tcp: initialize missing request_sock fields in syncookie path
Subsystems (3)
cover tcp: initialize missing request_sock fields in syncookie path
Initialize missing request_sock fields for TCP connections accepted via SYN cookies, where cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc() and bpf_sk_assign_tcp_reqsk() allocate without __GFP_ZERO:
- Patch 1 initializes ireq->ir_rmt_addr and ireq->ir_loc_addr to LOOPBACK4_IPV6 in cookie_v6_check(), matching tcp_v6_init_req().
- Patch 2 initializes the AccECN request_sock fields in cookie_tcp_reqsk_init() and sets syn_ect_snt in cookie_{v4,v6}_check(), matching tcp_openreq_init() and tcp_{v4,v6}_send_synack().
An AI coding assistant helped audit the request_sock initialization paths, write the QEMU reproducer, and draft the changelogs.
Thaison Phan (2):
tcp: initialize ir_rmt_addr and ir_loc_addr in cookie_v6_check()
tcp: accecn: initialize AccECN fields in syncookie path
net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
base-commit: 19ec8416a76c08326fe5f814410a1b43046e63be
Signature · 1 line
2.56.0.611.g1030f0b940-goog
PATCH 1/2 tcp: initialize ir_rmt_addr and ir_loc_addr in cookie_v6_check()
Commit a3a128f611a9 ("inet: consolidate inet_csk_clone_lock()") moved the LOOPBACK4_IPV6 initialization for passive IPv6 TCP sockets from tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() to tcp_v6_init_req().
IPv6 SYN cookie connections allocate a fresh request_sock without __GFP_ZERO and call tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() without tcp_v6_init_req(), leaving ireq->ir_rmt_addr and ireq->ir_loc_addr uninitialized in cookie_v6_check(). inet_csk_clone_lock() then copies uninitialized slab bytes into sk_daddr, sk_rcv_saddr, and inet_saddr, exposing them to tracepoints and bpf_sock and causing inet_daddr != LOOPBACK4_IPV6 checks (such as IP_OPTIONS in do_ip_setsockopt()) to misclassify native IPv6 child sockets as IPv4-mapped.
Initialize ireq->ir_rmt_addr and ireq->ir_loc_addr to LOOPBACK4_IPV6 in cookie_v6_check() to match tcp_v6_init_req().
Found in CI testing on a KASAN kernel; reproduced without kernel modifications in a KASAN VM (tcp_syncookies=2) and tested against the reproducer and packetdrill syncookie selftests.
--- net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/syncookies.c +3 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <net/ipv6.h> #include <net/tcp.h> #include <net/tcp_ecn.h> +#include <net/transp_v6.h> #define COOKIEBITS 24/* Upper bits store count */ #define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
@@ -205,6 +206,8 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr =ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr; ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr =ipv6_hdr (skb)->daddr; + ireq->ir_rmt_addr =LOOPBACK4_IPV6 ; + ireq->ir_loc_addr =LOOPBACK4_IPV6 ;if (security_inet_conn_request (sk, skb, req)) {SKB_DR_SET (reason,SECURITY_HOOK );
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Re: [PATCH net 1/2] tcp: initialize ir_rmt_addr and ir_loc_addr in cookie_v6_check()
Quoted 14 lines · Thaison Phan
Commit
a3a128f611a9("inet: consolidateinet_csk_clone_lock()") moved theLOOPBACK4_IPV6initialization for passive IPv6 TCP sockets fromtcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()totcp_v6_init_req().IPv6 SYN cookie connections allocate a fresh
request_sockwithout__GFP_ZEROand calltcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()withouttcp_v6_init_req(), leavingireq->ir_rmt_addrandireq->ir_loc_addruninitialized incookie_v6_check().inet_csk_clone_lock()then copies uninitialized slab bytes intosk_daddr,sk_rcv_saddr, andinet_saddr, exposing them to tracepoints andbpf_sockand causinginet_daddr!=LOOPBACK4_IPV6checks (such asIP_OPTIONSindo_ip_setsockopt()) to misclassify native IPv6 child sockets as IPv4-mapped.
Quoted 7 lines
Initialize
ireq->ir_rmt_addrandireq->ir_loc_addrtoLOOPBACK4_IPV6incookie_v6_check()to matchtcp_v6_init_req().Found in CI testing on a KASAN kernel; reproduced without kernel modifications in a KASAN VM (tcp_syncookies=2) and tested against the reproducer and packetdrill syncookie selftests.
