ffmpeg: mark CVE-2026-52295, CVE-2026-52296 and CVE-2026-52297 fixed
PATCH 1/3 ffmpeg: mark CVE-2026-52295, CVE-2026-52296 and CVE-2026-52297 fixed
From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
CVE-2026-52295:
Debian[1] identified the fix[2] which exists[3] in the upstream version.
CVE-2026-52296:
Debian[4] identified the fix[5] which exists[6] in the upstream version.
CVE-2026-52297:
Debian[7] identified the fix[8] which exists[9] in the upstream version.
[1]https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-52295 [2]https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/016a241102250372a9c2e96f6e8dca67ec01d3f7 [3]https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/ff43ef5219ad543e57ed56d065e9d4a3b0426468
[4]https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-52296 [5]https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/23227a444de4a8f7696f46660cdd044b460f7e47 [6]https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/d18354f8d4bd018eb486d18079ff0afb3b84c506
[7]https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-52297 [8]https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/8439e0203744a30d280668fcd086f74ed5001da1 [9]https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/ebff1abbad8b036bfc0f52a4785433b06e865e3b
--- meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg_8.0.3.bb | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg_8.0.3.bb +3 -0
@@ -185,3 +185,6 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-59729] = "fixed-version: this CVE are fixed since v8.0" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-59730] = "fixed-version: this CVE are fixed since v8.0" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-8461] = "cpe-stable-backport: this CVE are fixed since v8.0.3" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-40962] = "cpe-stable-backport: this CVE are fixed since v8.0.2" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-52295] = "fixed-version: fixed since v8.0.2" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-52297] = "fixed-version: fixed since v8.0.2" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-52297] = "fixed-version: fixed since v8.0.2"
PATCH 2/3 libxfont2: patch CVE-2026-59679
From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
Debian[1] also identified the fix.
[1]https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-59679
--- .../xorg-lib/libxfont2/CVE-2026-59679.patch | 93 +++++++++++++++++++ .../xorg-lib/libxfont2_2.0.7.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont2/CVE-2026-59679.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont2/CVE-2026-59679.patch new file +93 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +From 016a21b1eea8e4aef4949e19cdf5f386f36fd978 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 15:48:06 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] fserve: validate num_chars against encoding array size in + fs_read_glyphs + +FS_QueryXExtents16 causes us to allocate the encoding[] array, later +during the FS_QueryXBitmaps16 reply handling we fill in that array. +There is no verification that the allocation is large enough, a +malicious font server could send us a small numExtents and a +large num_chars to force underallocation and OOB read/rwrite. + +A regression test is included that constructs a crafted +FS_QueryXBitmaps16 reply with num_chars > num_encoding and verifies +the library rejects it. + +CVE-2026-59679 + +Found-by: Zhixi "Jace" Sun, independent security researcher +Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> +Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/merge_requests/36> + +CVE: CVE-2026-59679 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/commit/668fea81f40bcb48ec67fb55d0b851049d265290] + +Dropped makefile and test changes during backport. + +Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]> +--- + src/fc/fserve.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ + src/fc/fservestr.h | 1 + + 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/fc/fserve.c b/src/fc/fserve.c +index abf7d07..744a68c 100644 +--- a/src/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/src/fc/fserve.c +@@ -1081,6 +1081,7 @@ fs_read_extent_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + return AllocError; + } + fsfont->encoding = pCI; ++ fsfont->num_encoding = numExtents; + if (haveInk) + fsfont->inkMetrics = pCI + numExtents; + else +@@ -1980,6 +1981,17 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + { + minchar = 0; + maxchar = rep->num_chars; ++ ++ /* Reject replies where num_chars exceeds the encoding array ++ size allocated in fs_read_extent_info() to prevent ++ out-of-bounds access on encoding[]. */ ++ if (rep->num_chars > (CARD32)fsdata->num_encoding) ++ { ++ ErrorF("fserve: num_chars (%u) > num_encoding (%d)\n", ++ (unsigned) rep->num_chars, fsdata->num_encoding); ++ err = AllocError; ++ goto bail; ++ } + } + + off_adr = (char *)ppbits; +@@ -2001,6 +2013,16 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + for (i = 0; i < rep->num_chars; i++) + { + memcpy(&local_off, off_adr, SIZEOF(fsOffset32)); /* align it */ ++ /* Bounds-check minchar against the encoding array size to ++ prevent out-of-bounds access from a malicious font server ++ reply with more num_chars than num_extents. */ ++ if (minchar >= (unsigned long)fsdata->num_encoding) ++ { ++ ErrorF("fserve: glyph index %lu >= num_encoding (%d)\n", ++ minchar, fsdata->num_encoding); ++ err = AllocError; ++ goto bail; ++ } + if (blockrec->type == FS_OPEN_FONT || + fsdata->encoding[minchar].bits == &_fs_glyph_requested) + { +diff --git a/src/fc/fservestr.h b/src/fc/fservestr.h +index 29ae46e..da95e41 100644 +--- a/src/fc/fservestr.h ++++ b/src/fc/fservestr.h +@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ typedef struct _fs_glyph { + typedef struct _fs_font { + CharInfoPtr pDefault; + CharInfoPtr encoding; ++ int num_encoding; + CharInfoPtr inkMetrics; + FSGlyphPtr glyphs; + } FSFontRec, *FSFontPtr;
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont2_2.0.7.bb +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ BBCLASSEXTEND = "native" SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-56001.patch \ file://CVE-2026-56002.patch \ file://CVE-2026-56003.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59679.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8b7b82fdeba48769b69433e8e3fbb984a5f6bf368b0d5f47abeec49de3e58efb"
PATCH 3/3 libxfont2: patch CVE-2026-44950
In reply to [email protected]From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
Debian[1] also identified the fix.
