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Patch: Hide process info from other users/users not in my group

DISCUSSION Daniel Reichelt 4 participants 6 messages Nov 20, 2007 – Nov 25, 2007

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#0 lore raw

Hi list,

this patch sets (if the corresponding kconfig option is active) the access modes of /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550 instead of 555 in order to provide some privacy to users. Tools like lsof and ps to spy out on other users become ineffective.

Cheers,
--
Daniel Reichelt

# diff -Naur linux-2.6.23.8/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/Kconfig
--- linux-2.6.23.8/fs/Kconfig   2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/Kconfig       2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100
@@ -918,6 +918,17 @@
         help
         Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format.

+config PROC_SECURED_PID_DIRS

+       bool "chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550"
+       depends on PROC_FS
+       default n
+       help
+         chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550 instead of 555 which provides a bit
+         moreprivacy to users on your system as only the user's and the user's
+         group's process details may be viewed. Other users' tasks running on
+         the system will be completely hidden from the means of utilities like
+         ps or lsof.

+
config PROC_SYSCTL
bool "Sysctl support (/proc/sys)" if EMBEDDED depends on PROC_FS

# diff -Naur linux-2.6.23.8/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/proc/base.c
--- linux-2.6.23.8/fs/proc/base.c       2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100
+++ linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/proc/base.c   2007-11-20 11:31:31.000000000 +0100
@@ -2200,7 +2200,11 @@
        if (!inode)
                goto out;

+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SECURED_PID_DIRS
+ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP;
+#else

        inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
+#endif
        inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations;
        inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations;
        inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
#1 lore raw

Hi Daniel,

Quoted 4 lines · Daniel Reichelt
# diff -Naur linux-2.6.23.8/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/Kconfig

fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100 line 927

Quoted 10 lines
fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/Kconfig 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +7 -0
@@ -918,6 +918,17 @@
         help
         Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format.
 
+config PROC_SECURED_PID_DIRS
+       bool "chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550"
+       depends on PROC_FS
+       default n
+       help
+         chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550 instead of 555 which provides a bit
+         moreprivacy to users on your system as only the user's and the user's

Missing space ^.

I like the idea, but I would prefer to have three checkboxes for this option:

* Normal modes (as in how they are right now)
* User and group visible
* Visible for the owning user only

How about that?

Hannes

#2 lore raw
Quoted 1 line

I like the idea, but I would prefer to have three checkboxes for this option:

Nice addition, thanks for the input.

fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 19:54:54.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/Kconfig 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +30 -0
@@ -918,6 +918,36 @@
         help
         Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format.
 
+choice
+       prompt "Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs"
+       default PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED
+config PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED
+       bool "no restriction"
+       depends on PROC_FS
+       help
+         Don't restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs, i.e. leave mode at 555
+         respectively r-xr-xr-x . This is the traditional mode of operation.
+
+         If unsure, say Y.
+config PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_UG
+       bool "restrict to user and group
+       depends on PROC_FS
+       help
+         Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs to user and group, i.e. set mode
+         to 550 respectively r-xr-x--- .
+
+         If unsure, say N.
+
+config PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_U
+       bool "restrict to user
+       depends on PROC_FS
+       help
+         Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs to user only, i.e. set mode to
+         500 respectively r-x------ .
+
+         If unsure, say N.
+endchoice
+
 config PROC_SYSCTL
        bool "Sysctl support (/proc/sys)" if EMBEDDED
        depends on PROC_FS
fs/proc/base.c 2007-11-20 20:01:33.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/proc/base.c 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +6 -0
@@ -2200,7 +2200,13 @@
        if (!inode)
                goto out;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED
        inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
+#elifdef CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_UG
+       inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP;
+#elifdef CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_U
+       inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR;
+#endif
        inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations;
        inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations;
        inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;

--
Daniel

#3 lore raw
In reply to Johannes Weiner

Hi,

sorry, I messed up the #ifdef directives (confused them with C++...). Here's the really working patch:

fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 19:54:54.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/Kconfig 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +30 -0
@@ -918,6 +918,36 @@
         help
         Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format.
 
+choice
+       prompt "Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs"
+       default PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED
+config PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED
+       bool "no restriction"
+       depends on PROC_FS
+       help
+         Don't restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs, i.e. leave mode at 555
+         respectively r-xr-xr-x . This is the traditional mode of operation.
+
+         If unsure, say Y.
+config PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_UG
+       bool "restrict to user and group
+       depends on PROC_FS
+       help
+         Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs to user and group, i.e. set mode
+         to 550 respectively r-xr-x--- .
+
+         If unsure, say N.
+
+config PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_U
+       bool "restrict to user
+       depends on PROC_FS
+       help
+         Restrict access to /proc/<pid>-dirs to user only, i.e. set mode to
+         500 respectively r-x------ .
+
+         If unsure, say N.
+endchoice
+
 config PROC_SYSCTL
        bool "Sysctl support (/proc/sys)" if EMBEDDED
        depends on PROC_FS
fs/proc/base.c 2007-11-21 10:44:17.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/proc/base.c 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +6 -0
@@ -2200,7 +2200,13 @@
        if (!inode)
                goto out;
 
+#if defined CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_UNRESTRICTED
        inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
+#elif defined CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_UG
+       inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP;
+#elif defined CONFIG_PROC_PIDDIRS_RESTRICT_TO_U
+       inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR;
+#endif
        inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations;
        inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations;
        inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;

--
Daniel

#4 lore raw
In reply to Daniel Reichelt

Hi!

Quoted 17 lines

this patch sets (if the corresponding kconfig option is active) the access modes of /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550 instead of 555 in order to provide some privacy to users. Tools like lsof and ps to spy out on other users become ineffective.

Cheers,
--
Daniel Reichelt

# diff -Naur linux-2.6.23.8/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.23.8-dhr/fs/Kconfig
fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/Kconfig 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +1 -0
@@ -918,6 +918,17 @@
         help
         Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format.
 
+config PROC_SECURED_PID_DIRS

fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100 line 931

Quoted 10 lines
fs/Kconfig 2007-11-20 11:33:18.000000000 +0100 renamed from fs/Kconfig 2007-11-16 19:14:27.000000000 +0100 +10 -0
+       bool "chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550"
+       depends on PROC_FS
+       default n
+       help
+         chmod /proc/<pid>-dirs to 550 instead of 555 which provides a bit
+         moreprivacy to users on your system as only the user's and the user's
+         group's process details may be viewed. Other users' tasks running on
+         the system will be completely hidden from the means of utilities like
+         ps or lsof.
+

This really needs to be runtime-configurable.

Signature · 1 line
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
#5 lore raw

Hi Pavel,

Quoted 1 line

This really needs to be runtime-configurable.

Hm. When this setting is changed during runtime, all the pre-existing permissions would have to be changed as weill which might be done by iterating through a list of running processes. Unfortunately I don't know how to do that. This is my very first kernel patch (ever) and if I'd try to code s.th. like that, I'd probably conjure race-conditions and other beasts... If you're willing to help me, we might come up with a solution...

cu
Daniel