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EUID != root + EGID = root, and CAP_SETGID

DISCUSSION Ivan Zahariev 3 participants 3 messages Dec 11, 2009 – Dec 13, 2009

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Hi guys,

Currently, if a process is started with EUID which is non-root, and EGID which IS root (for example by set-group-ID file permission + file group owner "root", or an account in /etc/passwd with group=0), then the processes is not granted CAP_SETGID.

As a result, such a process cannot change its EGID to an arbitrary one, even though the current EGID is the super-user "root" one. Therefore, such a process cannot easily drop its EGID "root" privileges to non-root ones, for security reasons.

This is not the case if the process starts with EUID=0. Then the processes is granted *both* CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID.

Is this an intended behavior? Shouldn't a process which is started with EGID=0 get CAP_SETGID too?

Thank you.

Best regads,
Ivan Zahariev

P.S. For more detailed info: http://blog.famzah.net/2009/12/11/linux-non-root-user-processes-which-run-with-group-root-cannot-change-their-process-group-to-an-arbitrary-one/

#1 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Ivan Zahariev

As a result, such a process cannot change its EGID to an arbitrary one, even though the current EGID is the super-user "root" one.

There is no such thing as a "super-user group". No group has any special privleges.

Andreas.

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Andreas Schwab, [email protected]
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#2 lore raw
In reply to Ivan Zahariev
Quoted 1 line · Ivan Zahariev

Is this an intended behavior?

Yes. Setuid/setgid are a mess. For more details, you might find the following research papers interesting:

http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/setuid-usenix02.pdf
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/setuid-login08b.pdf

See, e.g., Section 5.2 of the former paper, which says:

"an effective group ID of zero does not accord any special privileges to change groups. This is a potential source of confusion: it is tempting to assume incorrectly that since appropriate privileges are carried by the euid in the setuid-like calls, they will be carried by the egid in the setgid-like calls, but this is not how it actually works. This misconception caused a mistake in the manual page of setgid in Redhat Linux 7.2 (Section 6.4.1)."