[1]https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-44950
--- .../xorg-lib/libxfont2/CVE-2026-44950.patch | 99 +++++++++++++++++++ .../xorg-lib/libxfont2_2.0.7.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 100 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont2/CVE-2026-44950.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont2/CVE-2026-44950.patch new file +99 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +From b48aa50f2ba02f74167492c1c3aa312a7590991a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 15:50:09 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] fserve: bounds-check cumulative glyph data writes in + fs_read_glyphs + +fs_read_glyphs() copies each glyph's bitmap into a single allbits +buffer allocated to rep->nbytes bytes. The per-glyph guard validates +only that the source slice (position, length) lies within the pbitmaps +source buffer. It does not check whether the running destination cursor +has exceeded the allocation. + +A malicious font server can send overlapping source offsets (e.g. 1000 +glyphs each referencing {position:0, length:64} with nbytes=64). Each +individual source range passes validation, but the cumulative writes +total 64000 bytes into a 64-byte destination buffer. + +Interestingly there was an unconditional debug printf in place that +sort-of warned about this but didn't prevent this. Let's remove that and +instead use the actual check to bail out before we run OOB. + +A regression test is included that sends 100 glyphs each referencing +the same 64-byte source slice into a 64-byte destination buffer, and +verifies the library rejects the overflow. + +CVE-2026-44950 + +Found-by: Zhixi "Jace" Sun, independent security researcher +Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> +Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/merge_requests/36> +(cherry picked from commit c2d222bb22c623d8a40f3275077fc7e6617f2c8a) + +CVE: CVE-2026-44950 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/commit/c2d222bb22c623d8a40f3275077fc7e6617f2c8a] + +Dropped test changes during the backport. + +Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]> +--- + src/fc/fserve.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/fc/fserve.c b/src/fc/fserve.c +index abf7d07..0fdc090 100644 +--- a/src/fc/fserve.c ++++ b/src/fc/fserve.c +@@ -1899,10 +1899,7 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + fsOffset32 local_off; + char *off_adr; + pointer pbitmaps; +- char *bits, *allbits; +-#ifdef DEBUG +- char *origallbits; +-#endif ++ char *bits, *allbits, *origallbits; + int i, + err; + int nranges = 0; +@@ -1992,8 +1989,8 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + goto bail; + } + +-#ifdef DEBUG + origallbits = allbits; ++#ifdef DEBUG + fprintf (stderr, "Reading %d glyphs in %d bytes for %s\n", + (int) rep->num_chars, (int) rep->nbytes, fsd->name); + #endif +@@ -2014,6 +2011,18 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + (local_off.position < rep->nbytes) && + (local_off.length <= (rep->nbytes - local_off.position))) + { ++ /* Check that the destination buffer has enough room ++ for this glyph to prevent a heap overflow from ++ overlapping source offsets. */ ++ if (local_off.length > ++ rep->nbytes - (allbits - origallbits)) ++ { ++ ErrorF("fserve: glyph data overflow: " ++ "cumulative write exceeds nbytes (%u)\n", ++ (unsigned) rep->nbytes); ++ err = AllocError; ++ goto bail; ++ } + bits = allbits; + allbits += local_off.length; + memcpy(bits, (char *)pbitmaps + local_off.position, +@@ -2041,10 +2050,6 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec) + } + off_adr += SIZEOF(fsOffset32); + } +-#ifdef DEBUG +- fprintf (stderr, "Used %d bytes instead of %d\n", +- (int) (allbits - origallbits), (int) rep->nbytes); +-#endif + + if (blockrec->type == FS_OPEN_FONT) + {
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont2_2.0.7.bb +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-56001.patch \ file://CVE-2026-56002.patch \ file://CVE-2026-56003.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59679.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-44950.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8b7b82fdeba48769b69433e8e3fbb984a5f6bf368b0d5f47abeec49de3e58efb"