Skip to contentSkip to conversation

RFC: 'ioctl' for keyrings

DISCUSSION David Howells 2 participants 6 messages Mar 13, 2014 – Mar 14, 2014

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

Hi Linus,

I've encountered a situation where I could do with providign certain key types with their own operations and I'm wondering as to the best way.

The problem I've been trying to deal with is to improve quota management on keys and introduce LRU key discard when a quota is overrun. This requires me to overhaul all the ->instantiate() and ->update() key type operations as they can ask for more quota.

What I want to do is to use the preparsing mechanism I introduced for asymmetric key handling for both operations. This has the advantage that all parse errors and invalid arguments can be found upfront before we start allocating things that are difficult to back out of - and means that we're less likely to encounter ENOMEM in the type op functions.

Now, ->instantiate() is meant to set the payload on a key and ->update() is meant to replace the payload on a key. There is, currently, no way to modify a key to some lesser extent.

However, in the process of doing this, I've come to realise that the trusted key type and the encrypted key type use their ->update() operations to make a partial alteration to a key.

Unfortunately, this does not lend itself to preparsing because the result depends on the key we're going to update - and we don't necessarily know the key yet.

Further, this behaviour is also broken because ->update() may be called by add_key() if it finds a matching key; but you cannot rely on add_key() adding vs updating because it may race with someone else doing an add_key(). To make matters yet more interesting, at least with encrypted_update(), the parameters expected in the payload depend on whether you want to create a key or alter a key.

I can fix this in one of a number of ways:

(1) Provide a generic control operation (analogous with ioctl()) that allows the user to make some general operation on a key (querying it, altering it, interacting with hardware).

(2) Provide an alter operation that only allows the key to be altered. Looking at trusted_update(), though, I have a suspicion that this may not be sufficient as that also seems to invoke an interaction with the TPM.

(3) Provide separate, specific keyctl functions for the special operations required by encrypted and trusted keys (and other key types potentially) that are then validated in the core and routed to the key type.

I would prefer (2) or perhaps (3), I think.

As I understand the code, I think operations being performed from ->update() are:

(a) Resealing a key with a new pcrs (trusted).

(b) Changing the master key (encrypted).

Mimi, Dmitry: is this list right?

Note that if I do provide some more appropriate vector, I will probably have to have special code for handling encrypted and trusted keyrings in the core, rejecting attempts to update in key_create_or_update() and redirecting them in key_update() in security/keys/key.c

David

#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · David Howells

I can fix this in one of a number of ways:

(1) Provide a generic control operation (analogous with ioctl()) that allows the user to make some general operation on a key (querying it, altering it, interacting with hardware).

Quoted 7 lines

(2) Provide an alter operation that only allows the key to be altered. Looking at trusted_update(), though, I have a suspicion that this may not be sufficient as that also seems to invoke an interaction with the TPM.

(3) Provide separate, specific keyctl functions for the special operations required by encrypted and trusted keys (and other key types potentially) that are then validated in the core and routed to the key type.

(4) Simply make key_update() look for the encrypted and trusted key types and call a special key type op for those. The main ->update op will be taking preparsed data and would no longer be callable in this situation.

David

#2 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · David Howells
Quoted 10 lines · David Howells

I can fix this in one of a number of ways:

(1) Provide a generic control operation (analogous with ioctl()) that allows the user to make some general operation on a key (querying it, altering it, interacting with hardware).

(2) Provide an alter operation that only allows the key to be altered. Looking at trusted_update(), though, I have a suspicion that this may not be sufficient as that also seems to invoke an interaction with the TPM.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

(3) Provide separate, specific keyctl functions for the special operations required by encrypted and trusted keys (and other key types potentially) that are then validated in the core and routed to the key type.

(4) Simply make key_update() look for the encrypted and trusted key types and call a special key type op for those. The main ->update op will be taking preparsed data and would no longer be callable in this situation.

