Problem with user naespace
Subsystems (2)
Hi
I have problem with starting lxc containers when SMACK is enabled
on the host. The issue appears when systemd try start user session in the container. In such case systemd reports error that has not permissions to set SMACK label. In my test configuration lxc container has full separation (all namespaces are enabled - including user namespace).
The issue is common. The problem is due to lack of permissions of
the task to write into /proc/self/sttr/current file even the task has active CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability. Regarding to may tests the issue is connected to user namespace.
I have prepared patch (see below). The patch was tested and created
on kernel 3.10.
From 1d42d88fccafb7a9fa279588bc827163484a7852 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jacek Pielaszkiewicz <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2014 14:11:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [PATCH] Enable user namespace in SMACK
SMACK: Enable user namespace
- Bug/Issue:
The issue has been found when we tried to setup lxc container. We tried to setup the container with active all linux namespaces (including user namespace). On the host as LSM was enabled SMACK.
We have found that "systemd" was not able to setup user sessiondue to lack of permissions to write into /proc/self/attr/currentfile.
We have found general issue that any privileged process with enabled CAP_MAC_ADMIN cannot write into /proc/self/attr/currentfile.
- Cause:
SMACK to check the task capabilities uses capable().
- Solution:
The fix replaces usage capable() by ns_capable().
Becuase SMACK uses globally defined rules usage ns_capable() was limited to places where requested by task operation are connected to himself. All operation that modify global SMACK rules remain unchanged - SMACK still to test capabilities calls capable(). It means that operation on smackfs remain unchanged - operation are allowed only by host.
--- security/smack/smack.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack.h +13 -0
@@ -319,6 +319,19 @@ static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) }/* +* Is the task privileged and allowed to privileged +* by the onlycap rule in user namespace. +*/ +static inline int smack_privileged_ns (int cap) +{ +if (!ns_capable (current_user_ns (), cap)) +return 0 ; +if (smack_onlycap ==NULL || smack_onlycap ==smk_of_current ()) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; +} + +/* * logging functions */ #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
security/smack/smack_access.c +0 -0
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct
smk_audit_info *a)
/*
* Allow for priviliged to override policy.
*/
- if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_ns(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = 0; out_audit:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1 -1
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)int rc =0 ;struct smack_known *skp =smk_of_current (); -if (smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) +if (smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE ))return 0 ;if (smack_syslog_label !=NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry, const char *name,
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
- if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged_ns(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
/*
* check label validity here so import wont fail on
@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry, const char *name,
smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
rc = -EINVAL;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
- if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged_ns(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry, const char *name)
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
- if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged_ns(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
} else
rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
@@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct
task_struct *tsk,
/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
skp = smk_find_entry(file->f_security);
rc = smk_access(skp, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
- if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (rc != 0 && has_ns_capability(tsk, current_user_ns(),
CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = 0;
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
@@ -2924,7 +2924,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p, char *name,
if (p != current)
return -EPERM;- if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!smack_privileged_ns(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
@@ -2980,7 +2980,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock,
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);#endif
- if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
+ if (!smack_privileged_ns(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
skp = ssp->smk_out;
rc = smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
@@ -3018,7 +3018,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock, struct socket *other)
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);#endif
- if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (smack_privileged_ns(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
skp = ssp->smk_out;Signature · 9 lines
1.8.3.2 I will be grateful for comments Best regards Jacek Pielaszkiewicz
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerQuoted 60 lines · Jacek Pielaszkiewicz
Hi
I have problem with starting lxc containers when SMACK is enabled
on the host. The issue appears when systemd try start user session in the container. In such case systemd reports error that has not permissions to set SMACK label. In my test configuration lxc container has full separation (all namespaces are enabled - including user namespace).
