make newrole suid
PATCH 3/4 make newrole suid
This is the 3rd of 4 patches.
This patch applies against policycoreutils-1.30.30-1.
Changes:
* Updated the #defines, these will be added to the Makefile in patch 4/4
* Mostly cleanup of existing functionality
* Added some function documentation
* Drop capabilities is split into three versions (AUDIT, NAMESPACE and neither)
Signed-off-by Michael Thompson <[email protected]>
newrole/newrole.c +179 -145
@@ -36,11 +36,6 @@* setuid root, so that it can read the shadow passwd file. * * -* option CANTSPELLGDB: -* -* If you set CANTSPELLGDB you will turn on some debugging printfs. -* -* * Authors: Tim Fraser , * Anthony Colatrella <[email protected]> * Various bug fixes by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
@@ -48,6 +43,14 @@*************************************************************************/ #define _GNU_SOURCE + +#if defined(AUDIT_LOG_PRIV ) && !defined(USE_AUDIT ) +#error AUDIT_LOG_PRIV needs the USE_AUDIT option +#endif +#if defined(NAMESPACE_PRIV ) && !defined(USE_PAM ) +#error NAMESPACE_PRIV needs the USE_PAM option +#endif +#include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> /* for malloc(), realloc(), free() */ #include <pwd.h> /* for getpwuid() */
@@ -63,13 +66,11 @@#include <selinux/get_default_type.h> #include <selinux/get_context_list.h> /* for SELINUX_DEFAULTUSER */ #include <signal.h> +#include <unistd.h> /* for getuid(), exit(), getopt() */ #ifdef USE_AUDIT #include <libaudit.h> #endif -#ifdef LOG_AUDIT_PRIV -#ifndef USE_AUDIT -#error LOG_AUDIT_PRIV needs the USE_AUDIT option -#endif +#if defined(AUDIT_LOG_PRIV ) || (NAMESPACE_PRIV )#include <sys/prctl.h> #include <sys/capability.h> #endif
@@ -86,18 +87,20 @@/* USAGE_STRING describes the command-line args of this program. */ #define USAGE_STRING "USAGE: newrole [ -r role ] [ -t type ] [ -l level ] [ -V ] [ -- args ]" - +#define DEFAULT_PATH "/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin"#define DEFAULT_CONTEXT_SIZE 255/* first guess at context size */ -char *xstrdup (const char *s) + +/** +* Returns valid pointer on success, NULL on failure +*/ +static char *xstrdup (const char *s) {char *s2; s2 =strdup (s); -if (!s2) { +if (!s2)fprintf (stderr,_ ("Out of memory!\n" )); -exit (1 ); - }return s2; }
@@ -120,6 +123,17 @@return 0 ; } +/** +* Construct from the current range and specified desired level a resulting +* range. If the specified level is a range, return that. If it is not, then +* construct a range with level as the sensitivity and clearance of the current +* context. +* +* newlevel - the level specified on the command line +* range - the range in the current context +* +* Returns malloc'd memory +*/ static char *build_new_range (char *newlevel,const char *range) {char *newrangep =NULL ;
@@ -136,9 +150,8 @@return newrangep; } -/* look for MLS range */ +/* look for MLS range in current context */ tmpptr =strchr (range,'-' ); -if (tmpptr) {/* we are inserting into a ranged MLS context */ len =strlen (newlevel) +1 +strlen (tmpptr +1 ) +1 ;
@@ -169,16 +182,11 @@* All PAM code goes in this section. * ************************************************************************/ - -#include <unistd.h> /* for getuid(), exit(), getopt() */ -#include <security/pam_appl.h> /* for PAM functions */ #include <security/pam_misc.h> /* for misc_conv PAM utility function */ #define SERVICE_NAME "newrole"/* the name of this program for PAM */ -int authenticate_via_pam (const struct passwd *,const char *); -/* authenticate_via_pam() * * in: pw - struct containing data from our user's line in
