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intel_txt: Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support for Linux - Details

RFC PATCH Superseded Joseph Cihula 7 participants 11 messages Jun 23, 2009 – Jun 27, 2009

v5 of 6 Superseded Latest is v6 →

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RFC PATCH v5 1/1 intel_txt: Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support for Linux - Details

How Does it Work?
=================

o Tboot is an executable that is launched by the bootloader as the "kernel" (the binary the bootloader executes).
o It performs all of the work necessary to determine if the platform supports Intel TXT and, if so, executes the GETSEC[SENTER] processor instruction that initiates the dynamic root of trust.
- If tboot determines that the system does not support Intel TXT or is not configured correctly (e.g. the SINIT AC Module was incorrect), it will directly launch the kernel with no changes to any state.
- Tboot will output various information about its progress to the terminal, serial port, and/or an in-memory log; the output locations can be configured with a command line switch.
o The GETSEC[SENTER] instruction will return control to tboot and tboot then verifies certain aspects of the environment (e.g. TPM NV lock, e820 table does not have invalid entries, etc.).
o It will wake the APs from the special sleep state the GETSEC[SENTER] instruction had put them in and place them into a wait-for-SIPI state.
- Because the processors will not respond to an INIT or SIPI when in the TXT environment, it is necessary to create a small VT-x guest for the APs. When they run in this guest, they will simply wait for the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence, which will cause VMEXITs, and then disable VT and jump to the SIPI vector. This approach seemed like a better choice than having to insert special code into the kernel's MP wakeup sequence.
o Tboot then applies an (optional) user-defined launch policy to verify the kernel and initrd.
- This policy is rooted in TPM NV and is described in the tboot project. The tboot project also contains code for tools to create and provision the policy.
- Policies are completely under user control and if not present then any kernel will be launched.
- Policy action is flexible and can include halting on failures or simply logging them and continuing.
o Tboot adjusts the e820 table provided by the bootloader to reserve its own location in memory as well as to reserve certain other TXT-related regions.
o As part of it's launch, tboot DMA protects all of RAM (using the VT-d PMRs). Thus, the kernel must be booted with 'intel_iommu=on' in order to remove this blanket protection and use VT-d's page-level protection.
o Tboot will populate a shared page with some data about itself and pass this to the Linux kernel as it transfers control.
- The location of the shared page is passed via the boot_params struct as a physical address.
o The kernel will look for the tboot shared page address and, if it exists, map it.
o As one of the checks/protections provided by TXT, it makes a copy of the VT-d DMARs in a DMA-protected region of memory and verifies them for correctness. The VT-d code will detect if the kernel was launched with tboot and use this copy instead of the one in the ACPI table.
o At this point, tboot and TXT are out of the picture until a shutdown (S<n>)
o In order to put a system into any of the sleep states after a TXT launch, TXT must first be exited. This is to prevent attacks that attempt to crash the system to gain control on reboot and steal data left in memory.
- The kernel will perform all of its sleep preparation and populate the shared page with the ACPI data needed to put the platform in the desired sleep state.
- Then the kernel jumps into tboot via the vector specified in the shared page.
- Tboot will clean up the environment and disable TXT, then use the kernel-provided ACPI information to actually place the platform into the desired sleep state.
- In the case of S3, tboot will also register itself as the resume vector. This is necessary because it must re-establish the measured environment upon resume. Once the TXT environment has been restored, it will restore the TPM PCRs and then transfer control back to the kernel's S3 resume vector.
In order to preserve system integrity across S3, the kernel provides tboot with a set of memory ranges (kernel code/data/bss, S3 resume code, and AP trampoline) that tboot will calculate a MAC (message authentication code) over and then seal with the TPM. On resume and once the measured environment has been re-established, tboot will re-calculate the MAC and verify it against the sealed value. Tboot's policy determines what happens if the verification fails.

That's pretty much it for TXT support.

Configuring the System:
======================

This code works with 32bit, 32bit PAE, and 64bit (x86_64) kernels.

In BIOS, the user must enable: TPM, TXT, VT-x, VT-d. Not all BIOSes allow these to be individually enabled/disabled and the screens in which to find them are BIOS-specific.

grub.conf needs to be modified as follows:

       title Linux 2.6.30-rc4 w/ tboot
         root (hd0,0)
               kernel /tboot.gz logging=serial,vga,memory
               module /vmlinuz-2.6.30-rc4 intel_iommu=on ro root=LABEL=/
rhgb console=ttyS0,115200 3
               module /initrd-2.6.30-rc4.img
               module /Q35_SINIT_17.BIN

The kernel option for enabling Intel TXT support is found under the Security top-level menu and is called "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)". It is marked as EXPERIMENTAL and depends only on the generic x86 support (to allow maximum flexibility in kernel build options) and CONFIG_DMAR, since the tboot code will detect whether the platform actually supports Intel TXT and thus whether any of the kernel code is executed.

