Skip to contentSkip to conversation

MODSIGN without RTC?

DISCUSSION Alexander Holler 3 participants 9 messages Feb 6, 2013 – Feb 13, 2013

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

Hello,

I wanted to try out MODSIGN with kernel 3.7.6 and I've just got hit by:

[    1.346445] X.509: Cert 6a23533cec71c4c52a1618fb4d830e06aa90474e is not yet valid

The reason is likely that the (ARM) device in question doesn't have a RTC (oh, that topic again ;) ) and gets it's time on boot through NTP.

The used certificate was generated automatically. Having a look at it, the following is shown:

       Validity
            Not Before: Feb  6 02:56:46 2013 GMT
            Not After : Jan 13 02:56:46 2113 GMT

Without having thought about possible security problems, my first idea would be to let the validity start at 1970. As I never did such I never had thought about possible implications when doing such (e.g. I don't know if someone checks the start date for plausabilitiy)

Another solution would be to retry loading of the certificate if the time gets set (and e.g. differs more than a year).

Has someone already thought about how to solve that problem? Or did everyone use sane systems which have a (working) RTC?

Regards,

Alexander

#1 lore raw

Am 07.02.2013 00:42, schrieb Alexander Holler:

Quoted 22 lines

Hello,

I wanted to try out MODSIGN with kernel 3.7.6 and I've just got hit by:

[    1.346445] X.509: Cert 6a23533cec71c4c52a1618fb4d830e06aa90474e is

not yet valid

The reason is likely that the (ARM) device in question doesn't have a RTC (oh, that topic again ;) ) and gets it's time on boot through NTP.

The used certificate was generated automatically. Having a look at it, the following is shown:

        Validity
             Not Before: Feb  6 02:56:46 2013 GMT
             Not After : Jan 13 02:56:46 2113 GMT

Without having thought about possible security problems, my first idea would be to let the validity start at 1970. As I never did such I never had thought about possible implications when doing such (e.g. I don't know if someone checks the start date for plausabilitiy)

Quoted 5 lines

Another solution would be to retry loading of the certificate if the time gets set (and e.g. differs more than a year).

Has someone already thought about how to solve that problem? Or did everyone use sane systems which have a (working) RTC?

Another option would be to make a configure option to just ignore the date. I'm not sure if I would like to use MODSIGN when I have to fear that the machine wouldn't start when the RTC fails or got set to a wrong date.

Regards,

Alexander

#2 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Alexander Holler

Am 07.02.2013 00:42, schrieb Alexander Holler:

Quoted 20 lines

I wanted to try out MODSIGN with kernel 3.7.6 and I've just got hit by:

[    1.346445] X.509: Cert 6a23533cec71c4c52a1618fb4d830e06aa90474e is

not yet valid

The reason is likely that the (ARM) device in question doesn't have a RTC (oh, that topic again ;) ) and gets it's time on boot through NTP.

The used certificate was generated automatically. Having a look at it, the following is shown:

        Validity
             Not Before: Feb  6 02:56:46 2013 GMT
             Not After : Jan 13 02:56:46 2113 GMT

Without having thought about possible security problems, my first idea would be to let the validity start at 1970. As I never did such I never had thought about possible implications when doing such (e.g. I don't know if someone checks the start date for plausabilitiy)

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Another solution would be to retry loading of the certificate if the time gets set (and e.g. differs more than a year).

Has someone already thought about how to solve that problem? Or did everyone use sane systems which have a (working) RTC?

Another option would be to make a configure option to just ignore the date.

Or an option to auto-advance the clock to the "Not Before" date if needed...

Quoted 2 lines

I'm not sure if I would like to use MODSIGN when I have to fear that the machine wouldn't start when the RTC fails or got set to a wrong date.

Hmm, nice failure mode...

Gr{oetje,eeting}s,

Geert

--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- [email protected]

In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds

#3 lore raw

Am 07.02.2013 07:42, schrieb Geert Uytterhoeven:

Quoted 29 lines · Alexander Holler
Quoted 28 lines

Am 07.02.2013 00:42, schrieb Alexander Holler:

Quoted 25 lines

I wanted to try out MODSIGN with kernel 3.7.6 and I've just got hit by:

[    1.346445] X.509: Cert 6a23533cec71c4c52a1618fb4d830e06aa90474e is

not yet valid

The reason is likely that the (ARM) device in question doesn't have a RTC (oh, that topic again ;) ) and gets it's time on boot through NTP.

The used certificate was generated automatically. Having a look at it, the following is shown:

        Validity
             Not Before: Feb  6 02:56:46 2013 GMT
             Not After : Jan 13 02:56:46 2113 GMT

Without having thought about possible security problems, my first idea would be to let the validity start at 1970. As I never did such I never had thought about possible implications when doing such (e.g. I don't know if someone checks the start date for plausabilitiy)

Another solution would be to retry loading of the certificate if the time gets set (and e.g. differs more than a year).

Has someone already thought about how to solve that problem? Or did everyone use sane systems which have a (working) RTC?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

Another option would be to make a configure option to just ignore the date.

Or an option to auto-advance the clock to the "Not Before" date if needed...

Quoted 2 lines

I'm not sure if I would like to use MODSIGN when I have to fear that the machine wouldn't start when the RTC fails or got set to a wrong date.

