OT] Joerg Schilling flames Linux on his Blog
Quoted 5 lines · Patrick McFarland
I was refering to the 2.6 permissions bug in cdrecord. It wouldn't work using a non-root user, even if they had the correct permissions. 2.6 changed (for the better, mind you), and Joerg refused to fix cdrecord. (I don't know if its even fixed now). Theres been other cases of cdrecord breaking on Linux only, but I can't think of them atm.
Well, it seems that you are uninformed about the facts :-(
So let me quote a mail I send to LKML on Aug 17 13:14:59 2004:
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ If Linux believes that there should be enhanced security similar to Solaris and if Linux is a true open Source business, then I would expect that there is cooperation. If I change things in e.g. mkisofs or cdrecord that could result in problems for my "users", I send a notification mail to the XCDRoast & k3b authors early enough.
If Linux plans to implement incompatible changes, I would expect that "important users" are informed in advance so that it is possible to discuss the problems an to have a planned smooth migration. As this did not happen, the change needs to be called a bug. This is even more obvious if we take into account that cdrtools curently is in code freeze state as a 2.01-final will come the next days.
For this reason, I would recommend that Linux immediately goes back to the old behavior and informs "important users". A change that has effects that are as widely as this one should not be tried again within the next 3 months. Then there is a change to have a smooth migration......
BTW: I try to inform my "important users" more than a year before I introduce important changes. /*--------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
Note that this was a few days before cdrtools-2.01 final have been published (after nearly two years of planned work on a new version).
The changes to Linux did neither fix the problem (just check the mailings on LKML from last year) nor has there been a need for introducing incompatible changes. If the cause for the change really was the "security problem" caused by the fact that Linux did allow to send SCSI commands on R/O file descriptors it would have been sufficient to require R/W permissions on the fd. After this putative small change, the supposed problem would have been fixed and cdrtools as well as other users of the interface did work as before.
What the change on Linux did was not to fix a problem but to break cdrtools.
I am not unwilling to fix cdrecored, as a non broken program does not need a fix. I was even willing to add a workaround for the incompatible interface change. But this may obviously not happen in a code freeze state.
Sorry - The problems between cdrtools and Linux is only a result of the missing will for cooperation from the Linux kernel crew.
BTW: Due to missing time (I like to see a good cooperation between my work and the support code in an OS, so I am now actively working on OpenSolaris and I am very busy...). My planned OpenSolaris based UNIX distribution "SchilliX" should be available soon after the public availability of the OpenSolaris source in Q2/2005 which is only a few days from now. Fortunately, I believe that I will be able to boot my first "SchilliX from scratch" compiled CD today.
P.S.: About 10 days ago, I made an attempt to include a workaround for the interface changes in Linux, check cdrtools-2.01.01a03
Jörg
Signature · 4 lines
EMail:[email protected] (home) Jörg Schilling D-13353 Berlin [email protected] (uni) [email protected] (work) Blog: http://schily.blogspot.com/ URL: http://cdrecord.berlios.de/old/private/ ftp://ftp.berlios.de/pub/schily
Quoted 5 lines · Joerg Schilling
If Linux believes that there should be enhanced security similar to Solaris and if Linux is a true open Source business, then I would expect that there is cooperation. If I change things in e.g. mkisofs or cdrecord that could result in problems for my "users", I send a notification mail to the XCDRoast & k3b authors early enough.
There was a security hole in the CD burner support. The Linux Kernel developers fixed it quickly. They were not planning to wait 6 months for you to get an updated version of cdrecord out the door in any case. If you want more information on the Linux Kernel security policy, please see a recent copy of the linux kernel for the file Documentation/SecurityBugs. To quote the relevant
part: "It is reasonable to delay disclosure ... or for vendor coordination. However we expect these delays to be short, measurable in days, not weeks or months." Part of this policy includes "we'd like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and disclosed as quickly as possible." This seems to imply that the security team is not likely to wait 6 months to fix a critical hardware-damaging vulnerability.
Quoted 5 lines
If the cause for the change really was the "security problem" caused by the fact that Linux did allow to send SCSI commands on R/O file descriptors it would have been sufficient to require R/W permissions on the fd. After this putative small change, the supposed problem would have been fixed and cdrtools as well as other users of the interface did work as before.
I will not debate this issue with you. Please see the copious quantities of emails when this issue was brought up a while ago.