Nice catch, but KASAN does not report uninitialized reads.
Was this KMSAN, or did you notice garbage in the inet_sock_set_state tracepoint output?
Please say which in the changelog, and include the report or the trace line if you have one.
Quoted 19 lines
Fixes a3a128f611a9 ("inet: consolidate inet_csk_clone_lock()")Signed-off-by Thaison Phan <[email protected]>--- net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)net/ipv6/syncookies.c +1
-0@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <net/ipv6.h> #include <net/tcp.h> #include <net/tcp_ecn.h> +#include <net/transp_v6.h> #define COOKIEBITS 24/* Upper bits store count */ #define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
net/ipv6/syncookies.c struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) · line 210
Quoted 5 lines
net/ipv6/syncookies.c +2
-0@@ -205,6 +206,8 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr =ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr; ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr =ipv6_hdr (skb)->daddr; + ireq->ir_rmt_addr =LOOPBACK4_IPV6 ; + ireq->ir_loc_addr =LOOPBACK4_IPV6 ;
With the changelog clarified:
pw-bot: cr
Re: [PATCH net 1/2] tcp: initialize ir_rmt_addr and ir_loc_addr in cookie_v6_check()
Quoted 6 lines · Eric Dumazet
Nice catch, but KASAN does not report uninitialized reads. Was this KMSAN, or did you notice garbage in the
inet_sock_set_statetracepoint output?Please say which in the changelog, and include the report or the trace line if you have one.
I should have explained KASAN's relation to the bug better. It was not caught by a KASAN/KMSAN report itself, but originally noticed via an out-of-tree socket hook observing inet_sk(sk)->inet_saddr != LOOPBACK4_IPV6 on KASAN test runs, and reproduced upstream via the inet_sock_set_state tracepoint.
When KASAN is enabled, SLUB_RCU_DEBUG is enabled by default, introducing an RCU grace period before freeing the request_sock from the initial SYN. Without that grace period, cookie_v6_check() typically reuses the warm request_sock whose ir_rmt_addr and ir_loc_addr were already set to LOOPBACK4_IPV6. With the grace period, cookie_v6_check() gets a cold slab object instead, e.g. (with slub_debug=P, expecting 127.0.0.6):
... sock:inet_sock_set_state: family=AF_INET6 protocol=IPPROTO_TCP \
sport=59839 dport=41050 \
saddr=90.90.90.90 daddr=90.90.90.90 \
saddrv6=::1 daddrv6=::1 \
oldstate=TCP_LISTEN newstate=TCP_SYN_RECVI'll clarify this and include the trace output in the v2 changelog.
PATCH 2/2 tcp: accecn: initialize AccECN fields in syncookie path
In reply to Thaison Phancookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc() and bpf_sk_assign_tcp_reqsk() allocate struct request_sock without __GFP_ZERO, leaving saw_accecn_opt, accecn_fail_mode, syn_ect_rcv, and syn_ect_snt uninitialized. When accecn_ok is negotiated in cookie_{v4,v6}_check(), tcp_ecn_openreq_child() reads all four fields to initialize the child socket's AccECN state.
In addition, because the temporary request_sock used to send a cookie SYN-ACK is immediately freed, treq->syn_ect_snt is lost. If the listener marks ECT (e.g. DCTCP), leaving syn_ect_snt at 0 causes tcp_accecn_third_ack() to flag TCP_ACCECN_ACE_FAIL_RECV when the peer reflects ECT, disabling ECT for the rest of the connection.
Initialize the AccECN fields in cookie_tcp_reqsk_init() to match tcp_openreq_init(), and set syn_ect_snt from the listener's TOS/tclass in cookie_{v4,v6}_check() to match tcp_{v4,v6}_send_synack().
Found by code inspection while auditing request_sock initialization in the syncookie path; reproduced without kernel modifications in a KASAN VM (tcp_syncookies=2, tcp_ecn=3) and tested against the reproducer and packetdrill AccECN/syncookie selftests.
