Two questions
1) Should it be possible to use a detached header and --integrity
options to cryptsetup at the same time? When I try, I get a message 'No integrity superblock detected on header.'
2) Are there security implications of using a single detached header
with multiple encrypted volumes?
Thanks
On 13 Nov 2019 15:15 +0000, from [email protected]:
Quoted 2 lines
2) Are there security implications of using a single detached header
with multiple encrypted volumes?
Yes; it implies that the two volumes are encrypted using the same master key (as well as being accessible using the same set of passphrases), _and_ it makes it obvious that this is the case.
Whether that's a problem _in practice_ is another matter. It's possible that in your scenario that's unproblematic, but it would be nearly impossible to tell from just a single-sentence question.
For the general case, I would definitely very strongly suggest to have different headers, with different master keys, even if the passphrases are the same.
Signature · 2 lines
Michael Kjörling • https://michael.kjorling.se • [email protected] “Remember when, on the Internet, nobody cared that you were a dog?”
Quoted 1 line · On 11/13/19 4:15 PM, [email protected] wrote:
1) Should it be possible to use a detached header and --integrity options to cryptsetup at the same time? When I try, I get a message 'No integrity superblock detected on header.'
Detached LUKS2 header with auth. encryption does not work. We should add straightforward error message right in 'luksFormat' and 'open' actions. (interestingly it fails in different code up to 2.0.6 and post 2.1.0, but it doesn't work in either release). From my perspective it's a bug that it fails so late in crypt_format() code.
Right now, I'm not sure if it's only unfinished feature from userspace perspective or we miss something also in kernel to make it work correctly.
O.
Quoted 1 line · On 13/11/2019 16:15, [email protected] wrote:
1) Should it be possible to use a detached header and --integrity options to cryptsetup at the same time? When I try, I get a message 'No integrity superblock detected on header.'
The current design is that integrity metadata will stay on the data device (even with detached LUKS header), and these are not encrypted (encryption is not implemented, but has some support in the kernel).
So with the current code, we are not going to support the detached header for authenticated encryption (integrity protection), we should fix the code to explicitly print a warning about it. (The message above is misleading.)
There is still note about --integrity option being experimental, and it stays this way some time... (Maybe forever, if we find that the model that allows reply attacks on the sector level is just inadequate.)
Milan