Introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 Introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
In reply to a message not in the archiveTOMOYO Linux needs method for calculating pathname in LSM module. However, we have received comment from Al Viro, the vfs maintainer, that adding vfsmount parameter to vfs helper functions (and LSM hooks) is not preferable. We have asked some people (including Al), and we came back to the most straightforward approach; adding new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
The attached patch introduces several new LSM hooks TOMOYO Linux needs. It has less impact to existing LSM module and no impact to vfs helper functions. Please review it.
Regards,
---
Subject: Introduce new LSM hooks.
This patch allows LSM to check permission using "struct vfsmount" without passing "struct vfsmount" to VFS helper functions.
--- fs/namei.c | 37 ++++++++++++ fs/open.c | 5 + include/linux/security.h | 135 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 + security/capability.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 297 insertions(+)
fs/namei.c +37 -0
@@ -1585,6 +1585,10 @@ int may_open(struct nameidata *nd, int a* Refuse to truncate files with mandatory locks held on them. */ error =locks_verify_locked (inode); +if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&nd->path,0 , +ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME |ATTR_OPEN , +NULL );if (!error) {DQUOT_INIT (inode);
@@ -1615,7 +1619,11 @@ static int __open_namei_create(struct naif (!IS_POSIXACL (dir->d_inode)) mode &= ~current->fs->umask; + error =security_path_mknod (&nd->path, path->dentry, mode,0 ); +if (error) + goto out_unlock; error =vfs_create (dir->d_inode, path->dentry, mode, nd); +out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);dput (nd->path.dentry); nd->path.dentry = path->dentry;
@@ -2018,6 +2026,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_mknod (&nd.path, dentry, mode, dev); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write;switch (mode &S_IFMT ) {case 0 :case S_IFREG : error =vfs_create (nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd);
@@ -2030,6 +2041,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con error =vfs_mknod (nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,0 );break ; } +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);
@@ -2089,7 +2101,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mkdirat(int dfd, con error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_mkdir (&nd.path, dentry, mode); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_mkdir (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);
@@ -2196,7 +2212,11 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit3; + error =security_path_rmdir (&nd.path, dentry); +if (error) + goto exit4; error =vfs_rmdir (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry); +exit4:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); exit3:dput (dentry);
@@ -2278,7 +2298,11 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const c error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit2; + error =security_path_unlink (&nd.path, dentry); +if (error) + goto exit3; error =vfs_unlink (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry); +exit3:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); exit2:dput (dentry);
@@ -2359,7 +2383,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_symlinkat(const char error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_symlink (&nd.path, dentry, from); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_symlink (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);
@@ -2456,7 +2484,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, c error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_link (old_path.dentry, &nd.path, new_dentry); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_link (old_path.dentry, nd.path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (new_dentry);
@@ -2688,8 +2720,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_renameat(int olddfd, error =mnt_want_write (oldnd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit5; + error =security_path_rename (&oldnd.path, old_dentry, + &newnd.path, new_dentry); +if (error) + goto exit6; error =vfs_rename (old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry, new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry); +exit6:mnt_drop_write (oldnd.path.mnt); exit5:dput (new_dentry);
fs/open.c +5 -0
@@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ static long do_sys_truncate(const char _ goto put_write_and_out; error =locks_verify_truncate (inode,NULL , length); +if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&path, length,0 ,NULL );if (!error) {DQUOT_INIT (inode); error =do_truncate (path.dentry, length,0 ,NULL );
@@ -329,6 +331,9 @@ static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned in error =locks_verify_truncate (inode, file, length);if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&file->f_path, length, +ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME , file); +if (!error) error =do_truncate (dentry, length,ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME , file); out_putf:fput (file);
include/linux/security.h +135 -0
199 lines not on this page · raw message
net/unix/af_unix.c +4 -0
@@ -827,7 +827,11 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock err =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (err) goto out_mknod_dput; + err =security_path_mknod (&nd.path, dentry, mode,0 ); +if (err) + goto out_mknod_drop_write; err =vfs_mknod (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode,0 ); +out_mknod_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt);if (err) goto out_mknod_dput;
security/capability.c +53 -0
65 lines not on this page · raw message
security/security.c +63 -0
69 lines not on this page · raw message
Quoted 7 lines · Kentaro Takeda
TOMOYO Linux needs method for calculating pathname in LSM module. However, we have received comment from Al Viro, the vfs maintainer, that adding vfsmount parameter to vfs helper functions (and LSM hooks) is not preferable. We have asked some people (including Al), and we came back to the most straightforward approach; adding new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
Quoted 7 lines
The attached patch introduces several new LSM hooks TOMOYO Linux needs. It has less impact to existing LSM module and no impact to vfs helper functions. Please review it.
Regards,
As always, the community will be eager to see the code that makes use of these hooks.
Quoted 528 lines
---
Subject: Introduce new LSM hooks.This patch allows LSM to check permission using "struct vfsmount" without passing "struct vfsmount" to VFS helper functions.
