perf_copy_attr pointer arithmetic weirdness
There is some -to me at least- weird code in per_copy_attr. Which supposedly checks that all bytes trailing a struct are zero.
It doesn't seem to get pointer arithmetic right. Since it increments an iterating pointer by sizeof(unsigned long) rather than 1.
I believe this has an impact on the exploitability of the recent buffer overflow in the perf_copy_attr function. I'm pretty sure I'm not the only one who noticed this, but i couldn't find it being mentioned. For some reason people prefer mmaping something at zero these days?
I have appended a patch locating the issue. The PTR_ALIGN stuff right above it doesn't seem to take any boundary conditions into account which is probably not a good thing either.
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signed-of-by Ian Schram <[email protected]>
kernel/perf_counter.c +1 -1
@@ -4208,7 +4208,7 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_counter_attr __user *uattr, end =PTR_ALIGN ((void __user *)uattr + size,sizeof (unsigned long )); -for (; addr < end; addr +=sizeof (unsigned long )) { +for (; addr < end; ++addr) { ret =get_user (val, addr);if (ret)return ret;
Peter Zijlstra
Acked-byQuoted 6 lines · Ian Schram
There is some -to me at least- weird code in
per_copy_attr. Which supposedly checks that all bytes trailing a struct are zero.It doesn't seem to get pointer arithmetic right. Since it increments an iterating pointer by sizeof(unsigned long) rather than 1.
Quoted 8 lines
I believe this has an impact on the exploitability of the recent buffer overflow in the
perf_copy_attrfunction. I'm pretty sure I'm not the only one who noticed this, but i couldn't find it being mentioned. For some reason people prefer mmaping something at zero these days?I have appended a patch locating the issue. The
PTR_ALIGNstuff right above it doesn't seem to take any boundary conditions into account which is probably not a good thing either.
sizeof(struct perf_counter_attr) should always be a multiple of u64, and we can indeed read beyond the tail boundary, but that should be ok, worst that can happen is that we fail the read..
Ugh on the ptr arith, one wonders how many stupid bugs one can make in such a piece of code... :/
Quoted 1 line
signed-of-by Ian Schram <[email protected]>
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/perf_counter.c +1
-1@@ -4208,7 +4208,7 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_counter_attr __user *uattr, end =PTR_ALIGN ((void __user *)uattr + size,sizeof (unsigned long )); -for (; addr < end; addr +=sizeof (unsigned long )) { +for (; addr < end; ++addr) { ret =get_user (val, addr);if (ret)return ret;
Quoted 20 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 6 lines · Ian Schram
There is some -to me at least- weird code in
per_copy_attr. Which supposedly checks that all bytes trailing a struct are zero.It doesn't seem to get pointer arithmetic right. Since it increments an iterating pointer by sizeof(unsigned long) rather than 1.
Quoted 8 lines
I believe this has an impact on the exploitability of the recent buffer overflow in the
perf_copy_attrfunction. I'm pretty sure I'm not the only one who noticed this, but i couldn't find it being mentioned. For some reason people prefer mmaping something at zero these days?I have appended a patch locating the issue. The
PTR_ALIGNstuff right above it doesn't seem to take any boundary conditions into account which is probably not a good thing either.
sizeof(struct perf_counter_attr)should always be a multiple of u64, and we can indeed read beyond the tail boundary, but that should be ok, worst that can happen is that we fail the read..
Quoted 6 lines
Ugh on the ptr arith, one wonders how many stupid bugs one can make in such a piece of code... :/
Quoted 1 line
signed-of-by Ian Schram <[email protected]>
Acked-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Ian, you meant Signed-off-by, not signed-of-by, right?
Ingo
Quoted 14 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 12 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 11 lines · Ian Schram
There is some -to me at least- weird code in
per_copy_attr. Which supposedly checks that all bytes trailing a struct are zero.It doesn't seem to get pointer arithmetic right. Since it increments an iterating pointer by sizeof(unsigned long) rather than 1.
I believe this has an impact on the exploitability of the recent buffer overflow in the
perf_copy_attrfunction. I'm pretty sure I'm not the only one who noticed this, but i couldn't find it being mentioned. For some reason people prefer mmaping something at zero these days?
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I have appended a patch locating the issue. The
PTR_ALIGNstuff right above it doesn't seem to take any boundary conditions into account which is probably not a good thing either.
sizeof(struct perf_counter_attr)should always be a multiple of u64, and
I don't think this matters since the starting address is not 'forced' to be aligned. In which case some bytes in the middle would be unchecked. All in all seems like an undesirable situation. I'll verify this and try my hand at fixing it properly. Unless somebody who actually understands the purpose of these checks wants to have a go..
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines
we can indeed read beyond the tail boundary, but that should be ok, worst that can happen is that we fail the read..
Ugh on the ptr arith, one wonders how many stupid bugs one can make in such a piece of code... :/
Quoted 1 line
signed-of-by Ian Schram <[email protected]>
Acked-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Ian, you meant Signed-off-by, not signed-of-by, right?
exactly right, *shame*, apologies for the extra work for this one line drive-by patch.
Quoted 3 lines
Ingo
[tip:perfcounters/core] perf_counter: Fix perf_copy_attr() pointer arithmetic
In reply to Ian SchramCommit-ID: cdf8073d6b2c6c5a3cd6ce0e6c1297157f7f99ba Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/cdf8073d6b2c6c5a3cd6ce0e6c1297157f7f99ba Author: Ian Schram <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Fri, 18 Sep 2009 21:26:26 +0200 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitDate: Sat, 19 Sep 2009 19:32:55 +0200
perf_counter: Fix perf_copy_attr() pointer arithmetic
There is still some weird code in per_copy_attr(). Which supposedly checks that all bytes trailing a struct are zero.
It doesn't seem to get pointer arithmetic right. Since it increments an iterating pointer by sizeof(unsigned long) rather than 1.
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
--- kernel/perf_counter.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
kernel/perf_counter.c +10 -10
@@ -4208,8 +4208,8 @@ done:static int perf_copy_attr (struct perf_counter_attr __user *uattr,struct perf_counter_attr *attr) { -int ret;u32 size; +int ret;if (!access_ok (VERIFY_WRITE , uattr,PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 ))return -EFAULT ;
@@ -4234,19 +4234,19 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_counter_attr __user *uattr,/* * If we're handed a bigger struct than we know of, -* ensure all the unknown bits are 0. +* ensure all the unknown bits are 0 - i.e. new +* user-space does not rely on any kernel feature +* extensions we dont know about yet. */ if (size >sizeof (*attr)) { -unsigned long val; -unsigned long __user *addr; -unsigned long __user *end; +unsigned char __user *addr; +unsigned char __user *end; +unsigned char val; - addr =PTR_ALIGN ((void __user *)uattr +sizeof (*attr), -sizeof (unsigned long )); - end =PTR_ALIGN ((void __user *)uattr + size, -sizeof (unsigned long )); + addr = (void __user *)uattr +sizeof (*attr); + end = (void __user *)uattr + size; -for (; addr < end; addr +=sizeof (unsigned long )) { +for (; addr < end; addr++) { ret =get_user (val, addr);if (ret)return ret;