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Release Digsig 1.3.1: kernel module for run-time authentication of binaries

ANNOUNCE Makan Pourzandi 4 participants 14 messages Sep 9, 2004 – Sep 10, 2004

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#0 lore raw

Hi all,

DSI development team would like to announce the release 1.3.1 of digsig.

This kernel module helps system administrators control Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) binary execution and library loading based on the presence of a valid digital signature. The main functionality is to help system administrators distinguish applications he/she trusts (and therefore signs) from viruses, worms (and other nuisances). It is based on the Linux Security Module hooks.

The code is GPL and available from:
http://sourceforge.net/projects/disec/, download digsig-1.3.1. For more documentation, please refer to disec.sourcefrge.net.

I hope that it'll be useful to you.

All bug reports and feature requests or general feedback are welcome (please CC me or [email protected] in your answer or feedback to the mailing list).

Regards,
Makan Pourzandi

Changes from Digsig release 0.2 announced in this mailing list:
================================================================

- the verification of signatures for the shared binaries has been added.
- added support for caching of signatures
- added documentation for digsig
- added support for revoked signatures
- support to avoid vulnerability for rewrite of shared libraries
- use sysfs to connect to the module instead of the char device
- code clean up, and some bug fixes

Future works
=============

- improving the caching and revocation: it is currently tested and will be sent out soon after stability testing

overview
=======

Instead of writing a long detailed explication, I rather give you an example of how you can use it.

A Very simple scenario to show how to use it
=======================================

1) Generate gpg key and export your public key in order to use it for signature verification.

$gpg --gen-key

=> careful generate RSA key

$gpg --export >> my_public_key.pub

2) Sign your binaries using Bsign

Before using bsign to sign all your binaries, try out with a simple example.

$cp which ps ps-test
$bsign -s ps-test // sign the binary
$bsign -v ps-test // be sure that the signature is valid

3) Make the digsig module

From ./digsig, do make -C /usr/src/linux-2.5.66 SUBDIRS=$PWD modules.
You need rw access to /usr/src/linux-2.5.66.

CAREFUL: we advice you to compile the module in debug mode at your first tries (see -DDSI_DEBUG -DDSI_DIGSIG_DEBUG in the Makefile). In this mode, the module verifies the signatures but does not enforce the security (if not any signature present in your binary, you'll have a message in /var/log/messages but the execution is not aborted.). However, the execution of the binaries with invalid signatures is aborted. Once, you're sure of your binary signature procedure you can recompile the whole on non-debug mode.

4) load digsig, use the public key exported in step 1 as argument

root@colby digsig-dev]# ./digsig.init start pubkey.pub Loading Digsig module.
Making device for communication with the module. Loading public key.
Done.
root@colby digsig-dev]#

5) In debug mode:

$./ps-test

$tail -f /var/log/messages

Sep 16 15:49:16 colby kernel: DSI-LSM MODULE - binary is ./ps-test
Sep 16 15:49:16 colby kernel: DSI-LSM MODULE - dsi_bprm_compute_creds:
Found signature section
Sep 16 15:49:16 colby kernel: DSI-LSM MODULE - dsi_bprm_compute_creds:

Signature verification successful

$ps

// no check for not signed binaries
$tail -f /var/log/messages

Sep 16 15:49:16 colby kernel: DSI-LSM MODULE - binary is ./ps

6) In restrictive mode, normal mode

You need to use bsign to sign all binaries that you want to run in normal mode.

// signed binary
[lmcmpou@reblochon lmcmpou]$ ps
PID TTY TIME CMD
6897 pts/2 00:00:00 bash
6941 pts/2 00:00:00 ps

// not signed binary
[lmcmpou@reblochon lmcmpou]$ ./ps-makan-1
bash: ./ps-makan: cannot execute binary file

// binary with wrong signature
[lmcmpou@reblochon lmcmpou]$ ./ps-makan-2
bash: ./ps-makan-colby: Operation not permitted

7) Unload the module.

[root@colby digsig-dev]# ./digsig.init stop
Unloading Digsig.

