keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into struct trusted_key_tpm
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v5 1/1 keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into struct trusted_key_tpm
The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash, policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
Define struct trusted_key_tpm and move the TPM-specific fields there. Store a pointer to it in the private member of struct trusted_key_options.
No functional change intended.
---
Changelog:
v5:
- Rename struct trusted_tpm_options to struct trusted_key_tpm, as suggested by Jarkko.
v4:
- Rebased onto mainline after tpm-buf memory-safe allocation changes were merged
- Resolved the resulting merge conflicts
v3:
- Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed in commit 9ec4175a30eb ("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature")
v2:
- Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7
- Rename instances of trusted_tpm_options from tpm_opts to private
- Use pr_debug and KERN_DEBUG for logging debug messages (preparatory clean up patch)
- Address other minor comments from Jarkko
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 --- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 ++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 96 ++++++++++++++--------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 ++++++------ 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
include/keys/trusted-type.h +0 -11
@@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {struct trusted_key_options {uint16_t keytype; -uint32_t keyhandle; -unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -uint32_t blobauth_len; -unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -uint32_t pcrinfo_len; -unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE ]; -int pcrlock; -uint32_t hash; -uint32_t policydigest_len; -unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -uint32_t policyhandle;void *private; };
include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +14 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,20 @@extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; +struct trusted_key_tpm { +uint32_t keyhandle; +unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +uint32_t blobauth_len; +unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +uint32_t pcrinfo_len; +unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE ]; +int pcrlock; +uint32_t hash; +uint32_t policydigest_len; +unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +uint32_t policyhandle; +}; +int tpm2_seal_trusted (struct tpm_chip *chip,struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options);
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +60 -36
264 lines not on this page · raw message
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +28 -22
159 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 298 lines · Srish Srinivasan
The
trusted_key_optionsstruct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle, keyauth,blobauth_len, blobauth,pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.Define struct
trusted_key_tpmand move the TPM-specific fields there. Store a pointer to it in the private member of structtrusted_key_options.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Stefan Berger <[email protected]>---
Changelog:v5:
- Rename structtrusted_tpm_optionsto structtrusted_key_tpm, as suggested by Jarkko.v4:
- Rebased onto mainline after tpm-buf memory-safe allocation changes were merged
- Resolved the resulting merge conflictsv3:
- Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed in commit9ec4175a30eb("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature")v2:
- Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7
- Rename instances oftrusted_tpm_optionsfromtpm_optsto private
- Usepr_debugandKERN_DEBUGfor logging debug messages (preparatory clean up patch)
- Address other minor comments from Jarkkoinclude/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 --- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 ++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 96 ++++++++++++++--------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 ++++++------ 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)include/keys/trusted-type.h +0
-11@@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {struct trusted_key_options {uint16_t keytype; -uint32_t keyhandle; -unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -uint32_t blobauth_len; -unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -uint32_t pcrinfo_len; -unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE ]; -int pcrlock; -uint32_t hash; -uint32_t policydigest_len; -unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -uint32_t policyhandle;void *private; };include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +14
-0@@ -6,6 +6,20 @@extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; +struct trusted_key_tpm { +uint32_t keyhandle; +unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +uint32_t blobauth_len; +unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +uint32_t pcrinfo_len; +unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE ]; +int pcrlock; +uint32_t hash; +uint32_t policydigest_len; +unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +uint32_t policyhandle; +}; +int tpm2_seal_trusted (struct tpm_chip *chip,struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options);security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +44