Signed-off-by Kentaro Takeda <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Toshiharu Harada <[email protected]>--- fs/namei.c | 37 ++++++++++++ fs/open.c | 5 + include/linux/security.h | 135 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 + security/capability.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 297 insertions(+)fs/namei.c +37
-0@@ -1585,6 +1585,10 @@ int may_open(struct nameidata *nd, int a* Refuse to truncate files with mandatory locks held on them. */ error =locks_verify_locked (inode); +if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&nd->path,0 , +ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME |ATTR_OPEN , +NULL );if (!error) {DQUOT_INIT (inode);@@ -1615,7 +1619,11 @@ static int __open_namei_create(struct naif (!IS_POSIXACL (dir->d_inode)) mode &= ~current->fs->umask; + error =security_path_mknod (&nd->path, path->dentry, mode,0 ); +if (error) + goto out_unlock; error =vfs_create (dir->d_inode, path->dentry, mode, nd); +out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);dput (nd->path.dentry); nd->path.dentry = path->dentry;@@ -2018,6 +2026,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_mknod (&nd.path, dentry, mode, dev); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write;switch (mode &S_IFMT ) {case 0 :case S_IFREG : error =vfs_create (nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd);@@ -2030,6 +2041,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con error =vfs_mknod (nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,0 );break ; } +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);@@ -2089,7 +2101,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mkdirat(int dfd, con error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_mkdir (&nd.path, dentry, mode); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_mkdir (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);@@ -2196,7 +2212,11 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit3; + error =security_path_rmdir (&nd.path, dentry); +if (error) + goto exit4; error =vfs_rmdir (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry); +exit4:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); exit3:dput (dentry);@@ -2278,7 +2298,11 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const c error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit2; + error =security_path_unlink (&nd.path, dentry); +if (error) + goto exit3; error =vfs_unlink (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry); +exit3:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); exit2:dput (dentry);@@ -2359,7 +2383,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_symlinkat(const char error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_symlink (&nd.path, dentry, from); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_symlink (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);@@ -2456,7 +2484,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, c error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_link (old_path.dentry, &nd.path, new_dentry); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_link (old_path.dentry, nd.path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (new_dentry);@@ -2688,8 +2720,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_renameat(int olddfd, error =mnt_want_write (oldnd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit5; + error =security_path_rename (&oldnd.path, old_dentry, + &newnd.path, new_dentry); +if (error) + goto exit6; error =vfs_rename (old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry, new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry); +exit6:mnt_drop_write (oldnd.path.mnt); exit5:dput (new_dentry);fs/open.c +5
-0@@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ static long do_sys_truncate(const char _ goto put_write_and_out; error =locks_verify_truncate (inode,NULL , length); +if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&path, length,0 ,NULL );if (!error) {DQUOT_INIT (inode); error =do_truncate (path.dentry, length,0 ,NULL );@@ -329,6 +331,9 @@ static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned in error =locks_verify_truncate (inode, file, length);if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&file->f_path, length, +ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME , file); +if (!error) error =do_truncate (dentry, length,ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME , file); out_putf:fput (file);include/linux/security.h +135
-0@@ -345,17 +345,37 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory of the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_link: +* Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. +* @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link +* to the file. +* @new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of +* the new link. +* @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_unlink: * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_unlink: +* Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. +* @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file. +* @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_symlink: * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link. * @old_name contains the pathname of file. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_symlink: +* Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. +* @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of +* the symbolic link. +* @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link. +* @old_name contains the pathname of file. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_mkdir: * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory * associated with inode strcture @dir. @@ -363,11 +383,25 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory. * @mode contains the mode of new directory. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_mkdir: +* Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory +* associated with path strcture @path. +* @dir containst the path structure of parent of the directory +* to be created. +* @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory. +* @mode contains the mode of new directory. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_rmdir: * Check the permission to remove a directory. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory to be removed. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_rmdir: +* Check the permission to remove a directory. +* @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be +* removed. +* @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_mknod: * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo * file created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation @@ -378,6 +412,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @mode contains the mode of the new file. * @dev contains the device number. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_mknod: +* Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called +* even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. +* @dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file. +* @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file. +* @mode contains the mode of the new file. +* @dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get +* the decoded device number. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_rename: * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. * @old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link. @@ -385,6 +428,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_rename: +* Check for permission to rename a file or directory. +* @old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link. +* @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link. +* @new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link. +* @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_readlink: * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link. @@ -413,6 +463,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file. * @attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_truncate: +* Check permission before truncating a file. +* @path contains the path structure for the file. +* @length is the new length of the file. +* @time_attrs is the flags passed to do_truncate(). +* @filp is the file structure (may be NULL). +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_getattr: * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. * @mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up @@ -1350,6 +1407,20 @@ struct security_operations { struct super_block *newsb);int (*sb_parse_opts_str) (char *options,struct security_mnt_opts *opts); +int (*path_unlink) (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry); +int (*path_mkdir) (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode); +int (*path_rmdir) (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry); +int (*path_mknod) (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode, +unsigned int dev); +int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path,loff_t length, +unsigned int time_attrs,struct file *filp); +int (*path_symlink) (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +const char *old_name); +int (*path_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry,struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry); +int (*path_rename) (struct path *old_dir,struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_dir,struct dentry *new_dentry); +int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);void (*inode_free_security) (struct inode *inode); int (*inode_init_security) (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,@@ -1618,6 +1689,20 @@ void security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const st struct super_block *newsb);int security_sb_parse_opts_str (char *options,struct security_mnt_opts *opts); +int security_path_unlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry); +int security_path_mkdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode); +int security_path_rmdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry); +int security_path_mknod (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode, +unsigned int dev); +int security_path_truncate (struct path *path,loff_t length, +unsigned int time_attrs,struct file *filp); +int security_path_symlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +const char *old_name); +int security_path_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry); +int security_path_rename (struct path *old_dir,struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_dir,struct dentry *new_dentry); +int security_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode);void security_inode_free (struct inode *inode); int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,@@ -1949,6 +2034,56 @@ static inline int security_sb_parse_optsreturn 0 ; } +static inline int security_path_unlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_mkdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +int mode) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_rmdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_mknod (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +int mode,unsigned int dev) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_truncate (struct path *path,loff_t length, +unsigned int time_attrs, +struct file *filp) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_symlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +const char *old_name) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_link (struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_rename (struct path *old_dir, +struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static inline int security_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode) {return 0 ;net/unix/af_unix.c +4
-0@@ -827,7 +827,11 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock err =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (err) goto out_mknod_dput; + err =security_path_mknod (&nd.path, dentry, mode,0 ); +if (err) + goto out_mknod_drop_write; err =vfs_mknod (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode,0 ); +out_mknod_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt);if (err) goto out_mknod_dput;security/capability.c +53
-0@@ -268,6 +268,51 @@ static void cap_inode_getsecid(const str *secid =0 ; } +static int cap_path_mknod (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode, +unsigned int dev) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_mkdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_rmdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_unlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_symlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +const char *old_name) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_rename (struct path *old_path,struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_path,struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_truncate (struct path *path,loff_t length, +unsigned int time_attrs,struct file *filp) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static int cap_file_permission (struct file *file,int mask) {return 0 ;@@ -877,6 +922,14 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_set_to_cap_if_null (ops, inode_setsecurity);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, inode_listsecurity);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, inode_getsecid); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_mknod); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_mkdir); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_rmdir); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_unlink); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_symlink); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_link); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_rename); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_truncate);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, file_permission);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, file_alloc_security);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, file_free_security);security/security.c +63
-1@@ -358,6 +358,69 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_init_security); +int security_path_mknod (struct path *path,struct dentry *dentry,int mode, +unsigned int dev) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_mknod (path, dentry, mode, dev); +} + +int security_path_mkdir (struct path *path,struct dentry *dentry,int mode) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_mkdir (path, dentry, mode); +} + +int security_path_rmdir (struct path *path,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_rmdir (path, dentry); +} + +int security_path_unlink (struct path *path,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_unlink (path, dentry); +} + +int security_path_symlink (struct path *path,struct dentry *dentry, +const char *old_name) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_symlink (path, dentry, old_name); +} + +int security_path_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (old_dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_link (old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); +} + +int security_path_rename (struct path *old_dir,struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_dir,struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (old_dentry->d_inode) || + (new_dentry->d_inode &&IS_PRIVATE (new_dentry->d_inode)))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_rename (old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, + new_dentry); +} + +int security_path_truncate (struct path *path,loff_t length, +unsigned int time_attrs,struct file *filp) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_truncate (path, length, time_attrs, filp); +} +int security_inode_create (struct inode *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode) {if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (dir))) --To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [email protected]
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Quoted 2 lines · Casey Schaufler
As always, the community will be eager to see the code that makes use of these hooks.
We are ready for submitting body of TOMOYO Linux as always. :-) However, the largest stumbling block of merging TOMOYO Linux is the method for calculating pathname in LSM module. This patch contains all modifications to the existing kernel code by TOMOYO Linux (the rest modification is within security/tomoyo).
We'd like to ask the community's approval of this approach before review of TOMOYO Linux main module.
Regards,
Quoted 12 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 11 lines · Kentaro Takeda
TOMOYO Linux needs method for calculating pathname in LSM module. However, we have received comment from Al Viro, the vfs maintainer, that adding vfsmount parameter to vfs helper functions (and LSM hooks) is not preferable. We have asked some people (including Al), and we came back to the most straightforward approach; adding new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
The attached patch introduces several new LSM hooks TOMOYO Linux needs. It has less impact to existing LSM module and no impact to vfs helper functions. Please review it.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Regards,
As always, the community will be eager to see the code that makes use of these hooks.
you can bet that if these hooks are accepted, AppArmor and the various other LSMs that have not been accepted becouse of the problems they have dealing with paths will switch to using the 'approved' hooks.
so there are several bodies of code that have already been published that would want to use hooks like these if they are available.
David Lang
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Kentaro Takeda
TOMOYO Linux needs method for calculating pathname in LSM module. However, we have received comment from Al Viro, the vfs maintainer, that adding vfsmount parameter to vfs helper functions (and LSM hooks) is not preferable. We have asked some people (including Al), and we came back to the most straightforward approach; adding new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
The attached patch introduces several new LSM hooks TOMOYO Linux needs. It has less impact to existing LSM module and no impact to vfs helper functions. Please review it.