Performances
===============

Finally, to provide a better insight into the actual impact of DigSig on real workloads, three kernel compiles were timed on a non-DigSig system, and three on a digsig system. The tests were performed using a 2.6.7 kernel on a Pentium 4 2.4GHz with 512 MB of RAM. The kernel being compiled was a 2.6.4 kernel, and the same .config was used for each compile. Each compile was preceded by a ``make clean''. The first execution both with and without DigSig appears to reflect extra time needed to load the kernel source data files from disk.

The results are presented below:
------------------------

Kernel without DigSig   |
------------------------|
real       |    sys     |
19m21.890s |  1m27.992s |
19m9.276s  |  1m26.584s |
19m9.464s  |  1m26.191s |
19m7.717s  |  1m25.799s |

------------------------

Kernel with DigSig
------------------------

real       |    sys     |
19m19.957s | 1m28.541s  |
19m7.485s  | 1m26.832s  |
19m7.883s  | 1m26.549s  |
19m6.494s  | 1m26.618s  |

------------------------

Requirements:
==============

Linux OS kernel 2.5.66 or higher. We tested against 2.5.66 and 2.6.0-test5.

Bsign version
0.4.5. (http://packages.debian.org/unstable/admin/bsign.html)

GPG 1.2.2 or higher.

Merits
=====

This work has been done by (alphabetical order)

A Apvrille  ([email protected]),
D Gordon    ([email protected]),
S Hallyn    ([email protected])

M Pourzandi ([email protected]),
V Roy ([email protected]).

Special Thanks to Greg Kroah-Hartman for his feedback and to Marc Singer who helped us with the use of Bsign.

Regards,
Makan Pourzandi
-------------------------------------------------------
Makan Pourzandi, Open Systems Lab
Ericsson Research Canada [email protected]
This email does not represent or express the opinions of Ericsson Inc.
-------------------------------------------------------

#1 lore raw
Quoted 27 lines · * Makan Pourzandi ([email protected]) wrote:

Hi all,

DSI development team would like to announce the release 1.3.1 of digsig.

This kernel module helps system administrators control Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) binary execution and library loading based on the presence of a valid digital signature. The main functionality is to help system administrators distinguish applications he/she trusts (and therefore signs) from viruses, worms (and other nuisances). It is based on the Linux Security Module hooks.

The code is GPL and available from:
http://sourceforge.net/projects/disec/, download digsig-1.3.1. For more documentation, please refer to disec.sourcefrge.net.

I hope that it'll be useful to you.

All bug reports and feature requests or general feedback are welcome (please CC me or [email protected] in your answer or feedback to the mailing list).

Regards,
Makan Pourzandi

Changes from Digsig release 0.2 announced in this mailing list:
================================================================

Quoted 7 lines

- the verification of signatures for the shared binaries has been added.
- added support for caching of signatures
- added documentation for digsig
- added support for revoked signatures
- support to avoid vulnerability for rewrite of shared libraries

Could you elaborate on this one?

Quoted 8 lines

- use sysfs to connect to the module instead of the char device
- code clean up, and some bug fixes

Future works
=============

- improving the caching and revocation: it is currently tested and will be sent out soon after stability testing

Should be helpful enough to cache result until thing's opened for writing, or is that what you're doing now?

thanks,
-chris

Signature · 1 line
Linux Security Modules     http://lsm.immunix.org     http://lsm.bkbits.net
#2 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

- support to avoid vulnerability for rewrite of shared libraries

Could you elaborate on this one?

When a file is being executed, deny_write_access(file) is called to prevent writing until execution completes. Because deny_write_access is not exported from fs/namei.c, we emulate this behavior for shared libraries.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Future works
=============

- improving the caching and revocation: it is currently tested and will be sent out soon after stability testing

Should be helpful enough to cache result until thing's opened for writing, or is that what you're doing now?

Exactly. When the file is opened for writing (which as much as possible requires the file to not be executed), we uncache the signature validation.

(The new patch hashes revocations (they were on a linked list), and steals the seqlock-based structure Rik van Riel had suggested for the selinux avc cache for use in the signature revocation cache. There is no change in functionality, only (hopefully) performance improvements.)