@@ -192,63 +200,39 @@* This function uses PAM to authenticate the user running this * program. This is the only function in this program that makes PAM * calls. -* */ - -int authenticate_via_pam (const struct passwd *pw,const char *ttyn) +int authenticate_via_pam (const char *ttyn,pam_handle_t *pam_handle) { -int result =0 ;/* our result, set to 0 (not authenticated) by default */ -int rc;/* pam return code */ -pam_handle_t *pam_handle;/* opaque handle used by all PAM functions */ +int result =0 ;/* set to 0 (not authenticated) by default */ +int pam_rc;/* pam return code */ const char *tty_name; -/* This is a jump table of functions for PAM to use when it wants to * -* communicate with the user. We'll be using misc_conv(), which is * -* provided for us via pam_misc.h. */ -struct pam_conv pam_conversation = { - misc_conv, -NULL - }; - -/* Make `p_pam_handle' a valid PAM handle so we can use it when * -* calling PAM functions. */ - rc =pam_start (SERVICE_NAME , - pw->pw_name, &pam_conversation, &pam_handle); -if (rc !=PAM_SUCCESS ) { -fprintf (stderr,_ ("failed to initialize PAM\n" )); -exit (-1 ); - } -if (strncmp (ttyn,"/dev/" ,5 ) ==0 ) tty_name = ttyn +5 ;else tty_name = ttyn; - rc =pam_set_item (pam_handle,PAM_TTY , tty_name); -if (rc !=PAM_SUCCESS ) { + pam_rc =pam_set_item (pam_handle,PAM_TTY , tty_name); +if (pam_rc !=PAM_SUCCESS ) {fprintf (stderr,_ ("failed to set PAM_TTY\n" )); goto out; }/* Ask PAM to authenticate the user running this program */ - rc =pam_authenticate (pam_handle,0 ); -if (rc !=PAM_SUCCESS ) { + pam_rc =pam_authenticate (pam_handle,0 ); +if (pam_rc !=PAM_SUCCESS ) { goto out; }/* Ask PAM to verify acct_mgmt */ - rc =pam_acct_mgmt (pam_handle,0 ); -if (rc ==PAM_SUCCESS ) { + pam_rc =pam_acct_mgmt (pam_handle,0 ); +if (pam_rc ==PAM_SUCCESS ) { result =1 ;/* user authenticated OK! */ } -/* We're done with PAM. Free `pam_handle'. */ out: -pam_end (pam_handle, rc); - -return (result); - +return result; }/* authenticate_via_pam() */ #else /* else !USE_PAM */
@@ -258,19 +242,14 @@* All shadow passwd code goes in this section. * ************************************************************************/ - -#include <unistd.h> /* for getuid(), exit(), crypt() */ #include <shadow.h> /* for shadow passwd functions */ #include <string.h> /* for strlen(), memset() */ #define PASSWORD_PROMPT _("Password:")/* prompt for getpass() */ -int authenticate_via_shadow_passwd (const struct passwd *); -/* authenticate_via_shadow_passwd() * -* in: pw - struct containing data from our user's line in -* the passwd file. +* in: uname - the calling user's user name * out: nothing * return: value condition * ----- ---------
@@ -280,51 +259,37 @@* * This function uses the shadow passwd file to thenticate the user running * this program. -* */ - -int authenticate_via_shadow_passwd (const struct passwd *pw) +int authenticate_via_shadow_passwd (const char *uname) { - -struct spwd *p_shadow_line;/* struct derived from shadow passwd file line */ -char *unencrypted_password_s;/* unencrypted password input by user */ -char *encrypted_password_s;/* user's password input after being crypt()ed */ - -/* Make `p_shadow_line' point to the data from the current user's * -* line in the shadow passwd file. */ -setspent ();/* Begin access to the shadow passwd file. */ - p_shadow_line =getspnam (pw->pw_name); -endspent ();/* End access to the shadow passwd file. */ +struct spwd *p_shadow_line; +char *unencrypted_password_s; +char *encrypted_password_s; + +setspent (); + p_shadow_line =getspnam (uname); +endspent ();if (!(p_shadow_line)) { -fprintf (stderr, -_ - ("Cannot find your entry in the shadow passwd file.\n" )); -exit (-1 ); +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Cannot find your entry in the shadow " +"passwd file.\n" )); +return 0 ; }/* Ask user to input unencrypted password */ if (!