-30@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum {#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private; +if (!trusted_debug)return ;pr_debug ("sealing key type %d\n" , o->keytype); -pr_debug ("sealing key handle %0X\n" , o->keyhandle); -pr_debug ("pcrlock %d\n" , o->pcrlock); -pr_debug ("pcrinfo %d\n" , o->pcrinfo_len); +pr_debug ("sealing key handle %0X\n" , private->keyhandle); +pr_debug ("pcrlock %d\n" , private->pcrlock); +pr_debug ("pcrinfo %d\n" , private->pcrinfo_len);print_hex_dump_debug ("pcrinfo " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len,0 ); +16 ,1 , private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len,0 ); }static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s)@@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,static int key_seal (struct trusted_key_payload *p,struct trusted_key_options *o) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;int ret; struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);@@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,/* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; - ret =tpm_seal (tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, + ret =tpm_seal (tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->key, p->key_len +1 , p->blob, &p->blob_len, - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); + private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo, + private->pcrinfo_len);if (ret <0 )pr_info ("srkseal failed (%d)\n" , ret);@@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,static int key_unseal (struct trusted_key_payload *p,struct trusted_key_options *o) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;int ret; struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);@@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,tpm_buf_init (tb,TPM_BUFSIZE ); - ret =tpm_unseal (tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); + ret =tpm_unseal (tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob, + p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);if (ret <0 )pr_info ("srkunseal failed (%d)\n" , ret);else @@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {static int getoptions (char *c,struct trusted_key_payload *pay,struct trusted_key_options *opt) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = opt->private;substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS ];char *p = c;int token;@@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,if (tpm2 <0 )return tpm2; - opt->hash = tpm2 ?HASH_ALGO_SHA256 :HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ; + private->hash = tpm2 ?HASH_ALGO_SHA256 :HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ;if (!c)return 0 ;@@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,switch (token) {case Opt_pcrinfo: - opt->pcrinfo_len =strlen (args[0 ].from) /2 ; -if (opt->pcrinfo_len >MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE ) + private->pcrinfo_len =strlen (args[0 ].from) /2 ; +if (private->pcrinfo_len >MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE )return -EINVAL ; - res =hex2bin (opt->pcrinfo, args[0 ].from, - opt->pcrinfo_len); + res =hex2bin (private->pcrinfo, args[0 ].from, + private->pcrinfo_len);if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ;break ;@@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ; opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; - opt->keyhandle = handle; + private->keyhandle = handle;break ;case Opt_keyauth:if (strlen (args[0 ].from) !=2 *SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )return -EINVAL ; - res =hex2bin (opt->keyauth, args[0 ].from, + res =hex2bin (private->keyauth, args[0 ].from,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE );if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ;@@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,* hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple * passwords (although it can take a hash as well) */ - opt->blobauth_len =strlen (args[0 ].from); + private->blobauth_len =strlen (args[0 ].from); -if (opt->blobauth_len ==2 *TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ) { - res =hex2bin (opt->blobauth, args[0 ].from, +if (private->blobauth_len ==2 *TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ) { + res =hex2bin (private->blobauth, args[0 ].from,TPM_DIGEST_SIZE );if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ; - opt->blobauth_len =TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ; + private->blobauth_len =TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ;break ; } -if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <=sizeof (opt->blobauth)) { -memcpy (opt->blobauth, args[0 ].from, - opt->blobauth_len); +if (tpm2 && + private->blobauth_len <= +sizeof (private->blobauth)) { +memcpy (private->blobauth, args[0 ].from, + private->blobauth_len);break ; }@@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, res =kstrtoul (args[0 ].from,10 , &lock);if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ; - opt->pcrlock = lock; + private->pcrlock = lock;break ;case Opt_hash:if (test_bit (Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))return -EINVAL ;for (i =0 ; i <HASH_ALGO__LAST ; i++) {if (!strcmp (args[0 ].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { - opt->hash = i; + private->hash = i;break ; } }@@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, }break ;case Opt_policydigest: - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; + digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash];if (!tpm2 ||strlen (args[0 ].from) != (2 * digest_len))return -EINVAL ; - res =hex2bin (opt->policydigest, args[0 ].from, + res =hex2bin (private->policydigest, args[0 ].from, digest_len);if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ; - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len; + private->policydigest_len = digest_len;break ;case Opt_policyhandle:if (!tpm2)@@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, res =kstrtoul (args[0 ].from,16 , &handle);if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ; - opt->policyhandle = handle; + private->policyhandle = handle;break ;default :return -EINVAL ;@@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc (void ) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private;struct trusted_key_options *options;int tpm2;@@ -844,14 +853,22 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)/* set any non-zero defaults */ options->keytype = SRK_keytype; -if (!tpm2) - options->keyhandle =SRKHANDLE ; + private =kzalloc_obj (*private); +if (!private) { +kfree_sensitive (options); + options =NULL ; + }else { +if (!tpm2) + private->keyhandle =SRKHANDLE ;
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) · line 872
Quoted 10 lines
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +3
-0+ options->private = private; + } }return options; }static int trusted_tpm_seal (struct trusted_key_payload *p,char *datablob) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private =NULL ;struct trusted_key_options *options =NULL ;
It would be leaner if you did:
struct trusted_key_options *options __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;
Then you can just return instead of jumping to "out".