I don't see any technical errors in this patch.
If it is going to be merged, please make a new config option for path-based hooks (similar to that for the network hooks), so they can be compiled out.
- James
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Quoted 13 lines · James Morris
Quoted 10 lines · Kentaro Takeda
TOMOYO Linux needs method for calculating pathname in LSM module. However, we have received comment from Al Viro, the vfs maintainer, that adding vfsmount parameter to vfs helper functions (and LSM hooks) is not preferable. We have asked some people (including Al), and we came back to the most straightforward approach; adding new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
The attached patch introduces several new LSM hooks TOMOYO Linux needs. It has less impact to existing LSM module and no impact to vfs helper functions. Please review it.
Quoted 5 lines
I don't see any technical errors in this patch.
If it is going to be merged, please make a new config option for path-based hooks (similar to that for the network hooks), so they can be compiled out.
one question about these new hook locations.
it is possible to gather all the info that was gathered at the old hook locations from the new ones? I realize that you are not eliminating the old hooks (and possibly can't for backwards compatibility), but possibly they should be depriciated in favor of the new locations if they can satisfy both the old uses and new use cases.
David Lang
Quoted 21 lines · On Mon, 2008-09-22 at 23:12 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 13 lines · James Morris
Quoted 10 lines · Kentaro Takeda
TOMOYO Linux needs method for calculating pathname in LSM module. However, we have received comment from Al Viro, the vfs maintainer, that adding vfsmount parameter to vfs helper functions (and LSM hooks) is not preferable. We have asked some people (including Al), and we came back to the most straightforward approach; adding new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
The attached patch introduces several new LSM hooks TOMOYO Linux needs. It has less impact to existing LSM module and no impact to vfs helper functions. Please review it.
Quoted 5 lines
I don't see any technical errors in this patch.
If it is going to be merged, please make a new config option for path-based hooks (similar to that for the network hooks), so they can be compiled out.
Quoted 7 lines
one question about these new hook locations.
it is possible to gather all the info that was gathered at the old hook locations from the new ones? I realize that you are not eliminating the old hooks (and possibly can't for backwards compatibility), but possibly they should be depriciated in favor of the new locations if they can satisfy both the old uses and new use cases.
They can't.
Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency
Quoted 17 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 15 lines · On Mon, 2008-09-22 at 23:12 -0700, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 13 lines · James Morris
Quoted 10 lines · Kentaro Takeda
TOMOYO Linux needs method for calculating pathname in LSM module. However, we have received comment from Al Viro, the vfs maintainer, that adding vfsmount parameter to vfs helper functions (and LSM hooks) is not preferable. We have asked some people (including Al), and we came back to the most straightforward approach; adding new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
The attached patch introduces several new LSM hooks TOMOYO Linux needs. It has less impact to existing LSM module and no impact to vfs helper functions. Please review it.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I don't see any technical errors in this patch.
If it is going to be merged, please make a new config option for path-based hooks (similar to that for the network hooks), so they can be compiled out.
Another pointless config option.
It's actually pretty surprising that SECURITY_NETWORK is
a) user-visible and b) is not SECURITY && NET.
Same for SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM.
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 7 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I don't see any technical errors in this patch.
If it is going to be merged, please make a new config option for path-based hooks (similar to that for the network hooks), so they can be compiled out.
Another pointless config option.
Why is it pointless? If distros don't want to use these hooks, they shouldn't have to have them enabled.
Quoted 5 lines
It's actually pretty surprising that
SECURITY_NETWORKis
a) user-visible and b) is not SECURITY && NET.Same for
SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM.
IIRC, this option was a perquisite for merge. Networking hooks have a relatively high overhead and not everyone wants to use them, even if they have networking enabled.
- James
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Quoted 1 line · James Morris
I don't see any technical errors in this patch.
Thanks for your review.
Quoted 3 lines
If it is going to be merged, please make a new config option for path-based hooks (similar to that for the network hooks), so they can be compiled out.
I see, here it is.
---
Subject: introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
----- What is this patch for? -----
There are security_inode_*() LSM hooks for attribute-based MAC, but they are not suitable for pathname-based MAC because they don't receive "struct vfsmount" information.
----- How this patch was developed? -----
Two pathname-based MACs, AppArmor and TOMOYO Linux, are trying to merge upstream. But because of "struct vfsmount" problem, they have been unable to merge upstream.
Here are the list of approaches and the reasons of denial.
(1) Not using LSM
http://lwn.net/Articles/277833/
This approach was rejected because security modules should use LSM because the whole idea behind LSM was to have a single set of hooks for all security modules; if every module now adds its own set of hooks, that purpose will have been defeated and the kernel will turn into a big mess of security hooks.
(2) Retrieving "struct vfsmount" from "struct task_struct".
http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/11/5/388
Since "struct task_struct" contains list of "struct vfsmount", "struct vfsmount" which corresponds to "struct dentry" can be retrieved from the list unless "mount --bind" is used.
This approach turned out to cause a critical problem that getting namespace_sem lock from security_inode_*() triggers AB-BA deadlock.
(3) Adding "struct vfsmount" parameter to VFS helper functions.