-serge

#3 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · * Serge E. Hallyn ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

- support to avoid vulnerability for rewrite of shared libraries

Could you elaborate on this one?

When a file is being executed, deny_write_access(file) is called to prevent writing until execution completes. Because deny_write_access is not exported from fs/namei.c, we emulate this behavior for shared libraries.

Hmm, ok, so you're relying on the loader to do PROT_EXEC mmaps for shared libraries? Probably not required at least on x86. Also, does this work when executing loader directly (/lib/ld.so /bin/ps), and with dlopen?

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Future works
=============

- improving the caching and revocation: it is currently tested and will be sent out soon after stability testing

Should be helpful enough to cache result until thing's opened for writing, or is that what you're doing now?

Quoted 8 lines

Exactly. When the file is opened for writing (which as much as possible requires the file to not be executed), we uncache the signature validation.

(The new patch hashes revocations (they were on a linked list), and steals the seqlock-based structure Rik van Riel had suggested for the selinux avc cache for use in the signature revocation cache. There is no change in functionality, only (hopefully) performance improvements.)

Ok, I see. Makes sense.

thanks,
-chris

Signature · 1 line
Linux Security Modules     http://lsm.immunix.org     http://lsm.bkbits.net
#5 lore raw
In reply to Chris Wright

Hi Chris,

Quoted 3 lines · Chris Wright
Quoted 2 lines · * Makan Pourzandi ([email protected]) wrote:

DSI development team would like to announce the release 1.3.1 of digsig.

...

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 11 lines

Changes from Digsig release 0.2 announced in this mailing list:
================================================================

- the verification of signatures for the shared binaries has been added.
- added support for caching of signatures
- added documentation for digsig
- added support for revoked signatures
- support to avoid vulnerability for rewrite of shared libraries

Quoted 1 line

Could you elaborate on this one?

We realized that when a shared library is opened by a binary it can still be modified. To solve the problem, we block the write access to the shared binary while it is loaded.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines

- use sysfs to connect to the module instead of the char device
- code clean up, and some bug fixes

Future works
=============

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

- improving the caching and revocation: it is currently tested and will be sent out soon after stability testing

Should be helpful enough to cache result until thing's opened for writing, or is that what you're doing now?

This is what we're doing now, but we need to implement a hash table to accelerate the lookup for the signatures.

Regards,
Makan

Quoted 2 lines

thanks,
-chris

Signature · 3 lines
Makan Pourzandi, Open Systems Lab
Ericsson Research, Montreal, Canada
*This email does not represent or express the opinions of Ericsson Inc.*
#6 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · * Makan Pourzandi ([email protected]) wrote:

Hi Chris,

Quoted 3 lines · Chris Wright
Quoted 2 lines · * Makan Pourzandi ([email protected]) wrote:

DSI development team would like to announce the release 1.3.1 of digsig.

...

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 11 lines

Changes from Digsig release 0.2 announced in this mailing list:
================================================================

- the verification of signatures for the shared binaries has been added.
- added support for caching of signatures
- added documentation for digsig
- added support for revoked signatures
- support to avoid vulnerability for rewrite of shared libraries

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

Could you elaborate on this one?

We realized that when a shared library is opened by a binary it can still be modified. To solve the problem, we block the write access to the shared binary while it is loaded.

AFAICT, this means anybody with read access to a file can block all writes. This doesn't sound great.

thanks,
-chris

Signature · 1 line
Linux Security Modules     http://lsm.immunix.org     http://lsm.bkbits.net
#4 lore raw
In reply to Chris Wright
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

When a file is being executed, deny_write_access(file) is called to prevent writing until execution completes. Because deny_write_access is not exported from fs/namei.c, we emulate this behavior for shared libraries.

Hmm, ok, so you're relying on the loader to do PROT_EXEC mmaps for shared libraries? Probably not required at least on x86.

Correct.

We don't pretend to stop someone from mmap'ing and executing bad code, we only want to help someone who wants to use a legitimate library to know that the right library is being used.

