the first one returned by bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_start(), seq_num 0 is consumed with no program run, the next valid element is shown with ctx->meta->seq_num == 1, and iterator programs that emit a header on ctx->meta->seq_num == 0 silently lose their header. Examples that would break:
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_bpf_hash_map.c:
if (ctx->meta->seq_num == 0) BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, " id refcnt ...\n");
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_tcp4.c:
if (ctx->meta->seq_num == 0) BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, " sl local_address ...\n");
For later elements the observable effect is a gap in the seq_num sequence.
The other socket iterators handle this exact situation (object found stale after handed to ->show()) by returning SEQ_SKIP:
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c bpf_iter_tcp_seq_show():
if (unlikely(sk_unhashed(sk))) {
ret = SEQ_SKIP;
goto unlock;
}net/ipv4/udp.c bpf_iter_udp_seq_show():
if (unlikely(sk_unhashed(sk))) {
ret = SEQ_SKIP;
goto unlock;
}net/unix/af_unix.c bpf_iter_unix_seq_show():
ret = SEQ_SKIP;
Returning SEQ_SKIP is safe for the first object too: seq_num is u64 and bpf_iter_dec_seq_num()/bpf_iter_inc_seq_num() in kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c wrap back to 0 before the next ->show().
---
A subsystem pattern flags the following as potentially concerning:
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, · line 812
Quoted 5 lines
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +2
-0sk_storage =rcu_dereference (selem->local_storage); +if (!sk_storage) +return 0 ; ctx.sk = sk_storage->owner; ctx.value =SDATA (selem)->data;
The fix adds a single check-based abort path for a race that has no exclusion mechanism, and the instructions that follow the abort point still consume the contested selem.
Looking at bpf_selem_unlink_nofail() in kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c, it tears the selem down in this order:
1. b->lock: hlist_del_init_rcu(&selem->map_node); bpf_obj_free_fields(smap->map.record, SDATA(selem)->data);
2. RCU_INIT_POINTER(SDATA(selem)->smap, NULL);
3. local_storage->lock: hlist_del_init_rcu(&selem->snode);
4. RCU_INIT_POINTER(selem->local_storage, NULL); <- new check sees this
A concurrent iterator that re-reads selem->local_storage between steps 1 and 4 still sees a non-NULL pointer and proceeds to:
ctx.sk = sk_storage->owner; /* owner is deliberately NOT cleared in the destroy path: * "Okay to skip clearing owner_storage and storage->owner * in destroy() since the owner is going away" - so ctx.sk * can be a sock already inside __sk_destruct() */ ctx.value = SDATA(selem)->data; /* bpf_obj_free_fields() has already released the value's * special fields (kptr/timer/etc.) at step 1 */
So the NULL check closes the specific general-protection fault in the report (sk_storage == NULL, offset 0x88 == offsetof(struct bpf_local_storage, owner), matching the KASAN address 0xdffffc0000000011) but does not make the iteration race-safe; it narrows the window rather than closing it.
Worth confirming with the local-storage maintainers whether the iterator needs to observe selem->state / SDATA(selem)->smap (or take the same exclusion bpf_selem_unlink_nofail uses) rather than only local_storage?
The residual window is not introduced by this patch - the same two lines executed unconditionally before it, so relative to the parent commit the change is a strict improvement. Practical impact of the residual window is also limited: ctx.sk is registered PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL so programs must NULL-check it, and ctx.value is PTR_TO_BUF, so a BPF program cannot dereference a released kptr read out of it without a kfunc.
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/33042447773
Quoted 33 lines · On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 10:38 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Socket local storage elements are removed from the RCU-protected BPF map inside the socket's destruction path (__sk_destruct), violating RCU-001 rules and causing a use-after-free of the socket because the socket can be freed while a BPF iterator is still using it.
- [High]bpf_selem_unlink_nofail()concurrently setsSDATA(selem)->smapandselem->local_storageto NULL, causing guaranteed NULL pointer dereferences in concurrentbpf_selem_unlink()andbpf_selem_unlink_map()paths.