Hmm, nice failure mode...

And the dream of every vendor, finally a working expiration date. And a nice TV-B-Gone, just feed a wrong date once. ;)

Regards,

Alexader

#4 lore raw

Am 07.02.2013 08:01, schrieb Alexander Holler:

Quoted 34 lines

Am 07.02.2013 07:42, schrieb Geert Uytterhoeven:

Quoted 33 lines · Alexander Holler
Quoted 21 lines

Am 07.02.2013 00:42, schrieb Alexander Holler:

Quoted 20 lines

I wanted to try out MODSIGN with kernel 3.7.6 and I've just got hit by:

[    1.346445] X.509: Cert 6a23533cec71c4c52a1618fb4d830e06aa90474e is

not yet valid

The reason is likely that the (ARM) device in question doesn't have a RTC (oh, that topic again ;) ) and gets it's time on boot through NTP.

The used certificate was generated automatically. Having a look at it, the following is shown:

         Validity
              Not Before: Feb  6 02:56:46 2013 GMT
              Not After : Jan 13 02:56:46 2113 GMT

Without having thought about possible security problems, my first idea would be to let the validity start at 1970. As I never did such I never had thought about possible implications when doing such (e.g. I don't know if someone checks the start date for plausabilitiy)

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Another solution would be to retry loading of the certificate if the time gets set (and e.g. differs more than a year).

Has someone already thought about how to solve that problem? Or did everyone use sane systems which have a (working) RTC?

Another option would be to make a configure option to just ignore the date.

Or an option to auto-advance the clock to the "Not Before" date if needed...

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I'm not sure if I would like to use MODSIGN when I have to fear that the machine wouldn't start when the RTC fails or got set to a wrong date.

Hmm, nice failure mode...

And the dream of every vendor, finally a working expiration date. And a nice TV-B-Gone, just feed a wrong date once. ;)

I've digged a bit around about how to disable the date check, but then decided that I shouldn't try to implement that (CONFIG_MODSIGN_IGNORE_DATES) because of missing knowledge about the (usage of) crypto-api.

I think adding attributes to the key and the parsed key like bool ingore_dates and bool parsed_dates_invalid might be an option. Using such x509_key_preparse() could just set parsed_dates_invalid instead of returning with -EKEYREJECTED or -EKEYEXPIRED, if it encounters invalid dates.

Regards,

Alexander

#5 lore raw
In reply to Alexander Holler

Am 07.02.2013 08:01, schrieb Alexander Holler:

Quoted 2 lines

And the dream of every vendor, finally a working expiration date. And a nice TV-B-Gone, just feed a wrong date once. ;)

Just in case someone missed what I wanted to hint: That date problem has implications for devices with a RTC too. If they need too load a kernel and signed modules to enable the user to modify the date (of the RTC), setting a date outside the range specified in the certificate and rebooting will brick such devices.

Regards,

Alexander

#6 lore raw
In reply to Alexander Holler
Quoted 4 lines

Another option would be to make a configure option to just ignore the date. I'm not sure if I would like to use MODSIGN when I have to fear that the machine wouldn't start when the RTC fails or got set to a wrong date.

Or just ignore the date unconditionally. After all, when a certificate check fails due to out-of-validity-period, then you can always "fix" that by appropriately setting the clock. So for security, in this application, the date check is outright useless.

Olaf

#7 lore raw

Am 07.02.2013 19:44, schrieb Olaf Titz:

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Another option would be to make a configure option to just ignore the date. I'm not sure if I would like to use MODSIGN when I have to fear that the machine wouldn't start when the RTC fails or got set to a wrong date.

Or just ignore the date unconditionally. After all, when a certificate check fails due to out-of-validity-period, then you can always "fix" that by appropriately setting the clock. So for security, in this application, the date check is outright useless.

I don't think that is an option, because the date check is part of the crypto-api and not a part of the modsign-stuff.

So it's necessary that the crypto-api offers a flag to ignore the dates and another flag to mark such keys as invalid because of the date. The first flag is necessary to load and use the keys, the second flag for (maybe) other users of the crypto-api which might not use such invalid keys.

Regards,

Alexander

#8 lore raw

Am 11.02.2013 20:44, schrieb Alexander Holler:

Quoted 11 lines

Am 07.02.2013 19:44, schrieb Olaf Titz:

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Another option would be to make a configure option to just ignore the date. I'm not sure if I would like to use MODSIGN when I have to fear that the machine wouldn't start when the RTC fails or got set to a wrong date.

Or just ignore the date unconditionally. After all, when a certificate check fails due to out-of-validity-period, then you can always "fix" that by appropriately setting the clock. So for security, in this application, the date check is outright useless.

Quoted 8 lines

I don't think that is an option, because the date check is part of the crypto-api and not a part of the modsign-stuff.

So it's necessary that the crypto-api offers a flag to ignore the dates and another flag to mark such keys as invalid because of the date. The first flag is necessary to load and use the keys, the second flag for (maybe) other users of the crypto-api which might not use such invalid keys.

Another option would be, to just load every key, regardless of the dates of the keys, and let the user of the keys (e.g. modsign) decide if they accept the dates in the keys.

But I'm missing the big picture about the crypto-api and their users, therefor I better don't touch that part of the kernel myself. ;)

Regards,

Alexander