Patch related with Fork Bobmbing Attack
Hello All
As per the discussion in the thread with subject as
Patch Related with Fork Bombing Attack on LKML, I request you for the inclusion of my attached patch named "fork.patch".
Summery of the Patch:
This patch warns the administrator about the fork bombing attack (whenever any user is crossing its process limit). I have used printk_ratelimit function in this patch. This function helps to prevent flooding of syslog and prints message as per the values set by root user in following files:-
1) /proc/sys/kernel/printk_ratelimit:- This file contains value for, how many times message should be printed in syslog.
2) /proc/sys/kernel/printk_ratelimit_burst: - This file contains value for, after how much time message should be repeated.
This patch is really helpful for administrator/root user from security point of view. They can take action against attacker by looking at syslog messages related with fork bombing attack.
Added comments will definitely help developers.
Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c +9 -2
@@ -958,11 +958,18 @@ retval = -EAGAIN ; +/* +* following code does not allow Non Root User to cross its process +* limit. it alerts administrator about fork bombing attack and prevents +* it. +*/ if (atomic_read (&p->user->processes) >= p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC ].rlim_cur)if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && - p->user != &root_user) - + p->user != &root_user) { +if (printk_ratelimit ()) +printk (KERN_CRIT "User with uid %d is crossing its process limit\n" ,p->user->uid); goto bad_fork_free; + }atomic_inc (&p->user->__count);
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Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c +4
-0+/* +* following code does not allow Non Root User to cross its process +* limit. it alerts administrator about fork bombing attack and prevents +* it.
Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c line 972
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Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c +5
-2+*/ if (atomic_read (&p->user->processes) >= p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC ].rlim_cur)if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && - p->user != &root_user) - + p->user != &root_user) { +if (printk_ratelimit ()) +printk (KERN_CRIT "User with uid %d is crossing its process limit\n" ,p->user->uid); goto bad_fork_free; + }
please run scripts/checkpatch.pl against your patch. It will point out numerous problems with the coding style. Also, I think a space between KERN_CRIT and " would look better too.
- R.
Quoted 10 lines · Roland Dreier
Quoted 10 lines
Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c +6
-2+/* +* following code does not allow Non Root User to cross its process +* limit. it alerts administrator about fork bombing attack and prevents +* it. +*/ if (atomic_read (&p->user->processes) >= p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC ].rlim_cur)if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && - p->user != &root_user) - + p->user != &root_user) {
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Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c line 972
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Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c +3
-0+if (printk_ratelimit ()) +printk (KERN_CRIT "User with uid %d is crossing its process limit\n" ,p->user->uid); goto bad_fork_free; + }please run
scripts/checkpatch.plagainst your patch. It will point out numerous problems with the coding style. Also, I think a space betweenKERN_CRITand " would look better too.
And uid is %lu, not %d.
And s/its/his/ or s/its/the/;
Jan
Quoted 14 lines · Jan Engelhardt
Quoted 13 lines · Roland Dreier
Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c
Quoted 12 lines
Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c +8
-2+/* +* following code does not allow Non Root User to cross its process +* limit. it alerts administrator about fork bombing attack and prevents +* it. +*/ if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >= p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && - p->user != &root_user) - + p->user != &root_user) { + if (printk_ratelimit()) + printk(KERN_CRIT"User with uid %d is crossing its processlimit\n",p->user->uid);
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Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c line 972
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Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c +1
-0goto bad_fork_free; + }
Why does this need to be KERN_CRIT? You can't assume that every time a process limit is reached that it's a fork bomb.
Signature · 1 line
Simon Arlott
Quoted 18 lines · On Wednesday 13 June 2007 07:34:09 Simon Arlott wrote:
Quoted 17 lines · Jan Engelhardt
Quoted 16 lines · Roland Dreier
Quoted 12 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+ /* + * following code does not allow Non Root User to cross itsprocess + * limit. it alerts administrator about fork bombing
attack and prevents + * it.(quoted diff) +1
-0+ */ if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >=p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && -p->user!=&root_user)Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c +3
-1- + p->user != &root_user) { + if (printk_ratelimit()) + printk(KERN_CRIT"User with uid %d isQuoted 1 line
crossing its process
limit\n",p->user->uid);
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Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c line 972
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Desktop/a1/linux-2.6.17.tar.bz2_FILES/linux-2.6.17/kernel/fork.c +1
-0goto bad_fork_free; + }Why does this need to be
KERN_CRIT? You can't assume that every time a process limit is reached that it's a fork bomb.
I think the reasoning here is to alert the administrator(s) to the possibility that somebody has just tried a fork-bomb. A better test, IMHO, would be to check how fast the processes are being spawned and whether a large percentage share the same parent. (Those two taken together would better spot most fork-bombs, including the very simple types that are just a simple one-liner)
DRH
Signature · 1 line
Dialup is like pissing through a pipette. Slow and excruciatingly painful.
Quoted 7 lines · Daniel Hazelton
I think the reasoning here is to alert the administrator(s) to the possibility
that somebody has just tried a fork-bomb. A better test, IMHO, would be to check how fast the processes are being spawned and whether a large percentage
share the same parent. (Those two taken together would better spot most fork-bombs, including the very simple types that are just a simple one-liner)
Not sure if it's a great idea at all. If the attacker is dumb then the administrator already has everything he/she needs (and more) to adjust the luser attitude.
If it's a serious attack then the attacker will evade the tests anyway (but he/she may not be able to overcome the limits and the admin still have all required info etc).
If we print such things then perhaps the next patch in queue should warn us about users trying to access /etc/shadow or issuing some configuration syscalls?
Quoted 1 line
From a different point of view it would be alerting sysadmins about
a user who tried to create one more process than he/she was allowed to. Isn't it crazy?
Signature · 1 line
Krzysztof Halasa