--- net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/syncookies.c +5 -0
@@ -290,6 +290,10 @@ static int cookie_tcp_reqsk_init(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,*/ treq->txhash = treq->snt_isn; treq->syn_tos =TCP_SKB_CB (skb)->ip_dsfield; + treq->saw_accecn_opt =TCP_ACCECN_OPT_NOT_SEEN ; + treq->accecn_fail_mode =0 ; + treq->syn_ect_rcv =0 ; + treq->syn_ect_snt =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MPTCP ) treq->is_mptcp =sk_is_mptcp (sk);
@@ -502,6 +506,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale; ireq->ecn_ok &=cookie_ecn_ok (net, &rt->dst); treq->accecn_ok = ireq->ecn_ok &&cookie_accecn_ok (th); + treq->syn_ect_snt =READ_ONCE (inet_sk (sk)->tos) &INET_ECN_MASK ; ret =tcp_get_cookie_sock (sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);/* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup
net/ipv6/syncookies.c +1 -0
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale; ireq->ecn_ok &=cookie_ecn_ok (net, dst);tcp_rsk (req)->accecn_ok = ireq->ecn_ok &&cookie_accecn_ok (th); +tcp_rsk (req)->syn_ect_snt =READ_ONCE (np->tclass) &INET_ECN_MASK ; ret =tcp_get_cookie_sock (sk, skb, req, dst);if (!ret) {
Signature · 1 line
2.56.0.611.g1030f0b940-goog
Re: [PATCH net 2/2] tcp: accecn: initialize AccECN fields in syncookie path
Quoted 8 lines · Thaison Phan
cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc()andbpf_sk_assign_tcp_reqsk()allocate structrequest_sockwithout__GFP_ZERO, leavingsaw_accecn_opt,accecn_fail_mode,syn_ect_rcv, andsyn_ect_sntuninitialized. Whenaccecn_okis negotiated in cookie_{v4,v6}_check(),tcp_ecn_openreq_child()reads all four fields to initialize the child socket's AccECN state.
Right.
Quoted 5 lines
In addition, because the temporary
request_sockused to send a cookie SYN-ACK is immediately freed,treq->syn_ect_sntis lost. If the listener marks ECT (e.g. DCTCP), leavingsyn_ect_sntat 0 causestcp_accecn_third_ack()to flagTCP_ACCECN_ACE_FAIL_RECVwhen the peer reflects ECT, disabling ECT for the rest of the connection.
This is a different bug than the uninitialized fields above, with a different impact. I would prefer two patches, one per bug, but since both Fixes: commits landed in the same release I will not insist.
Quoted 9 lines
Initialize the AccECN fields in
cookie_tcp_reqsk_init()to matchtcp_openreq_init(), and setsyn_ect_sntfrom the listener's TOS/tclass in cookie_{v4,v6}_check() to match tcp_{v4,v6}_send_synack().Found by code inspection while auditing
request_sockinitialization in the syncookie path; reproduced without kernel modifications in a KASAN VM (tcp_syncookies=2, tcp_ecn=3) and tested against the reproducer and packetdrill AccECN/syncookie selftests.
Same remark as for the LOOPBACK4_IPV6 patch: KASAN does not catch uninitialized bitfields. Please say how the failure was observed (KMSAN, tcpi_accecn_fail_mode in TCP_INFO on the child, ...).
Quoted 14 lines
Fixes 3cae34274c79 ("tcp: accecn: AccECN negotiation")Fixes b40671b5ee58 ("tcp: accecn: AccECN option failure handling")Signed-off-by Thaison Phan <[email protected]>--- net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)net/ipv4/syncookies.c +0
-0
net/ipv4/syncookies.c static int cookie_tcp_reqsk_init(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, · line 296
Quoted 7 lines
net/ipv4/syncookies.c +4
-0@@ -290,6 +290,10 @@ static int cookie_tcp_reqsk_init(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,*/ treq->txhash = treq->snt_isn; treq->syn_tos =TCP_SKB_CB (skb)->ip_dsfield; + treq->saw_accecn_opt =TCP_ACCECN_OPT_NOT_SEEN ; + treq->accecn_fail_mode =0 ; + treq->syn_ect_rcv =0 ; + treq->syn_ect_snt =0 ;
I think syn_ect_snt is always overwritten in cookie_{v4,v6}_check() before being read, this line is not needed?
