open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
v13 cover open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
v12->v13:
- remove unrelated comments
- remove SAFE_WAITPID
Wei Gao (3):
lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path
lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
include/tst_uid.h | 14 +++ lib/tst_uid.c | 30 ++++- runtest/syscalls | 1 + testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 + testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
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PATCH v13 1/3 lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path
tst_get_free_gid_() prints the found GID when it succeeds, but it incorrectly includes TERRNO in tst_res_(). This prints whatever value happens to be in errno (often 0 or a stale value) which is confusing in a success path.
Remove the spurious TERRNO flag from the tst_res_() success message.
--- lib/tst_uid.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/tst_uid.c +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ gid_t tst_get_free_gid_(const char *file, const int lineno, gid_t skip)continue ;if (errno ==0 || errno ==ENOENT || errno ==ESRCH ) { -tst_res_ (file, lineno,TINFO |TERRNO , +tst_res_ (file, lineno,TINFO ,"Found unused GID %d" , (int )ret);return ret; }
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Re: [LTP] lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path
Hi Wei,
Quoted 1 line · Wei Gao
lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO fromtst_get_free_gidsuccess path
Verdict - Reviewed
---
Note:
The agent can sometimes produce false positives although often its findings are genuine. If you find issues with the review, please comment this email or ignore the suggestions.
Regards,
LTP AI Reviewer
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Re: [LTP] [PATCH v13 1/3] lib/tst_uid: Remove spurious TERRNO from tst_get_free_gid success path
In reply to Wei Gao via ltp--
Andrea Cervesato
SUSE QE Automation Engineer Linux
[email protected]
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PATCH v13 2/3 lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
In reply to Wei Gao via ltpAdd tst_get_free_uid() to dynamically find unused UIDs for tests.
Some tests need a completely unassigned, unused UID. This is used by open16 to verify restricted O_CREAT in sticky directories by running as a sandboxed user with no file ownership or privileges.
--- include/tst_uid.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ lib/tst_uid.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
include/tst_uid.h +14 -0
@@ -7,6 +7,20 @@#include <sys/types.h> +uid_t tst_get_free_uid_ (const char *file,const int lineno,uid_t skip); + +/** +* tst_get_free_uid() - Find a UID not assigned to any user. +* @skip: UID value to skip (pass 0 to skip none). +* +* Scans the password database for the first unused UID starting +* from 1, skipping @skip. Calls tst_brk(TBROK) if no free UID +* is found or a lookup error occurs. +* +* Return: An unused uid_t value. +*/ +#define tst_get_free_uid (skip) tst_get_free_uid_(__FILE__, __LINE__, (skip)) +/* * Find unassigned gid. The skip argument can be used to ignore e.g. the main * group of a specific user in case it's not listed in the group file. If you
lib/tst_uid.c +28 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@#include <sys/types.h> #include <grp.h> +#include <pwd.h> #include <errno.h> #define TST_NO_DEFAULT_MAIN
@@ -12,6 +13,33 @@#include "tst_uid.h" #define MAX_GID 32767 +#define MAX_UID 32767 + +uid_t tst_get_free_uid_ (const char *file,const int lineno,uid_t skip) +{ +uid_t ret; + +for (ret =1 ; ret <MAX_UID ; ret++) { +if (ret == skip) +continue ; + + errno =0 ; +if (getpwuid (ret)) +continue ; + +if (errno ==0 || errno ==ENOENT || errno ==ESRCH ) { +tst_res_ (file, lineno,TINFO , +"Found unused UID %d" , (int )ret); +return ret; + } + +tst_brk_ (file, lineno,TBROK |TERRNO ,"User ID lookup failed" ); +return (uid_t)-1 ; + } + +tst_brk_ (file, lineno,TBROK ,"No free user ID found" ); +return (uid_t)-1 ; +}gid_t tst_get_free_gid_ (const char *file,const int lineno,gid_t skip) {
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Re: [LTP] [PATCH v13 2/3] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
--
Andrea Cervesato
SUSE QE Automation Engineer Linux
[email protected]
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PATCH v13 3/3 open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
In reply to Wei Gao via ltpAdd LTP coverage for kernel commit 30aba6656f61 (Linux 4.19), which introduced protection against spoofing attacks via O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files in world-writable or group-writable sticky directories.
This commit adds test cases to verify these security restrictions (Level 1 and Level 2 protections) for opening FIFOs and regular files in world-writable or group-writable sticky directories when the file is not owned by the opener.