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/5/29/207
This approach adds "struct vfsmount" to VFS helper functions (e.g. vfs_mkdir() and vfs_symlink()) and LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions. This approach is helpful for not only AppArmor and TOMOYO Linux 2.x but also SELinux and auditing purpose, for this approach allows existent LSM users to use pathnames in their access control and audit logs.
This approach was rejected by Al Viro, the VFS maintainer, because he thinks individual filesystem should remain "struct vfsmount"-unaware and VFS helper functions should not receive "struct vfsmount".
Al Viro also suggested to move existing security_inode_*() to out of VFS helper functions so that security_inode_*() can receive "struct vfsmount" without modifying VFS helper functions, but this suggestion was opposed by Stephen Smalley because changing the order of permission checks (i.e. MAC checks before DAC checks) is not acceptable.
(4) Passing "struct vfsmount" via "struct task_struct".
http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/11/16/157
Since we didn't understand the reason why accessing "struct vfsmount" from LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions is not acceptable, we thought the reason why VFS helper functions don't receive "struct vfsmount" is the amount of modifications needed to do so. Thus, we proposed to pass "struct vfsmount" via "struct task_struct" so that modifications remain minimal.
This approach was rejected because this is an abuse of "struct task_struct".
(5) Remembering pathname of "struct vfsmount" via "struct task_struct".
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/8/19/16
Since pathname of a "struct dentry" up to the mount point can be calculated without "struct vfsmount", absolute pathname of a "struct dentry" can be calculated if "struct task_struct" can remember absolute pathname of a "struct vfsmount" which corresponds to "struct dentry".
As we now understand that Al Viro is opposing to access "struct vfsmount" from LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions, we gave up delivering "struct vfsmount" to LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions.
Kernel 2.6.26 introduced read-only bind mount feature, and hooks for that feature (i.e. mnt_want_write() and mnt_drop_write()) were inserted around VFS helper functions call. Since mnt_want_write() receives "struct vfsmount" which corresponds to "struct dentry" that will be passed to subsequent VFS helper functions call, we associated pathname of "struct vfsmount" with "struct task_struct" instead of associating "struct vfsmount" itself.
This approach was not explicitly rejected, but there seems to be performance problem.
(6) Introducing new LSM hooks.
(this patch)
We understand that adding new LSM hooks which receive "struct vfsmount" outside VFS helper functions is the most straightforward approach. This approach has less impact to existing LSM module and no impact to VFS helper functions.
-----
fs/namei.c | 37 ++++++++++++ fs/open.c | 5 + include/linux/security.h | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 + security/Kconfig | 9 +++ security/capability.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 317 insertions(+)
fs/namei.c +37 -0
@@ -1571,6 +1571,10 @@ int may_open(struct nameidata *nd, int a* Refuse to truncate files with mandatory locks held on them. */ error =locks_verify_locked (inode); +if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&nd->path,0 , +ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME |ATTR_OPEN , +NULL );if (!error) {DQUOT_INIT (inode);
@@ -1601,7 +1605,11 @@ static int __open_namei_create(struct naif (!IS_POSIXACL (dir->d_inode)) mode &= ~current->fs->umask; + error =security_path_mknod (&nd->path, path->dentry, mode,0 ); +if (error) + goto out_unlock; error =vfs_create (dir->d_inode, path->dentry, mode, nd); +out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);dput (nd->path.dentry); nd->path.dentry = path->dentry;
@@ -2014,6 +2022,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_mknod (&nd.path, dentry, mode, dev); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write;switch (mode &S_IFMT ) {case 0 :case S_IFREG : error =vfs_create (nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd);
@@ -2026,6 +2037,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con error =vfs_mknod (nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,0 );break ; } +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);
@@ -2085,7 +2097,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mkdirat(int dfd, con error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_mkdir (&nd.path, dentry, mode); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_mkdir (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);
@@ -2192,7 +2208,11 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit3; + error =security_path_rmdir (&nd.path, dentry); +if (error) + goto exit4; error =vfs_rmdir (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry); +exit4:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); exit3:dput (dentry);
@@ -2274,7 +2294,11 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const c error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit2; + error =security_path_unlink (&nd.path, dentry); +if (error) + goto exit3; error =vfs_unlink (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry); +exit3:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); exit2:dput (dentry);
@@ -2355,7 +2379,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_symlinkat(const char error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_symlink (&nd.path, dentry, from); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_symlink (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);
@@ -2452,7 +2480,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, c error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_link (old_path.dentry, &nd.path, new_dentry); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_link (old_path.dentry, nd.path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (new_dentry);
@@ -2682,8 +2714,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_renameat(int olddfd, error =mnt_want_write (oldnd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit5; + error =security_path_rename (&oldnd.path, old_dentry, + &newnd.path, new_dentry); +if (error) + goto exit6; error =vfs_rename (old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry, new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry); +exit6:mnt_drop_write (oldnd.path.mnt); exit5:dput (new_dentry);
fs/open.c +5 -0
@@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ static long do_sys_truncate(const char _ goto put_write_and_out; error =locks_verify_truncate (inode,NULL , length); +if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&path, length,0 ,NULL );if (!error) {DQUOT_INIT (inode); error =do_truncate (path.dentry, length,0 ,NULL );
@@ -329,6 +331,9 @@ static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned in error =locks_verify_truncate (inode, file, length);if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&file->f_path, length, +ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME , file); +if (!error) error =do_truncate (dentry, length,ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME , file); out_putf:fput (file);
include/linux/security.h +139 -0
197 lines not on this page · raw message
net/unix/af_unix.c +4 -0
@@ -828,7 +828,11 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock err =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (err) goto out_mknod_dput; + err =security_path_mknod (&nd.path, dentry, mode,0 ); +if (err) + goto out_mknod_drop_write; err =vfs_mknod (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode,0 ); +out_mknod_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt);if (err) goto out_mknod_dput;
security/capability.c +57 -0
69 lines not on this page · raw message
security/security.c +66 -0
72 lines not on this page · raw message
security/Kconfig +9 -0
@@ -81,6 +81,15 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM IPSec. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config SECURITY_PATH + bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" + depends on SECURITY + help + This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. + If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to + implement pathname based access controls. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES bool "File POSIX Capabilities" default n
Quoted 633 lines · Kentaro Takeda
Quoted 1 line · James Morris
I don't see any technical errors in this patch.