--commit
cabffb2f3787054c5c6ba2a413eaf5dc639ba23d
Author: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <[email protected]>
bpf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in__bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_showThis commit addresses a NULL pointer dereference in
__bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show()during concurrent socket closure. It adds a NULL check after re-readingselem->local_storageto prevent dereferencing a cleared pointer.net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, · line 811
Quoted 11 lines
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +2
-0@@ -806,6 +806,8 @@ static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, ctx.map = info->map;if (selem) { sk_storage =rcu_dereference (selem->local_storage); +if (!sk_storage) +return 0 ; ctx.sk = sk_storage->owner;[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this patch fully address the underlying TOCTOU race?
Quoted 3 lines
If a socket without
SOCK_RCU_FREE(e.g.,AF_UNIX) is closed,__sk_destruct()innet/core/sock.ccallsbpf_sk_storage_free(), which unlinks the storage from the BPF map.
It looks like a valid issue that should be addressed in another patch. Probably need to defer free in sk_destruct if local storage is used:
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
if (rcu_access_pointer(sk->sk_bpf_storage))
use_call_rcu = true;#endif
Quoted 21 lines
Couldn't a concurrent BPF iterator in
__bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show()operating underrcu_read_lock()find the storage element before it is unlinked, and read ctx.sk =sk_storage->owner? The socket is then synchronously freed by__sk_destruct()without waiting for an RCU grace period, leaving the iterator to pass a dangling pointer to the BPF program viabpf_iter_run_prog(prog, &ctx).This appears to violate the remove-before-reclaim ordering (RCU-001) since the socket is removed from the RCU-protected BPF map inside the socket's destruction path.
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but might this only fix a downstream symptom in the iterator path while leaving other concurrent map operations vulnerable?When a socket goes away,
bpf_selem_unlink_nofail()inkernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.csets SDATA(selem)->smap to NULL without holdinglocal_storage->lock.
Quoted 5 lines
If a concurrent map deletion calls
bpf_selem_unlink(), it acquireslocal_storage->lockfirst, seesselem->snodeis still hashed, and callsbpf_selem_unlink_map(). Couldbpf_selem_unlink_map()then unconditionally dereference the now-NULL SDATA(selem)->smap, crashing insideselect_bucket()?
Callers of bpf_selem_unlink_nofail() (i.e., map_free and destroy) do not race with bpf_selem_unlink() so this should be a false positive.
Quoted 27 lines
kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c:bpf_selem_unlink_map() { ... smap = rcu_dereference_check(SDATA(selem)->smap, bpf_rcu_lock_held()); b = select_bucket(smap, local_storage); ... }Similarly, it looks like
bpf_selem_unlink()could use a potentially NULLlocal_storagefor lock acquisition:kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c:bpf_selem_unlink() { ... local_storage = rcu_dereference_check(selem->local_storage, bpf_rcu_lock_held()); err = raw_res_spin_lock_irqsave(&local_storage->lock, flags); ... }Quoted 3 lines
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +0
-0ctx.value =SDATA (selem)->data; }ret = bpf_iter_run_prog(prog, &ctx);--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Quoted 32 lines · Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)
Iterating a
sk_storagemap is two stages:bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_find_next()
returns a selem, then__bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show()uses that selem.__bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show()re-readsselem->local_storageviarcu_dereference()with no NULL check. A concurrentclose()can runbpf_selem_unlink_nofail()in between and set that field to NULL, causing a NULL dereference ofsk_storage->owner.Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000011 net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c:809 __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show() bpf_seq_read+0x366/0x1120 vfs_read+0x174/0xa50 ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0Return if the re-read yields NULL.
Fixes 5d800f87d0a5 ("bpf: Support lockless unlink when freeing map or local storage")Reported-by Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <[email protected]>Assisted-by Copilot (Grok 4.6)--- net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +0
-0
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, · line 810
Quoted 5 lines
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +2
-0@@ -806,6 +806,8 @@ static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, ctx.map = info->map;if (selem) { sk_storage =rcu_dereference (selem->local_storage); +if (!sk_storage) +return 0 ;
As pointed out by CI bot, should this be SEQ_SKIP?
On a seperate note, __cgroup_iter_seq_show() also seem to return the wrong value.
Quoted 5 lines
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +0
-1ctx.sk = sk_storage->owner; ctx.value =SDATA (selem)->data; } --2.55.0
Hi Cen Zhang,
Quoted 8 lines · Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs)
Iterating a
sk_storagemap is two stages:bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_find_next()
returns a selem, then__bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show()uses that selem.__bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show()re-readsselem->local_storageviarcu_dereference()with no NULL check. A concurrentclose()can runbpf_selem_unlink_nofail()in between and set that field to NULL, causing a NULL dereference ofsk_storage->owner.