Applies also to trusted_tpm_unseal at least.
Quoted 248 lines
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +13
-6int ret =0 ;int tpm2;@@ -869,7 +886,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out;dump_options (options); -if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { + private = options->private; +if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto out; }@@ -883,20 +901,23 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out; } -if (options->pcrlock) { - ret =pcrlock (options->pcrlock); +if (private->pcrlock) { + ret =pcrlock (private->pcrlock);if (ret <0 ) {pr_info ("pcrlock failed (%d)\n" , ret); goto out; } } out: +if (options) +kfree_sensitive (options->private);kfree_sensitive (options);return ret; }static int trusted_tpm_unseal (struct trusted_key_payload *p,char *datablob) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private =NULL ;struct trusted_key_options *options =NULL ;int ret =0 ;int tpm2;@@ -914,7 +935,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out;dump_options (options); -if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { + private = options->private; +if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto out; }@@ -926,14 +948,16 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)if (ret <0 )pr_info ("key_unseal failed (%d)\n" , ret); -if (options->pcrlock) { - ret =pcrlock (options->pcrlock); +if (private->pcrlock) { + ret =pcrlock (private->pcrlock);if (ret <0 ) {pr_info ("pcrlock failed (%d)\n" , ret); goto out; } } out: +if (options) +kfree_sensitive (options->private);kfree_sensitive (options);return ret; }security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +28
-22@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options, u8 *src, u32 len) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;const int SCRATCH_SIZE =PAGE_SIZE ;u8 *scratch =kmalloc (SCRATCH_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL );u8 *work = scratch, *work1;@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, work =asn1_encode_oid (work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,asn1_oid_len (tpm2key_oid)); -if (options->blobauth_len ==0 ) { +if (private->blobauth_len ==0 ) {unsigned char bool[3 ], *w = bool;/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ w =asn1_encode_boolean (w, w +sizeof (bool ), true);@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, goto err; } - work =asn1_encode_integer (work, end_work, options->keyhandle); + work =asn1_encode_integer (work, end_work, private->keyhandle); work =asn1_encode_octet_string (work, end_work, pub, pub_len); work =asn1_encode_octet_string (work, end_work, priv, priv_len);@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options, u8 **buf) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;int ret;struct tpm2_key_context ctx;u8 *blob;@@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,return -ENOMEM ; *buf = blob; - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; + private->keyhandle = ctx.parent;memcpy (blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); blob += ctx.priv_len;@@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;off_t offset =TPM_HEADER_SIZE ; struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL; struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;@@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,u32 flags;int rc; - hash =tpm2_find_hash_alg (options->hash); + hash =tpm2_find_hash_alg (private->hash);if (hash <0 )return hash; -if (!options->keyhandle) +if (!private->keyhandle)return -EINVAL ; rc =tpm_try_get_ops (chip);@@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,tpm_buf_init_sized (sized,TPM_BUFSIZE ); - rc =tpm_buf_append_name (chip, buf, options->keyhandle,NULL ); + rc =tpm_buf_append_name (chip, buf, private->keyhandle,NULL );if (rc) goto out;tpm_buf_append_hmac_session (chip, buf,TPM2_SA_DECRYPT , - options->keyauth,TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ); + private->keyauth,TPM_DIGEST_SIZE );/* sensitive */ -tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized, options->blobauth_len); +tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized, private->blobauth_len); -if (options->blobauth_len) -tpm_buf_append (sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); +if (private->blobauth_len) +tpm_buf_append (sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized, payload->key_len);tpm_buf_append (sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);@@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,/* key properties */ flags =0 ; - flags |= options->policydigest_len ?0 :TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH ; + flags |= private->policydigest_len ?0 :TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH ; flags |= payload->migratable ?0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM |TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT );tpm_buf_append_u32 (sized, flags);/* policy */ -tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized, options->policydigest_len); -if (options->policydigest_len) -tpm_buf_append (sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len); +tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized, private->policydigest_len); +if (private->policydigest_len) +tpm_buf_append (sized, private->policydigest, + private->policydigest_len);/* public parameters */ tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized,TPM_ALG_NULL );@@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *blob_handle) { u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL; +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;unsigned int private_len;unsigned int public_len;@@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, }/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ -if (!options->keyhandle) +if (!private->keyhandle)return -EINVAL ;/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ @@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,tpm_buf_init (buf,TPM_BUFSIZE );tpm_buf_reset (buf,TPM2_ST_SESSIONS ,TPM2_CC_LOAD ); - rc =tpm_buf_append_name (chip, buf, options->keyhandle,NULL ); + rc =tpm_buf_append_name (chip, buf, private->keyhandle,NULL );if (rc)return rc; -tpm_buf_append_hmac_session (chip, buf,0 , options->keyauth, +tpm_buf_append_hmac_session (chip, buf,0 , private->keyauth,TPM_DIGEST_SIZE );tpm_buf_append (buf, blob, blob_len);@@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_options *options, u32 blob_handle) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;struct tpm_header *head; struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;u16 data_len;@@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,if (rc)return rc; -if (!options->policyhandle) { +if (!private->policyhandle) {tpm_buf_append_hmac_session (chip, buf,TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT , - options->blobauth, - options->blobauth_len); + private->blobauth, + private->blobauth_len); }else {/* * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the @@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,* could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated * password. */ -tpm2_buf_append_auth (buf, options->policyhandle, +tpm2_buf_append_auth (buf, private->policyhandle,NULL /* nonce */ ,0 ,0 , - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); + private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);if (tpm2_chip_auth (chip)) {tpm_buf_append_hmac_session (chip, buf,TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT ,NULL ,0 );Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
BR, Jarkko
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 311 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 298 lines · Srish Srinivasan
The
trusted_key_optionsstruct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle, keyauth,blobauth_len, blobauth,pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.Define struct
trusted_key_tpmand move the TPM-specific fields there. Store a pointer to it in the private member of structtrusted_key_options.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Stefan Berger <[email protected]>---
Changelog:v5:
- Rename structtrusted_tpm_optionsto structtrusted_key_tpm, as suggested by Jarkko.v4:
- Rebased onto mainline after tpm-buf memory-safe allocation changes were merged
- Resolved the resulting merge conflictsv3:
- Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed in commit9ec4175a30eb("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature")v2:
- Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7
- Rename instances oftrusted_tpm_optionsfromtpm_optsto private
- Usepr_debugandKERN_DEBUGfor logging debug messages (preparatory clean up patch)
- Address other minor comments from Jarkkoinclude/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 --- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 ++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 96 ++++++++++++++--------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 ++++++------ 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)include/keys/trusted-type.h +0
-11@@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {struct trusted_key_options {uint16_t keytype; -uint32_t keyhandle; -unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -uint32_t blobauth_len; -unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -uint32_t pcrinfo_len; -unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE ]; -int pcrlock; -uint32_t hash; -uint32_t policydigest_len; -unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -uint32_t policyhandle;void *private; };include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +14
-0@@ -6,6 +6,20 @@extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; +struct trusted_key_tpm { +uint32_t keyhandle; +unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +uint32_t blobauth_len; +unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +uint32_t pcrinfo_len; +unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE ]; +int pcrlock; +uint32_t hash; +uint32_t policydigest_len; +unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +uint32_t policyhandle; +}; +int tpm2_seal_trusted (struct tpm_chip *chip,struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options);security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +44