The issue is common. The problem is due to lack of permissions of
the task to write into/proc/self/sttr/currentfile even the task has activeCAP_MAC_ADMINcapability. Regarding to may tests the issue is connected to user namespace.I have prepared patch (see below). The patch was tested and created
on kernel 3.10.From
1d42d88fccafb7a9fa279588bc827163484a7852Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jacek Pielaszkiewicz <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2014 14:11:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [PATCH] Enable user namespace in SMACKSMACK: Enable user namespace
- Bug/Issue:
The issue has been found when we tried to setup lxc container. We tried to setup the container with active all linux namespaces (including user namespace). On the host as LSM was enabled SMACK.We have found that "systemd" was not able to setup user sessiondue to lack of permissions to write into
/proc/self/attr/currentfile.We have found general issue that any privileged process with enabled
CAP_MAC_ADMINcannot write into/proc/self/attr/currentfile.- Cause:
SMACK to check the task capabilities usescapable().- Solution:
The fix replaces usagecapable()byns_capable().Becuase SMACK uses globally defined rules usage
ns_capable()was limited to places where requested by task operation are connected to himself. All operation that modify global SMACK rules remain unchanged - SMACK still to test capabilities callscapable(). It means that operation on smackfs remain unchanged - operation are allowed only by host.Change-Id I0bb28fa02943dd7ccb38dda2c8a37dcce2d551b2Signed-off-by Jacek Pielaszkiewicz <[email protected]>--- security/smack/smack.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)security/smack/smack.h +0
-0
security/smack/smack.h static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) · line 328
Quoted 10 lines
security/smack/smack.h +7
-0@@ -319,6 +319,19 @@ static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) }/* +* Is the task privileged and allowed to privileged +* by the onlycap rule in user namespace. +*/ +static inline int smack_privileged_ns (int cap) +{ +if (!ns_capable (current_user_ns (), cap)) +return 0 ;
As I responded on lxc-devel (sorry I had apparently missed this original mail),
This is an often seen, but very wrong, idiom. This check means nothing, because any unprivileged user can create a new userns and pass this check.
You're on the right track, but to do this right you'll need to do a bit more work. For privilege over an inode, there is inode_capable(). For the network access, check the userns of the struct net owning the socket. etc.
Quoted 125 lines
security/smack/smack.h +6
-0+if (smack_onlycap ==NULL || smack_onlycap ==smk_of_current ()) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; +} + +/* * logging functions */ #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1security/smack/smack_access.c +1
-1@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)/* * Allow for priviliged to override policy. */ -if (rc !=0 &&smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) +if (rc !=0 &&smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) rc =0 ;
out_audit:security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2
-2@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)int rc =0 ;struct smack_known *skp =smk_of_current (); -if (smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) +if (smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE ))return 0 ;if (smack_syslog_label !=NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { -if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +if (!smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) rc = -EPERM ;/* * check label validity here so import wont fail on
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1
-1@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, smk_import(value, size) == NULL) rc = -EINVAL ; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE ) ==0 ) { -if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +if (!smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) rc = -EPERM ; if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1
-1@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) { -if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +if (!smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) rc = -EPERM ; } elserc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1
-1@@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(structtask_struct *tsk,/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */ skp =smk_find_entry (file->f_security); rc =smk_access (skp, tkp->smk_known,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ); -if (rc !=0 &&has_capability (tsk,CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) +if (rc !=0 &&has_ns_capability (tsk,current_user_ns (),CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) rc =0 ;smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1
-1@@ -2924,7 +2924,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (p != current) return -EPERM; -if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +if (!smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1
-1@@ -2980,7 +2980,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk (&ad, other);#endif -if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) { +if (!smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) { skp = ssp->smk_out; rc =smk_access (skp, osp->smk_in,MAY_WRITE , &ad);}security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1
-1@@ -3018,7 +3018,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk (&ad, other->sk);#endif -if (smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) +if (smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE ))return 0 ;skp = ssp->smk_out;Signature · 17 lines
1.8.3.2 I will be grateful for comments Best regards Jacek Pielaszkiewicz -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
My comments below.
Best regards
Jacek Pielaszkiewicz
Samsung R&D Institute Poland
Samsung Electronics
Email: [email protected]
Quoted 84 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Serge E. Hallyn [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Saturday, March 29, 2014 5:16 PM
To: Jacek Pielaszkiewicz
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Fwd: [SMACK]Problem with user naespaceQuoted 7 lines · Jacek Pielaszkiewicz
Hi
I have problem with starting lxc containers when SMACK is enabled
on the host. The issue appears when systemd try start user session in the container. In such case systemd reports error that has not permissions to set SMACK label. In my test configuration lxccontainer
Quoted 1 line
has full separation (all namespaces are enabled - including user
namespace).