The Q35_SINIT_17.BIN file is what Intel TXT refers to as an Authenticated Code Module. It is specific to the chipset in the system and can also be found on the Trusted Boot site. It is a firmware module digitally signed by Intel that is used as part of the DRTM process to verify and configure the system. It is signed because it operates at a higher privilege level in the system than any other macrocode and its correct operation is critical to the establishment of the DRTM. The process for determining the correct SINIT ACM for a system is documented in the SINIT-guide.txt file that is on the tboot SourceForge site under the SINIT ACM downloads.

TODOs:
=====

This patch implements the basic TXT support as described above. There will be additional patches sent to add functionality and improve the security of the launched kernel. Some of those tasks are:
o S3 dynamic memory and userspace integrity protection
The current patch only provides memory integrity protection of the kernel code and static data. Complete S3 protection requires providing integrity over userspace and kernel dynamic data as well.
We have this implemented for 64b builds and are working out some issues on 32b.
o BIOS call scrubbing
One of the goals of TXT is to reduce the TCB by eliminating pre-kernel code from the trust boundary. This includes BIOS (with the exception of SMM). We will see how many of the BIOS calls can be eliminated on a TXT boot and whether the remainder of BIOS-provided code and data can be measured or "protected" (e.g. validate ACPI pointers before using).

This information is also contained in the file
Documentation/intel_txt.txt (in the patch).

We welcome your comments and suggestions and genuinely value your feedback.

Joseph Cihula
Shane Wang
Intel Corp.

#1 lore raw

Is there a summary of what has changes from RFC v4 ?

Alan

#2 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines

From: Alan Cox [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, June 23, 2009 2:11 AM

Is there a summary of what has changes from RFC v4 ?

- The monolithic patch was broken into four patches that represent discrete functionality (boot and build, reboot/halt shutdown, Sx shutdown, forcing DMAR on). An appropriate (and more descriptive) patch description was added to each patch.

- Small stylistic cleanups (capitalization, comment wording, whitespace, etc.).

- The code in hwsleep.c that populated the tboot ACPI structures was moved into its own function in tboot.c.

- Use pr_warning(), pr_info(), pr_debug().

- Moved some #include's from the middle of tboot.c to the top.

- Changed the memory type of the tboot shared page from E820_UNUSABLE to E820_RESERVED (really a change to tboot, but requires a change here in the checking code).

And the new patches that I'm about to send have notes in the top indicating their changes from the previous versions.

Joe

#4 lore raw
In reply to Joseph Cihula
Quoted 5 lines · Joseph Cihula

The Q35_SINIT_17.BIN file is what Intel TXT refers to as an Authenticated Code Module. It is specific to the chipset in the system and can also be found on the Trusted Boot site. It is a firmware module digitally signed by Intel that is used as part of the DRTM process to verify and configure the system.

This seems a little disingenious. Firmware isn't typically loaded by grub into main memory and executed by the host processor.

so, is this all worthless without the binary blob ?

"trust us, it's signed by intel" doesn't make me feel more secure.

Dave

#3 lore raw
In reply to Cihula, Joseph
Quoted 24 lines · Joseph
Quoted 4 lines

From: Alan Cox [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Tuesday, June 23, 2009 2:11 AM

Is there a summary of what has changes from RFC v4 ?

- The monolithic patch was broken into four patches that represent discrete functionality (boot and build, reboot/halt shutdown, Sx shutdown, forcing DMAR on). An appropriate (and more descriptive) patch description was added to each patch.

- Small stylistic cleanups (capitalization, comment wording, whitespace, etc.).

- The code in hwsleep.c that populated the tboot ACPI structures was moved into its own function in tboot.c.

(quoted diff) +0 -3
-  Use pr_warning(), pr_info(), pr_debug().
 
-  Moved some #include's from the middle of tboot.c to the top.
 
-  Changed the memory type of the tboot shared page from

E820_UNUSABLE to E820_RESERVED (really a change to tboot, but requires a change here in the checking code).

Quoted 2 lines

And the new patches that I'm about to send have notes in the top indicating their changes from the previous versions.

So it still requires a giant binary blob to be loaded into main memory to be executed by the main CPU with full privileges (or plausibly even more lattitude than kernel normally has), right?

Signature · 1 line
        Peter
#5 lore raw
In reply to Dave Jones
Quoted 8 lines · Dave Jones
Quoted 5 lines · Joseph Cihula

The Q35_SINIT_17.BIN file is what Intel TXT refers to as an Authenticated Code Module. It is specific to the chipset in the system and can also be found on the Trusted Boot site. It is a firmware module digitally signed by Intel that is used as part of the DRTM process to verify and configure the system.

Quoted 6 lines

This seems a little disingenious. Firmware isn't typically loaded by grub into main memory and executed by the host processor.

so, is this all worthless without the binary blob ?

"trust us, it's signed by intel" doesn't make me feel more secure.

how's that different from your normal bios ?

#6 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Arjan van de Ven
Quoted 8 lines · Dave Jones
Quoted 5 lines · Joseph Cihula

The Q35_SINIT_17.BIN file is what Intel TXT refers to as an Authenticated Code Module. It is specific to the chipset in the system and can also be found on the Trusted Boot site. It is a firmware module digitally signed by Intel that is used as part of the DRTM process to verify and configure the system.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

This seems a little disingenious. Firmware isn't typically loaded by grub into main memory and executed by the host processor.

so, is this all worthless without the binary blob ?