Quoted 3 lines

Also, does
this work when executing loader directly (/lib/ld.so /bin/ps), and with dlopen?

Yup, both of these (at least on i386) use mmap with PROT_EXEC, and go through digsig's dsi_file_mmap check. (I've made a note to check the /lib/ld.so /bin/ps case on a powerpc and, if I can find one, z)

-serge

#7 lore raw
In reply to Chris Wright
Quoted 1 line · Chris Wright

* Makan Pourzandi ([email protected]) wrote:

...

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

We realized that when a shared library is opened by a binary it can still be modified. To solve the problem, we block the write access to the shared binary while it is loaded.

AFAICT, this means anybody with read access to a file can block all writes. This doesn't sound great.

True.

This could be fixed by adding a check at the top of dsi_file_mmap for file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & MAY_EXEC. Of course then shared libraries which are installed without execute permissions will cause apps to break. On my quick test, I couldn't run xterm or vi :)

Note that blocking writes requires that the file be a valid ELF file, as this is all that digsig mediates. So I'm not sure which we worry about more - the fact that all shared libraries have to be installed with execute permissions (under the proposed solution), or that write to an ELF file can be prevented by mmap(PROT_EXEC). Presumably, if you are replacing an ELF file, you will always want to do "mv foo.so foo.so.del; cp new/foo.so foo.so" anyway.

Thoughts?

thanks,
-serge

#8 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 1 line · Chris Wright

* Makan Pourzandi ([email protected]) wrote:

...

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

We realized that when a shared library is opened by a binary it can still be modified. To solve the problem, we block the write access to the shared binary while it is loaded.

AFAICT, this means anybody with read access to a file can block all writes. This doesn't sound great.

True.

I want to narrow down the discussion, I believe that some people could get confused with the mention of "file" here. AFAICT, the above problem only concerns the shared libraries. Digsig applies only to binaries: in digsig_file_mmap() implementing the file_mmap LSM hook, if the file is not executable there is a return and no verification or any other blocking is done.

For executables, there is no meaning to load them on read mode, you should have execute permission. if you then load them for execution IMHO, it makes sense to block the writing on that file.

For shared libraries, you're right. the problem exists, the shared libraries can be loaded being only readable (even though I remember reading in exec.c:sys_uselib() kernel 2.6.8.1 that the shared libraries must be both readable and executable due to "security reasons", but I'm not an expert and definitely readable is enough to load the shared library but I'll be happy to learn more about this.)

Quoted 9 lines

This could be fixed by adding a check at the top of dsi_file_mmap for file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & MAY_EXEC. Of course then shared libraries which are installed without execute permissions will cause apps to break. On my quick test, I couldn't run xterm or vi :)

Note that blocking writes requires that the file be a valid ELF file, as this is all that digsig mediates. So I'm not sure which we worry about more - the fact that all shared libraries have to be installed with execute permissions (under the proposed solution), or that write

My 2 cents, a quick browsing on my machine (fedora core 1) shows that almost all my shared libraries are installed with both execution and read permissions. IMHO, I don't believe then that this should be considered as a major issue.

Quoted 1 line

to an ELF file can be prevented by mmap(PROT_EXEC). Presumably, if

Regards,
Makan

Quoted 7 lines

you are replacing an ELF file, you will always want to do "mv foo.so foo.so.del; cp new/foo.so foo.so" anyway.

Thoughts?

thanks,
-serge

Signature · 3 lines
Makan Pourzandi, Open Systems Lab
Ericsson Research, Montreal, Canada
*This email does not represent or express the opinions of Ericsson Inc.*
#9 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · * Makan Pourzandi ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 2 lines · Chris Wright

AFAICT, this means anybody with read access to a file can block all writes. This doesn't sound great.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

True.

I want to narrow down the discussion, I believe that some people could get confused with the mention of "file" here. AFAICT, the above problem only concerns the shared libraries. Digsig applies only to binaries: in digsig_file_mmap() implementing the file_mmap LSM hook, if the file is not executable there is a return and no verification or any other blocking is done.

