Patch: Hide process info from other users/users not in my group
Subsystems (2)
Hi list,
this patch sets (if the corresponding kconfig option is active) the access modes of /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550 instead of 555 in order to provide some privacy to users. Tools like lsof and ps to spy out on other users become ineffective.
Cheers,
--
Daniel Reichelt
# diff -Naur linux-2.6.23.8/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/Kconfig
--- linux-2.6.23.8/fs/Kconfig 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100
@@ -918,6 +918,17 @@
help
Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format.+config PROC_SECURED_PID_DIRS
+ bool "chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550" + depends on PROC_FS + default n + help + chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550 instead of 555 which provides a bit + moreprivacy to users on your system as only the user's and the user's + group's process details may be viewed. Other users' tasks running on + the system will be completely hidden from the means of utilities like + ps or lsof.
+
config PROC_SYSCTL
bool "Sysctl support (/proc/sys)" if EMBEDDED depends on PROC_FS
# diff -Naur linux-2.6.23.8/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/proc/base.c
--- linux-2.6.23.8/fs/proc/base.c 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/proc/base.c 2007-11-20 11:31:31.000000000 +0100
@@ -2200,7 +2200,11 @@
if (!inode)
goto out;+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SECURED_PID_DIRS
+ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP;
+#else
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
+#endif
inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations;
inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;Hi Daniel,
Quoted 4 lines · Daniel Reichelt
# diff -Naur linux-2.6.23.8/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/Kconfig
fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100 line 927
Quoted 10 lines
fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/Kconfig 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +7
-0@@ -918,6 +918,17 @@ help Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format. +config PROC_SECURED_PID_DIRS + bool "chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550" + depends on PROC_FS + default n + help + chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550 instead of 555 which provides a bit + moreprivacy to users on your system as only the user's and the user's
Missing space ^.
I like the idea, but I would prefer to have three checkboxes for this option:
* Normal modes (as in how they are right now)
* User and group visible
* Visible for the owning user only
How about that?
Hannes
Quoted 1 line
I like the idea, but I would prefer to have three checkboxes for this option:
Nice addition, thanks for the input.
fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 19:54:54.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/Kconfig 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +30 -0
@@ -918,6 +918,36 @@ help Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format. +choice + prompt "Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs" + default PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED +config PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED + bool "no restriction" + depends on PROC_FS + help + Don't restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs, i.e. leave mode at 555 + respectively r-xr-xr-x . This is the traditional mode of operation. + + If unsure, say Y. +config PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_UG + bool "restrict to user and group + depends on PROC_FS + help + Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs to user and group, i.e. set mode + to 550 respectively r-xr-x--- . + + If unsure, say N. + +config PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_U + bool "restrict to user + depends on PROC_FS + help + Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs to user only, i.e. set mode to + 500 respectively r-x------ . + + If unsure, say N. +endchoice + config PROC_SYSCTL bool "Sysctl support (/proc/sys)" if EMBEDDED depends on PROC_FS
fs/proc/base.c 2007-11-20 20:01:33.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/proc/base.c 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +6 -0
@@ -2200,7 +2200,13 @@ if (!inode) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO; +#elifdef CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_UG + inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP; +#elifdef CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_U + inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR; +#endif inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations; inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
--
Daniel
Hi,
sorry, I messed up the #ifdef directives (confused them with C++...). Here's the really working patch:
fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 19:54:54.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/Kconfig 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +30 -0
@@ -918,6 +918,36 @@ help Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format. +choice + prompt "Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs" + default PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED +config PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED + bool "no restriction" + depends on PROC_FS + help + Don't restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs, i.e. leave mode at 555 + respectively r-xr-xr-x . This is the traditional mode of operation. + + If unsure, say Y. +config PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_UG + bool "restrict to user and group + depends on PROC_FS + help + Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs to user and group, i.e. set mode + to 550 respectively r-xr-x--- . + + If unsure, say N. + +config PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_U + bool "restrict to user + depends on PROC_FS + help + Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs to user only, i.e. set mode to + 500 respectively r-x------ . + + If unsure, say N. +endchoice + config PROC_SYSCTL bool "Sysctl support (/proc/sys)" if EMBEDDED depends on PROC_FS
fs/proc/base.c 2007-11-21 10:44:17.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/proc/base.c 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +6 -0
@@ -2200,7 +2200,13 @@ if (!inode) goto out; +#if defined CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO; +#elif defined CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_UG + inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP; +#elif defined CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_U + inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR; +#endif inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations; inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
--
Daniel
Hi!
Quoted 17 lines
this patch sets (if the corresponding kconfig option is active) the access modes of /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550 instead of 555 in order to provide some privacy to users. Tools like lsof and ps to spy out on other users become ineffective.
Cheers,
--
Daniel Reichelt# diff -Naur linux-2.6.23.8/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/Kconfigfs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/Kconfig 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +1
-0@@ -918,6 +918,17 @@ help Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format. +config PROC_SECURED_PID_DIRS
fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100 line 931
Quoted 10 lines
fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/Kconfig 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +10
-0+ bool "chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550" + depends on PROC_FS + default n + help + chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550 instead of 555 which provides a bit + moreprivacy to users on your system as only the user's and the user's + group's process details may be viewed. Other users' tasks running on + the system will be completely hidden from the means of utilities like + ps or lsof. +
This really needs to be runtime-configurable.
Signature · 1 line
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
Hi Pavel,
Quoted 1 line
This really needs to be runtime-configurable.
Hm. When this setting is changed during runtime, all the pre-existing permissions would have to be changed as weill which might be done by iterating through a list of running processes. Unfortunately I don't know how to do that. This is my very first kernel patch (ever) and if I'd try to code s.th. like that, I'd probably conjure race-conditions and other beasts... If you're willing to help me, we might come up with a solution...
cu
Daniel