(unencrypted_password_s =getpass (PASSWORD_PROMPT ))) {fprintf (stderr,_ ("getpass cannot open /dev/tty\n" )); -exit (-1 ); +return 0 ; } -/* Use crypt() to encrypt user's input password. Clear the * -* unencrypted password as soon as we're done, so it is not * -* visible to memory snoopers. */ +/* Use crypt() to encrypt user's input password. */ encrypted_password_s =crypt (unencrypted_password_s, p_shadow_line->sp_pwdp);memset (unencrypted_password_s,0 ,strlen (unencrypted_password_s)); - -/* Return 1 (authenticated) iff the encrypted version of the user's * -* input password matches the encrypted password stored in the * -* shadow password file. */ return (!strcmp (encrypted_password_s, p_shadow_line->sp_pwdp)); - -}/* authenticate_via_shadow_passwd() */ - +}#endif /* if/else USE_PAM */ -/* +/** * This function checks to see if the shell is known in /etc/shells. * If so, it returns 1. On error or illegal shell, it returns 0. */
@@ -333,7 +298,7 @@int found =0 ;const char *buf; -if (!shell_name) +if (! (shell_name && shell_name[0 ]))return found;while ((buf =getusershell ()) !=NULL ) {
@@ -460,67 +425,138 @@return rc; } -/* +/** * This function will drop the capabilities so that we are left * only with access to the audit system. If the user is root, we leave * the capabilities alone since they already should have access to the * audit netlink socket. +* +* Returns zero on success, non-zero otherwise */ -#ifdef LOG_AUDIT_PRIV -static void drop_capabilities (void ) +#if defined(AUDIT_LOG_PRIV ) && !defined(NAMESPACE_PRIV ) +static int drop_capabilities (void ) { +int rc =0 ; +cap_t new_caps, tmp_caps; +cap_value_t cap_list[] = {CAP_AUDIT_WRITE }; +cap_value_t tmp_cap_list[] = {CAP_AUDIT_WRITE ,CAP_SETUID };uid_t uid =getuid (); -if (uid) {/* Non-root path */ -cap_t new_caps, tmp_caps; -cap_value_t cap_list[] = {CAP_AUDIT_WRITE }; -cap_value_t tmp_cap_list[] = {CAP_AUDIT_WRITE ,CAP_SETUID }; - - new_caps =cap_init (); - tmp_caps =cap_init (); -if (!new_caps || !tmp_caps) { -fprintf (stderr, -_ ("Error initing capabilities, aborting.\n" )); -exit (-1 ); - } -cap_set_flag (new_caps,CAP_PERMITTED ,1 , cap_list,CAP_SET ); -cap_set_flag (new_caps,CAP_EFFECTIVE ,1 , cap_list,CAP_SET ); -cap_set_flag (tmp_caps,CAP_PERMITTED ,2 , tmp_cap_list,CAP_SET ); -cap_set_flag (tmp_caps,CAP_EFFECTIVE ,2 , tmp_cap_list,CAP_SET ); +if (!uid) +return 0 ; -/* Keep capabilities across uid change */ -prctl (PR_SET_KEEPCAPS ,1 ,0 ,0 ,0 ); +/* Non-root caller, suid root path */ + new_caps =cap_init (); + tmp_caps =cap_init (); +if (!new_caps || !tmp_caps) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error initing capabilities, aborting.\n" )); +return -1 ; + } + rc |=cap_set_flag (new_caps,CAP_PERMITTED ,1 , cap_list,CAP_SET ); + rc |=cap_set_flag (new_caps,CAP_EFFECTIVE ,1 , cap_list,CAP_SET ); + rc |=cap_set_flag (tmp_caps,CAP_PERMITTED ,2 , tmp_cap_list,CAP_SET ); + rc |=cap_set_flag (tmp_caps,CAP_EFFECTIVE ,2 , tmp_cap_list,CAP_SET ); +if (rc) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error setting capabilities, aborting\n" )); + goto out; + } -/* We should still have root's caps, so drop most capabilities now */ -if (cap_set_proc (tmp_caps)) { -fprintf (stderr, -_ ("Error dropping capabilities, aborting\n" )); -exit (-1 ); - } -cap_free (tmp_caps); +/* Keep capabilities across uid change */ +if (prctl (PR_SET_KEEPCAPS ,1 ,0 ,0 ,0 )) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error setting KEEPCAPS, aborting\n" )); + rc =-1 ; + goto out; + } -/* Change uid */ -if (setresuid (uid, uid, uid)) { -fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error changing uid, aborting.\n" )); -exit (-1 ); - } +/* Does this temporary change really buy us much? */ +/* We should still have root's caps, so drop most capabilities now */ +if ((rc =cap_set_proc (tmp_caps))) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error dropping capabilities, aborting\n" )); + goto out; + } -/* Now get rid of this ability */ -if (prctl (PR_SET_KEEPCAPS ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ) <0 ) { -fprintf (stderr, -_ ("Error resetting KEEPCAPS, aborting\n" )); -exit (-1 ); - } +/* Change uid */ +if ((rc =setresuid (uid, uid, uid))) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error changing uid, aborting.