Quoted 9 lines
The issue is common. The problem is due to lack of permissions of
the task to write into/proc/self/sttr/currentfile even the task has activeCAP_MAC_ADMINcapability. Regarding to may tests the issue is connected to user namespace.I have prepared patch (see below). The patch was tested and
created on kernel 3.10.From
1d42d88fccafb7a9fa279588bc827163484a7852Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
Quoted 20 lines
From: Jacek Pielaszkiewicz <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2014 14:11:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [PATCH] Enable user namespace in SMACKSMACK: Enable user namespace
- Bug/Issue:
The issue has been found when we tried to setup lxc container. We tried to setup the container with active all linux namespaces (including user namespace). On the host as LSM was enabled SMACK.We have found that "systemd" was not able to setup user sessiondue to lack of permissions to write into
/proc/self/attr/currentfile.We have found general issue that any privileged process with enabled
CAP_MAC_ADMINcannot write into/proc/self/attr/currentfile.- Cause:
SMACK to check the task capabilities usescapable().Quoted 6 lines
- Solution:
The fix replaces usagecapable()byns_capable().Becuase SMACK uses globally defined rules usage
ns_capable()was limited to places where requested by task operation are connected to himself. All operation that modify global SMACK rules remainunchanged
Quoted 17 lines
- SMACK still to test capabilities calls
capable(). It means that operation on smackfs remain unchanged - operation are allowed only by host.Change-Id I0bb28fa02943dd7ccb38dda2c8a37dcce2d551b2Signed-off-by Jacek Pielaszkiewicz <[email protected]>--- security/smack/smack.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)security/smack/smack.h index renamed from security/smack/smack.h +0
-0d072fd3..9f9d5e7 100644
security/smack/smack.h static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) } · line 326
Quoted 8 lines
security/smack/smack.h +6
-0@@ -319,6 +319,19 @@ static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) }/* +* Is the task privileged and allowed to privileged +* by the onlycap rule in user namespace. +*/ +static inline int smack_privileged_ns (int cap) { +if (!ns_capable (current_user_ns (), cap)) +return 0 ;As I responded on lxc-devel (sorry I had apparently missed this original mail),
Quoted 3 lines
This is an often seen, but very wrong, idiom. This check means nothing, because any unprivileged user can create a new userns and pass this check.
I spent two days thinking how to fix the issue. I also discussed the issue with
my colleagues. The issue seems not to be trivial.
Generally the SMACK is not ready to support namespaces and definitely it was designed to work on host only (in root namespace only). Of course you are right - patch like my cause that any unprivileged process in his own user namespace can set any label, what from practical point of view means that "SMACK" is disabled.
Quoted 1 line
From my perspective the issue is caused by changed that was implemented
in kernel 3.8. From this version and later any process can creates own user namespace. In the older kernels it was limited to privileged processes.
Perhaps this change should be rollback?
I will be grateful for some ideas how the issue should be resolved.
Quoted 131 lines
You're on the right track, but to do this right you'll need to do a bit more work. For privilege over an inode, there is
inode_capable(). For the network access, check the userns of the struct net owning the socket. etc.security/smack/smack.h static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) } · line 327
Quoted 1 line
security/smack/smack.h +1
-0+ if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap ==
smk_of_current())Quoted 44 lines
security/smack/smack.h +5
-0+return 1 ; +return 0 ; +} + +/* * logging functions */ #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/security/smack/smack_access.cindex 14293cd..07d25f5 100644security/smack/smack_access.c +1
-1@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)/* * Allow for priviliged to override policy. */ -if (rc !=0 &&smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) +if (rc !=0 &&smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) rc =0 ;
out_audit:security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2
-2@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)int rc =0 ;struct smack_known *skp =smk_of_current (); -if (smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) +if (smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE ))return 0 ;if (smack_syslog_label !=NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { -if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +if (!smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) rc = -EPERM ;/* Quoted 1 line
* check label validity here so import wont fail on
@@
Quoted 77 lines
-852,7 +852,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
smk_import(value, size) == NULL) rc = -EINVAL; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2
-2-if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +if (!smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) rc = -EPERM ;if (size !=TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||strncmp (value,TRANS_TRUE ,TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ) !=0 )@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) { -if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +if (!smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) rc = -EPERM ; } elserc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); @@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */ skp = smk_find_entry(file->f_security); rc = smk_access(skp, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, NULL);security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1
-1-if (rc !=0 &&has_capability (tsk,CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) + if (rc != 0 && has_ns_capability(tsk, current_user_ns(),
CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))rc = 0; smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); @@ -2924,7 +2924,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (p != current) return -EPERM;security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1
-2-if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +if (!smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) @@ -2980,7 +2980,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock*sock,
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other); #endifsecurity/smack/smack_lsm.c +2
-3-if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) { +if (!smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) { skp = ssp->smk_out; rc =smk_access (skp, osp->smk_in,MAY_WRITE , &ad); }@@ -3018,7 +3018,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk (&ad, other->sk);#endif -if (smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE )) +if (smack_privileged_ns (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE ))return 0 ; skp = ssp->smk_out; --1.8.3.2
I will be grateful for comments
Best regards
Jacek Pielaszkiewicz
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerQuoted 108 lines · Jacek Pielaszkiewicz
My comments below.