I prefer this last option. Define a separate 'update' option for trusted and encrypted keys, which would only create or modify, but never replace an existing key.

thanks,

Mimi

#3 lore raw
In reply to David Howells
Quoted 51 lines · David Howells

Hi Linus,

I've encountered a situation where I could do with providign certain key types with their own operations and I'm wondering as to the best way.

The problem I've been trying to deal with is to improve quota management on keys and introduce LRU key discard when a quota is overrun. This requires me to overhaul all the ->instantiate() and ->update() key type operations as they can ask for more quota.

What I want to do is to use the preparsing mechanism I introduced for asymmetric key handling for both operations. This has the advantage that all parse errors and invalid arguments can be found upfront before we start allocating things that are difficult to back out of - and means that we're less likely to encounter ENOMEM in the type op functions.

Now, ->instantiate() is meant to set the payload on a key and ->update() is meant to replace the payload on a key. There is, currently, no way to modify a key to some lesser extent.

However, in the process of doing this, I've come to realise that the trusted key type and the encrypted key type use their ->update() operations to make a partial alteration to a key.

Unfortunately, this does not lend itself to preparsing because the result depends on the key we're going to update - and we don't necessarily know the key yet.

Further, this behaviour is also broken because ->update() may be called by add_key() if it finds a matching key; but you cannot rely on add_key() adding vs updating because it may race with someone else doing an add_key(). To make matters yet more interesting, at least with encrypted_update(), the parameters expected in the payload depend on whether you want to create a key or alter a key.

I can fix this in one of a number of ways:

(1) Provide a generic control operation (analogous with ioctl()) that allows the user to make some general operation on a key (querying it, altering it, interacting with hardware).

(2) Provide an alter operation that only allows the key to be altered. Looking at trusted_update(), though, I have a suspicion that this may not be sufficient as that also seems to invoke an interaction with the TPM.

(3) Provide separate, specific keyctl functions for the special operations required by encrypted and trusted keys (and other key types potentially) that are then validated in the core and routed to the key type.

I would prefer (2) or perhaps (3), I think.

Quoted 8 lines

As I understand the code, I think operations being performed from ->update() are:

(a) Resealing a key with a new pcrs (trusted).

(b) Changing the master key (encrypted).

Mimi, Dmitry: is this list right?

In addition to resealing trusted keys to a new TPM PCR value, there are a few other options that can be modified (eg. keyauth, blobauth, pcrlock). Encrypted keys can be encrypted/decrypted with a new master key (trusted or user key type).

Mimi

Quoted 11 lines

Note that if I do provide some more appropriate vector, I will probably have to have special code for handling encrypted and trusted keyrings in the core, rejecting attempts to update in key_create_or_update() and redirecting them in key_update() in security/keys/key.c

David
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

#4 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 5 lines

As I understand the code, I think operations being performed from ->update() are:

(a) Resealing a key with a new pcrs (trusted).

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

(b) Changing the master key (encrypted).

Mimi, Dmitry: is this list right?

In addition to resealing trusted keys to a new TPM PCR value, there are a few other options that can be modified (eg. keyauth, blobauth, pcrlock). Encrypted keys can be encrypted/decrypted with a new master key (trusted or user key type).

Can (re)sealing a key be viewed as encrypting it? Is the difference between sealing a key and encrypting a key the use of hardware support?

David

#5 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · David Howells
Quoted 9 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 8 lines

As I understand the code, I think operations being performed from ->update() are:

(a) Resealing a key with a new pcrs (trusted).

(b) Changing the master key (encrypted).

Mimi, Dmitry: is this list right?

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

In addition to resealing trusted keys to a new TPM PCR value, there are a few other options that can be modified (eg. keyauth, blobauth, pcrlock). Encrypted keys can be encrypted/decrypted with a new master key (trusted or user key type).

Can (re)sealing a key be viewed as encrypting it? Is the difference between sealing a key and encrypting a key the use of hardware support?

Yes, 'resealing/sealing' is TPM terminology for encrypting/decrypting. The sealing is RSA encryption by a TPM chip, which can only be decrypted by the same chip.

Mimi