Thanks for your review.
Quoted 3 lines
If it is going to be merged, please make a new config option for path-based hooks (similar to that for the network hooks), so they can be compiled out.
I see, here it is.
---
Subject: introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.----- What is this patch for? -----
There are security_inode_*() LSM hooks for attribute-based MAC, but they are not suitable for pathname-based MAC because they don't receive "struct vfsmount" information.
----- How this patch was developed? -----
Two pathname-based MACs, AppArmor and TOMOYO Linux, are trying to merge upstream. But because of "struct vfsmount" problem, they have been unable to merge upstream.
Here are the list of approaches and the reasons of denial.
(1) Not using LSM
http://lwn.net/Articles/277833/This approach was rejected because security modules should use LSM because the whole idea behind LSM was to have a single set of hooks for all security modules; if every module now adds its own set of hooks, that purpose will have been defeated and the kernel will turn into a big mess of security hooks.
(2) Retrieving "struct vfsmount" from "struct
task_struct".
http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/11/5/388Since "struct
task_struct" contains list of "struct vfsmount", "struct vfsmount" which corresponds to "struct dentry" can be retrieved from the list unless "mount --bind" is used.This approach turned out to cause a critical problem that getting
namespace_semlock from security_inode_*() triggers AB-BA deadlock.(3) Adding "struct vfsmount" parameter to VFS helper functions.
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/5/29/207This approach adds "struct vfsmount" to VFS helper functions (e.g.
vfs_mkdir()andvfs_symlink()) and LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions. This approach is helpful for not only AppArmor and TOMOYO Linux 2.x but also SELinux and auditing purpose, for this approach allows existent LSM users to use pathnames in their access control and audit logs.This approach was rejected by Al Viro, the VFS maintainer, because he thinks individual filesystem should remain "struct vfsmount"-unaware and VFS helper functions should not receive "struct vfsmount".
Al Viro also suggested to move existing security_inode_*() to out of VFS helper functions so that security_inode_*() can receive "struct vfsmount" without modifying VFS helper functions, but this suggestion was opposed by Stephen Smalley because changing the order of permission checks (i.e. MAC checks before DAC checks) is not acceptable.
(4) Passing "struct vfsmount" via "struct
task_struct".
http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/11/16/157Since we didn't understand the reason why accessing "struct vfsmount" from LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions is not acceptable, we thought the reason why VFS helper functions don't receive "struct vfsmount" is the amount of modifications needed to do so. Thus, we proposed to pass "struct vfsmount" via "struct
task_struct" so that modifications remain minimal.This approach was rejected because this is an abuse of "struct
task_struct".(5) Remembering pathname of "struct vfsmount" via "struct
task_struct".
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/8/19/16Since pathname of a "struct dentry" up to the mount point can be calculated without "struct vfsmount", absolute pathname of a "struct dentry" can be calculated if "struct
task_struct" can remember absolute pathname of a "struct vfsmount" which corresponds to "struct dentry".
As we now understand that Al Viro is opposing to access "struct vfsmount" from LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions, we gave up delivering "struct vfsmount" to LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions.
Kernel 2.6.26 introduced read-only bind mount feature, and hooks for that feature (i.e.mnt_want_write()andmnt_drop_write()) were inserted around VFS helper functions call. Sincemnt_want_write()receives "struct vfsmount" which corresponds to "struct dentry" that will be passed to subsequent VFS helper functions call, we associated pathname of "struct vfsmount" with "structtask_struct" instead of associating "struct vfsmount" itself.This approach was not explicitly rejected, but there seems to be performance problem.
(6) Introducing new LSM hooks.
(this patch)We understand that adding new LSM hooks which receive "struct vfsmount" outside VFS helper functions is the most straightforward approach. This approach has less impact to existing LSM module and no impact to VFS helper functions.
