FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selinux: fix data race on AVC latest_notif" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
[email protected]
maintainerThe patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 1ca924044bf0de879a1648be93a56939652267d3
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026101222-xbox-operate-40df@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 1ca924044bf0de879a1648be93a56939652267d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 12:13:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: fix data race on AVC latest_notif
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
avc_policy_seqno() reads latest_notif without holding notif_lock, while avc_latest_notif_update() can update it under that lock. KCSAN reports these concurrent accesses during policy boolean updates and permission checks.
Use READ_ONCE() for the lockless read and WRITE_ONCE() for the update. The spinlock continues to serialize the comparison and update against other writers. Reads made while holding notif_lock cannot race with a writer and can remain plain accesses.
This marks both sides of the intentional concurrent access and constrains compiler transformations, without suppressing checking with data_race().
security/selinux/avc.c +3 -2
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(u32 seqno, int is_insert) } }else {if (seqno > selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif) - selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno; +WRITE_ONCE (selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif, seqno); }spin_unlock_irqrestore (¬if_lock, flag);
@@ -1206,5 +1206,6 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,u32 avc_policy_seqno (void ) { -return selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif; +/* Writers hold notif_lock; readers only sample the sequence number. */ +return READ_ONCE (selinux_avc.avc_cache.latest_notif); }
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/1 selinux: fix data race on AVC latest_notif
From: Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1ca924044bf0de879a1648be93a56939652267d3 ]
avc_policy_seqno() reads latest_notif without holding notif_lock, while avc_latest_notif_update() can update it under that lock. KCSAN reports these concurrent accesses during policy boolean updates and permission checks.
Use READ_ONCE() for the lockless read and WRITE_ONCE() for the update. The spinlock continues to serialize the comparison and update against other writers. Reads made while holding notif_lock cannot race with a writer and can remain plain accesses.
This marks both sides of the intentional concurrent access and constrains compiler transformations, without suppressing checking with data_race().
--- security/selinux/avc.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/selinux/avc.c +3 -2
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(struct selinux_avc *avc, } }else {if (seqno > avc->avc_cache.latest_notif) - avc->avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno; +WRITE_ONCE (avc->avc_cache.latest_notif, seqno); }spin_unlock_irqrestore (¬if_lock, flag);
@@ -1202,7 +1202,8 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,u32 avc_policy_seqno (struct selinux_state *state) { -return state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif; +/* Writers hold notif_lock; readers only sample the sequence number. */ +return READ_ONCE (state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif); }void avc_disable (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0