"trust us, it's signed by intel" doesn't make me feel more secure.

how's that different from your normal bios ?

well..

AFAICS, this code exists solely to enable a binary blob. We don't do that for the BIOS. Even for blobs like ACPI, we at least have documentation on the opcodes/data structures.

Also, if they're the same as you claim, why isn't the blob just included as part of the BIOS ?

Dave

#7 lore raw
In reply to Arjan van de Ven
Quoted 9 lines · Arjan van de Ven
Quoted 6 lines · Dave Jones

This seems a little disingenious. Firmware isn't typically loaded by grub into main memory and executed by the host processor.

so, is this all worthless without the binary blob ?

"trust us, it's signed by intel" doesn't make me feel more secure.

how's that different from your normal bios ?

BIOSes can typically be replaced with trusted code. Is the source to the ACMs available? Is there any way for the owner of the machine to substitute their key for Intel's?

Signature · 1 line
Matthew Garrett | [email protected]
#8 lore raw
In reply to Arjan van de Ven
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

"trust us, it's signed by intel" doesn't make me feel more secure.

how's that different from your normal bios ?

I've yet to see grub load my bios 8)

Alan

#9 lore raw

Let me try to unify and respond to the couple of branches of this thread:

Quoted 8 lines

From: Alan Cox [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2009 3:50 PM

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

"trust us, it's signed by intel" doesn't make me feel more secure.

how's that different from your normal bios ?

I've yet to see grub load my bios 8)

and

Quoted 22 lines

From: Dave Jones [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2009 1:51 PM

Quoted 9 lines · Arjan van de Ven
Quoted 8 lines · Dave Jones
Quoted 5 lines · Joseph Cihula

The Q35_SINIT_17.BIN file is what Intel TXT refers to as an Authenticated Code Module. It is specific to the chipset in the system and can also be found on the Trusted Boot site. It is a firmware module digitally signed by Intel that is used as part of the DRTM process to verify and configure the system.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

This seems a little disingenious. Firmware isn't typically loaded by grub into main memory and executed by the host processor.

so, is this all worthless without the binary blob ?

"trust us, it's signed by intel" doesn't make me feel more secure.

how's that different from your normal bios ?

Quoted 8 lines

well..

AFAICS, this code exists solely to enable a binary blob. We don't do that for the BIOS. Even for blobs like ACPI, we at least have documentation on the opcodes/data structures.

Also, if they're the same as you claim, why isn't the blob just included as part of the BIOS ?

I would actually liken the SINIT AC module more to microcode than to BIOS. If you look at the Intel(R) TXT measured launch flow (e.g. see http://www.xen.org/files/summit_3/Xen_support_for_LaGrande_Technology.pdf), SINIT is executed by the SENTER microcode and the software that executed the SENTER instruction doesn't get control again until after SINIT finishes executing (and SINIT is executing in a special CPU mode that only microcode can create).

Microcode patches, while not loaded by a bootloader, *are* contained in most OSes (as well as the BIOS). And the TXT architecture allows for an OEM to include SINIT in the BIOS flash (or a special HDD partition, etc.), but desktop BIOS flash space is usually very constrained and none of the OEMs have chosen to do this. But even if they had, just like most BIOSes include a microcode patch, there is still value in system software being able to provide an updated version so that users don't have to re-flash their BIOS just to get the new module.

Joe

#10 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

well..

AFAICS, this code exists solely to enable a binary blob. We don't do that for the BIOS. Even for blobs like ACPI, we at least have documentation on the opcodes/data structures.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Also, if they're the same as you claim, why isn't the blob just included as part of the BIOS ?

I would actually liken the SINIT AC module more to microcode than to BIOS. If you look at the Intel(R) TXT measured launch flow (e.g. see http://www.xen.org/files/summit_3/Xen_support_for_LaGrande_Technology.pdf), SINIT is executed by the SENTER microcode and the software that executed the SENTER instruction doesn't get control again until after SINIT finishes executing (and SINIT is executing in a special CPU mode that only microcode can create).

Microcode patches, while not loaded by a bootloader, *are* contained in most OSes (as well as the BIOS). And the TXT architecture allows for an OEM to include SINIT in the BIOS flash (or a special HDD partition, etc.), but desktop BIOS flash space is usually very constrained and none of the OEMs have chosen to do this. But even if they had, just like most BIOSes include a microcode patch, there is still value in system software being able to provide an updated version so that users don't have to re-flash their BIOS just to get the new module.

There's additional problem with this: if Intel is bought by Microsoft (or chinese government) next year, it may create & sign evil blob that will subvert security of sinit. That's pretty unique/dangerous. (Maybe FBI can get special signed version?)

While I mostly have to trust Intel from 2007, this expects me to trust intel from 2021, too. Sounds dangerous.
Pavel

Signature · 2 lines
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