Cheers,
Kyle Moffett
-----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK-----
Version: 3.12
GCM/CS/IT/U d- s++: a18 C++++>$ UB/L/X/*++++(+)>$ P+++(++++)>$ L++++(+++) E W++(+) N+++(++) o? K? w--- O? M++ V? PS+() PE+(-) Y+ PGP+++ t+(+++) 5 X R? tv-(--) b++++(++) DI+ D+ G e->++++$ h!*()>++$ r !y?(-) ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------
Quoted 11 lines · Kyle Moffett
Quoted 9 lines · Joerg Schilling
If Linux believes that there should be enhanced security similar to Solaris and
if Linux is a true open Source business, then I would expect that there is
cooperation. If I change things in e.g. mkisofs or cdrecord that could result
in problems for my "users", I send a notification mail to the XCDRoast & k3b
authors early enough.
Quoted 9 lines
There was a security hole in the CD burner support. The Linux Kernel developers
fixed it quickly. They were not planning to wait 6 months for you to get an
updated version of cdrecord out the door in any case. If you want more information on the Linux Kernel security policy, please see a recent copy of the
linux kernel for the fileDocumentation/SecurityBugs. To quote the relevant
Looks like you did not read the mail from me you were replying to.
The best way to fix a problem is to fix the problem and not to do something else and to change the interface.
The problem was that you could send SCSI commands on R/O fds and fixing the problem would have been to forbid sending SCSI commands on R/O fds.
Jörg
Signature · 4 lines
EMail:[email protected] (home) Jörg Schilling D-13353 Berlin [email protected] (uni) [email protected] (work) Blog: http://schily.blogspot.com/ URL: http://cdrecord.berlios.de/old/private/ ftp://ftp.berlios.de/pub/schily
Quoted 1 line · Joerg Schilling
Looks like you did not read the mail from me you were replying to.
Let's start a technical discussion with a personal attack...
Quoted 3 lines
The best way to fix a problem is to fix the problem and not to do something else and to change the interface.
When possible, correct.
Quoted 3 lines
The problem was that you could send SCSI commands on R/O fds and fixing the problem would have been to forbid sending SCSI commands on R/O fds.
IT DOESN'T WORK THAT WAY. You *can't* disallow sending commands, that's how you do a read on a SCSI device, by sending commands like "seek" and "read." What is needed is to limit the commands allowed to be sent, and pass only known appropriate commands depending on access.
It is true that the first implementation didn't have all the legitimate commands in the table of allowed commands. But once the idea of doing bad things to a CD by sending evil commands was well-known, it was important to have protection in place quickly.
It is true that some developers have been very unhelpful, and replied with canned "you don't have permission" messages to reports that legitimate commands aren't in the allowed table.
It is true that the implementation is overly complex, instead of using only read and write, other things are checked, resulting in some unexpected behaviour, like blocking programs being setuid.
What is NOT TRUE is that any of this was done just to piss you off. That was just a fringe benefit to fixing the security issue quickly. AFAIK all of the commands for burning single session CD/DVD are working as intended.
Signature · 3 lines
bill davidsen <[email protected]> CTO, TMR Associates, Inc Doing interesting things with little computers since 1979.
Re: [OT] Joerg Schilling flames Linux on his Blog
In reply to Joerg SchillingQuoted 2 lines · Joerg Schilling
The problem was that you could send SCSI commands on R/O fds and fixing the problem would have been to forbid sending SCSI commands on R/O fds.
Unfortunately, this is not going to work. It would work only if the only app that has to send SCSI commands were cdrecord. Then really, a non-setuid program just would not be able to get a R/W fd, and setuid ones are assumed to be trusted.
The problem is that many CD audio players also send SCSI commands in order to extract digital audio data. Are you proposing to make them setuid root? use a well-defined setuid helper? other solution?
Signature · 1 line
Alexander E. Patrakov
Re: [OT] Joerg Schilling flames Linux on his Blog
Quoted 9 lines · Alexander E. Patrakov
Quoted 2 lines · Joerg Schilling
The problem was that you could send SCSI commands on R/O fds and fixing the problem would have been to forbid sending SCSI commands on R/O fds.
Unfortunately, this is not going to work. It would work only if the only app that has to send SCSI commands were cdrecord. Then really, a non-setuid program just would not be able to get a R/W fd, and setuid ones are assumed to be trusted.
If these programs did rely on the named security bug, then these programs were broken anyway and need to be fixed. Note that the _old_ (non ioctl based) /dev/sg interface needed write access in order to send SCSI commands.
Quoted 3 lines
The problem is that many CD audio players also send SCSI commands in order to extract digital audio data. Are you proposing to make them setuid root? use a well-defined setuid helper? other solution?
If these programs did ever work before, someone did break them meanwhile.
Jörg
Signature · 4 lines
EMail:[email protected] (home) Jörg Schilling D-13353 Berlin [email protected] (uni) [email protected] (work) Blog: http://schily.blogspot.com/ URL: http://cdrecord.berlios.de/old/private/ ftp://ftp.berlios.de/pub/schily