/proc parent &proc_root == NULL?
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proc_misc_init() has both these lines in it:
entry = create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root); proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);
Both entries show up in /proc, as /proc/kmsg and /proc/kcore. So I ask, as I can't see after several minutes of examination, what's the difference? Why is NULL used for some and &proc_root used for others?
I'm looking at 2.6.10
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Quoted 5 lines · John Richard Moser
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proc_misc_init()has both these lines in it:
Quoted 8 lines
entry =
create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root);proc_root_kcore=create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);Both entries show up in /proc, as
/proc/kmsgand/proc/kcore. So I ask, as I can't see after several minutes of examination, what's the difference? Why is NULL used for some and&proc_rootused for others?I'm looking at 2.6.10
create_proc_entry() passes &parent to proc_create(). See proc_create():
...
This is an error path:
if (!(*parent) && xlate_proc_name(name, parent, &fn) != 0) goto out;
but xlate_proc_name() searches for a /proc/.... and returns the all-but-final-part-of-name *parent (hope that makes some sense, see the comments above the function), so it returns &proc_root.
HTH. If not, fire back.
Signature · 1 line
~Randy
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Quoted 21 lines · Randy.Dunlap
Quoted 5 lines · John Richard Moser
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proc_misc_init()has both these lines in it:Quoted 8 lines
entry =
create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root);proc_root_kcore=create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);Both entries show up in /proc, as
/proc/kmsgand/proc/kcore. So I ask, as I can't see after several minutes of examination, what's the difference? Why is NULL used for some and&proc_rootused for others?I'm looking at 2.6.10
create_proc_entry()passes &parent toproc_create(). Seeproc_create():
...
This is an error path:
Quoted 7 lines
if (!(*parent) && xlate_proc_name(name, parent, &fn) != 0) goto out;but
xlate_proc_name()searches for a/proc/.... and returns the all-but-final-part-of-name *parent (hope that makes some sense, see the comments above the function), so it returns&proc_root.HTH. If not, fire back.
create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root);
So this is asking for proc_root to be filled?
create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);
And this is just saying to shove it in proc's root?
I'm trying to locate a specific proc entry, using this lovely piece of code I ripped off:
/*
* Find a proc entry
* Duplicated from remove_proc_entry()
*/
struct proc_dir_entry **get_proc_entry(const char *name, struct
proc_dir_entry *parent) {
struct proc_dir_entry **p;
const char *fn = name;
int len;
if (!parent && xlate_proc_name(name, &parent, &fn) != 0)
goto out;
len = strlen(fn);
for (p = &parent->subdir; *p; p=&(*p)->next ) {
if (!proc_match(len, fn, *p))
continue;
return p;
}
out:
return NULL;
}And I'm trying to figure out if, say, /proc/devices would be found by...
get_proc_entry("devices",NULL);
- -OR-get_proc_entry("devices",&proc_root);
Oh well. I'll figure it out eventually. :) I've already caused my kernel to not boot :) figured it out too, it was that very function above; I replaced a chunk of remove_proc_entry() with a modified version of that and I'd busted it horribly so it didn't work. Just more things to remind me that I know not what it is I do.
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Quoted 7 lines · John Richard Moser
create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root);So this is asking for
proc_rootto be filled?
create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);And this is just saying to shove it in proc's root?
NULL is equivalent to &proc_root in that context; moreover, it's better style - drivers really shouldn't be refering to what is procfs-private object.
Quoted 2 lines
I'm trying to locate a specific proc entry, using this lovely piece of code I ripped off:
That's not something allowed outside of procfs code - lifetime rules alone make that a Very Bad Idea(tm). If that's just debugging - OK, but if your code really uses that stuff, I want details on the intended use. In that case your design is almost certainly asking for trouble.
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Quoted 16 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 7 lines · John Richard Moser
create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root);So this is asking for
proc_rootto be filled?
create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);And this is just saying to shove it in proc's root?
NULL is equivalent to
&proc_rootin that context; moreover, it's better style - drivers really shouldn't be refering to what is procfs-private object.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I'm trying to locate a specific proc entry, using this lovely piece of code I ripped off:
That's not something allowed outside of procfs code - lifetime rules alone make that a Very Bad Idea(tm). If that's just debugging - OK, but if your code really uses that stuff, I want details on the intended use. In that case your design is almost certainly asking for trouble.
I'm trying to implement parts of grsecurity on top of a framework similar to LSM (i.e. ripoff) that I wrote as an academic endeavor to find out how stuff works and get some real-life kernel coding experience.