-30@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum {#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private; +if (!trusted_debug)return ;pr_debug ("sealing key type %d\n" , o->keytype); -pr_debug ("sealing key handle %0X\n" , o->keyhandle); -pr_debug ("pcrlock %d\n" , o->pcrlock); -pr_debug ("pcrinfo %d\n" , o->pcrinfo_len); +pr_debug ("sealing key handle %0X\n" , private->keyhandle); +pr_debug ("pcrlock %d\n" , private->pcrlock); +pr_debug ("pcrinfo %d\n" , private->pcrinfo_len);print_hex_dump_debug ("pcrinfo " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len,0 ); +16 ,1 , private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len,0 ); }static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s)@@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,static int key_seal (struct trusted_key_payload *p,struct trusted_key_options *o) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;int ret; struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);@@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,/* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; - ret =tpm_seal (tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, + ret =tpm_seal (tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->key, p->key_len +1 , p->blob, &p->blob_len, - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); + private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo, + private->pcrinfo_len);if (ret <0 )pr_info ("srkseal failed (%d)\n" , ret);@@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,static int key_unseal (struct trusted_key_payload *p,struct trusted_key_options *o) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;int ret; struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);@@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,tpm_buf_init (tb,TPM_BUFSIZE ); - ret =tpm_unseal (tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); + ret =tpm_unseal (tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob, + p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);if (ret <0 )pr_info ("srkunseal failed (%d)\n" , ret);else @@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {static int getoptions (char *c,struct trusted_key_payload *pay,struct trusted_key_options *opt) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = opt->private;substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS ];char *p = c;int token;@@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,if (tpm2 <0 )return tpm2; - opt->hash = tpm2 ?HASH_ALGO_SHA256 :HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ; + private->hash = tpm2 ?HASH_ALGO_SHA256 :HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ;if (!c)return 0 ;@@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,switch (token) {case Opt_pcrinfo: - opt->pcrinfo_len =strlen (args[0 ].from) /2 ; -if (opt->pcrinfo_len >MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE ) + private->pcrinfo_len =strlen (args[0 ].from) /2 ; +if (private->pcrinfo_len >MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE )return -EINVAL ; - res =hex2bin (opt->pcrinfo, args[0 ].from, - opt->pcrinfo_len); + res =hex2bin (private->pcrinfo, args[0 ].from, + private->pcrinfo_len);if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ;break ;@@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ; opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; - opt->keyhandle = handle; + private->keyhandle = handle;break ;case Opt_keyauth:if (strlen (args[0 ].from) !=2 *SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )return -EINVAL ; - res =hex2bin (opt->keyauth, args[0 ].from, + res =hex2bin (private->keyauth, args[0 ].from,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE );if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ;@@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,* hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple * passwords (although it can take a hash as well) */ - opt->blobauth_len =strlen (args[0 ].from); + private->blobauth_len =strlen (args[0 ].from); -if (opt->blobauth_len ==2 *TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ) { - res =hex2bin (opt->blobauth, args[0 ].from, +if (private->blobauth_len ==2 *TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ) { + res =hex2bin (private->blobauth, args[0 ].from,TPM_DIGEST_SIZE );if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ; - opt->blobauth_len =TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ; + private->blobauth_len =TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ;break ; } -if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <=sizeof (opt->blobauth)) { -memcpy (opt->blobauth, args[0 ].from, - opt->blobauth_len); +if (tpm2 && + private->blobauth_len <= +sizeof (private->blobauth)) { +memcpy (private->blobauth, args[0 ].from, + private->blobauth_len);break ; }@@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, res =kstrtoul (args[0 ].from,10 , &lock);if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ; - opt->pcrlock = lock; + private->pcrlock = lock;break ;case Opt_hash:if (test_bit (Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))return -EINVAL ;for (i =0 ; i <HASH_ALGO__LAST ; i++) {if (!strcmp (args[0 ].