Quoted 8 lines
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000011 net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c:809 __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show() bpf_seq_read+0x366/0x1120 vfs_read+0x174/0xa50 ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0Return if the re-read yields NULL.
I also reproduced this issue and came across your patch while preparing to submit a fix. Do you have any plans to send a v2?
Here is the crash log from my reproducer:
[ 756.754624] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfff800000000011 [ 756.754631] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000088-0x000000000000008f] [ 756.754635] Mem abort info: [ 756.754638] ESR = 0x0000000096000006 [ 756.754641] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 756.754645] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 756.754649] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 756.754651] FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault [ 756.754655] Data abort info: [ 756.754657] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 756.754660] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 756.754664] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0 [ 756.754667] [dfff800000000011] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 756.754673] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP [ 756.815224] Modules linked in: vfat fat sr_mod cdrom virtio_scsi virtio_console cfg80211 rfkill binfmt_misc sch_fq_codel virtio_net net_failover failover fuse vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vsock virtio_rng [ 756.821030] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 914 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 7.3.0-rc1+ #33 PREEMPTLAZY [ 756.823909] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 756.824703] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 756.826443] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 756.828224] pc : __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show+0x158/0x1d8 [ 756.830842] lr : __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show+0x148/0x1d8 [ 756.832300] sp : ffff8000a32afa30 [ 756.833144] x29: ffff8000a32afa30 x28: ffff0000ceb5ec80 x27: ffff0000ceb5eca8 [ 756.834956] x26: ffff0000d516d400 x25: ffffa9f37d85e3a0 x24: ffff8000a32afad0 [ 756.836764] x23: 1ffff00014655f4e x22: ffff8000a3300000 x21: ffff0000d516d400 [ 756.838716] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffa9f37d85e080 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 756.840556] x17: 65642d6572702030 x16: 3030303033336130 x15: 303038666666663d [ 756.842400] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: ffff700014655eef [ 756.844210] x11: 1ffff00014655eee x10: ffff700014655eee x9 : ffffa9f37a9be66c [ 756.846018] x8 : 00008fffeb9aa112 x7 : ffff8000a32af777 x6 : 0000000000000001 [ 756.847825] x5 : ffff8000a32af770 x4 : ffff700014655eef x3 : ffffa9f37a9be380 [ 756.849630] x2 : 0000000000000011 x1 : dfff800000000000 x0 : 0000000000000088 [ 756.851437] Call trace: [ 756.852086] __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show+0x158/0x1d8 (P) [ 756.853498] bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show+0x18/0x30 [ 756.854715] bpf_seq_read+0x2ec/0xd28 [ 756.855707] vfs_read+0x188/0x7b0 [ 756.856577] ksys_read+0xe4/0x1b8 [ 756.857424] __arm64_sys_read+0x78/0xb0 [ 756.858402] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x260 [ 756.859372] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x240 [ 756.860585] do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x70 [ 756.861430] el0_svc+0x54/0x118 [ 756.862287] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8 [ 756.863352] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 [ 756.864288] Code: 91022280 d2d00001 f2fbffe1 d343fc02 (38e16841) [ 756.865828] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Quoted 1 line
Fixes 5d800f87d0a5 ("bpf: Support lockless unlink when freeing map or local storage")
Would 0be08389c7f2 be a more accurate Fixes tag?
5d800f87d0a5 only introduced bpf_selem_unlink_nofail(), while 0be08389c7f2 switched the destruction path to use it.
Quoted 13 lines
Reported-by Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <[email protected]>Assisted-by Copilot (Grok 4.6)--- net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +0
-0
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, · line 810
Quoted 5 lines
net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +2
-0@@ -806,6 +806,8 @@ static int __bpf_sk_storage_map_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, ctx.map = info->map;if (selem) { sk_storage =rcu_dereference (selem->local_storage); +if (!sk_storage) +return 0 ;
Also, I agree that returning SEQ_SKIP would be appropriate here.
Thanks,
Xuanqiang
Hi Amery and Xuanqiang,
Sorry for the delayed response. I somehow missed this thread.
For clarity, I am using my new Microsoft-approved email address, [email protected], for this reply and v2.
Thanks for all the reviews. I'll send v2 shortly with SEQ_SKIP as the return value and the suggested Fixes tag.
Thanks,
Cen