Signed-off-by Kentaro Takeda <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Toshiharu Harada <[email protected]>Cc Al Viro <[email protected]>Cc Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>Cc Crispin Cowan <[email protected]>Cc Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Cc Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Andrew Morton <[email protected]>-----
fs/namei.c | 37 ++++++++++++ fs/open.c | 5 + include/linux/security.h | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 + security/Kconfig | 9 +++ security/capability.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 317 insertions(+)fs/namei.c +37
-0@@ -1571,6 +1571,10 @@ int may_open(struct nameidata *nd, int a* Refuse to truncate files with mandatory locks held on them. */ error =locks_verify_locked (inode); +if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&nd->path,0 , +ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME |ATTR_OPEN , +NULL );if (!error) {DQUOT_INIT (inode);@@ -1601,7 +1605,11 @@ static int __open_namei_create(struct naif (!IS_POSIXACL (dir->d_inode)) mode &= ~current->fs->umask; + error =security_path_mknod (&nd->path, path->dentry, mode,0 ); +if (error) + goto out_unlock; error =vfs_create (dir->d_inode, path->dentry, mode, nd); +out_unlock:mutex_unlock (&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);dput (nd->path.dentry); nd->path.dentry = path->dentry;@@ -2014,6 +2022,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_mknod (&nd.path, dentry, mode, dev); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write;switch (mode &S_IFMT ) {case 0 :case S_IFREG : error =vfs_create (nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd);@@ -2026,6 +2037,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con error =vfs_mknod (nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,0 );break ; } +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);@@ -2085,7 +2097,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mkdirat(int dfd, con error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_mkdir (&nd.path, dentry, mode); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_mkdir (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);@@ -2192,7 +2208,11 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit3; + error =security_path_rmdir (&nd.path, dentry); +if (error) + goto exit4; error =vfs_rmdir (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry); +exit4:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); exit3:dput (dentry);@@ -2274,7 +2294,11 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const c error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit2; + error =security_path_unlink (&nd.path, dentry); +if (error) + goto exit3; error =vfs_unlink (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry); +exit3:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); exit2:dput (dentry);@@ -2355,7 +2379,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_symlinkat(const char error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_symlink (&nd.path, dentry, from); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_symlink (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (dentry);@@ -2452,7 +2480,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, c error =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (error) goto out_dput; + error =security_path_link (old_path.dentry, &nd.path, new_dentry); +if (error) + goto out_drop_write; error =vfs_link (old_path.dentry, nd.path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); +out_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt); out_dput:dput (new_dentry);@@ -2682,8 +2714,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_renameat(int olddfd, error =mnt_want_write (oldnd.path.mnt);if (error) goto exit5; + error =security_path_rename (&oldnd.path, old_dentry, + &newnd.path, new_dentry); +if (error) + goto exit6; error =vfs_rename (old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry, new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry); +exit6:mnt_drop_write (oldnd.path.mnt); exit5:dput (new_dentry);fs/open.c +5
-0@@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ static long do_sys_truncate(const char _ goto put_write_and_out; error =locks_verify_truncate (inode,NULL , length); +if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&path, length,0 ,NULL );if (!error) {DQUOT_INIT (inode); error =do_truncate (path.dentry, length,0 ,NULL );@@ -329,6 +331,9 @@ static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned in error =locks_verify_truncate (inode, file, length);if (!error) + error =security_path_truncate (&file->f_path, length, +ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME , file); +if (!error) error =do_truncate (dentry, length,ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME , file); out_putf:fput (file);include/linux/security.h +139
-0@@ -331,17 +331,37 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory of the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_link: +* Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. +* @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link +* to the file. +* @new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of +* the new link. +* @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_unlink: * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_unlink: +* Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. +* @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file. +* @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_symlink: * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link. * @old_name contains the pathname of file. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_symlink: +* Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. +* @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of +* the symbolic link. +* @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link. +* @old_name contains the pathname of file. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_mkdir: * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory * associated with inode strcture @dir. @@ -349,11 +369,25 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory. * @mode contains the mode of new directory. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_mkdir: +* Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory +* associated with path strcture @path. +* @dir containst the path structure of parent of the directory +* to be created. +* @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory. +* @mode contains the mode of new directory. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_rmdir: * Check the permission to remove a directory. * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory to be removed. * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_rmdir: +* Check the permission to remove a directory. +* @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be +* removed. +* @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_mknod: * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo * file created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation @@ -364,6 +398,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @mode contains the mode of the new file. * @dev contains the device number. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_mknod: +* Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called +* even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. +* @dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file. +* @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file. +* @mode contains the mode of the new file. +* @dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get +* the decoded device number. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_rename: * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. * @old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link. @@ -371,6 +414,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link. * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_rename: +* Check for permission to rename a file or directory. +* @old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link. +* @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link. +* @new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link. +* @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_readlink: * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link. @@ -399,6 +449,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt* @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file. * @attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @path_truncate: +* Check permission before truncating a file. +* @path contains the path structure for the file. +* @length is the new length of the file. +* @time_attrs is the flags passed to do_truncate(). +* @filp is the file structure (may be NULL). +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_getattr: * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. * @mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up @@ -1327,6 +1384,22 @@ struct security_operations { struct super_block *newsb);int (*sb_parse_opts_str) (char *options,struct security_mnt_opts *opts); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH +int (*path_unlink) (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry); +int (*path_mkdir) (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode); +int (*path_rmdir) (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry); +int (*path_mknod) (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode, +unsigned int dev); +int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path,loff_t length, +unsigned int time_attrs,struct file *filp); +int (*path_symlink) (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +const char *old_name); +int (*path_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry,struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry); +int (*path_rename) (struct path *old_dir,struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_dir,struct dentry *new_dentry); +#endif +int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);void (*inode_free_security) (struct inode *inode); int (*inode_init_security) (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,@@ -2685,6 +2758,72 @@ static inline void security_skb_classify#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH +int security_path_unlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry); +int security_path_mkdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode); +int security_path_rmdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry); +int security_path_mknod (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode, +unsigned int dev); +int security_path_truncate (struct path *path,loff_t length, +unsigned int time_attrs,struct file *filp); +int security_path_symlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +const char *old_name); +int security_path_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry); +int security_path_rename (struct path *old_dir,struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_dir,struct dentry *new_dentry); +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ +static inline int security_path_unlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_mkdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +int mode) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_rmdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_mknod (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +int mode,unsigned int dev) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_truncate (struct path *path,loff_t length, +unsigned int time_attrs, +struct file *filp) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_symlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +const char *old_name) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_link (struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline int security_path_rename (struct path *old_dir, +struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY net/unix/af_unix.c +4
-0@@ -828,7 +828,11 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock err =mnt_want_write (nd.path.mnt);if (err) goto out_mknod_dput; + err =security_path_mknod (&nd.path, dentry, mode,0 ); +if (err) + goto out_mknod_drop_write; err =vfs_mknod (nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode,0 ); +out_mknod_drop_write:mnt_drop_write (nd.path.mnt);if (err) goto out_mknod_dput;security/capability.c +57
-0@@ -263,6 +263,53 @@ static void cap_inode_getsecid(const str *secid =0 ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH +static int cap_path_mknod (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode, +unsigned int dev) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_mkdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_rmdir (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_unlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_symlink (struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +const char *old_name) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_rename (struct path *old_path,struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_path,struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static int cap_path_truncate (struct path *path,loff_t length, +unsigned int time_attrs,struct file *filp) +{ +return 0 ; +} +#endif +static int cap_file_permission (struct file *file,int mask) {return 0 ;@@ -883,6 +930,16 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_set_to_cap_if_null (ops, inode_setsecurity);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, inode_listsecurity);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, inode_getsecid); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_mknod); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_mkdir); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_rmdir); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_unlink); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_symlink); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_link); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_rename); +set_to_cap_if_null (ops, path_truncate); +#endif set_to_cap_if_null (ops, file_permission);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, file_alloc_security);set_to_cap_if_null (ops, file_free_security);security/security.c +66
-0@@ -341,6 +341,72 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_init_security); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH +int security_path_mknod (struct path *path,struct dentry *dentry,int mode, +unsigned int dev) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_mknod (path, dentry, mode, dev); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_path_mknod); + +int security_path_mkdir (struct path *path,struct dentry *dentry,int mode) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_mkdir (path, dentry, mode); +} + +int security_path_rmdir (struct path *path,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_rmdir (path, dentry); +} + +int security_path_unlink (struct path *path,struct dentry *dentry) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_unlink (path, dentry); +} + +int security_path_symlink (struct path *path,struct dentry *dentry, +const char *old_name) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_symlink (path, dentry, old_name); +} + +int security_path_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,struct path *new_dir, +struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (old_dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_link (old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); +} + +int security_path_rename (struct path *old_dir,struct dentry *old_dentry, +struct path *new_dir,struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (old_dentry->d_inode) || + (new_dentry->d_inode &&IS_PRIVATE (new_dentry->d_inode)))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_rename (old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, + new_dentry); +} + +int security_path_truncate (struct path *path,loff_t length, +unsigned int time_attrs,struct file *filp) +{ +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (path->dentry->d_inode))) +return 0 ; +return security_ops->path_truncate (path, length, time_attrs, filp); +} +#endif +int security_inode_create (struct inode *dir,struct dentry *dentry,int mode) {if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (dir)))security/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -81,6 +81,15 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM IPSec.
security/Kconfig config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM · line 91
Quoted 10 lines
security/Kconfig +8
-0If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config SECURITY_PATH + bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" + depends on SECURITY + help + This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. + If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to + implement pathname based access controls. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
Is there any reason why users should have to deal with this option? Would it make sense in this case to make the option and have tomoyo and apparmor select it?
Quoted 8 lines
security/Kconfig +0
-1config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES bool "File POSIX Capabilities" default n --To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoting Kentaro Takeda ([email protected]):
[please trim quoted material..]
Quoted 13 lines
security/Kconfig config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM · line 91
Quoted 9 lines
security/Kconfig +8
-0+config SECURITY_PATH + bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" + depends on SECURITY + help + This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. + If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to + implement pathname based access controls. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.Is there any reason why users should have to deal with this option? Would it make sense in this case to make the option and have tomoyo and apparmor select it?
Who are users in this case? It's probably useful as a separate option for testing purposes and for people doing development. LSMs which depend on it should probably still use SELECT in any case.
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>