Quoted 24 lines
net/ipv4/syncookies.c +1
-0#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MPTCP ) treq->is_mptcp =sk_is_mptcp (sk);@@ -502,6 +506,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale; ireq->ecn_ok &=cookie_ecn_ok (net, &rt->dst); treq->accecn_ok = ireq->ecn_ok &&cookie_accecn_ok (th); + treq->syn_ect_snt =READ_ONCE (inet_sk (sk)->tos) &INET_ECN_MASK ; ret =tcp_get_cookie_sock (sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);/* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup net/ipv6/syncookies.c +1
-1@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale; ireq->ecn_ok &=cookie_ecn_ok (net, dst);tcp_rsk (req)->accecn_ok = ireq->ecn_ok &&cookie_accecn_ok (th); +tcp_rsk (req)->syn_ect_snt =READ_ONCE (np->tclass) &INET_ECN_MASK ; ret =tcp_get_cookie_sock (sk, skb, req, dst);if (!ret) { --
Quoted 2 lines
2.56.0.611.g1030f0b940-goog
Thanks.
Re: [PATCH net 2/2] tcp: accecn: initialize AccECN fields in syncookie path
Quoted 4 lines · Eric Dumazet
This is a different bug than the uninitialized fields above, with a different impact. I would prefer two patches, one per bug, but since both Fixes: commits landed in the same release I will not insist.
Makes sense. I'll make sure to split independent fixes into separate patches in the future.
Quoted 3 lines
Same remark as for the
LOOPBACK4_IPV6patch: KASAN does not catch uninitialized bitfields. Please say how the failure was observed (KMSAN,tcpi_accecn_fail_modeinTCP_INFOon the child, ...).
This was spotted by code inspection (with AI assistance) comparing tcp_openreq_init() and cookie_tcp_reqsk_init() while investigating the LOOPBACK4_IPV6 bug. We then verified it on a kernel with SLUB_RCU_DEBUG=y and slub_debug=P (preventing reuse of the warm request_sock from the initial SYN), observing bogus tcpi_accecn_fail_mode and tcpi_accecn_opt_seen values in TCP_INFO on the accepted child socket (as well as tcpi_accecn_fail_mode=0x2 when the listener sends ECT(0) on the SYN-ACK).
I'll update the v2 changelog with these details.
Quoted 2 lines
I think
syn_ect_sntis always overwritten in cookie_{v4,v6}_check() before being read, this line is not needed?
Agreed, cookie_{v4,v6}_check() always overwrite syn_ect_snt before tcp_get_cookie_sock() reads it. I'll drop that line in v2.
RE: [PATCH net 2/2] tcp: accecn: initialize AccECN fields in syncookie path
In reply to Thaison PhanQuoted 7 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Thaison Phan <[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2026 5:13 PM
To: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>; Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>; Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>; David S . Miller <[email protected]>; Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>; Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>; Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]>; Olivier Tilmans (Nokia) <[email protected]>; Chia-Yu Chang (Nokia) <[email protected]>
Cc: Simon Horman <[email protected]>; Stan Iliev <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]; Thaison Phan <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH net 2/2] tcp: accecn: initialize AccECN fields in syncookie path
Quoted 6 lines
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If the listener marks ECT (e.g. DCTCP), leaving
syn_ect_sntat 0 causestcp_accecn_third_ack()to flagTCP_ACCECN_ACE_FAIL_RECVwhen the peer reflects ECT, disabling ECT for the rest of the connection.
Hi,
Thanks for the fix, the only change I propose is to clarify the above message into:
"For AccECN connections where the listener marks ECT on the SYN-ACK, leaving syn_ect_snt as 0 causes tcp_accecn_third_ack() to see a mismatch between the expected Not-ECT and the peer's reflected ECT in the ACE field, erroneously flagging TCP_ACCECN_ACE_FAIL_RECV in accecn_fail_mode. Refer to Table 4 of RFC 9768 for more details."
Because RFC3168 ECN does not use this syn_ect_snt.
Thanks.
Chia-Yu
Re: [PATCH net 2/2] tcp: accecn: initialize AccECN fields in syncookie path
Quoted 9 lines · Chia-Yu Chang (Nokia)
Thanks for the fix, the only change I propose is to clarify the above message into:
"For AccECN connections where the listener marks ECT on the SYN-ACK, leaving
syn_ect_sntas 0 causestcp_accecn_third_ack()to see a mismatch between the expected Not-ECT and the peer's reflected ECT in the ACE field, erroneously flaggingTCP_ACCECN_ACE_FAIL_RECVinaccecn_fail_mode.
Refer to Table 4 of RFC 9768 for more details."Because RFC3168 ECN does not use this
syn_ect_snt.
Thanks for reviewing. That wording is clearer and more precise.
I sent out v2 [1] yesterday before seeing your note, so once the 24-hour repost window passes I will send a v3 incorporating your clarification (assuming v2 hasn't already been picked up by then).