Xen bug fixes
Subsystems (3)
Hi Linus,
Here are some Xen bugfixes against -rc1. This is another spin of the "don't free memory below 1M" patch the last time around. I played around with it a bit and slightly improved it, but I couldn't find anything substantially prettier.
The other significant fix here is from Stefano which allows domain creation to work - it seems that one or both of aaead25b9 and c9d0bf24145 exposed the fact that we should have been setting VM_PFNMAP on these cross-domain mappings.
There's also a fix for save/restore - we have IPI interrupts which should not be disabled by a suspend, but they still need some specific setup on resume.
There are two branches:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeremy/xen.git upstream/core
Ian Campbell (3):
xen: correct size of level2_kernel_pgt
xen: events: do not unmask event channels on resume
xen: do not release any memory under 1M in domain 0
arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/setup.c | 18 +++++++++++------- drivers/xen/events.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeremy/xen.git upstream/xenfs
Stefano Stabellini (1):
xen: set vma flag VM_PFNMAP in the privcmd mmap file_op
Vasiliy Kulikov (1):
xen: xenfs: privcmd: check put_user() return code
arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 3 ++- drivers/xen/xenfs/privcmd.c | 13 +++++-------- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Thanks,
J
arch/x86/xen/mmu.c +1 -1
@@ -2126,7 +2126,7 @@ __init pgd_t *xen_setup_kernel_pagetable(pgd_t *pgd, {pmd_t *kernel_pmd; - level2_kernel_pgt =extend_brk (sizeof (pmd_t *) *PTRS_PER_PMD ,PAGE_SIZE ); + level2_kernel_pgt =extend_brk (sizeof (pmd_t) *PTRS_PER_PMD ,PAGE_SIZE ); max_pfn_mapped = PFN_DOWN(__pa(xen_start_info->pt_base) + xen_start_info->nr_pt_frames * PAGE_SIZE +
arch/x86/xen/setup.c +11 -7
@@ -118,16 +118,18 @@ static unsigned long __init xen_return_unused_memory(unsigned long max_pfn, const struct e820map *e820) {phys_addr_t max_addr =PFN_PHYS (max_pfn); -phys_addr_t last_end =0 ; +phys_addr_t last_end =ISA_END_ADDRESS ;unsigned long released =0 ;int i; +/* Free any unused memory above the low 1Mbyte. */ for (i =0 ; i < e820->nr_map && last_end < max_addr; i++) {phys_addr_t end = e820->map[i].addr; end =min (max_addr, end); - released +=xen_release_chunk (last_end, end); - last_end = e820->map[i].addr + e820->map[i].size; +if (last_end < end) + released +=xen_release_chunk (last_end, end); + last_end =max (last_end, e820->map[i].addr + e820->map[i].size); }if (last_end < max_addr)
@@ -164,6 +166,7 @@ char * __init xen_memory_setup(void) XENMEM_memory_map; rc =HYPERVISOR_memory_op (op, &memmap);if (rc == -ENOSYS ) { +BUG_ON (xen_initial_domain ()); memmap.nr_entries =1 ; map[0 ].addr =0ULL ; map[0 ].size = mem_end;
@@ -201,12 +204,13 @@ char * __init xen_memory_setup(void) }/* -* Even though this is normal, usable memory under Xen, reserve -* ISA memory anyway because too many things think they can poke +* In domU, the ISA region is normal, usable memory, but we +* reserve ISA memory anyway because too many things poke * about in there. * -* In a dom0 kernel, this region is identity mapped with the -* hardware ISA area, so it really is out of bounds. +* In Dom0, the host E820 information can leave gaps in the +* ISA range, which would cause us to release those pages. To +* avoid this, we unconditionally reserve them here. */ e820_add_region (ISA_START_ADDRESS ,ISA_END_ADDRESS -ISA_START_ADDRESS ,E820_RESERVED );
drivers/xen/events.c +18 -7
@@ -1299,9 +1299,6 @@ static void restore_cpu_virqs(unsigned int cpu) evtchn_to_irq[evtchn] = irq; irq_info[irq] =mk_virq_info (evtchn, virq);bind_evtchn_to_cpu (evtchn, cpu); - -/* Ready for use. */ -unmask_evtchn (evtchn); } }
@@ -1327,10 +1324,6 @@ static void restore_cpu_ipis(unsigned int cpu) evtchn_to_irq[evtchn] = irq; irq_info[irq] =mk_ipi_info (evtchn, ipi);bind_evtchn_to_cpu (evtchn, cpu); - -/* Ready for use. */ -unmask_evtchn (evtchn); - } }
@@ -1390,6 +1383,7 @@ void xen_poll_irq(int irq)void xen_irq_resume (void ) {unsigned int cpu, irq, evtchn; +struct irq_desc *desc;init_evtchn_cpu_bindings ();
@@ -1408,6 +1402,23 @@ void xen_irq_resume(void)restore_cpu_virqs (cpu);restore_cpu_ipis (cpu); } + +/* +* Unmask any IRQF_NO_SUSPEND IRQs which are enabled. These +* are not handled by the IRQ core. +*/ +for_each_irq_desc (irq, desc) { +if (!desc->action || !(desc->action->flags &IRQF_NO_SUSPEND )) +continue ; +if (desc->status &IRQ_DISABLED ) +continue ; + + evtchn =evtchn_from_irq (irq); +if (evtchn ==-1 ) +continue ; + +unmask_evtchn (evtchn); + } }static struct irq_chip xen_dynamic_chip__read_mostly = {
arch/x86/xen/mmu.c +2 -1
@@ -2299,7 +2299,8 @@ int xen_remap_domain_mfn_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, prot =__pgprot (pgprot_val (prot) | _PAGE_IOMAP); - vma->vm_flags |=VM_IO |VM_RESERVED |VM_PFNMAP ; +BUG_ON (!((vma->vm_flags & (VM_PFNMAP |VM_RESERVED |VM_IO )) == + (VM_PFNMAP |VM_RESERVED |VM_IO ))); rmd.mfn = mfn; rmd.prot = prot;
drivers/xen/xenfs/privcmd.c +5 -8
@@ -266,9 +266,7 @@ static int mmap_return_errors(void *data, void *state)xen_pfn_t *mfnp = data;struct mmap_batch_state *st = state; -put_user (*mfnp, st->user++); - -return 0 ; +return put_user (*mfnp, st->user++); }static struct vm_operations_struct privcmd_vm_ops;
@@ -323,10 +321,8 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(void __user *udata)up_write (&mm->mmap_sem);if (state.err >0 ) { - ret =0 ; - state.user = m.arr; -traverse_pages (m.num,sizeof (xen_pfn_t), + ret =traverse_pages (m.num,sizeof (xen_pfn_t), &pagelist, mmap_return_errors, &state); }
@@ -384,8 +380,9 @@ static int privcmd_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)if (xen_feature (XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))return -ENOSYS ; -/* DONTCOPY is essential for Xen as copy_page_range is broken. */ - vma->vm_flags |=VM_RESERVED |VM_IO |VM_DONTCOPY ; +/* DONTCOPY is essential for Xen because copy_page_range doesn't know +* how to recreate these mappings */ + vma->vm_flags |=VM_RESERVED |VM_IO |VM_DONTCOPY |VM_PFNMAP ; vma->vm_ops = &privcmd_vm_ops; vma->vm_private_data =NULL ;