\n" )); + goto out; + } -/* Finish dropping capabilities. */ -if (cap_set_proc (new_caps)) { -fprintf (stderr, -_ - ("Error dropping SETUID capability, aborting\n" )); -exit (-1 ); - } -cap_free (new_caps); +/* Now get rid of this ability */ +if ((rc =prctl (PR_SET_KEEPCAPS ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ) <0 )) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error resetting KEEPCAPS, aborting\n" )); + goto out; + } + +/* Finish dropping capabilities. */ +if ((rc =cap_set_proc (new_caps))) { +fprintf (stderr, +_ ("Error dropping SETUID capability, aborting\n" )); + goto out; } +out: +if (cap_free (tmp_caps) ||cap_free (new_caps)) +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error freeing caps\n" )); +return rc; +} +#elif defined(NAMESPACE_PRIV ) +/** +* This function will drop the capabilities so that we are left +* only with access to the audit system and the ability to raise +* CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_FOWNER and CAP_CHOWN, +* before invoking pam_namespace. These capabilities are needed +* for performing bind mounts/unmounts and to create potential new +* instance directories with appropriate DAC attributes. If the +* user is root, we leave the capabilities alone since they already +* should have access to the audit netlink socket and should have +* the ability to create/mount/unmount instance directories. +* +* Returns zero on success, non-zero otherwise +*/ +static int drop_capabilities (void ) +{ +int rc =0 ; +cap_t new_caps; +cap_value_t cap_list[] = {CAP_AUDIT_WRITE ,CAP_SETUID , +CAP_SYS_ADMIN ,CAP_FOWNER ,CAP_CHOWN , +CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE }; + +if (!getuid ()) +return 0 ; + +/* Non-root caller, suid root path */ + new_caps =cap_init (); +if (!new_caps) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error initing capabilities, aborting.\n" )); +return -1 ; + } + rc |=cap_set_flag (new_caps,CAP_PERMITTED ,6 , cap_list,CAP_SET ); + rc |=cap_set_flag (new_caps,CAP_EFFECTIVE ,6 , cap_list,CAP_SET ); +if (rc) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error setting capabilities, aborting\n" )); + goto out; + } + +/* Ensure that caps are dropped after setuid call */ +if ((rc =prctl (PR_SET_KEEPCAPS ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ) <0 )) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error resetting KEEPCAPS, aborting\n" )); + goto out; + } + +/* We should still have root's caps, so drop most capabilities now */ +if ((rc =cap_set_proc (new_caps))) { +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error dropping capabilities, aborting\n" )); + goto out; + } +out: +if (cap_free (new_caps)) +fprintf (stderr,_ ("Error freeing caps\n" )); +return rc; +} + +#else +static inline int drop_capabilities (void ) +{ +return 0 ; }#endif
@@ -541,7 +577,7 @@ }#endif -#ifdef LOG_AUDIT_PRIV +#ifdef AUDIT_LOG_PRIV /* Send audit message */ static int send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t old_context,
@@ -577,12 +613,10 @@ }#else static inline -int send_audit_message (int success __attribute__ ((unused)), -security_context_t old_context - __attribute__ ((unused)), -security_context_t new_context - __attribute__ ((unused)),const char *ttyn - __attribute__ ((unused))) +int send_audit_message (int success __attribute__ ((unused)), +security_context_t old_context __attribute__ ((unused)), +security_context_t new_context __attribute__ ((unused)), +const char *ttyn __attribute__ ((unused))) {return 0 ; }