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openssh: fix CVE-2026-73283

PATCH New Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) 1 participant 3 messages Sep 29

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PATCH 1/3 openssh: fix CVE-2026-73283

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream fix that makes the authorized_keys restrict keyword apply to tunnel forwarding. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d322f2ccf7da095ce94d1d99cb563246f61487b
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-73283

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73283.patch      | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb                 |  1 +
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73283.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73283.patch new file +42 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d2660149e31
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From d322f2ccf7da095ce94d1d99cb563246f61487b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 01:05:05 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: make authorized_keys "restrict" keyword apply
+ correctly
+
+to tunnel forwarding (which is administratively disabled by default).
+
+Reported by Erichen, Institute of Computing Technology,
+Chinese Academy of Sciences
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b3cc987a64749c94b20e12755db32a83f8f01e6
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-73283
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d322f2ccf7da095ce94d1d99cb563246f61487b]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunk and retained the Wrynose
+  OpenSSH 10.3p1 revision.
+
+(cherry picked from commit d322f2ccf7da095ce94d1d99cb563246f61487b)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ serverloop.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 8e63480ec..9d8a3429 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -523,7 +523,8 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	}
+-	if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0 || options.disable_forwarding) {
++	if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0 || options.disable_forwarding ||
++	    auth_opts->restricted) {
+ 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has rejected tunnel device "
+ 		    "forwarding");
+ 		return NULL;
+-- 
+2.43.0
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
index e6bc9e9a5b6..3085f71bc6e 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta
            file://CVE-2026-60001.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-60002.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-60000.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 openssh: fix CVE-2026-73282

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream fix that tracks pending remote-forward requests by index instead of retaining a pointer that realloc may invalidate. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/9910d5ef53124ce1157d57bc11e222658aa41299
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-73282

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73282.patch      | 80 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb                 |  1 +
 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73282.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73282.patch new file +80 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f5b4762e511
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From 9910d5ef53124ce1157d57bc11e222658aa41299 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 05:03:56 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: avoid potential realloc use-after-free in the
+ client if a
+
+remote forwarding is added via the local session multiplexing socket while a
+remote forwarding open request is pending with the server.
+
+Report and fix from Brian Mingus of Cognatory
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7888d566576386d0e96859f9ec7310a1e2d3609
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-73282
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/9910d5ef53124ce1157d57bc11e222658aa41299]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunk and retained the Wrynose
+  OpenSSH 10.3p1 revision.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 9910d5ef53124ce1157d57bc11e222658aa41299)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ ssh.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index d030b548..e9f99c43 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -1899,14 +1899,24 @@
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++struct rfwd_confirm_ctx {
++	int fid;
++};
++
+ /* Callback for remote forward global requests */
+ static void
+ ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, uint32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ {
+-	struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt;
++	struct rfwd_confirm_ctx *rctx = (struct rfwd_confirm_ctx *)ctxt;
++	struct Forward *rfwd;
+ 	u_int port;
+ 	int r;
+ 
++	if (rctx->fid < 0 || rctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards)
++		fatal_f("invalid forwarding ID %d", rctx->fid);
++	rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[rctx->fid];
++	freezero(rctx, sizeof(*rctx));
++
+ 	/* XXX verbose() on failure? */
+ 	debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d",
+ 	    type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
+@@ -2084,6 +2094,8 @@
+ 
+ 	/* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
++		struct rfwd_confirm_ctx *rctx;
++
+ 		debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
+ 		    "local address %.200s:%d",
+ 		    (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
+@@ -2098,9 +2110,10 @@
+ 		if ((options.remote_forwards[i].handle =
+ 		    channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh,
+ 		    &options.remote_forwards[i])) >= 0) {
++			rctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*rctx));
++			rctx->fid = i;
+ 			client_register_global_confirm(
+-			    ssh_confirm_remote_forward,
+-			    &options.remote_forwards[i]);
++			    ssh_confirm_remote_forward, rctx);
+ 			forward_confirms_pending++;
+ 		} else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ 			fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
+-- 
+2.43.0
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
index 3085f71bc6e..00e2cd8726e 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta
            file://CVE-2026-60002.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-60000.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-73282.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 openssh: fix CVE-2026-73281

In reply to Hetvi Thakar -X (hthakar - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream fix that permits session-bind requests while the agent is locked so forwarded sessions remain classified as remote. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/6a57081dc35acf3ee298108d4bc3580489608d5
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-73281

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73281.patch      | 80 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb                 |  1 +
 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73281.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73281.patch new file +80 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..6dbe7b33ff3
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From 6a57081dc35acf3ee298108d4bc3580489608d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 05:18:05 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Allow [email protected] requests when the
+ agent is
+
+locked, otherwise forwarding sessions established with an agent was locked
+will be treated as local, rather than remote.
+
+Reported by sn0x-sharma
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 524f210c6f2b3a06e0a2f6d0af5188a9a75fa2c7
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-73281
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/6a57081dc35acf3ee298108d4bc3580489608d5]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunk and retained the Wrynose
+  OpenSSH 10.3p1 revision.
+- OpenSSH 10.3p1 lacks the later `replied` result tracking in
+  process_extension(), so retained `success = process_ext_query(e)`.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 6a57081dc35acf3ee298108d4bc3580489608d5)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 5fc73d69..1604f540 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1795,12 +1795,22 @@
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (strcmp(name, "query") == 0)
+-		success = process_ext_query(e);
+-	else if (strcmp(name, "[email protected]") == 0)
++	/*
++	 * This function can be called while the agent is locked to allow
++	 * session binds to be processed for new channels.
++	 * Other operations should be refused when locked.
++	 */
++
++	if (strcmp(name, "[email protected]") == 0) {
+ 		success = process_ext_session_bind(e);
+-	else {
++	} else if (locked) {
++		debug_f("attempt to use extension \"%s\" while locked", name);
++		goto generic_fail;
++	} else if (strcmp(name, "query") == 0) {
++		success = process_ext_query(e);
++	} else {
+ 		debug_f("unsupported extension \"%s\"", name);
++ generic_fail:
+ 		free(name);
+ 		send_status(e, 0);
+ 		return;
+@@ -1857,14 +1867,17 @@
+ 	/* check whether agent is locked */
+ 	if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
+-		sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+ 		switch (type) {
+ 		case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
+ 			/* send empty lists */
+ 			no_identities(e);
+ 			break;
++		case SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION:
++			process_extension(e);
++			break;
+ 		default:
+ 			/* send a fail message for all other request types */
+ 			send_status(e, 0);
+ 		}
++		sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.43.0
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
index 00e2cd8726e..0b34e4563ca 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta
            file://CVE-2026-60000.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73282.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-73281.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6