FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: validate security descriptor offsets before pointer" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
[email protected]
maintainerThe patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 3474e1a304fbf9f7c996b24adcd519e031227a90
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026110319-default-yelp-9aa0@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 3474e1a304fbf9f7c996b24adcd519e031227a90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 17 Oct 2026 09:44:48 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: validate security descriptor offsets before pointer
arithmetic
parse_sec_desc() constructs SID and DACL pointers by adding untrusted 32-bit offsets to the security descriptor before checking their bounds. The existing checks reject offsets into the descriptor header, but do not reject offsets beyond the descriptor's length.
On a 32-bit kernel, a large offset can wrap the pointer before the descriptor. The end-only checks in parse_sid() and parse_dacl() can then accept it, allowing an authenticated SMB2 SET_INFO request to access memory outside the security descriptor and fault the kernel.
Check each nonzero offset against acl_len before constructing its pointer. Initialize the optional owner and group SID pointers to NULL so an omitted SID remains absent when parsing the DACL.
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c +11 -9
@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ int parse_sec_desc(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, int acl_len, struct smb_fattr *fattr) { int rc = 0; -struct smb_sid *owner_sid_ptr, *group_sid_ptr; +struct smb_sid *owner_sid_ptr =NULL , *group_sid_ptr =NULL ;struct smb_acl *dacl_ptr;/* no need for SACL ptr */ char *end_of_acl = ((char *)pntsd) + acl_len;__u32 dacloffset;
@@ -912,12 +912,7 @@ int parse_sec_desc(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd,if (acl_len <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ))return -EINVAL ; - owner_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + -le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset)); - group_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + -le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset)); dacloffset =le32_to_cpu (pntsd->dacloffset); - dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset); ksmbd_debug(SMB, "revision %d type 0x%x ooffset 0x%x goffset 0x%x sacloffset 0x%x dacloffset 0x%x\n", pntsd->revision, pntsd->type, le32_to_cpu(pntsd->osidoffset),
@@ -933,9 +928,12 @@ int parse_sec_desc(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, pntsd->type =cpu_to_le16 (DACL_PRESENT );if (pntsd->osidoffset) { -if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd )) +if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ) || +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset) >= acl_len)return -EINVAL ; + owner_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset)); rc =parse_sid (owner_sid_ptr, end_of_acl);if (rc) {pr_err ("%s: Error %d parsing Owner SID\n" , __func__, rc);
@@ -951,9 +949,12 @@ int parse_sec_desc(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, }if (pntsd->gsidoffset) { -if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd )) +if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ) || +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset) >= acl_len)return -EINVAL ; + group_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset)); rc =parse_sid (group_sid_ptr, end_of_acl);if (rc) { pr_err("%s: Error %d mapping Owner SID to gid\n",
@@ -975,9 +976,10 @@ int parse_sec_desc(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, pntsd->type |=cpu_to_le16 (DACL_PROTECTED );if (dacloffset) { -if (dacloffset <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd )) +if (dacloffset <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ) || dacloffset >= acl_len)return -EINVAL ; + dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset); rc =parse_dacl (idmap, dacl_ptr, end_of_acl, owner_sid_ptr, group_sid_ptr, fattr);if (rc)
Re: Backport: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: validate security descriptor offsets before pointer" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3474e1a304fbf9f7c996b24adcd519e031227a90 ]
parse_sec_desc() constructs SID and DACL pointers by adding untrusted 32-bit offsets to the security descriptor before checking their bounds. The existing checks reject offsets into the descriptor header, but do not reject offsets beyond the descriptor's length.
On a 32-bit kernel, a large offset can wrap the pointer before the descriptor. The end-only checks in parse_sid() and parse_dacl() can then accept it, allowing an authenticated SMB2 SET_INFO request to access memory outside the security descriptor and fault the kernel.
Check each nonzero offset against acl_len before constructing its pointer. Initialize the optional owner and group SID pointers to NULL so an omitted SID remains absent when parsing the DACL.
The 6.1 tree uses a void parse_dacl(). Preserve that interface in this backport.
--- fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c +11 -9
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, int acl_len, struct smb_fattr *fattr) { int rc = 0; -struct smb_sid *owner_sid_ptr, *group_sid_ptr; +struct smb_sid *owner_sid_ptr =NULL , *group_sid_ptr =NULL ;struct smb_acl *dacl_ptr;/* no need for SACL ptr */ char *end_of_acl = ((char *)pntsd) + acl_len;__u32 dacloffset;
@@ -897,12 +897,7 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd,if (acl_len <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ))return -EINVAL ; - owner_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + -le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset)); - group_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + -le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset)); dacloffset =le32_to_cpu (pntsd->dacloffset); - dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset); ksmbd_debug(SMB, "revision %d type 0x%x ooffset 0x%x goffset 0x%x sacloffset 0x%x dacloffset 0x%x\n", pntsd->revision, pntsd->type, le32_to_cpu(pntsd->osidoffset),
@@ -918,9 +913,12 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, pntsd->type =cpu_to_le16 (DACL_PRESENT );if (pntsd->osidoffset) { -if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd )) +if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ) || +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset) >= acl_len)return -EINVAL ; + owner_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset)); rc =parse_sid (owner_sid_ptr, end_of_acl);if (rc) {pr_err ("%s: Error %d parsing Owner SID\n" , __func__, rc);
@@ -936,9 +934,12 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, }if (pntsd->gsidoffset) { -if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd )) +if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ) || +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset) >= acl_len)return -EINVAL ; + group_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset)); rc =parse_sid (group_sid_ptr, end_of_acl);if (rc) { pr_err("%s: Error %d mapping Owner SID to gid\n",
@@ -960,9 +961,10 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, pntsd->type |=cpu_to_le16 (DACL_PROTECTED );if (dacloffset) { -if (dacloffset <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd )) +if (dacloffset <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ) || dacloffset >= acl_len)return -EINVAL ; + dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);parse_dacl (user_ns, dacl_ptr, end_of_acl, owner_sid_ptr, group_sid_ptr, fattr); }
--
2.43.0
Sasha Levin
maintainerRe: Backport: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: validate security descriptor offsets before pointer" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree
Quoted 1 line · Ratnaker Gautam
The 6.1 tree uses a void
parse_dacl(). Preserve that interface in t
Could you fix your mail client and try again please? :)
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Sasha
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): DB5PR08MB100627622C33C426D3138E1FAFD682@DB5PR08MB10062.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com
PATCH 1/1 Fixed ksmbd: validate security descriptor offsets before pointer arithmetic
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3474e1a304fbf9f7c996b24adcd519e031227a90 ]
parse_sec_desc() constructs SID and DACL pointers by adding untrusted 32-bit offsets to the security descriptor before checking their bounds. The existing checks reject offsets into the descriptor header, but do not reject offsets beyond the descriptor's length.
On a 32-bit kernel, a large offset can wrap the pointer before the descriptor. The end-only checks in parse_sid() and parse_dacl() can then accept it, allowing an authenticated SMB2 SET_INFO request to access memory outside the security descriptor and fault the kernel.
Check each nonzero offset against acl_len before constructing its pointer. Initialize the optional owner and group SID pointers to NULL so an omitted SID remains absent when parsing the DACL.
The 6.1 tree uses a void parse_dacl(). Preserve that interface in this backport.
---
My earlier reply in this thread had its tabs expanded by Outlook. Please disregard that copy.
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c +11 -9
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, int acl_len, struct smb_fattr *fattr) { int rc = 0; -struct smb_sid *owner_sid_ptr, *group_sid_ptr; +struct smb_sid *owner_sid_ptr =NULL , *group_sid_ptr =NULL ;struct smb_acl *dacl_ptr;/* no need for SACL ptr */ char *end_of_acl = ((char *)pntsd) + acl_len;__u32 dacloffset;
@@ -897,12 +897,7 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd,if (acl_len <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ))return -EINVAL ; - owner_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + -le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset)); - group_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + -le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset)); dacloffset =le32_to_cpu (pntsd->dacloffset); - dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset); ksmbd_debug(SMB, "revision %d type 0x%x ooffset 0x%x goffset 0x%x sacloffset 0x%x dacloffset 0x%x\n", pntsd->revision, pntsd->type, le32_to_cpu(pntsd->osidoffset),
@@ -918,9 +913,12 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, pntsd->type =cpu_to_le16 (DACL_PRESENT );if (pntsd->osidoffset) { -if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd )) +if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ) || +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset) >= acl_len)return -EINVAL ; + owner_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->osidoffset)); rc =parse_sid (owner_sid_ptr, end_of_acl);if (rc) {pr_err ("%s: Error %d parsing Owner SID\n" , __func__, rc);
@@ -936,9 +934,12 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, }if (pntsd->gsidoffset) { -if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd )) +if (le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset) <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ) || +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset) >= acl_len)return -EINVAL ; + group_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + +le32_to_cpu (pntsd->gsidoffset)); rc =parse_sid (group_sid_ptr, end_of_acl);if (rc) { pr_err("%s: Error %d mapping Owner SID to gid\n",
@@ -960,9 +961,10 @@ int parse_sec_desc(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, pntsd->type |=cpu_to_le16 (DACL_PROTECTED );if (dacloffset) { -if (dacloffset <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd )) +if (dacloffset <sizeof (struct smb_ntsd ) || dacloffset >= acl_len)return -EINVAL ; + dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);parse_dacl (user_ns, dacl_ptr, end_of_acl, owner_sid_ptr, group_sid_ptr, fattr); }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH 6.1.y] Fixed ksmbd: validate security descriptor offsets before pointer arithmetic
Quoted 3 lines
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
3474e1a304fbf9f7c996b24adcd519e031227a90]
Queued for 6.1 and 5.15, thanks.
Going forward please fix your mail client and follow the submission rules: send with git send-email, use a proper [PATCH 6.1.y] / [PATCH 5.15.y] subject, and do not send patches as Outlook replies.
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Sasha