No, it's the mmap PROT check that's the issue.

Quoted 3 lines

For executables, there is no meaning to load them on read mode, you should have execute permission. if you then load them for execution IMHO, it makes sense to block the writing on that file.

Thing is, x86 makes no distinction btween r/x so, have you tried mmaping with read, then executing (I haven't)? If it works, then you may find that there are dumb things out there that do that as well (which you wouldn't be able to protect, and become one attack vector). You can make a file read-only (no exec bits), and still execute it with ld.so. Same as bash can interpret readonly shell script files. Now, ld.so _will_ mmap PROT_EXEC, so it works for you.

Quoted 18 lines

For shared libraries, you're right. the problem exists, the shared libraries can be loaded being only readable (even though I remember reading in exec.c:sys_uselib() kernel 2.6.8.1 that the shared libraries must be both readable and executable due to "security reasons", but I'm not an expert and definitely readable is enough to load the shared library but I'll be happy to learn more about this.)

Quoted 9 lines

This could be fixed by adding a check at the top of dsi_file_mmap for file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & MAY_EXEC. Of course then shared libraries which are installed without execute permissions will cause apps to break. On my quick test, I couldn't run xterm or vi :)

Note that blocking writes requires that the file be a valid ELF file, as this is all that digsig mediates. So I'm not sure which we worry about more - the fact that all shared libraries have to be installed with execute permissions (under the proposed solution), or that write

Quoted 4 lines

My 2 cents, a quick browsing on my machine (fedora core 1) shows that almost all my shared libraries are installed with both execution and read permissions. IMHO, I don't believe then that this should be considered as a major issue.

This has nothing to do with file permissions aside of read. All you need is read permission, then you can mmap(PROT_EXEC) which will kick off the check, and do deny_write_access. It's a freeform way to lock writers out of any readable file in the system. This is why MAP_EXECUTABLE and MAP_DENYWRITE are masked off at syscall entry.

thanks,
-chris

Signature · 1 line
Linux Security Modules     http://lsm.immunix.org     http://lsm.bkbits.net
#10 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines

Thing is, x86 makes no distinction btween r/x so, have you tried mmaping with read, then executing (I haven't)?

Yup, clearly that will work on x86. And so obviously DigSig is not a solution to format and buffer overflows :) Nor, unfortunately, a solution to code which for whatever reason exploited this behavior.

Quoted 4 lines

This has nothing to do with file permissions aside of read. All you need is read permission, then you can mmap(PROT_EXEC) which will kick off the check, and do deny_write_access. It's a freeform way to lock writers out of any readable file in the system.

No, not "any readable file," because DigSig will not lock non-ELF files.

The attached patch adds a check for execute permission to the file being mmap'ed. Failing such permission, it will return -EPERM and not lock the file.

thanks,
-serge

digsig.c.noexec renamed from digsig.c +5 -0
@@ -556,6 +556,11 @@ int dsi_file_mmap(struct file * file, un
 		goto out_file_no_buf;
 	}
 
+	if (!(file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & MAY_EXEC)) {
+		retval = -EPERM;
+		goto out_with_file;
+	}
+
 	retval = DIGSIG_MODE;
 
 	size = elf_ex->e_shnum * sizeof(Elf32_Shdr);
#12 lore raw
In reply to Chris Wright

Hi all,

see below:

Quoted 22 lines · Chris Wright
Quoted 20 lines · * Makan Pourzandi ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 16 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 2 lines · Chris Wright

AFAICT, this means anybody with read access to a file can block all writes. This doesn't sound great.

True.

This could be fixed by adding a check at the top of dsi_file_mmap for file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & MAY_EXEC. Of course then shared libraries which are installed without execute permissions will cause apps to break. On my quick test, I couldn't run xterm or vi :)

Note that blocking writes requires that the file be a valid ELF file, as this is all that digsig mediates. So I'm not sure which we worry about more - the fact that all shared libraries have to be installed with execute permissions (under the proposed solution), or that write

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

My 2 cents, a quick browsing on my machine (fedora core 1) shows that almost all my shared libraries are installed with both execution and read permissions. IMHO, I don't believe then that this should be considered as a major issue.

