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btrfs: allow idmapped DEFRAG ioctls

PATCH In review Tao Cui 2 participants 2 messages Oct 9 – Oct 19

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Tao Cui

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PATCH v3 1/1 btrfs: allow idmapped DEFRAG ioctls

From: Tao Cui <[email protected]>

btrfs_ioctl_defrag() checks MAY_WRITE against nop_mnt_idmap, so on an idmapped mount the owner comparison uses the caller's fsuid against the raw on-disk uid and the ioctl fails with -EPERM even for the file's owner. Pass the mount idmap down so defrag works on idmapped mounts.

The check, added in 616d374efa23 ("btrfs: allow defrag on a file opened read-only that has rw permissions"), is not a privilege gate. It only tests whether the file could have been opened for writing, and a user who owns the file on the idmapped mount can already open it O_RDWR, write() to it or fallocate() it. Defragmenting a regular file only rearranges the caller's own extents; there is nothing it can rewrite that the caller could not rewrite anyway. Whole-subvolume defrag on a directory keeps its capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) requirement, and the !capable() guard around this check is left as is.

FIDEDUPERANGE already works this way for unprivileged callers:
may_dedupe_file() in fs/remap_range.c compares the inode owner through file_mnt_idmap(file) and falls back to inode_permission() with the same idmap, and dedupe can rewrite one file's extents from another file's contents, which is a stronger operation than defrag.

On regular mounts file_mnt_idmap() is nop_mnt_idmap and nothing changes.

---
Changes in v3:
- Rebase onto linux-next (next-20261008); no functional changes.
- Collect tags from review.

Changes in v2:
- Rewrite the commit message to explain why defrag is safe for idmapped users (Seth Forshee); the code is unchanged.

---
 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +1 -1
index f3e2afe221be..fe8c00eb38bc 100644
@@ -2473,7 +2473,7 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_defrag(struct file *file, void __user *argp)
 		 * running and allows defrag on files open in read-only mode.
 		 */
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
-		    inode_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, MAY_WRITE)) {
+		    inode_permission(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, MAY_WRITE)) {
 			ret = -EPERM;
 			goto out;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 26 lines · Tao Cui

From: Tao Cui <[email protected]>

btrfs_ioctl_defrag() checks MAY_WRITE against nop_mnt_idmap, so on an idmapped mount the owner comparison uses the caller's fsuid against the raw on-disk uid and the ioctl fails with -EPERM even for the file's owner. Pass the mount idmap down so defrag works on idmapped mounts.

The check, added in 616d374efa23 ("btrfs: allow defrag on a file opened read-only that has rw permissions"), is not a privilege gate. It only tests whether the file could have been opened for writing, and a user who owns the file on the idmapped mount can already open it O_RDWR, write() to it or fallocate() it. Defragmenting a regular file only rearranges the caller's own extents; there is nothing it can rewrite that the caller could not rewrite anyway. Whole-subvolume defrag on a directory keeps its capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) requirement, and the !capable() guard around this check is left as is.

FIDEDUPERANGE already works this way for unprivileged callers:
may_dedupe_file() in fs/remap_range.c compares the inode owner through file_mnt_idmap(file) and falls back to inode_permission() with the same idmap, and dedupe can rewrite one file's extents from another file's contents, which is a stronger operation than defrag.

On regular mounts file_mnt_idmap() is nop_mnt_idmap and nothing changes.

Quoted 8 lines

---
Changes in v3:
- Rebase onto linux-next (next-20261008); no functional changes.
- Collect tags from review.

Added to for-next, thanks.