O_DIRECTORY|O_CREAT handling
PATCH 1/1 O_DIRECTORY|O_CREAT handling
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The kernel currently handles open() calls with flags having at least O_DIRECTORY|O_CREAT set strangely (to say the least). It creates a regular file, completely ignoring the O_DIRECTORY bit. One can argue that open() does not perform any real checking on the parameters and that it is the programmers responsibility, but there is a twist.
Some programs create temporary directory which they afterward use as the working directory or changed root. I.e., we have code like this:
mkdir ("/some/dirRANDOM");
chdir ("/some/dirRANDOM");or
mkdir ("/some/dirRANDOM");
fd = open ("/some/dirRANDOM", O_DIRECTORY);
fchdir (fd);or
mkdir ("/some/dirRANDOM");
chroot ("/some/dirRANDOM");All these pieces of code have an obvious flaw, a race. There is no atomic way to do what we want.
Now combine these two problems. How about making this work?
fd = open ("/some/dirRANDOM", O_RDONLY|O_CREAT|O_DIRECTORY|O_EXCL, 0700);
fchdir (fd);(and similarly for a new interface fchroot which I can add to glibc).
I've attached a little patch which does just that. Some comments on the code:
~ if an existing directory is opened with O_RDWR open() returns
- -EISDIR. I've mimicked this, allthough the error code might not be the most obvious.
~ O_TRUNC is not allowed.
The small attached patch implements this proposal. At least it does what I want it to do, no idea what bugs I introduce.
- --
➧ Ulrich Drepper ➧ Red Hat, Inc. ➧ 444 Castro St ➧ Mountain View, CA ❖ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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fs/namei.c renamed from fs/namei.c-opendir +11 -2
@@ -1295,7 +1295,12 @@if (!dentry->d_inode) {if (!IS_POSIXACL (dir->d_inode)) mode &= ~current->fs->umask; - error =vfs_create (dir->d_inode, dentry, mode, nd); +if (unlikely (flag &O_DIRECTORY )) { + error = -EISDIR ; +if (!(flag &FMODE_WRITE )) + error =vfs_mkdir (dir->d_inode, dentry, mode); + }else + error =vfs_create (dir->d_inode, dentry, mode, nd);up (&dir->d_inode->i_sem);dput (nd->dentry); nd->dentry = dentry;
@@ -1331,7 +1336,11 @@dput (nd->dentry); nd->dentry = dentry; error = -EISDIR ; -if (dentry->d_inode &&S_ISDIR (dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) +/* Since we allow creating directories with open(2) we forbid +opening an existing directory with O_CREAT only if the +O_DIRECTORY flag is not set or if truncation is requested. */ +if (dentry->d_inode &&S_ISDIR (dentry->d_inode->i_mode) && + (!(flag &O_DIRECTORY ) || (flag &O_TRUNC ))) goto exit; ok: error =may_open (nd, acc_mode, flag);
Hi Ulrich,
Quoted 13 lines · Ulrich Drepper
Some programs create temporary directory which they afterward use as the working directory or changed root. I.e., we have code like this:
mkdir ("/some/dirRANDOM"); chdir ("/some/dirRANDOM");or
mkdir ("/some/dirRANDOM"); fd = open ("/some/dirRANDOM", O_DIRECTORY); fchdir (fd);
Quoted 7 lines
or
mkdir ("/some/dirRANDOM"); chroot ("/some/dirRANDOM");All these pieces of code have an obvious flaw, a race. There is no atomic way to do what we want.
Although I agree on the race, I fail to see in what case it matters. In my programs, I often use mkdir() to get temporary directories instead of temporary files, just because of the atomicity of the test-and-set which mkdir() provides. Basically, I do :
base_dir="/tmp/tmpdir";
do {
rnd=random();
sprintf(dir, "%s%d", base_dir, rnd);
} while (!mkdir(dir, 0700);
/* now I'm guaranteed that I'm the first to get this dir, */
/* and only my UID can work in it */
chdir(dir);So the only race would be someone working with the same UID (or root) removing the directory and replacing it with another one (or a symlink or anything) between mkdir() and chdir(). But don't see any use or consequence to this.
Quoted 4 lines
Now combine these two problems. How about making this work?
fd = open ("/some/dirRANDOM", O_RDONLY|O_CREAT|O_DIRECTORY|O_EXCL, 0700); fchdir (fd);
It would be interesting, of course, but is it portable to other systems ? If it is not, very few people will use it, unfortunately. But if others already do it right, then why not include it ?
Cheers,
Willy
Quoted 9 lines · Willy Tarreau
base_dir="/tmp/tmpdir";
do {
rnd=random();
sprintf(dir, "%s%d", base_dir, rnd);
} while (!mkdir(dir, 0700);
/* now I'm guaranteed that I'm the first to get this dir, */
/* and only my UID can work in it */
chdir(dir);Quoted 3 lines
So the only race would be someone working with the same UID (or root) removing the directory and replacing it with another one (or a symlink or anything) between
mkdir()andchdir().
If /tmp isn't sticky, anyone can do this. I think this is the scenario Ulrich was referring to.
Andrew
Quoted 10 lines · Andrew Pimlott
Quoted 9 lines · Willy Tarreau
base_dir="/tmp/tmpdir"; do { rnd=random(); sprintf(dir, "%s%d", base_dir, rnd); } while (!mkdir(dir, 0700); /* now I'm guaranteed that I'm the first to get this dir, */ /* and only my UID can work in it */ chdir(dir);
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
So the only race would be someone working with the same UID (or root) removing the directory and replacing it with another one (or a symlink or anything) between
mkdir()andchdir().If /tmp isn't sticky, anyone can do this. I think this is the scenario Ulrich was referring to.
And if /etc/shadow is world-writable, anyone can do other interesting things. Doctor, it hurts when I do it...