This has nothing to do with file permissions aside of read. All you need is read permission, then you can mmap(PROT_EXEC) which will kick off the check, and do deny_write_access. It's a freeform way to lock writers out of any readable file in the system. This is why MAP_EXECUTABLE and MAP_DENYWRITE are masked off at syscall entry.

Chris, my understanding is that Serge's patch even though it restricts a little the system admin, is the best solution we have for time being. Am I right? If this is the case I'll include Serge's patch in the cvs source code and send out a new release soon.

regards,
Makan

Quoted 3 lines

thanks,
-chris

Signature · 3 lines
Makan Pourzandi, Open Systems Lab
Ericsson Research, Montreal, Canada
*This email does not represent or express the opinions of Ericsson Inc.*
#13 lore raw
Quoted 39 lines · * Makan Pourzandi ([email protected]) wrote:

Hi all,

see below:

Quoted 28 lines · Chris Wright
Quoted 20 lines · * Makan Pourzandi ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 12 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 2 lines · Chris Wright

AFAICT, this means anybody with read access to a file can block all writes. This doesn't sound great.

True.

This could be fixed by adding a check at the top of dsi_file_mmap for file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & MAY_EXEC. Of course then shared libraries which are installed without execute permissions will cause apps to break. On my quick test, I couldn't run xterm or vi :)

Quoted 4 lines

Note that blocking writes requires that the file be a valid ELF file, as this is all that digsig mediates. So I'm not sure which we worry about more - the fact that all shared libraries have to be installed with execute permissions (under the proposed solution), or that write

Quoted 4 lines

My 2 cents, a quick browsing on my machine (fedora core 1) shows that almost all my shared libraries are installed with both execution and read permissions. IMHO, I don't believe then that this should be considered as a major issue.

Quoted 5 lines

This has nothing to do with file permissions aside of read. All you need is read permission, then you can mmap(PROT_EXEC) which will kick off the check, and do deny_write_access. It's a freeform way to lock writers out of any readable file in the system. This is why MAP_EXECUTABLE and MAP_DENYWRITE are masked off at syscall entry.

Quoted 5 lines

Chris, my understanding is that Serge's patch even though it restricts a little the system admin, is the best solution we have for time being. Am I right?
If this is the case I'll include Serge's patch in the cvs source code and send out a new release soon.

The key piece I had missed is that it only checks elf files (I now see read_elf_header). So, the test may even be superfluous. But try it, see what breaks, then send fixes upstream ;-) BTW, the read_elf_header returns NULL on error, but IS_ERR is used against the returned pointer (so errors will oops). Also, the security_set_operations + set_digsig_ops looks like it should be replaced with static structure member assignment. The digsig_sem can be statically setup with DECLARE_MUTEX(). digsig.c::secondary should be static. digsig.c::digsig_num_cached_sigs should be static and declared in digsig_cache.c. I'll keep digging.

thanks,
-chris

Signature · 1 line
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#11 lore raw
In reply to Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 5 lines · * Serge E. Hallyn ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 2 lines

Thing is, x86 makes no distinction btween r/x so, have you tried mmaping with read, then executing (I haven't)?

Yup, clearly that will work on x86. And so obviously DigSig is not a solution to format and buffer overflows :) Nor, unfortunately, a

heh

Quoted 1 line

solution to code which for whatever reason exploited this behavior.

That's what I was getting at. Beats me what's out there that does this, but I expect some stuff does, and it wouldn't get the same assurance.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

This has nothing to do with file permissions aside of read. All you need is read permission, then you can mmap(PROT_EXEC) which will kick off the check, and do deny_write_access. It's a freeform way to lock writers out of any readable file in the system.

No, not "any readable file," because DigSig will not lock non-ELF files.

Ahh, this is the part I had missed.

thanks,
-chris

Signature · 1 line
Linux Security Modules     http://lsm.immunix.org     http://lsm.bkbits.net