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { - opt->hash = i; + private->hash = i;break ; } }@@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, }break ;case Opt_policydigest: - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; + digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash];if (!tpm2 ||strlen (args[0 ].from) != (2 * digest_len))return -EINVAL ; - res =hex2bin (opt->policydigest, args[0 ].from, + res =hex2bin (private->policydigest, args[0 ].from, digest_len);if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ; - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len; + private->policydigest_len = digest_len;break ;case Opt_policyhandle:if (!tpm2)@@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, res =kstrtoul (args[0 ].from,16 , &handle);if (res <0 )return -EINVAL ; - opt->policyhandle = handle; + private->policyhandle = handle;break ;default :return -EINVAL ;@@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc (void ) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private;struct trusted_key_options *options;int tpm2;@@ -844,14 +853,22 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)/* set any non-zero defaults */ options->keytype = SRK_keytype; -if (!tpm2) - options->keyhandle =SRKHANDLE ; + private =kzalloc_obj (*private); +if (!private) { +kfree_sensitive (options); + options =NULL ; + }else { +if (!tpm2) + private->keyhandle =SRKHANDLE ;security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) · line 872
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security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +3
-0+ options->private = private; + } }return options; }static int trusted_tpm_seal (struct trusted_key_payload *p,char *datablob) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private =NULL ;struct trusted_key_options *options =NULL ;It would be leaner if you did:
Quoted 5 lines
struct trusted_key_options *options __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;Then you can just return instead of jumping to "out".
Applies also to
trusted_tpm_unsealat least.
Thanks for bringing this up.
Yup, I have made the required changes and posted v6.
Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
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security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +13
-6int ret =0 ;int tpm2;@@ -869,7 +886,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out;dump_options (options); -if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { + private = options->private; +if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto out; }@@ -883,20 +901,23 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out; } -if (options->pcrlock) { - ret =pcrlock (options->pcrlock); +if (private->pcrlock) { + ret =pcrlock (private->pcrlock);if (ret <0 ) {pr_info ("pcrlock failed (%d)\n" , ret); goto out; } } out: +if (options) +kfree_sensitive (options->private);kfree_sensitive (options);return ret; }static int trusted_tpm_unseal (struct trusted_key_payload *p,char *datablob) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private =NULL ;struct trusted_key_options *options =NULL ;int ret =0 ;int tpm2;@@ -914,7 +935,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out;dump_options (options); -if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { + private = options->private; +if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto out; }@@ -926,14 +948,16 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)if (ret <0 )pr_info ("key_unseal failed (%d)\n" , ret); -if (options->pcrlock) { - ret =pcrlock (options->pcrlock); +if (private->pcrlock) { + ret =pcrlock (private->pcrlock);if (ret <0 ) {pr_info ("pcrlock failed (%d)\n" , ret); goto out; } } out: +if (options) +kfree_sensitive (options->private);kfree_sensitive (options);return ret; }security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +27
-22@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options, u8 *src, u32 len) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;const int SCRATCH_SIZE =PAGE_SIZE ;u8 *scratch =kmalloc (SCRATCH_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL );u8 *work = scratch, *work1;@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, work =asn1_encode_oid (work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,asn1_oid_len (tpm2key_oid)); -if (options->blobauth_len ==0 ) { +if (private->blobauth_len ==0 ) {unsigned char bool[3 ], *w = bool;/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ w =asn1_encode_boolean (w, w +sizeof (bool ), true);@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, goto err; } - work =asn1_encode_integer (work, end_work, options->keyhandle); + work =asn1_encode_integer (work, end_work, private->keyhandle); work =asn1_encode_octet_string (work, end_work, pub, pub_len); work =asn1_encode_octet_string (work, end_work, priv, priv_len);@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options, u8 **buf) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;int ret;struct tpm2_key_context ctx;u8 *blob;@@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,return -ENOMEM ; *buf = blob; - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; + private->keyhandle = ctx.parent;memcpy (blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); blob += ctx.priv_len;@@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options) { + struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;off_t offset =TPM_HEADER_SIZE ; struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL; struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;@@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,u32 flags;int rc; - hash =tpm2_find_hash_alg (options->hash); + hash =tpm2_find_hash_alg (private->hash);if (hash <0 )return hash; -if (!options->keyhandle) +if (!private->keyhandle)return -EINVAL ; rc =tpm_try_get_ops (chip);@@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,tpm_buf_init_sized (sized,TPM_BUFSIZE ); - rc =tpm_buf_append_name (chip, buf, options->keyhandle,NULL ); + rc =tpm_buf_append_name (chip, buf, private->keyhandle,NULL );if (rc) goto out;tpm_buf_append_hmac_session (chip, buf,TPM2_SA_DECRYPT , - options->keyauth,TPM_DIGEST_SIZE ); + private->keyauth,TPM_DIGEST_SIZE );/* sensitive */ -tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized, options->blobauth_len); +tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized, private->blobauth_len); -if (options->blobauth_len) -tpm_buf_append (sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); +if (private->blobauth_len) +tpm_buf_append (sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized, payload->key_len);tpm_buf_append (sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);@@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,/* key properties */ flags =0 ; - flags |= options->policydigest_len ?0 :TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH ; + flags |= private->policydigest_len ?0 :TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH ; flags |= payload->migratable ?0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM |TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT );tpm_buf_append_u32 (sized, flags);/* policy */ -tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized, options->policydigest_len); -if (options->policydigest_len) -tpm_buf_append (sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len); +tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized, private->policydigest_len); +if (private->policydigest_len) +tpm_buf_append (sized, private->policydigest, + private->policydigest_len);/* public parameters */ tpm_buf_append_u16 (sized,TPM_ALG_NULL );@@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *blob_handle) { u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL; +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private; struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;unsigned int private_len;unsigned int public_len;@@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, }/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ -if (!options->keyhandle) +if (!private->keyhandle)return -EINVAL ;/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ @@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,tpm_buf_init (buf,TPM_BUFSIZE );tpm_buf_reset (buf,TPM2_ST_SESSIONS ,TPM2_CC_LOAD ); - rc =tpm_buf_append_name (chip, buf, options->keyhandle,NULL ); + rc =tpm_buf_append_name (chip, buf, private->keyhandle,NULL );if (rc)return rc; -tpm_buf_append_hmac_session (chip, buf,0 , options->keyauth, +tpm_buf_append_hmac_session (chip, buf,0 , private->keyauth,TPM_DIGEST_SIZE );tpm_buf_append (buf, blob, blob_len);@@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_options *options, u32 blob_handle) { +struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;struct tpm_header *head; struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;u16 data_len;@@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,if (rc)return rc; -if (!options->policyhandle) { +if (!private->policyhandle) {tpm_buf_append_hmac_session (chip, buf,TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT , - options->blobauth, - options->blobauth_len); + private->blobauth, + private->blobauth_len); }else {/* * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the @@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,* could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated * password. */ -tpm2_buf_append_auth (buf, options->policyhandle, + tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle, NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0, - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +1
-0+ private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);if (tpm2_chip_auth (chip)) {tpm_buf_append_hmac_session (chip, buf,TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT ,NULL ,0 );Signature · 1 line
2.53.0BR, Jarkko
Thanks,
Srish.