FAILED: patch "[PATCH] smb: client: reject SetEA requests that do not fit the" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
[email protected]
maintainerThe patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 4aa2c106aef4bf3dfd97c30842db0767b26e8428
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026102229-snack-quotable-d6f5@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4aa2c106aef4bf3dfd97c30842db0767b26e8428 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yunpeng Tian <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2026 18:46:56 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] smb: client: reject SetEA requests that do not fit the
request buffer
CIFSSMBSetEA() copies the caller's extended attribute value into the SMB request buffer without checking that it fits. The requirement is stated in the source but was never implemented:
/*BB add length check to see if it would fit in negotiated SMB buffer size BB */ /* if (ea_value_len > buffer_size - 512 (enough for header)) */ if (ea_value_len) memcpy(parm_data->list.name + name_len + 1, ea_value, ea_value_len);
The only bound applied on the way in is in cifs_xattr_set():
#define MAX_EA_VALUE_SIZE CIFSMaxBufSize ... if (size > MAX_EA_VALUE_SIZE)
CIFSMaxBufSize is the full payload capacity of the buffer, so a value of exactly that size leaves no room for the SMB header, the TRANS2 parameter block, the fealist header and the EA name that are written ahead of it in the same object.
SendReceive() already enforces the correct limit on this very length:
if (in_len > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE)
but it is called after the copy has taken place. An unprivileged setxattr(2) on an SMB1 mount with a 250-byte name and a 16384-byte value writes 16384 bytes starting 345 bytes into a 16588-byte cifs_request object, ending 141 bytes past it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in CIFSSMBSetEA+0xabc/0xde0 Write of size 16384 at addr ffff888003aa0159 by task init/68 __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60 CIFSSMBSetEA+0xabc/0xde0 cifs_xattr_set+0xd3a/0xff0 __vfs_setxattr+0x13e/0x1a0 The buggy address is located 345 bytes inside of allocated 16588-byte region
Apply SendReceive()'s limit to the assembled request before the copy rather than after it, and widen the byte counters so the sum cannot wrap before it is tested.
byte_count is also tested against U16_MAX, because it is stored in the 16-bit pSMB->ByteCount. That becomes reachable when CIFSMaxBufSize is raised at module load, where it may be set as high as 1024*127: with a 5-byte EA name and a 65521-byte value, count is exactly U16_MAX while byte_count is 65556, and cpu_to_le16() would truncate it to 20 and transmit a frame whose ByteCount does not match its length. Testing byte_count covers count as well, since byte_count is the larger of the two and count's only 16-bit consumer is written after this point.
check_add_overflow() is evaluated first so that total_len is assigned before it is reported.
fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c +10 -1
@@ -6334,8 +6334,10 @@ CIFSSMBSetEA(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,int name_len;int rc =0 ;int bytes_returned =0 ; -__u16 params, param_offset, byte_count, offset, count; +__u16 params, param_offset; +unsigned int byte_count, offset, count;int remap =cifs_remap (cifs_sb); +unsigned int total_len;cifs_dbg (FYI ,"In SetEA\n" ); SetEARetry:
@@ -6387,6 +6389,13 @@ CIFSSMBSetEA(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, pSMB->Reserved3 =0 ; pSMB->SubCommand =cpu_to_le16 (TRANS2_SET_PATH_INFORMATION ); byte_count =3 /* pad */ + params + count; +if (check_add_overflow (in_len, byte_count, &total_len) || + byte_count >U16_MAX || + total_len > CIFSMaxBufSize +MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE ) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"EA request too large: %u bytes\n" , total_len); +cifs_buf_release (pSMB); +return -E2BIG ; + } pSMB->DataCount =cpu_to_le16 (count); parm_data->list_len =cpu_to_le32 (count); parm_data->list.EA_flags =0 ;
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/1 smb: client: reject SetEA requests that do not fit the request buffer
From: Yunpeng Tian <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4aa2c106aef4bf3dfd97c30842db0767b26e8428 ]
CIFSSMBSetEA() copies the caller's extended attribute value into the SMB request buffer without checking that it fits. The requirement is stated in the source but was never implemented:
/*BB add length check to see if it would fit in negotiated SMB buffer size BB */ /* if (ea_value_len > buffer_size - 512 (enough for header)) */ if (ea_value_len) memcpy(parm_data->list.name + name_len + 1, ea_value, ea_value_len);
The only bound applied on the way in is in cifs_xattr_set():
#define MAX_EA_VALUE_SIZE CIFSMaxBufSize ... if (size > MAX_EA_VALUE_SIZE)
CIFSMaxBufSize is the full payload capacity of the buffer, so a value of exactly that size leaves no room for the SMB header, the TRANS2 parameter block, the fealist header and the EA name that are written ahead of it in the same object.
SendReceive() already enforces the correct limit on this very length:
if (in_len > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE)
but it is called after the copy has taken place. An unprivileged setxattr(2) on an SMB1 mount with a 250-byte name and a 16384-byte value writes 16384 bytes starting 345 bytes into a 16588-byte cifs_request object, ending 141 bytes past it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in CIFSSMBSetEA+0xabc/0xde0 Write of size 16384 at addr ffff888003aa0159 by task init/68 __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60 CIFSSMBSetEA+0xabc/0xde0 cifs_xattr_set+0xd3a/0xff0 __vfs_setxattr+0x13e/0x1a0 The buggy address is located 345 bytes inside of allocated 16588-byte region
Apply SendReceive()'s limit to the assembled request before the copy rather than after it, and widen the byte counters so the sum cannot wrap before it is tested.
byte_count is also tested against U16_MAX, because it is stored in the 16-bit pSMB->ByteCount. That becomes reachable when CIFSMaxBufSize is raised at module load, where it may be set as high as 1024*127: with a 5-byte EA name and a 65521-byte value, count is exactly U16_MAX while byte_count is 65556, and cpu_to_le16() would truncate it to 20 and transmit a frame whose ByteCount does not match its length. Testing byte_count covers count as well, since byte_count is the larger of the two and count's only 16-bit consumer is written after this point.
check_add_overflow() is evaluated first so that total_len is assigned before it is reported.
--- fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c +11 -1
@@ -6227,8 +6227,10 @@ CIFSSMBSetEA(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,int name_len;int rc =0 ;int bytes_returned =0 ; -__u16 params, param_offset, byte_count, offset, count; +__u16 params, param_offset; +unsigned int byte_count, offset, count;int remap =cifs_remap (cifs_sb); +unsigned int total_len;cifs_dbg (FYI ,"In SetEA\n" ); SetEARetry:
@@ -6279,6 +6281,14 @@ CIFSSMBSetEA(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, pSMB->Reserved3 =0 ; pSMB->SubCommand =cpu_to_le16 (TRANS2_SET_PATH_INFORMATION ); byte_count =3 /* pad */ + params + count; +if (check_add_overflow (get_rfc1002_length (pSMB), byte_count, + &total_len) || + byte_count >U16_MAX || + total_len > CIFSMaxBufSize +MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE -4 ) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"EA request too large: %u bytes\n" , total_len); +cifs_buf_release (pSMB); +return -E2BIG ; + } pSMB->DataCount =cpu_to_le16 (count); parm_data->list_len =cpu_to_le32 (count); parm_data->list[0 ].EA_flags =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0