This particular problem pertains to proc_misc.c and trying to create a hook for some grsecurity protections that alter the modes on certain /proc entries. The chunk of the patch I'm trying to immitate is:
diff -urNp linux-2.6.10/fs/proc/proc_misc.c linux-2.6.10/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
- --- linux-2.6.10/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2004-12-24 16:34:00 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.10/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2005-01-08 15:53:52 -0500
@@ -582,6 +582,8 @@ static void create_seq_entry(char *name,
void __init proc_misc_init(void)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
+ int gr_mode = 0;
+
static struct {
char *name;
int (*read_proc)(char*,char**,off_t,int,int*,void*);@@ -596,9 +598,13 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_STRAM_PROC
{"stram", stram_read_proc},
#endif
+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
{"devices", devices_read_proc},
+#endif
{"filesystems", filesystems_read_proc},
+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
{"cmdline", cmdline_read_proc},
+#endif
{"locks", locks_read_proc},
{"execdomains", execdomains_read_proc},
{NULL,}
@@ -606,27 +612,45 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
for (p = simple_ones; p->name; p++)
create_proc_read_entry(p->name, 0, NULL, p->read_proc,NULL);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+ gr_mode = S_IRUSR;
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+ gr_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ create_proc_read_entry("devices", gr_mode, NULL,&devices_read_proc, NULL);
+ create_proc_read_entry("cmdline", gr_mode, NULL,&cmdline_read_proc, NULL);
+#endif
+
proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts");
/* And now for trickier ones */
entry = create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root);
if (entry)
entry->proc_fops = &proc_kmsg_operations;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", gr_mode, &proc_cpuinfo_operations);
+#else
create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", 0, &proc_cpuinfo_operations);
+#endif
create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations);
create_seq_entry("stat", 0, &proc_stat_operations);
create_seq_entry("interrupts", 0, &proc_interrupts_operations);+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|gr_mode,&proc_slabinfo_operations); +#else
create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations); +#endif
create_seq_entry("buddyinfo",S_IRUGO,
&fragmentation_file_operations);
create_seq_entry("vmstat",S_IRUGO, &proc_vmstat_file_operations);
create_seq_entry("diskstats", 0, &proc_diskstats_operations); #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
- - create_seq_entry("modules", 0, &proc_modules_operations);
+ create_seq_entry("modules", gr_mode, &proc_modules_operations);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
create_seq_entry("schedstat", 0, &proc_schedstat_operations);
#endif
- -#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_KCORE
+#if defined(CONFIG_PROC_KCORE) && !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD)
proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);
if (proc_root_kcore) {
proc_root_kcore->proc_fops = &proc_kcore_operations;The above I've been trying to create a security hook for to test out. I've learned much already, like that breaking proc breaks your system and causes panics. :)
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Review
Quoted 9 lines · John Richard Moser
This particular problem pertains to
proc_misc.cand trying to create a hook for some grsecurity protections that alter the modes on certain /proc entries. The chunk of the patch I'm trying to immitate is:(quoted diff) +4
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", gr_mode, &proc_cpuinfo_operations); +#else create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", 0, &proc_cpuinfo_operations); +#endif
An alternate way to approach this - leave the permissions alone here.
And then use the security_ops->inode_permission() hook to do something like:
if ((inode == cpuinfo) && (current->fsuid)) return -EPERM;
Writing the proper tests for whether it's the inode you want and whether to give the request the kiss-of-death are left as an excersize for the programmer.. ;)
You may want to use a properly timed initcall() to create a callback that happens after proc_misc_init() happens, but before userspace gets going, and walk through the /proc tree at that time and cache info on the files you care about, so you don't have to re-walk /proc every time permission() gets called....
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Quoted 22 lines · [email protected] wrote:
Review
Quoted 10 lines · John Richard Moser
This particular problem pertains to
proc_misc.cand trying to create a hook for some grsecurity protections that alter the modes on certain /proc entries. The chunk of the patch I'm trying to immitate is:(quoted diff) +4
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", gr_mode, &proc_cpuinfo_operations); +#else create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", 0, &proc_cpuinfo_operations); +#endifAn alternate way to approach this - leave the permissions alone here.
And then use the
security_ops->inode_permission()hook to do something like:if ((inode == cpuinfo) && (current->fsuid)) return -EPERM;
Quoted 7 lines
Writing the proper tests for whether it's the inode you want and whether to give the request the kiss-of-death are left as an excersize for the programmer.. ;)
You may want to use a properly timed
initcall()to create a callback that happens afterproc_misc_init()happens, but before userspace gets going, and walk through the /proc tree at that time and cache info on the files you care about, so you don't have to re-walk /proc every timepermission()gets called....
mmm. I'd thought about that actually-- for modules to get a whack at this they'd have to be compiled in. Loaded as modules would break the security.
Perhaps both. I could give modules a "Hook" that gave them a crack at /proc on load, as well as put a hook in *read**read**read**read* proc_permission()? (I wrote one there already! :)
Also, before it expires
http://rafb.net/paste/results/tZ5Jp878.html
Nice for a simple learning excercise huh? Modules aren't aware of stacking, and there's no mandatory dummy code (a la security/dummy.c); but each hook calls a function that does a loop (based on a C99 variadic macro) through things, so the lack of a dummy module is kind of offset.
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Quoted 4 lines · On Thu, 27 Jan 2005 01:40:12 EST, [email protected] said:
You may want to use a properly timed
initcall()to create a callback that happens afterproc_misc_init()happens, but before userspace gets going, and walk through the /proc tree at that time and cache info on the files you care about, so you don't have to re-walk /proc every timepermission()gets called
Blarg.
The proper time to walk the /proc filesystem and cache such info, is, of course, in the ->sp_post_addmount() LSM hook. Check @mnt and @mountpoint_nd to see if it's /proc, and if so, go snarf all the info you need to make your tests fast..
Not sure if you'd need to redo your cache in sp_post_remount(), for the odd case where /proc gets remounted....
Quoted 3 lines · John Richard Moser
mmm. I'd thought about that actually-- for modules to get a whack at this they'd have to be compiled in. Loaded as modules would break the security.
And that, my friends, is *exactly* why SELinux can't be built as a module ;)
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Quoted 9 lines · [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 3 lines · John Richard Moser
mmm. I'd thought about that actually-- for modules to get a whack at this they'd have to be compiled in. Loaded as modules would break the security.
And that, my friends, is *exactly* why SELinux can't be built as a module ;)
:) So far my little grkernsec module hasn't hit any bumps like that; though so far I haven't copied much of spender's code. I'm sure the chroot() restrictions will easily be make for a loadable module.
At this point, I should be making more important design decisions. For example, why am I still doing this? Isn't there something better for me to do than clone LSM and GrSecurity, attempt (*cough*) to improve on the original designs, and then harass kernel devs about problems I'm having with things that are just meant to be toys for me anyway?
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