--- runtest/syscalls | 1 + testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 + testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 135 insertions(+) create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
runtest/syscalls +1 -0
@@ -1008,6 +1008,7 @@ open12 open12 open13 open13 open14 open14 open15 open15 +open16 open16 openat01 openat01 openat02 openat02
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ /open13 /open14 /open15 +/open16
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +133 -0
133 lines not on this page · raw message
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--
Andrea Cervesato
SUSE QE Automation Engineer Linux
[email protected]
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Hi Wei,
Quoted 9 lines
Add LTP coverage for kernel commit
30aba6656f61(Linux 4.19), which introduced protection against spoofing attacks viaO_CREATof FIFOs and regular files in world-writable or group-writable sticky directories.This commit adds test cases to verify these security restrictions (Level 1 and Level 2 protections) for opening FIFOs and regular files in world-writable or group-writable sticky directories when the file is not owned by the opener.
I was thinking what level you're talking about.
...
Quoted 8 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +2
-0@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/*
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c line 12
Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +10
-0+* Copyright (c) 2026 Wei Gao <[email protected]> +*/ + +/*\ +* Verify restricted opening (:manpage:`open(2)` and :manpage:`openat(2)`) of +* FIFOs and regular files in sticky directories. This test covers the positive +* case where access is allowed when protection is disabled (level 0), and the +* negative cases where access is disallowed (EACCES) in world-writable (level +* 1) or group-writable (level 2) sticky directories when the file is not owned +* by the opener.
Even here it's not clear. Could you just mention that these are /proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos values? man proc_sys_fs(5) which document it does not talk about levels at all.
Quoted 5 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +5
-0+* +* This test requires root to modify /proc/sys/fs/protected_* sysctls and +* to manage file ownership and permissions in sticky directories. +*/ +
...
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
Quoted 2 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +2
-0+#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular" +#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
Could you please add these 2 into include/tst_path_defs.h?
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
Quoted 8 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +8
-0+#define TEST_FIFO_PATH DIR "/" TEST_FIFO + +static int dir_fd =-1 ; +static uid_t uid1, uid2; +static gid_t gid1; + +static struct tcase { + char *level;
How about define level as int?
I would even not define it and use unsigned int n in verify_open() since the values are the same, but up to you.
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
Quoted 9 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +9
-0+int exp_errno; +uid_t owner_uid; +int use_nobody_gid; +mode_t dir_mode; +} tcases[] = { + {"0", 0, 0, 0, 0777 | S_ISVTX}, + {"1", EACCES, 0, 0, 0777 | S_ISVTX}, + {"2", EACCES, -1, 1, 0030 | S_ISVTX}, +};
I usually prefer using designated initializers to
1) not having to specify 0
2)
Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +10
-0+ +static void verify_open (unsigned int n) +{ +struct tcase *tc = &tcases[n]; +pid_t pid; + +SAFE_FILE_PRINTF (PROTECTED_REGULAR ,"%s" , tc->level); +SAFE_FILE_PRINTF (PROTECTED_FIFOS ,"%s" , tc->level); + +if (tc->owner_uid != (uid_t)-1 || tc->use_nobody_gid) {
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +10
-0+gid_t gid = tc->use_nobody_gid ? gid1 :0 ; + +SAFE_CHOWN (DIR , tc->owner_uid, gid); + } + +if (tc->dir_mode) +SAFE_CHMOD (DIR , tc->dir_mode); + + pid =SAFE_FORK (); +if (!pid) {
How about:
1) using SAFE_FORK() directly
2) return for parent to save indent (readability)
if (SAFE_FORK()) return; SAFE_SETGID(gid1); SAFE_SETUID(uid2); ...
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +10
-0+SAFE_SETGID (gid1); +SAFE_SETUID (uid2); + +if (tc->exp_errno) { +TST_EXP_FAIL2 (openat (dir_fd,TEST_FILE ,O_RDWR |O_CREAT ,0777 ), + tc->exp_errno,"openat %s (Level %s)" ,TEST_FILE , tc->level); +TST_EXP_FAIL2 (open (TEST_FIFO_PATH ,O_RDWR |O_CREAT ,0777 ), + tc->exp_errno,"open %s (Level %s)" ,TEST_FIFO , tc->level); + }else { +int fd =TST_EXP_FD (openat (dir_fd,TEST_FILE ,O_CREAT |O_RDWR ,0777 ));
nit: we don't have to define fd when it's not used, we can use TST_RET.
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
Quoted 8 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +8
-0+ +if (TST_PASS ) +SAFE_CLOSE (fd); + + fd =TST_EXP_FD (open (TEST_FIFO_PATH ,O_RDWR |O_CREAT ,0777 )); +if (TST_PASS ) +SAFE_CLOSE (fd); + }
This else branch use the same code, how about to use TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL()?
TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), tc->exp_errno, "openat %s (Level %s)", TEST_FILE, tc->level); if (TST_RET != -1) SAFE_CLOSE(TST_RET); TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), tc->exp_errno, "open %s (Level %s)", TEST_FIFO, tc->level); if (TST_RET != -1) SAFE_CLOSE(TST_RET);
@Cyril @Li: I always wondered if TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL() should use TST_EXP_FAIL2().
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
Quoted 2 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +2
-0+ +exit (0 );
I guess we need to bother with exit(0) at this point, right?
Quoted 35 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +35
-0+ } +} + +static void setup (void ) +{ +struct passwd *pw; + + pw =SAFE_GETPWNAM ("nobody" ); + uid1 = pw->pw_uid; + gid1 = pw->pw_gid; + uid2 =tst_get_free_uid (uid1); + +umask (0 ); +SAFE_MKDIR (DIR ,0777 |S_ISVTX ); + dir_fd =SAFE_OPEN (DIR ,O_DIRECTORY ); + +int fd =SAFE_OPENAT (dir_fd,TEST_FILE ,O_CREAT |O_RDWR ,0777 ); + +SAFE_CLOSE (fd); +SAFE_MKFIFO (TEST_FIFO_PATH ,0777 ); +SAFE_CHOWN (TEST_FIFO_PATH , uid1, gid1); +SAFE_CHOWN (DIR "/" TEST_FILE , uid1, gid1); +} + +static void cleanup (void ) +{ +if (dir_fd !=-1 ) +SAFE_CLOSE (dir_fd); +} + +static struct tst_test test = { + .setup = setup, + .cleanup = cleanup, + .needs_root =1 , + .tcnt =ARRAY_SIZE (tcases),
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +10
-0+ .test = verify_open, + .needs_tmpdir = 1, + .forks_child = 1, + .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val []) { + {PROTECTED_REGULAR ,NULL ,TST_SR_TCONF }, + {PROTECTED_FIFOS ,NULL ,TST_SR_TCONF }, + {} + }, + .tags = (const struct tst_tag []) { + {"linux-git" ,"30aba6656f61" },
30aba6656f61 notes many CVEs, IMHO we should add them as well:
CVE-2000-1134
CVE-2007-3852
CVE-2008-0525
CVE-2009-0416
CVE-2011-4834
CVE-2015-1838
CVE-2015-7442
CVE-2016-7489testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
Quoted 3 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c new file +3
-0+ {} + } +};
Feel free to speedup with this (still TODO CVE and using int for "level").
Kind regards,
Petr
kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c +12 -21
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ static struct tcase {static void verify_open (unsigned int n) {struct tcase *tc = &tcases[n]; -pid_t pid;SAFE_FILE_PRINTF (PROTECTED_REGULAR ,"%s" , tc->level);SAFE_FILE_PRINTF (PROTECTED_FIFOS ,"%s" , tc->level);
@@ -61,29 +60,21 @@ static void verify_open(unsigned int n)if (tc->dir_mode)SAFE_CHMOD (DIR , tc->dir_mode); - pid =SAFE_FORK (); -if (!pid) { -SAFE_SETGID (gid1); -SAFE_SETUID (uid2); +if (SAFE_FORK ()) +return ; -if (tc->exp_errno) { -TST_EXP_FAIL2 (openat (dir_fd,TEST_FILE ,O_RDWR |O_CREAT ,0777 ), - tc->exp_errno,"openat %s (Level %s)" ,TEST_FILE , tc->level); -TST_EXP_FAIL2 (open (TEST_FIFO_PATH ,O_RDWR |O_CREAT ,0777 ), - tc->exp_errno,"open %s (Level %s)" ,TEST_FIFO , tc->level); - }else { -int fd =TST_EXP_FD (openat (dir_fd,TEST_FILE ,O_CREAT |O_RDWR ,0777 )); +SAFE_SETGID (gid1); +SAFE_SETUID (uid2); -if (TST_PASS ) -SAFE_CLOSE (fd); +TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL (openat (dir_fd,TEST_FILE ,O_RDWR |O_CREAT ,0777 ), + tc->exp_errno,"openat %s (Level %s)" ,TEST_FILE , tc->level); +if (TST_RET !=-1 ) +SAFE_CLOSE (TST_RET ); - fd =TST_EXP_FD (open (TEST_FIFO_PATH ,O_RDWR |O_CREAT ,0777 )); -if (TST_PASS ) -SAFE_CLOSE (fd); - } - -exit (0 ); - } +TST_EXP_FD_OR_FAIL (open (TEST_FIFO_PATH ,O_RDWR |O_CREAT ,0777 ), + tc->exp_errno,"open %s (Level %s)" ,TEST_FIFO , tc->level); +if (TST_RET !=-1 ) +SAFE_CLOSE (TST_RET ); }static void setup (void )
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