Best regards
Jacek Pielaszkiewicz
Samsung R&D Institute Poland
Samsung Electronics
Email: [email protected]Quoted 84 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Serge E. Hallyn [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Saturday, March 29, 2014 5:16 PM
To: Jacek Pielaszkiewicz
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Fwd: [SMACK]Problem with user naespaceQuoted 7 lines · Jacek Pielaszkiewicz
Hi
I have problem with starting lxc containers when SMACK is enabled
on the host. The issue appears when systemd try start user session in the container. In such case systemd reports error that has not permissions to set SMACK label. In my test configuration lxccontainer
Quoted 1 line
has full separation (all namespaces are enabled - including user
namespace).
Quoted 9 lines
The issue is common. The problem is due to lack of permissions of
the task to write into/proc/self/sttr/currentfile even the task has activeCAP_MAC_ADMINcapability. Regarding to may tests the issue is connected to user namespace.I have prepared patch (see below). The patch was tested and
created on kernel 3.10.From
1d42d88fccafb7a9fa279588bc827163484a7852Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
Quoted 20 lines
From: Jacek Pielaszkiewicz <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2014 14:11:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [PATCH] Enable user namespace in SMACKSMACK: Enable user namespace
- Bug/Issue:
The issue has been found when we tried to setup lxc container. We tried to setup the container with active all linux namespaces (including user namespace). On the host as LSM was enabled SMACK.We have found that "systemd" was not able to setup user sessiondue to lack of permissions to write into
/proc/self/attr/currentfile.We have found general issue that any privileged process with enabled
CAP_MAC_ADMINcannot write into/proc/self/attr/currentfile.- Cause:
SMACK to check the task capabilities usescapable().Quoted 6 lines
- Solution:
The fix replaces usagecapable()byns_capable().Becuase SMACK uses globally defined rules usage
ns_capable()was limited to places where requested by task operation are connected to himself. All operation that modify global SMACK rules remainunchanged
Quoted 17 lines
- SMACK still to test capabilities calls
capable(). It means that operation on smackfs remain unchanged - operation are allowed only by host.Change-Id I0bb28fa02943dd7ccb38dda2c8a37dcce2d551b2Signed-off-by Jacek Pielaszkiewicz <[email protected]>--- security/smack/smack.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)security/smack/smack.h index renamed from security/smack/smack.h +0
-0d072fd3..9f9d5e7 100644
security/smack/smack.h static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) } · line 326
Quoted 8 lines
security/smack/smack.h +6
-0@@ -319,6 +319,19 @@ static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) }/* +* Is the task privileged and allowed to privileged +* by the onlycap rule in user namespace. +*/ +static inline int smack_privileged_ns (int cap) { +if (!ns_capable (current_user_ns (), cap)) +return 0 ;As I responded on lxc-devel (sorry I had apparently missed this original mail),
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This is an often seen, but very wrong, idiom. This check means nothing, because any unprivileged user can create a new userns and pass this check.
I spent two days thinking how to fix the issue. I also discussed the issue with
my colleagues. The issue seems not to be trivial.
Generally the SMACK is not ready to support namespaces and definitely it was designed to work on host only (in root namespace only). Of course you are right - patch like my cause that any unprivileged process in his own user namespace can set any label, what from practical point of view means that "SMACK" is disabled.
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From my perspective the issue is caused by changed that was implemented
in kernel 3.8. From this version and later any process can creates own user namespace. In the older kernels it was limited to privileged processes.
Perhaps this change should be rollback?
? The problem is that admins in a non-init userns cannot be smack_capable() so you can't create an unprivileged container. Right? (Please correct me if I'm wrong). So why would we revert the ability for unprivileged users to unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)? If you don't want to use unprivileged containers, don't use unprivileged containers.
Have you talked to Casey about this? (cc:d)
As I said, it'll just take a bit more work to check for privilege over the right things.
-serge