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Policy rework for SE-PostgreSQL (Re: Some ideas in SE-PostgreSQL enhancement)

PATCH New Andy Warner 1 participant 1 message Mar 27, 2009

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PATCH 1/1 Policy rework for SE-PostgreSQL (Re: Some ideas in SE-PostgreSQL enhancement)

Quoted 7 lines · KaiGai Kohei
Quoted 7 lines

The attached patch is the first one in the series of reworks for the SE-PostgreSQL security policy.

It updates the following items.

* Changes in the definition of object classes

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This patch add new three object classes and modifies the definition of a few object classes.
- db_database:{get_param set_param} is removed due to nonsense.
- db_database:{superuser} is added to restrict privileges of database superuser.
- db_table/db_column/db_tuple:{use} is removed due to nonsense.
- New object classes: db_catalog, db_schema and db_sequence are added.

In the RUBIX policy I used the db_table use permission (could be called open) to have a simple way to control access to the table as a whole, much like a file open permission. While not absolutely necessary, I think it is valuable. The other uses of the use permission I did not use. Also, see my related comment below on the catalog/schema object permissions.

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In the previous design, we have the following object hierarchy:
[db_database]
+ [db_table]

   |  + [db_column]
   |  + [db_tuple]

+ [db_procedure]
+ [db_blob]

The newly added db_schema should be placed between the db_database and the db_table and others. TYPE_TRANSITION rules follows the revised design.

[db_database]
+ [db_schema]

   |  + [db_table]
   |  |   + [db_column]
   |  |   + [db_tuple]
   |  + [db_procedure]
   |  + [db_sequence] (newly added object class)

+ [db_blob]

(*) Unfortunatelly, PostgreSQL handles large object quite ad-hoc,
although it can be used to communicate channel between multiple domains. So, it needs to be placed under the database.

Currently, SE-PostgreSQL does not use db_catalog class, but it can be used for other DBMS's.

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In addition, this patch changes something.

o The trusted procedure (sepgsql_trusted_proc_t) lost the db_database:{superuser} privilege, because it is invoked by unprived users to over the MAC restriction for a certain purpose, but it does not need to allow superpower in DAC.

Is it intended that the superuser privilege give only DAC override or both MAC and DAC? Specifically, is it intended to override MLS or Type enforcement?

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o The trusted procedure (sepgsql_trusted_proc_exec_t) lost the db_procedure:{install} privilege, because once installed procedure as a system internal entity can be invoked implicitly. We should not install trusted procedures for the purpose.

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o The db_schema:{add_object remove_object} newly added are controled via the "sepgsql_enable_users_ddl" boolean.
Now we control user's DDLs on uncategorized objects as row-level checks on sepgsql_sysobj_t, but it can be revised with adding db_schema object class.

I think this also needs the equivalent of a "search" permission (or open, or use). This gives a nice way to control some access to an entire schema. That is, we want to use the schema (and catalog) as a mechanism to cut off users from entire subtrees. This helps to ensure that a user does not gain access to a newly created subordinate object. So, if a user does not have search for a schema (or catalog), there is no way they can access any present or future object in that schema (or catalog). Analogous to a directory. Without this search control I would continue to use the dir object class.

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o type_transition for user_sepgsql_XXXX_t is moved to outside of tunable_policy(`...'). IIRC, I said these should be inside of the tunable, but unprive ones cannot create/drop tables labeled as sepgsql_XXX_t anyway when the boolean is disabled. So, I reconsidered it should be placed out of the tunable.

o {create drop setattr} permission for user_sepgsql_XXX is moved to inside of the tunable_policy, even if it is db_procedure class. I wonder why we didn't control CREATE FUNCTION statement by unpriv domains.

o db_blob:{import export} on user_sepgsql_blob_t is allowed to unpriv domains. It seems to me a strange behavior that it is not allowed on the object created by unpriv domain itself.

* Remaining items
o When we allows an unpriv domain to access SE-PostgreSQL using postgresql_unpriv_client(), its default labeling behavior is same as unconfined domains. For example, functions created by them are labeled as "sepgsql_proc_t".
Now I'm considering it should be user_sepgsql_XXXX_t, because I would like to handle unprefixed types as an object created by database administrator (unconfined domains).
It helps correctness of db_procedure:{install} permission.

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o Because of db_schema object class, we can control user's DDLs without ad-hoc using row-level security on sepgsql_sysobj_t class. Now I think its purpose should be changed to prevent users accesses system catalogs directly.

Are you implying here the need for something like a search or open permissions as I suggested above? If so, please disregard my previous comment:-)

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Thanks,

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