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Building out-of-tree tracepoint modules on Ubuntu

lttng-dev Mathieu Desnoyers 1 participant 1 message Aug 13, 2013 1 message not in the archive

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CCing LKML on this module signature tainting discussion.

Quoted 9 lines · * Francis Giraldeau ([email protected]) wrote:

The lttng-modules addons stopped working on Ubuntu 12.10 with Linux 3.8. Tracepoints defined in these modules were listed by "lttng list -k", no error was return when enabling, but events were not written to the trace.

This problem is caused by the option CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y on Ubuntu kernels. Because the signing key is not available, it's not possible to sign LTTng modules, and they are flagged as TAINT_FORCED. This flag is checked on tracepoints registration [1].

Quoted 4 lines

/*
* We skip modules that taint the kernel, especially those with
* different module headers (for forced load), to make sure we don't
* cause a crash. Staging and out-of-tree GPL modules are fine.

We should probably add non-signed modules to the exception list of tainted modules considered by tracepoints.

Quoted 31 lines

*/
if (mod->taints & ~((1 << TAINT_OOT_MODULE) | (1 << TAINT_CRAP)))

	return 0;

In consequence, it's not possible to have out-of-tree tracepoint module with the default Ubuntu kernel.

What about generating a new x.509 certificate and sign modules with it? I tried to use keyctl to add a signing key, but I didn't found a way to add the key to the special ".module_sign" keyring [2]. It seems internal and inaccessible, but if somebody knows how to deal with this, that would be the best solution.

As a last resort solution, I did a small module that embed the certificate and loads it. Then, signed modules loaded after this one are not marked as TAINTE_FORCED, and thus works correctly [3].

$ cat /proc/modules
[...]
lttng_addons 14418 0 - Live 0x0000000000000000 (O)
lttng_modsign 12623 0 - Live 0x0000000000000000 (OF)
$ lttng create
$ lttng enable-event -k inet_sock_create
$ lttng start
$ echo bidon | netcat localhost 1234
$ lttng stop
$ lttng view
$ [15:03:40.850792507] (+?.?????????) ubuntu inet_sock_create: { cpu_id
= 0 }, { sk = 0xFFFF88003C670E00 }
Quoted 1 line

So, even if this is a dirty hack, it works ;-)

Oh, wow. So a non-signed module can simply add a trusted signature, just like that ? This seems like a nice hack indeed!

Quoted 6 lines

Could it be possible to relax checks to add tracepoint module if they are not signed? Then a new flag TAINT_UNTRUSTED (or something) shall be added to distinguish such situation from the more general TAINT_FORCED. At least, there should be some warning message when inserting the module and enabling such event should be failing.

Indeed, it looks like we should make tracepoint.c more specific wrt what modules it rejects. Rejecting tracepoints from non-signed modules seems more strict than what should be required, but this would require that we introduce a new TAINT_UNTRUSTED flag to distinguish between a non-signed module and a module which has been forcefully loaded.

Thoughts ?

Thanks,

Mathieu

Quoted 18 lines

Thoughts?

Thanks!

Francis Giraldeau

[1]
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/kernel/tracepoint.c#n634
[2]
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c#n33
[3]
https://github.com/giraldeau/lttng-modules/blob/addons-modsign/lttng-signature.c

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Mathieu Desnoyers
EfficiOS Inc.
http://www.efficios.com